Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Virginie Nantchop propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Benjamin Michelon, Douala & Kigali. Villes modernes et citadins précaires en Afrique (Karthala, 2016, 320 pages).
Douala et Kigali sont deux villes importantes d’Afrique centrale. Si des cohérences géographique, historique et urbaine les rapprochent, ces villes présentent des trajectoires économique et politique, et une urbanisation, différenciées. L’auteur s’interroge sur les stratégies de ces villes désormais impliquées dans la compétition mondiale : quelle place est réservée à l’amélioration des conditions de vie des habitants des quartiers précaires ?
Le quartier (et son marché) est choisi par l’auteur pour faire une « anthropologie urbaine du changement social », permettant d’appréhender la fabrique de la ville à partir des pratiques sociales des habitants et des politiques des pouvoirs publics. Deux quartiers historiques, entre la ville coloniale et la ville moderne, sont choisis comme lieux d’observation de la fabrique urbaine : Biryogo à Kigali et Cité SIC à Douala.
Kigali est marquée par une forte dépendance vis-à-vis de l’État. Dans le contexte post-génocidaire, la reconstruction a pour objectif de créer une ville compacte, égalitaire, sur fond de réconciliation nationale. Kigali est appréciée pour ses rues propres et ses maisons bien alignées. La question sociale est au cœur des préoccupations des pouvoirs publics : il est urgent de promouvoir l’intégration urbaine des quartiers défavorisés. La métamorphose de Kigali, assurée par les acteurs privés et les bailleurs de fonds, est visible à travers ses nouveaux monuments (centres commerciaux et d’affaires). Les transformations observées positionnent le pays sur le devant de la scène internationale, mais ces changements s’accompagnent, dans l’ombre, de l’éviction des pauvres, victimes d’expropriations du fait de la libéralisation du marché foncier et de la spéculation. En outre, on observe une mutation des types de commerce et une relocalisation des espaces marchands. Les centres commerciaux, qui attirent une clientèle aisée, se substituent désormais aux marchés « traditionnels ».
À Douala, des agendas inachevés (modernisation architecturale, valorisation du patrimoine et des espaces verts, extension et renouvellement de réseaux d’infrastructures) caractérisent une ville qui s’affranchit difficilement des acquis du passé colonial. La dualité socio-spatiale qui prédomine dans la construction des infrastructures de services (eau, assainissement, transports) est perpétuée par les autorités locales. Le retrait relatif de l’État de la planification urbaine a des conséquences sur la production de l’espace urbain, largement assurée par les acteurs privés. L’habitat informel se développe ainsi en marge de toute intervention des pouvoirs publics. L’analyse des pratiques citadines à l’échelle du quartier révèle la complexité des rapports entre autorités locales et commerçants, permettant une lecture plus large des rapports entre autorités et habitants d’une ville historiquement réputée frondeuse.
Ces deux études montrent bien l’existence d’une forme d’expulsion des pauvres plus pernicieuse : l’éviction par le marché. En effet, si les États se saisissent de projets de construction de villes vitrines, symboles de modernité, moteurs du développement économique, leur mise en œuvre se révèle plus complexe. Le dirigisme étatique à Kigali et l’inertie observée à Douala reproduisent un schéma dichotomique – l’opposition entre la ville formelle et informelle – et accentuent la fragmentation urbaine.
Virginie Nantchop
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On the road of corruption, there must often be a mechanism or legal shield in order to protect past crimes by individuals, parties or governments that have had their hands in the public purse for their personal gain or that of their party.
Silence may not protect high ranking politicians and corrupt community leaders from prosecution if public outrage and activist judicial authorities are able to break through the barrier of silence and power and find those who have committed crimes against the public interest. Brazil is an example where the powerful have been tied to corrupt practices, and while not a perfect and wholly agreed upon solution, moves towards de-legitimizing corruption in Brazil has begun.
Often the concentration of power to one individual or party comes with the presentation of actions that will improve the public good. Altering an election system to make individual votes more balanced is something that any citizen of any country would approve of, but when it installs one party and one President or Prime Minister indefinitely by legal means, it de-legitimizes the law and assures that a small cabal of powerful people has almost total control of the society with no effective means to remove them from power. In many cases, these actions come on the heels of issues linked to corruption or are formalized in a manner that protects powerful politicians from being subject to transparency.
