SWP

With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 2020, the announcement of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 December, and the prospects of enlarging the Compre­hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), trade policy with and within Asia is gathering speed. In the greater East Asia region, consisting of Japan, South Korea, China and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), economic integration via trade, investment, supply chains and digital connectivity will accelerate. In contrast, regions that remain on the outside – i.e. North America, Europe and India – surely fear that trade flows will be diverted. At the same time, geo­politics have become a determining factor of trade policy. Any agreement also represents political positioning in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, or at least a reinsurance against the risks of economic or technological decoupling. What are the economic and political perspectives of these trade and investment agreements? What goals and strategies are the relevant actors pursuing? And what are the con­sequences for Europe’s trade policy?

With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 15 November 2020, the announcement of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on 30 December, and the prospects of enlarging the Compre­hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), trade policy with and within Asia is gathering speed. In the greater East Asia region, consisting of Japan, South Korea, China and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), economic integration via trade, investment, supply chains and digital connectivity will accelerate. In contrast, regions that remain on the outside – i.e. North America, Europe and India – surely fear that trade flows will be diverted. At the same time, geo­politics have become a determining factor of trade policy. Any agreement also represents political positioning in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, or at least a reinsurance against the risks of economic or technological decoupling. What are the economic and political perspectives of these trade and investment agreements? What goals and strategies are the relevant actors pursuing? And what are the con­sequences for Europe’s trade policy?

Turkey’s new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population.

Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail.

Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system.

Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting.

The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader – the President.

Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair.

Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states.

 

Mit dem ersten »Fünfjahresplan über den Aufbau von Rechtsstaatlichkeit (2020–2025)« konkretisiert Chinas Führung ihre Vision eines kohärenten, genuin chinesischen Rechtssystems. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei der Begriff »sozia­listische Rechtsstaatlichkeit chinesischer Prägung«. Bis 2035 soll sie im Wesentlichen etabliert sein. Marxistisch-leninistische Rechtskonzepte bleiben funda­mental. Durch das Recht als Instrument soll der Staat effizienter werden. Willkür bei der Rechts­findung soll für den Großteil der Bevölkerung reduziert werden, unter anderem mit Hilfe von Hoch­technologie. In ausgewählten Teilbereichen, zum Beispiel bei pro­zessualen Fragen, lässt sich Beijing für den Aufbau der chinesischen »Rechtsstaatlich­keit« vom Westen inspirieren. Eine unabhängige Justiz und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung aber lehnt die Parteistaatsführung weiterhin strikt als »fehlerhafte west­liche Gedanken« ab. Beijing geht es explizit darum, auch international für Chinas Rechtsvorstellungen zu werben, Standards zu etablieren und Interessen mittels des Rechts durchzusetzen. Daher sollten Berlin und Brüssel ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf chinesische Rechts­vorstellungen richten. Vertiefte Kenntnisse darüber sind zwingend notwendig, um die strategischen Implikationen von Chinas Rechtspolitik zu erfassen, die Hand­lungs­logik besser zu verstehen und adäquat darauf zu reagieren.

Turkey’s new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population.

Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail.

Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system.

Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting.

The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader – the President.

Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair.

Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states.

 

 

Mit dem ersten »Fünfjahresplan über den Aufbau von Rechtsstaatlichkeit (2020–2025)« konkretisiert Chinas Führung ihre Vision eines kohärenten, genuin chinesischen Rechtssystems. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei der Begriff »sozia­listische Rechtsstaatlichkeit chinesischer Prägung«. Bis 2035 soll sie im Wesentlichen etabliert sein. Marxistisch-leninistische Rechtskonzepte bleiben funda­mental. Durch das Recht als Instrument soll der Staat effizienter werden. Willkür bei der Rechts­findung soll für den Großteil der Bevölkerung reduziert werden, unter anderem mit Hilfe von Hoch­technologie. In ausgewählten Teilbereichen, zum Beispiel bei pro­zessualen Fragen, lässt sich Beijing für den Aufbau der chinesischen »Rechtsstaatlich­keit« vom Westen inspirieren. Eine unabhängige Justiz und das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung aber lehnt die Parteistaatsführung weiterhin strikt als »fehlerhafte west­liche Gedanken« ab. Beijing geht es explizit darum, auch international für Chinas Rechtsvorstellungen zu werben, Standards zu etablieren und Interessen mittels des Rechts durchzusetzen. Daher sollten Berlin und Brüssel ihr besonderes Augenmerk auf chinesische Rechts­vorstellungen richten. Vertiefte Kenntnisse darüber sind zwingend notwendig, um die strategischen Implikationen von Chinas Rechtspolitik zu erfassen, die Hand­lungs­logik besser zu verstehen und adäquat darauf zu reagieren.

Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine »neue Partnerschaft« zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden.

Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internatio­nalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik.

Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessen­ausgleich.

Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheits­politischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten.

Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europa­politischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen.

Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei.

Frankreichs Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat das Ziel ausgegeben, die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen zu revitalisieren und eine »neue Partnerschaft« zwischen Paris und Berlin zu begründen. In der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie in Teilen der Europapolitik konnte dieser Anspruch jedoch selten eingelöst werden.

Hauptgrund hierfür sind strukturelle Veränderungen in den internatio­nalen Beziehungen, auf die Frankreich und Deutschland unterschiedlich reagieren: Paris sucht neue Wege, seine verteidigungspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit zu erhalten und das strategische Vakuum zu füllen, das entstanden ist durch das nachlassende Interesse der USA an Europa und seiner Peripherie. Berlin setzt auf die Weiterentwicklung von Nato und EU als grundlegenden Organisationen deutscher Außenpolitik.

Zudem erschweren nationale Alleingänge, Desinteresse und ein ungenügender Erfahrungsaustausch einen bilateralen Interessen­ausgleich.

Eine neue Intensität der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit setzt erstens voraus, dass sich Paris und Berlin in ihren bestehenden außen- und sicherheits­politischen Kooperationsformaten einer Gesamtschau der internationalen Gemengelage stellen. Sie müssen ihre jeweilige Betroffenheit sowie ihre Interessen offen besprechen und aus ihnen konkrete Maßnahmen ableiten.

Zweitens müssen sie sich darauf verständigen, dass nationale Alleingänge unterbleiben und ein Desinteresse an den außen-, sicherheits- und europa­politischen Druckpunkten des Partners nicht geduldet wird. Die Deutsch-Französische Parlamentarische Versammlung sollte die Exekutiven beider Länder dazu anhalten, den Élysée-Vertrag wie den Vertrag von Aachen zu erfüllen.

Zu diesen Ergebnissen kommen die sechs Fallstudien zu Libyen, zur Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, zu Russland, zur Nato und zur Türkei.

Die 2020 veröffentlichten Leitlinien der Bundesregierung für den Indo-Pazifik defi­nieren deutsche Interessen in der Region und führen darüber hinaus Initiativen auf, wie diese Interessen gesichert werden sollen. Die präzise sicherheitspolitische Über­setzung in praktische Maßnahmen befindet sich noch in einem frühen Stadium. Der als Indo-Pazifik bezeichnete Raum ist seit gut einem Jahrzehnt in den sicherheits­politischen Fokus gerückt und Ort des Agierens zahlreicher regionaler und externer Akteure. In diesem Raum systemischer Rivalität des Westens mit China positioniert sich Deutschland nun auch. Ein Mittel der Wahl, um die deutschen Interessen abzu­sichern, ist die Bundeswehr. Jedoch sind die deutschen Streitkräfte bereits mit den bestehenden Einsätzen und Verpflichtungen derart strapaziert, dass ein Engagement im Indo-Pazifik nur leistbar ist, wenn an anderer Stelle weniger getan wird. Somit scheint eine Koalition gleichgesinnter Akteure am besten geeignet, um dem Problem einer zunehmenden Überdehnung der Streitkräfte zu begegnen.

Die 2020 veröffentlichten Leitlinien der Bundesregierung für den Indo-Pazifik defi­nieren deutsche Interessen in der Region und führen darüber hinaus Initiativen auf, wie diese Interessen gesichert werden sollen. Die präzise sicherheitspolitische Über­setzung in praktische Maßnahmen befindet sich noch in einem frühen Stadium. Der als Indo-Pazifik bezeichnete Raum ist seit gut einem Jahrzehnt in den sicherheits­politischen Fokus gerückt und Ort des Agierens zahlreicher regionaler und externer Akteure. In diesem Raum systemischer Rivalität des Westens mit China positioniert sich Deutschland nun auch. Ein Mittel der Wahl, um die deutschen Interessen abzu­sichern, ist die Bundeswehr. Jedoch sind die deutschen Streitkräfte bereits mit den bestehenden Einsätzen und Verpflichtungen derart strapaziert, dass ein Engagement im Indo-Pazifik nur leistbar ist, wenn an anderer Stelle weniger getan wird. Somit scheint eine Koalition gleichgesinnter Akteure am besten geeignet, um dem Problem einer zunehmenden Überdehnung der Streitkräfte zu begegnen.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?

Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costs

In August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.

Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.

First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.

Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.

Political conditionality as a necessary European reaction

While increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.

This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?

Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costs

In August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.

Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.

First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.

Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.

Political conditionality as a necessary European reaction

While increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.