Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Public response to PTI’s calls for protests is low, as Pakistanis, battered by inflation and economic woes, have little appetite for upheaval.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

Das Konjunkturbarometer des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) setzt seinen schrittweisen Aufwärtstrend fort und steigt im Januar auf 94,8 Punkte. Im Dezember lag der Wert noch bei 93,4 Punkten. Der Barometerwert ist somit noch einmal etwas näher an die neutrale 100-Punkte ...

Hinduism gained ground in the region in the early centuries of the Common Era because it provided elites with a fully-fleshed metaphysical package along with literacy.

Bauvolumen dürfte 2026 erstmals seit fünf Jahren wieder zulegen – Öffentliche Investitionen treiben das Wachstum – Auch der Wohnungsneubau dürfte im laufenden Jahr wieder im Plus landen – Sorge bereitet schwache Produktivität im Bausektor Die deutsche Bauwirtschaft steht vor einer Trendwende: Nach ...

It’s the state’s inability to create civilian capacity.

Marcus Tantau from Templeton Research sees maritime Southeast Asia faring well, but predicts mixed fortunes for the mainland nations.

Große Internetplattformen prägen Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft in der EU, stellen den Binnenmarkt vor neue Herausforderungen und sind wegen ihrer überwiegenden US-amerikanischen Herkunft auch zu­nehmend ein geopolitisches Konfliktthema. Online-Plattformen haben ambivalente Effekte: Sie fördern Integration, Innovation und Digitalisierung des Binnenmarkts, bergen aber zugleich Risiken wie Marktmachtmissbrauch, Desinformation und intransparente algorithmische Steuerung. Die EU hat ihren Regulierungsansatz deutlich verschärft, insbesondere mit den beiden Verordnungen DSA und DMA. Sie steht bei der Durch­setzung jedoch vor einer Reihe von Hürden: der nicht eindeutigen Rechtsklarheit, der asymmetrischen Ressourcenverteilung zwischen Regulierungsbehörden und großen digitalen Plattformen und der un­zureichenden Verpflichtung zu algorithmischer Transparenz. Zur Stärkung der digitalen Souveränität wird die Einrichtung einer unabhängigen europäischen Digitalaufsicht empfohlen. Sie könnte darauf hinwirken, dass nationale Vollzugsdefizite und regulatorische Fragmentierung überwunden und Vorschriften einheitlich durchgesetzt werden. Digitale Regulierung allein reicht nicht aus: Sie muss durch eine um­fassende industrie- und wettbewerbspolitische Strategie ergänzt werden, die das Wachstum europäischer Technologieunternehmen im globalen Wettbewerb fördert.

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On January 27, 2026, the International Peace Institute (IPI) hosted its annual Peacekeeping Observatory workshop, in partnership with the French Ministry of the Armed Forces’ Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS). This year’s workshop focused on mission transitions. Participants included member state representatives, UN personnel, and independent experts.

The first session provided an opportunity to take stock of the UN Transitions Project, which concluded in 2025. Comprising the UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and the UN Development Program (UNDP), the project, which started in 2014, provided direct support to countries undergoing transitions and contributed to the development of UN Secretariat guidance on transitions. In addition to reflecting on the conclusions and practices that emerged from the project, participants considered how the political landscape on transitions has changed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 2594. The discussion emphasized the importance of ensuring flexibility and coherence in transition planning while sustaining political engagement with host governments. Experts discussed opportunities for sustaining efforts on critical tasks, such as the protection of civilians during and after transitions through integrated planning with UN country teams and leveraging financing mechanisms like the Peacebuilding Fund.

The second session focused on critical challenges from the field in current and recent transition settings. Much of the discussion centered on responses to accelerated withdrawals and transitions in crisis settings, drawing on the experience of MINUSMA. Participants discussed ways to address challenges related to financing gaps, knowledge and capacity transfer, and sustaining political engagement in volatile contexts. Experts also reflected on the importance of strategic communications in transition planning and in managing public information and awareness, especially around mandate renewals, transitions, and/or reconfigurations of the UN presence.

During a working lunch, participants were briefed by the co-facilitators of the recently concluded 2025 peacebuilding architecture review (PBAR), including reflections on the role that the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund can play in transition contexts. The ensuing discussion focused on funding challenges for peacebuilding, obstacles to the implementation of the PBAR, and the willingness of member states to engage with the peacebuilding architecture.

The final session considered potential future transitions and how they can be informed by key takeaways from the workshop. Participants discussed the need for missions to have exit strategies from the beginning while anticipating different scenarios, the importance of engaging host states authorities, civil society and local communities in transition processes, the relevance of transition benchmarks, and challenges and opportunities for developing networked approaches to multilateralism.

As part of its Peacekeeping Observatory series, IPI will also publish three issue briefs in 2026 on UN mission transitions, including:

• The role of strategic communications in mission transitions, by Albert Trithart
• Accelerated withdrawals and transitions in crisis settings, by Dirk Druet
• Women, peace, and security and transitions, by Lauren McGowan and Evyn Papworth

The post IPI Peacekeeping Observatory Series on Mission Transitions appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Die EU und Indien haben sich auf ein Freihandelsabkommen geeinigt. Experte Scholz erklärt, warum der Tag vor allem symbolisch wichtig ist, und was sich beim Handel ändern könnte.