Another abuse of power that often follows this normalization of corruption is that opposition to the government change in policy is labelled and ostracized so they lose legitimacy in their perspective, or in some cases are outright arrested for working against the state itself.
There are no true international mechanisms to assure that elections will not install corrupt governments when the national legal framework is changed to suit the powerful few over the public. An international standard of legal alterations that would avoid the absolute corruption of a legal and political system would be useful, but would require unified and legitimate political will.
Venezuela as a case in point has legalized a committee that will change their constitution to make it into one that permits a concentration of power into a one party state. Protests have been met with violence, and with the current government’s stockpile of advanced weapons over the last twelve years, there is a good chance that Venezuela will resemble the 2009 mass protests in Iran, with their own Neda and silence from the international community. In 2017, it seems as if international crimes and the natural response to promote justice are limited by illegitimate legal power in places like Venezuela, and silence from most international media while local media is threatened and imprisoned.
This combination guarantees that the worst elements of dictatorships almost always succeed in our current generation.
The post Venezuela is on the Road to a One Party State appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
North Korea has proven its determination once again to fulfill its aspiration as a self-proclaimed Nuclear Power State with a new ballistic test on July 27th. These tests marked the 64th anniversary of the signing of the Korean armistice. According to the US Department of Defense, an intermediate-range missile Hwasong-14 traveled 620 miles from a Jagang base before landing into the Sea of Japan, within Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
This test represents a new challenge to Washington, after Pyongyang conducted its first successful ICBM test last July 1st, which proved that the regime has now reached a new and dreadful stage in the acquisition of preemptive first strike capabilities. Despite the initial predictions, under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, the quest for nuclear weapons has achieved significant breakthroughs. The regime has reached an unprecedented level of sophistication in a number of vital areas, including the development of solid-duel rocket engines and the expansion of mobile launch capabilities.
While Pyongyang has made important progress in the acceleration of its intercontinental range ballistic missile program, North Korea’s regime pushes towards the acquisition of the miniaturization technology considered critical to arm a nuclear warhead. The nation could plausibly achieve this milestone in early 2018 as reported by an anonymous CNN source.
Many observers consider this new test additional evidence about Pyongyang’s determination to deliver a “stern warning to Washington in response to any attempt to alter the peninsula status quo”. North Korea’s warmongering to annihilate the U.S. could now be more than an empty threat since it appears that Pyongyang has acquired the capabilities to hit major cities beyond the West Coast. There is the possibility that the range of the North Korean missile could potentially reach New York City and Washington DC, fostering concerns over Pyongyang’s aggressive intentions.
In the aftermath of the recent missile test, two B-1B Bomber Jets have been deployed to the Korean peninsula, joining Japanese and South Korean fighter jets for training exercise purposes. The United States have also tested the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Alaska by launching a mock ballistic missile in the Pacific Ocean to prove their ability to repel any incoming threat, and to inspire its allies over Washington’s adamant commitment to contrast any further expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.
The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander, Gen. O’Shaughnessy has warned North Korea that the U.S. may “respond with rapid, lethal and overwhelming force at a time and place of our choosing”, highlights that the defiant regime is getting close to Washington’s redline. Meanwhile, UN Ambassador Haley has stressed that the U.S. could pursue a different pact, including the deployment of “consistent military forces”, rather than relying on the UN Security Council to consider further actions. Washington has expressed its frustration several times for its inability to produce consistent results through conventional diplomatic tools to rein in Pyongyang, even acknowledging two decades of failed attempts to denuclearize North Korea.
Over the years, North Korea’s militaristic propaganda has several times made threats to Washington about serious military retaliations in response to any incoming threat to the survival of the Kim’s dynasty. Amid the growing tensions in the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang has further stressed and justified its path toward the acquisition of nuclear capabilities as a tool to achieve the natural vocation of the DPRK as a nuclear power nation as enshrined in its Constitution. The ultimate strategy is to further consolidate its position and eventually force Washington to normalize relations.
