SWP

This joint study by the SWP and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris) starts from the premise that Ukraine’s and Russia’s visions of European security are fundamentally incompatible. Ukraine aims to join existing Western structures and contribute to their reinforcement, whereas Russia intends to gain control of Ukraine and undermine the foundations of the European and transatlantic security architecture. A vast majority of European actors see Russia as a serious threat to Euro­pean security and democracy. This means that Europe’s main external focus will be on deterring and defending itself from Russia in at least the medium term. A critical mass of actors views NATO and the EU as the principal pillars of security in Europe. They intend to find ways to strengthen both organisations while ensuring that the United States remains involved in protecting European security. A large consensus has emerged around consolidating a “European pillar of NATO”. At the same time, the EU has managed to become a recognised and influential actor in the field of European security with surprising rapidity. Minilateral and ad hoc formats such as the “Nordic-Baltic 8” and the “Coalition of the Willing” are gaining traction, in part because they allow the consensus requirements of larger organisations to be circumvented, thus providing more flexibility. There is broad agreement on continuing Ukraine’s integration into both the EU and NATO. However, not only the degree of commitment to Kyiv, but also the tempo of Europe’s actions will determine the extent to which Ukraine becomes part of the European security order.

Zu den Erfolgen der Demokraten bei US-Wahlen

Wahlen in verschiedenen Bundesstaaten an einem Tag - und alle erfolgreich für die Demokraten: Der USA-Experte Johannes Thimm sieht darin ein Zeichen der Unzufriedenheit mit Präsident Trump. Doch die Demokraten müssten eine Entscheidung treffen.

The cybersecurity of governments, companies, and individuals in Europe is heavily dependent on the United States. Specifically, US companies dominate the global mar­kets for cybersecurity applications and information on cyber threats. The US military also plays a role in data-gathering. In addition, Washington provides financial sup­port for vulnerability databases and the open source ecosystem. Taken together, these seemingly isolated technical issues mean that Europe’s ability to act in the field of cybersecurity is limited. This would even remain the case if Europe built its own “EuroStack.” These dependencies can become a problem for Europe in various situa­tions – if the US government ends its financial support for cybersecurity, if it changes its political priorities, or if it openly weaponizes these dependencies in a conflict with Europe. German and European decision-makers should act now to reduce these dependencies and protect Europe’s cybersecurity in the long term.

Die Cybersicherheit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Europa ist stark abhängig von den Vereinigten Staaten. Konkret dominieren US-amerikanische Unter­nehmen den weltweiten Markt für Cybersicherheits-Anwendungen ebenso wie für Informationen über entsprechende Bedrohungen. Bei der Gewinnung von Letzteren spielt auch das Militär des Landes eine Rolle. Außerdem leistet die Regierung in Washington finanzielle Unterstützung für Schwachstellen-Datenbanken und das Open-Source-Ökosystem. Was zunächst nach technischen Einzelaspekten klingt, be­deutet in der Summe, dass Europas Handlungsfähigkeit in diesem Bereich begrenzt ist und es auch mit einem eigenen »EuroStack« noch bliebe. Diese Abhängigkeiten können in verschiedenen Situationen zum Problem werden – wenn die US-Regierung ihre finanzielle Unterstützung für Cybersicherheit beendet, wenn sie ihre politischen Prioritäten ändert oder in einem Konflikt mit Europa die Depen­denz offen als Waffe einsetzt. Deutsche und europäische Entscheidungsträger:innen sollten jetzt gezielt Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die Abhängigkeiten zu reduzieren und so die Cybersicherheit in Europa langfristig zu schützen.

Zohran Mamdanis Sieg in New York und Erfolge in Virginia, New Yersey und Kalifornien stärken die Demokraten.

During the closing press conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz called for a strategic dialogue and closer partnership with Ankara. He offered Turkey a European perspective, emphasising that the German government wants to see Turkey close to the European Union (EU) – on the condition that Ankara meets the Copenhagen criteria. This marks a significant departure from the Merkel era, which sought to keep Turkey at arm’s length from the EU. In doing so, Merz sought to balance Realpolitik with value-based diplomacy by not letting Turkey’s democratic deficits go uncommented, effectively placing the ball firmly in Ankara’s court.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan brushed aside implicit criticism over Ankara’s failure to meet EU standards, framing judicial action against the opposition as part of an anti-corruption drive. İstanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, has been held in pre-trial detention since 19 March on charges of aiding terrorism, the misuse of public funds and, more recently, espionage. Meanwhile, multiple cases against the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, have aimed to place it under state trusteeship and annul the congress that elected its new leader.