Knapp ein Jahr ist Donald Trump jetzt Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Versprochen hatte er wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung durch seine "America first"-Politik. Bekommen haben die Menschen hohe Lebenshaltungskosten und einen wackeligen Finanzmarkt.

Nach den tödlichen Schüssen von Minneapolis wächst die Kritik am Vorgehen der US-Regierung. Die Politologin Laura von Daniels sieht einen Angriff auf die Zivilgesellschaft und Meinungsfreiheit in Amerika.

Die Europäische Union und Indien haben ein umfassendes Freihandelsabkommen beschlossen. Welche Bedeutung das hat, kommentiert die Handelsexpertin des DIW Berlin, Sonali Chowdhry:

Das Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Indien ist von großer Bedeutung. Die bilaterale Partnerschaft gewinnt nach einem langen Verhandlungsprozess, der 2007 begann und wiederholt ins Stocken geriet, die nun dringend benötigte Dynamik. Indien wird bis 2026 voraussichtlich um 7,3 Prozent wachsen und in den kommenden Jahren zu einer der drei größten Volkswirtschaften der Welt aufsteigen. Die EU kann es sich kaum leisten, ihre Präsenz auf diesem Markt nicht auszubauen.

Das Abkommen baut auf den bilateralen Handelsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und Indien auf, die bereits mehr als 170.000 Käufer-Lieferanten-Beziehungen zwischen indischen und EU-Unternehmen umfassen. Durch den Abbau von Zöllen und anderen Handelshemmnissen in Schlüsselindustrien eröffnet das Abkommen EU-Exporteuren in vielen Sektoren wie Automobil, Maschinenbau und Getränken neue Möglichkeiten. Gleichzeitig wird sich der Marktzugang für indische Exporte wie Arzneimittel, IT-Dienstleistungen und Textilien verbessern.

Über diese unmittelbaren wirtschaftlichen Vorteile hinaus erfüllt das Abkommen eine weitere wichtige Funktion, die nicht unterschätzt werden sollte: Es ist eine Versicherungspolice in der derzeitigen unsicheren Lage. Denn die im Rahmen von Freihandelsabkommen eingegangenen Verpflichtungen sorgen für Transparenz und Vorhersehbarkeit im internationalen Handel und in der globalen Governance, die anderswo untergraben werden. Solche Freihandelsabkommen schützen das globale Handelssystem und verhindern, dass es in eine Spirale des Protektionismus gerät.

This study examines portrayals of marine mammal celebrities (MMCs) in popular culture over the past 70 years, reflecting evolving public attitudes toward ocean conservation. It identifies four main types of MMCs, each linked to a specific era and shaped by changes in media landscapes, perceptions of marine mammal agency and welfare, and conservation priorities: (1) Hollywood MMCs (ca. 1960–1990s)—wild animals captured and exhibited in aquaria, cast as celebrities based on their roles in traditional mass media (blockbuster movies); (2) MMCs in human care (ca. 1990s–2010s)—animals housed in aquaria whose fame stemmed from public concern about their welfare and calls for their release; (3) rescued MMCs (ca. 1980s–present)—marine mammals cared for by humans after they were injured in the ocean; and (4) endangered and dangerous MMCs (2010s–present)—wild animals that approach humans, demonstrate human‐like behaviours, or interact with boats. Introducing the method of “following the animal,” the article provides examples of celebrity animals that illustrate each of the four categories, such as the dolphin Flipper and the walrus Freya. The study contributes to the thematic issue on "Ocean Pop: Marine Imaginaries in the Age of Global Polycrisis" by highlighting the mutual influence of media, animal celebrity, and conservation, and urges further research into how shifting representations shape global engagement with marine life and the environment.

This study examines portrayals of marine mammal celebrities (MMCs) in popular culture over the past 70 years, reflecting evolving public attitudes toward ocean conservation. It identifies four main types of MMCs, each linked to a specific era and shaped by changes in media landscapes, perceptions of marine mammal agency and welfare, and conservation priorities: (1) Hollywood MMCs (ca. 1960–1990s)—wild animals captured and exhibited in aquaria, cast as celebrities based on their roles in traditional mass media (blockbuster movies); (2) MMCs in human care (ca. 1990s–2010s)—animals housed in aquaria whose fame stemmed from public concern about their welfare and calls for their release; (3) rescued MMCs (ca. 1980s–present)—marine mammals cared for by humans after they were injured in the ocean; and (4) endangered and dangerous MMCs (2010s–present)—wild animals that approach humans, demonstrate human‐like behaviours, or interact with boats. Introducing the method of “following the animal,” the article provides examples of celebrity animals that illustrate each of the four categories, such as the dolphin Flipper and the walrus Freya. The study contributes to the thematic issue on "Ocean Pop: Marine Imaginaries in the Age of Global Polycrisis" by highlighting the mutual influence of media, animal celebrity, and conservation, and urges further research into how shifting representations shape global engagement with marine life and the environment.