During the Obama Administration, Pyongyang offered a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War in return for Washington’s commitment to renounce the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, a de facto recognition of Pyongyang’s nuclear power status. Such a proposal was promptly rejected by Washington, urging for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a prerequisite for restarting any new negotiation.
North Korea has become one of the most pressing priorities for the Trump Administration. Its resolution to tame the belligerent regime under the auspices of Beijing has so far produced little results. Trump’s Administration has also expressed its regrets for China’s limited efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, calling for a more radical engagement in restraining Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Since the Trump Administration took office, regular promises to“take care” of the North Korea issue have characterized the very last days of the previous “strategic patience” strategy.
Trump Administration’s initial entente with China and its attempts to convince Beijing to fully recalibrate its North Korean policy have not produced the expected results, raising tensions culminated in the recent threats of waging a trade war against China. Despite this, Beijing has expressed its frustration for not being able to regain control of the former communist ally, the Chinese leadership remains committed to preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime and the marked geo-strategic alteration that could emerge from the ashes of the hermit kingdom under the auspices of Washington.
Due to the increasing level of North Korea’s nuclear assertiveness, the discussion over a military intervention in the Korean Peninsula has become a recurring topic. The consequence of a military action would certainly expose Washington and its close allies to major retaliation, not to mention the disruption of the fragile balance of the regional security architecture.
Kim Jong-un’s decision to pursue nuclear development along with economic expansion has characterized his personal agenda (byungjin policy) leaves no doubts that the international sanctions and diplomatic pressure from China would not alter the direction taken by the North Korean leadership. North Korean leadership considers itself constantly exposed to foreign attack or internal coup that could destitute Kim’s family sharing the fate of other authoritarian regimes such as Ghaddafi’s Libya in the wake of his decision to abandon the nuclear program in return of expected economic aids under Washington’s pressure.
North Korea’s regime is now one of the most immediate threats to US national security and also an additional challenge for the Trump Administration, constantly engaged in redefining the contours of American strategic architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. Albeit, Washington remains adamant in instilling faith in its closer allies towards its strategic commitment in the region while confronting the growing threat represented by the North Korean regime, the risk of igniting a conflict in the region, whose catastrophic effects could far outweigh the removal of Kim’s dynastic rule, must be avoided.
The post North Korea’s ICBM Test Jeopardizes Regional Balance of Power appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). John Seaman, chercheur au Centre Asie de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-François Huchet, La crise environnementale en Chine. Évolutions et limites des politiques publiques (Presses de Sciences Po, 2016, 152 pages).
Une conséquence néfaste de l’essor économique chinois – qui a permis de sortir plusieurs centaines de millions de personnes de la pauvreté – est le cauchemar environnemental qu’il a généré. Ce n’est certes pas une particularité de la Chine, mais comme l’explique Jean-François Huchet, la crise y est d’une ampleur inédite. Paradoxalement, c’est la vitalité de l’économie chinoise qui est à terme menacée, et donc la stabilité politique du pays.
S’engageant dans la voie ouverte par Benoît Vermander (Chine brune ou Chine verte ? Les dilemmes de l’État-parti, 2007), Jean-François Huchet, professeur à l’Inalco et spécialiste du monde économique et industriel chinois, concentre son propos sur l’étendue de la crise environnementale du pays, offrant une introduction concise mais sérieuse sur le sujet. Il commence par un inventaire assez complet des manifestations extérieures de cette crise (pollution atmosphérique ; épuisement des nappes phréatiques et pollution généralisée de l’eau en Chine ; dégradation des sols, érosion et désertification ; gestion insuffisante des déchets industriels et ménagers). Mais, de l’aveu de l’auteur, les coûts humains et économiques restent sous-étudiés, bien que certains soient clairement visibles.
Pour aller plus loin, les effets internationaux engendrés par cette crise restent aussi à explorer : l’impact sur le changement climatique est bien étudié, mais d’autres sphères, comme la biodiversité maritime ou la pollution transfrontalière, le sont moins, même de manière générale, dans la littérature spécialisée. Jean-François Huchet s’attaque ensuite à l’identification des causes structurelles de la crise, notamment une conception persistante, née sous Mao Zedong, des rapports homme-nature qui favorisent l’exploitation vers l’épuisement de cette dernière : le poids inéluctable de la question démographique, l’urbanisation frénétique, les choix énergétiques (place centrale au charbon) et, tout simplement, l’échelle absolue de l’économie chinoise.
