Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The dataset contains all resolutions of the United Nations between session 49 (1995/1996) and 76 (2021/2022) until September 2022, as well as newly developed issue categories that allow for in-depth analysis of voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly. The issue categories are based on the subjects used by the UN. Metadata for each resolution, such as information on the authorship, as well as corresponding draft resolutions were collected through webscraping and subsequently cleaned from the UN Digital Library website.

The data covers the following time period: 10.03.1995-01.01.2024.

This paper discusses the growing potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities of UN peace operations. Fast-moving changes in the cyber capabilities of state and non-state actors, the changing nature of asymmetric warfare, and the positioning of the UN in relation to global and regional geopolitics are increasingly placing peace operations in the crosshairs of complex cybersecurity threats. In parallel to these external trends, internal trends in missions’ intelligence, surveillance, and data management technologies also make them more vulnerable to cyber threats. At the same time, there are opportunities for missions to leverage cybersecurity infrastructure to support the implementation of their mandates, including in the areas of mediation and political settlements and the protection of civil society actors.

The paper provides an overview of the cyber threats facing peace operations and opportunities to leverage cybersecurity tools for mandate implementation. It also documents the operational and policy challenges that have arisen and the Secretariat’s efforts to address them. It concludes with several recommendations for the UN as peace operations seek to operate in an increasingly fraught political and cybersecurity environment:

• The Secretariat should develop cross-cutting operational concepts and guidance for cyber threat assessments.
• The Secretariat should articulate its understanding of its duty of care for staff privacy and develop operational guidance and expertise for mitigating threats to privacy.
• When facilitating political processes, peace operations should consider whether cybersecurity measures will be equally effective in deterring hacking attempts by all parties to ensure they do not exacerbate “information asymmetries.”
• The UN should explore the boundaries around missions evading or obstructing surveillance or intrusion activities by host states to secure their operations.
• The Secretariat should mitigate the volume of data exposed to external systems, including by deploying UN-owned and UN-operated intelligence and surveillance devices when possible.

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Since the first feminist foreign policy (FFP) was adopted by Sweden in 2014, sixteen countries have either published an FFP or announced their intention to do so. Some proponents of FFPs have indicated that these policies can be a way to democratize and transform multilateralism, integrating feminist approaches and principles into multilateral institutions and leading to more inclusive and equitable outcomes. This requires seeing FFPs as not just a “women’s issue” but also as a way to reinvigorate an outdated and inequitable system through transformational change and the interrogation of entrenched power dynamics, including in areas such as trade, climate, migration, and disarmament.

One obstacle to realizing the potential of FFPs is that there is no single definition of feminist foreign policy. Part of the challenge is that there are many interpretations of feminism, some of which reflect a more transformative, systemic approach than others. Ultimately, there is no single way to “do” feminism, and approaches to FFP should, and will, vary. If FFP is to survive and grow, it will encompass contradictions and compromises, as with all policymaking, and civil society and member states will have to collaborate to advance feminist principles in the multilateral arena.

To explore the future of FFPs, the International Peace Institute, in partnership with the Open Society Foundations and in collaboration with the co-chairs of the Feminist Foreign Policy Plus (FFP+) Group, Chile and Germany, convened a retreat on Feminist Foreign Policy and Multilateralism in July 2023. Drawing on insights from the retreat, this paper discusses five ongoing debates that FFP-interested states should meaningfully engage with:

• Militarization, demilitarization, and the root causes of violence;
• Global perspectives and postcolonial critiques;
• The branding and substance of FFPs;
• The domestication of FFPs; and
• Accountability and sustainability.

In many European countries, the number of asylum applications continues to rise, as does the appeal of right-wing populist parties. In response, initiatives such as the Brit­ish government’s Rwanda Plan and the Italian government’s agreement with Albania aim to significantly reduce the number of arrivals by transferring asylum procedures and refugee protection to third countries. It is worth noting that although similar pro­posals in the past have never progressed beyond the idea stage, concrete implemen­tation procedures are currently under discussion for Rwanda and Albania. However, there are several legal and normative concerns as well as practical challenges that need to be carefully considered. These approaches would fundamentally jeopardise international refugee protection and harm vital foreign policy interests as well as the credibility of the development cooperation of Germany and the European Union (EU).

Am 26. Januar haben die beiden Ko-Fazilitator:innen für den Zukunftsgipfel der Vereinten Nationen (UN) im September 2024 den Erstentwurf für das Abschlussdoku­ment vorgelegt, den »Pakt für die Zukunft«. Nach umfangreichen Konsultationen verhandeln die Mit­glied­staaten nun diesen sogenannten Zero Draft. Dass der Pakt im Konsens verabschie­det werden soll, hatten die Staaten bereits 2022 vereinbart. Das begrenzt die Chancen, über einen dünnen und vagen Minimalkonsens hinauszukommen. Was steht im Entwurf? Kann es gelingen, beim »Summit of the Future« im September einen Pakt zu schließen, der eine Vision mit kon­kreten Reformvorhaben verbindet, um alte und neue Herausforderungen effektiver multilateral zu bearbeiten?

In mid-February, the world’s largest elections took place in Indonesia over the course of a single day. Around 205 million eligible voters were called to the polls to elect a new president, vice president and almost 20,000 representatives for the national, pro­vincial and district parliaments. The spotlight was largely centred on the presidential election, as the president plays a prominent role in the country’s political system, and according to the official results released on 20 March, General Prabowo Subianto will be assuming office in October. His election as head of state is seen by some observers as a threat to Indonesian democracy or even a return to dictatorship. However, it is much more likely that Prabowo will maintain the policies of his predecessor Jokowi, who prioritised the economic development of the country. Nonetheless, democratic institutions and procedures are likely to be further weakened. Germany and the EU should be prepared for Indonesia to adopt a more active and self-confident foreign policy stance under Prabowo as Jakarta will likely come to be driven by a decidedly transactional understanding of international cooperation.

Diversifying Germany’s bilateral partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is one of the central goals of German policy. On the one hand, this diversification aims to reduce economic dependence on China, and on the other – in the context of systemic rivalry with authoritarian states – to bring about cooperation with states that share common values with Germany, so-called Wertepartnern (value-based partners). However, it is not clearly defined which values are fundamental to value-based partnerships. It also remains unclear which states in the Indo-Pacific are referred to as value-based partners and how these value-based partnerships differ from “normal” bilateral relations with other states in the region. Instead, this study shows that the significance that is rhetorically attached to cooperation with value-based partners is at odds with the vague concept of “value-based partnership” and its limited importance as a basis for bilateral cooperation. A comparison of value-based partners with a control group of non-value-based partners across different policy areas produces mixed results. The assumed correlation between being categorised as a value-based partner and closer international cooperation based on shared norms and values cannot, with any coherence, be demonstrated empirically. A comprehensive revision of the hitherto diffuse concept of value-based partnerships is recommended – either by normative sharpening, combined with a narrowing of the circle of states designated as value-based partners, or by eradicating the term from the political vocabulary.