France

Financial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.

Financial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.

Financial constraints are one of the most severe obstacles for the operation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Yet women and women-led enterprises are disproportionally affected, which leads to a gender gap in access to finance. This paper uses panel estimation techniques, namely a correlated random effects model, for 1,655 financial institutions from 109 mostly LMICs for the years 2000 to 2019 to examine empirically whether there are purely economic incentives for financial institutions to scale up their lending activities towards women and women-led enterprises. Going beyond the microfinance sector, this study provides – to the best of my knowledge – the first empirical evidence on this question for banks and bank-like financial institutions that serve higher credit market segments. I find positive and significant effects on the quality of the loan portfolio (lower portfolio at risk), income streams (higher portfolio yield) and the overall financial performance (captured by return on assets or profit margin). Since economic incentives and profitability considerations are crucial in steering the decisions of financial institutions with regard to credit allocations, the banks’ self-interest could lead to management decisions and internal directives to favor female loan applicants, which could contribute to closing the gender gap in access to finance. Furthermore, the findings on the positive effects on banks’ financial performance give policymakers and regulators leeway to push financial institutions through more restrictive policy measures and regulatory requirements to direct more loans to women and women-led firms.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

Demonstration plots (demo plots) are crucial for knowledge dissemination and knowledge production to and with smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, making them important in rural development. Beyond their agricultural extension function considerations, their political and ecological dynamics remain undertheorized. Drawing on qualitative empirical data across Mbeya Region, Tanzania, we analyze the political ecology of different demonstration plots as assemblages deployed by private-sector actors, NGOs/grassroots organizations, and research institutions, to shape agricultural transformation. Our study reveals stark power asymmetries: private sector and research-led demo plots, strategically located and strongly resourced, dominate both physical and discursive landscapes. Their alliance building and branding practices territorialize monocultures, input-dependent farming as aspired futures. Conversely, the more conservation-oriented grassroots demo plots, despite retaining agroforestry socioecological systems, fostering local knowledge and diverse practices, are marginalized by resource constraints and limited institutional support, exposing their territories to constant erasure. Using assemblage theory, we scrutinize demo plots as active sites of socio-technical selection, configuring actors, spaces, and knowledge systems in ways that privilege market integration through intensification, while sidelining alternatives. The analysis challenges prevailing narratives of demo plots as neutral (even apolitical) pedagogical tools, instead arguing to understand them as instruments of power that determine which agricultural futures materialize.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

The European Investment Bank (EIB), the world’s largest multilateral financial institution, has supported projects in over 160 countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs). Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EIB adopted its first Strategic Approach to Fragility and Conflict in 2022. While the bank has a history of operating in FCSs, this strategy signals its ambition to strengthen the bank’s focus on state fragility. What is driving this shift and how does it align with the EIB’s traditional emphasis on financial sustainability and risk aversion? This paper examines the drivers of the EIB’s engagement with fragile states through an institutional logics lens, identifying three core logics embedded in the bank’s identity: development, investment and bureaucratic logics. The analysis shows that although development and bureaucratic logics strongly shape the new strategy, the investment logic – anchored in financial prudence – continues to influence lending practices. This finding suggests that the progressive rhetoric on fragility is constrained by institutional caution.

A delegation from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee was in La Réunion to assess youth employment initiatives and to meet government representatives.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

A delegation from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee was in La Réunion to assess youth employment initiatives and to meet government representatives.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

A delegation from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee was in La Réunion to assess youth employment initiatives and to meet government representatives.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

A delegation from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee was in La Réunion to assess youth employment initiatives and to meet government representatives.
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Jeudi 28 mai 2026, rien n’étant à leurs yeux plus urgent, les députés français vont voter à l’unanimité l’abrogation symbolique de l’ensemble des édits esclavagistes - dont le Code noir -, pourtant formellement abrogés par deux fois. La première le 4 février 1794, lorsque la Convention nationale décréta l’abolition de l’esclavage dans les colonies. La seconde abolition est datée du 27 avril 1848 quand le gouvernement provisoire de la IIᵉ République, mit définitivement fin à l’esclavage dans les colonies françaises.  Avec un sens des priorités égal à sa temporalité, les députés français vont donc voter l’abolition d’une disposition juridique caduque depuis 178 ans…

Les honorables représentants du Peuple français seront en revanche bien silencieux sur la réalité d’un autre esclavage. Ils ignorent en effet probablement que l’Abolition décidée unilatéralement par les Européens au XIXe siècle ne concerna pas la traite arabo-musulmane. Depuis la Libye, au nord, ou depuis Zanzibar, à l’est, des caravanes organisées militairement continuèrent ainsi à dévaster des régions entières de l’Afrique sud-saharienne. À la veille de la colonisation, au centre comme à l’est de l’Afrique, les réseaux esclavagistes musulmans étaient même en pleine extension. Jusqu’à ce que la colonisation les détruise.

On lira à ce propos mon livre « Esclavage, l’histoire àl’endroit »

Ce vote chronologiquement insolite ne renforcera pas le prestige de l’Assemblée. Cela n’est cependant pas une nouveauté. Le 23 novembre 1913, le maréchal Lyautey écrivait ainsi à Albert de Mun à propos des députés : 

« La horde des parlementaires abattus sur ce malheureux pays, encombrants, plastronnant, pérorant à tort et à travers, et si ignorants et si vulgaires (…) En temps normal, tous ces gens que je devais recevoir à ma table avec égards, auraient mangé à l’office (…). Et dire que c’est « ça » qui dispose de notre sort. Le spectacle me donne la nausée du Parlement et j’envie celui (qui ne sera pas moi-je suis trop vieux) qui aura la joie, la plus grande probablement qu’on puisse avoir sur cette terre, d’entrer au Palais-Bourbon avec 100 baïonnettes derrière lui et de jeter tout cela à la Seine ».