Pour surmonter cette crise, la Chine se réveille certes, mais tardivement, et de manière encore insuffisante pour l’auteur. Il est vrai que la population chinoise – avec en premier lieu la classe moyenne urbaine – semble s’engager davantage, que les autorités à Pékin affichent désormais une volonté politique plus forte en matière de protection environnementale, que des réformes administratives et juridiques progressent dans le domaine, et qu’une transformation économique est amorcée, qui favorise (et se base quelque part sur) le développement des énergies renouvelables et des industries moins polluantes.
Toutefois, nous explique l’auteur, la Chine est bien loin de sortir du bois : les questions structurelles pèsent encore lourdement, et redessiner les liens complexes entre le développement économique, l’autorité politique et la protection environnementale à différents niveaux n’est pas chose facile (effets de la décentralisation, influence des lobbies industriels, culture de consommation prédominante…) La Chine restera pendant un certain temps un pays à deux vitesses sur la question : en marche vers le développement des solutions environnementales, tout en persistant dans des activités effrénées qui épuisent les écosystèmes chinois et planétaires.
John Seaman
Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.
Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Flickr
As President of France, Emmanuel Macron has revived the “Grande Nation” more quickly than even he could have imagined: France was recently declared the world’s top soft power for 2017, outranking both the US and the UK for the first time.
After Donald Trump’s recent visit to join Macron for the French National Day celebrations in Paris, the ranking is not too surprising. Less than two months after the handshake heard ‘round the world, Macron’s flattering reception of his American counterpart was apparently enough to paper over the rift the French president himself opened in previous meetings. Having asserted his independence for the sake of his domestic audience, Macron treated Trump (who is easily impressed by displays of military power) to the annual parade on the Champs-Élysées and dinner atop the Eiffel Tower.
Macron has a reputation for deft political maneuvering, and inviting Trump to Paris was the latest example. During the visit, Trump not only retracted his earlier Paris-bashing but even suggested that “something could happen” on the Paris climate agreement. What is that something? For now, only Trump knows. More important is the fact Macron has turned Paris into Washington’s primary European point of contact… all while re-elevating the role of France in global affairs.
Macron’s nascent relationship with Trump, however, comes at the expense of other traditional American partners in Europe and most especially the UK. The success of Macron’s overtures has surely come as a slap in the face to Theresa May. After all, the British prime minister has invested considerable time and political capital on forging a relationship since well before Macron even became president.
Those efforts started well before Trump’s inauguration, when May responded to Trump’s victory with unequivocal congratulations to the President-elect. Just days after he took office, May became the first world leader to visit President Trump at the White House in Washington. May has repeatedly hitched her wagon to Trump’s by insisting that the US & UK can “lead, together, again.”
As of now, she has very little to show for it. Because the prospect of his coming to London has been met with hostility from the British public, Trump has written off any state visit to the UK until next year at the earliest. Trump upped the ante after leaving Paris by reportedly refusing to come until Theresa May can assure him a similarly warm welcome in the UK.
That Trump can so easily shift his affinities between Britain and France, at the very moment contentious negotiations over the Brexit he supported get underway, is a jarring reminder to Downing Street that Trump is both fickle and unreliable in his priorities. Trump’s constantly changing views on a UK-US trade deal, a cornerstone of the British government’s post-Brexit planning, should be most worrying.
In April, Trump’s commerce secretary indicated a trade deal with the UK was a low priority for the administration and argued that a deal with the EU was more important. This month, Trump himself reversed course and opined that a trade deal with the UK would be completed “very, very quickly”. On Tuesday, he promised that the US-UK special relationship would be “even better” – in between tweets attacking his own Attorney General and joking that his young son would soon be testifying in the Russia investigations.