Germany’s Strategic Rationale 

Differences also emerged regarding Hamas and Israel. Whereas Germany designates Hamas as a terrorist organisation and provides military support to Israel, Turkey considers Hamas a liberation movement and accuses Israel of genocide. Erdoğan criticised Germany, particularly for its arms deliveries to Israel.

These differences help explain why a breakthrough in relations – for example, on visa liberalisation or modernising the Customs Union – remains a distant prospect. Despite Erdoğan’s assertive stance, Merz remains willing to engage, which is a sign that Germany recognises Turkey’s rising geopolitical importance. In recent years, Ankara has consolidated its regional role by exploiting Russia’s vulnerabilities in Libya and the South Caucasus, backing Azerbaijan’s recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has further underscored Turkey’s strategic importance in the Black Sea. In Syria, Ankara remains deeply entangled, seeking a say in the country’s political reshaping.

Erdoğan’s confidence also stems from the understanding that Germany requires Turkey’s collaboration in Syria and Palestine. Both governments are cooperating on Syria’s reconstruction and humanitarian projects to support the return of refugees. Berlin also expects Ankara to help disarm Hamas and play a constructive role in resolving the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, Germany is seeking Turkey’s assistance in returning Turkish citizens who are being forced to leave Germany, and cooperation in the Ukraine crisis.

The Pillars of a Pragmatic Partnership: Security, Defence, and Trade

The need to rebuild its defence capacities has increased Germany’s interest in deepening defence cooperation with Turkey. Berlin has lifted its veto on the Eurofighter procurement process and supports Ankara’s potential participation in the European defence initiative Security Action for Europe (SAFE). Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan welcomed Germany’s positive steps towards Turkey’s participation in the SAFE initiative, stating that Ankara aims to advance joint projects and strengthen the mechanism itself. Both governments emphasise cooperation in security and the defence industry, pursuing joint projects and recognising the strategic value of Turkey’s cost-effective and technologically capable defence sector.

Germany’s interest in Turkey also has an economic dimension. Despite political tensions, bilateral trade remains robust, reaching US$47.5 billion in 2024. Germany is Turkey’s largest export market and its third-largest import partner. Since 1980, German direct investment in Turkey has totalled around US$14.5 billion, including US$687 million in 2023 alone, with over 8,000 German firms employing more than 100,000 people in the country.

Merz’s visit underlines a pragmatic shift in bilateral relations towards security cooperation. Shared geopolitical interests will take precedence, while economic and defence ties continue to expand. Yet pragmatic realignment alone cannot forge a strategic partnership: Fundamental differences persist. A genuine breakthrough will require mutual trust, a clear roadmap, and tangible progress on the rule of law, human rights, and democratic governance – without which closer ties will remain transactional rather than strategic.

Politologe Thimm zur Wahl in New York

Systematisches Nachdenken darüber, wie ein »kalter« militärischer Wettbewerb (peacetime military competition) zum eigenen Vorteil gestaltet werden kann, ist im deut­schen Regierungsapparat nicht institutionalisiert. Auch deshalb ist es in Deutschland unterentwickelt. Mit Russland befindet sich Deutschland aber in einem solchen Wett­bewerb, und das dürfte so bleiben. In den USA wurden auf der Suche nach Ansätzen, um militärische Kräfteverhältnisse zulasten von Gegnern zu ändern, seit den 1970er Jahren sogenannte »Net Assessments« einflussreich: Analysen, die vielfältige Erkenntnisse einbeziehen – von historischen Traumata über industrielle Engpässe bis zu büro­kratischen Dysfunktionalitäten – und die darauf abzielen, Schwachstellen des Gegners im militärischen Wett­bewerb zu ermitteln. Damit zeigen sie Wege auf, wie diese Schwä­chen ausgenutzt werden können. Für Deutsch­lands strategische Aufstellung gegenüber Russland scheint Net Assessment ein vielversprechendes Instrument zu sein.