And yet, despite her American counterpart’s constant unpredictability, May keeps putting high hopes in Trump and puts her own credibility on the line to defend his erratic behavior. Embroiled in the intricacies of Brexit, there is a real danger of Theresa May getting herself “stuck in the pending tray.” With Trump distracted by his troubles at home, she would be better off not counting on a UK-US FTA any time soon. Her best move (at least as far as life after Brexit is concerned) would be to focus on the UK’s alternative options.
It’s fortunate that she has several to choose from. Following extensive visits by UK government officials to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), GCC states and major British trade partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have reacted positively to the idea of forming free trade agreements with the UK. Both countries are looking for investments to realize deep economic restructuring, and annual exports from Britain to the GCC already total about £30 billion.
As the largest member of the bloc, Saudi Arabia is at the forefront of British attention to the region. The Saudis welcomed Theresa May to Riyadh in April to talk trade and the upcoming IPO of Saudi Aramco (in London, if May has her way). London recently published new rules to facilitate the listing of foreign state-owned firms at the London Stock Exchange as part of its bid for Aramco’s public offering. Both May and Cabinet officials like Liam Fox have endorsed Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic program, of which the Aramco IPO is a significant component.
Besides the Gulf states, former British colonies like Australia and India have also been much more consistent in quickly reaching agreements once the UK is outside the European Union. Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull used a joint press conference with May two weeks ago to tell reporters he is ready to sign a free trade agreement with London “as quickly as the UK is able to move” after Brexit. India has hinted that an ongoing visa issue for qualified workers needs to be resolved for negotiations to take off in earnest, but Narendra Modi is still a much more straightforward interlocutor than Donald Trump.
As Brexit negotiations get dicey, Theresa May and her government will need to be able to point to tangible steps forward. The current political climate in the US is hardly amenable to “quickly” coming to terms on a US-UK FTA – at least for now. May needs to focus on serious partners from other parts of the globe, at least until the instability in Washington comes to an end.
The post Theresa May’s Misplaced Bet on Donald Trump appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2011 (RBC)
As CNN reports, U.S. “companies from the oil, energy, banking, aerospace, auto and heavy manufacturing industries” have been lobbying against the new Russia sanctions legislation currently making its way through Congress, arguing that it could harm their business interests. Since the Trump administration’s efforts at weakening the bill appear to have failed, Russia is now pinning its hopes on opposition from U.S. corporations and from the European Union to avoid tightened U.S. sanctions.
In addition to new sanctions aimed at punishing Russia for its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, human rights violations, and aggression toward Russia’s neighbors, the bill limits the president’s ability to ease sanctions without congressional approval. This sets up a tough choice for Trump: Sign the bill and accept limitations on his authority to control U.S. policy regarding Russia, or veto it and risk accusations that he is doing the Kremlin’s bidding. The “Trump-proof” sanctions bill has strong bipartisan support in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and a Trump veto would further risk a humiliating override vote in Congress.
Russia views the bill “extremely negatively,” and Russian media have been quick to grasp at U.S. corporate opposition to tightened sanctions. For international audiences, corporate opposition to the bill has been reported in English at Pravda, Sputnik, and RT, emphasizing its potential harm to U.S. and international business interests. As these reports note, U.S. corporations opposing or seeking changes in the bill include ExxonMobil, General Electric, Boeing, Ford, Dow Chemical, Citigroup, Visa, and MasterCard.
ExxonMobil, incidentally, was recently fined $2 million by the U.S. Treasury Department for violating sanctions on Russia while current U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was the company’s CEO. While at ExxonMobil Tillerson met with Russian President Vladimir Putin numerous times following their first meeting in 1999, and condemned U.S. sanctions on Russia following Russia’s attack on Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. Tillerson’s former role at ExxonMobil and his relationship with Russia have raised conflict of interest concerns regarding his current role as Secretary of State. Tillerson has been vocal in his criticism of the current sanctions bill.
Reports in English from Russian media also note European Union concerns and warnings that “unintended consequences” may result from “unilateral tightening of Russia sanctions.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel is quoted calling the sanctions “a peculiar move” by the United States. Concerned particularly that tightened sanctions on Russia might impact Europe’s energy sector, the EU has indeed expressed alarm at the bill, urging the United States to coordinate sanctions with its European partners. EU opposition to tightened U.S. sanctions on Russia comes despite evident Russian interference in European as well as U.S. elections.
U.S. corporate opposition to tightened sanctions on Russia has also been widely reported in Russian-language media for domestic audiences. American industrialists are “tired of the persecution of Russia,” says Pravda TV, “and demand that their own business interests be protected.” Pravda TV also notes EU corporate opposition to tightened U.S. sanctions on Russia: “The presence of these restrictions for most business people on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean is a major headache. Business seeks to resolve this issue and return to traditional business relations.”
Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election and suspicions regarding possible collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign have put considerable pressure on Congress and the White House to take strong measures against Russia. Both in Russia and in American and European corporate circles, however, the hope seems to be that multinational business interests will prevail over the interests of American democracy and national security.
The post Russia Pins Hopes on U.S. Corporations to Ease Sanctions appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Rémy Hémez, chercheur au Laboratoire de recherche sur la défense (LRD) de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State (Oxford University Press, 2017, 352 pages).
Seth G. Jones est directeur de l’International Security and Policy Center de la Rand, professeur à l’université Johns Hopkins et auteur du remarqué In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (2009). Il offre dans son dernier ouvrage un intéressant panorama de la guerre insurrectionnelle. Ce livre se veut un manuel aidant à la compréhension des conflits asymétriques, un pont entre une démarche académique et une approche de terrain, et un complément à des études qui se focaliseraient trop souvent sur la contre-insurrection plutôt que sur l’insurrection. L’auteur définit l’insurrection comme « une campagne politique et militaire d’un groupe (ou de groupes) non étatique(s) pour renverser un régime ou pour faire sécession ».
L’approche quantitative est largement utilisée par Seth G. Jones. Il s’appuie sur une base de données de 181 guerres insurrectionnelles qui se sont déroulées entre 1946 et 2015. Pour chaque insurrection, une centaine de facteurs sont pris en compte tels que l’issue de la guerre, le nombre de partisans, les buts de l’insurrection, le type d’organisation, etc. L’auteur arrive à des résultats qui suscitent la réflexion. Par exemple : une insurrection dure en moyenne 12 ans ; elle se termine dans 36 % des cas par une victoire des forces gouvernementales, à 35 % par celle des insurgés et à 29 % par un « nul ». Ce qui signifie que dans 71 % des cas, ce n’est pas un accord de paix mais bien les armes qui décident du sort d’une insurrection. La liste des cas étudiés est reproduite à la fin du livre avec quelques informations qui peuvent laisser le lecteur sur sa faim. Il est dommage que la totalité de la base de données ne soit pas disponible en ligne pour mieux comprendre certains résultats et permettre d’autres recherches.
Jones passe en revue six thèmes clés pour l’analyse des insurrections. Le premier concerne leurs débuts et permet d’étudier les facteurs permettant leur développement ou leur échec. Le deuxième thème est celui des stratégies mises en œuvre. Trois approches sont distinguées : guérilla, guerre conventionnelle et stratégie punitive. Vient ensuite l’étude des tactiques : embuscades, raids, assassinats ciblés, subversion, etc. L’auteur souligne le fait que, pour le moment, aucun mouvement utilisant les attaques-suicides n’est parvenu à renverser un gouvernement. Cela serait notamment dû au fait que ce genre d’attaques entraînerait une perte de soutien populaire. Le quatrième sujet est celui des structures organisationnelles. Les avantages et inconvénients de la centralisation ou de la décentralisation sont mis en avant. Le cinquième thème renvoie à la propagande et aux opérations d’information. Enfin, l’issue des insurrections est étudiée. Le soutien direct au combat d’un État extérieur est essentiel pour obtenir la victoire. En revanche, étonnamment, avoir une zone refuge n’augmenterait pas les chances de succès. Dans la dernière partie de son livre, l’auteur tire de ses recherches des conclusions intéressantes quant aux opérations de contre-insurrection.
Dans un style très clair et faisant preuve d’un vrai talent analytique, Seth G. Jones offre ainsi un outil précieux pour tous ceux qui s’intéressent aux insurrections, que ce soit du point de vue de l’historien militaire, de l’analyste des conflits contemporains ou du praticien.
Rémy Hémez
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