Agrégateur de flux

L’équipe de France a décroché une deuxième médaille aux championnats du monde de cyclisme, ce mercredi 24 septembre, à l’occasion du contre-la-montre par équipes en relais mixte, au Rwanda. Thomas Voeckler, sélectionneur de l'équipe de France de cyclisme, est notre invité sur France 24.

Promoting sign language and Deaf culture is not only a constitutional mandate, but also an international legal requirement.

By Timothy Egwelu
KAMPALA, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

Every Last week of September the Deaf community in Uganda and the rest of the world celebrates sign languages and the rich identity of Deaf people and Deaf culture. The day is also an opportunity to advocate for the enforcement of sign language laws and policies.

In Uganda, despite the legal recognition of sign language in the 1995 Constitution of Uganda as amended, the Persons with Disabilities Act of 2020, and the ratification of the African Disability Protocol, the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disability and other international laws, significant implementation gaps remain the major issue in the promotion of sign language.

For instance, the Public Service Ministry announced in the approved staffing structure shared to local governments last year that sign language interpreters must be posted in general and referral hospital service structures.

Acknowledging and fostering sign language enhances society's comprehension of the Deaf community's needs and rights, supporting the pursuit of equal opportunities and inclusion

However, more than a year later, no tangible updates have occurred. Ministry of Health’s lack of compliance may be potentially due to the non availability of funds allocated in their budgets – and yet the same structures were already approved by the Ministry of finance.

Previously, no hospitals employed interpreters, making it increasingly critical that this mandate is fulfilled.

Under Section 7(1) of the Persons with Disability Act, 2020 there is a clear stipulation against discrimination in the provision of health services on the basis of one’s disability, highlighting the urgency for compliance and action to support individuals who rely on these sign language interpreting services.

As another example, the Uganda Communication Commission as mandated under section 31 and schedule 4 of the Uganda Communications Commission Act of 2013 also issued a suspension of broadcasting licence for broadcasters that don’t meet the requirements of the law under section 12(4) of the Persons with Disability Act of 2020 which stipulate that “An owner or a person in charge of a television station shall, provide or cause to be provided sign language insets in all newscasts.”.

However, many broadcasters have been in breach without interpreters at newscasts and no licence has been suspended as a punishment. What is the point of inclusive policies if they are not enforced?

In addition, the absence of sign language-trained teachers and adequate funding for assistive technology such as computers and screens for visualisation in electronic classrooms, means the average Deaf student continues to be excluded from important educational and career opportunities.

Is it any wonder that they annually have consistent poor performance in national exams countrywide? A major shortcoming of the state is the lack of a Policy to Streamline early childhood education for Deaf children.

Of course, promoting sign language and Deaf culture is not only a constitutional mandate, but also an international legal requirement. There is urgent need for Uganda sign language policy to operationalize its promotion and usage.

The Agenda 2030 of the Sustainable Development Goals hinges on leaving no one behind. This is a salient feature of promoting sign language rights and zero discrimination towards the Deaf community.

Sign language interpretation available is an issue of the Deaf community’s human rights. Indeed, sign language acts as an essential instrument for advocating for Deaf rights. Acknowledging and fostering sign language enhances society’s comprehension of the Deaf community’s needs and rights, supporting the pursuit of equal opportunities and inclusion.

In South Africa is an example of a country that is making more strides, and Uganda should follow suit. The long-awaited recognition of sign language as the 12th official language is gaining momentum following parliamentary approval to amend the constitution.

This landmark decision marks the culmination of over thirty years of advocacy aimed at empowering the deaf community throughout the nation. By granting official status to sign language, South Africa acknowledges its role as a vital medium for communication and administration in public affairs, thereby enhancing accessibility for the country’s deaf citizens.

The inclusion of South African Sign Language (SASL) in policy discussions is indicative of a broader commitment to inclusivity and accessibility there.

This policy shift not only elevates SASL to a status comparable to other official languages but also lays the groundwork for its integration in educational, legal, and governmental frameworks.

With dedicated initiatives aimed at teacher training, public awareness campaigns, and resources development, South Africa demonstrates a proactive approach in fostering a deeper understanding and appreciation of sign language.

This commitment not only serves the deaf community but enriches South African society as a whole, emphasizing the importance of linguistic diversity and human rights.

In contrast, in Uganda, systematic corruption has critically redirected essential resources away from initiatives aimed at enhancing the livelihoods of Deaf individuals, particularly within key sectors like the Ministry of Gender, Labour, and Social Development.

This ministry’s budget for the Special Island Grant and Youth Livelihood Program experienced staggering cuts of 80% and 79%, respectively, in the previous financial year.

Such drastic reductions reflect a troubling indifference towards minorities and , as the current regime, characterized by radicalization and self-enrichment, perpetuates a culture where the needs of Deaf persons and other marginalized groups are deemed non-essential.

Political figures, including leaders like Speaker Anita Annet, often downplay the importance of including sign language in public services, viewing it as a minimal concern amidst their pursuit of wealth and power. This disregard for minority rights breeds an environment where advocacy is stifled, and the rule of law is undermined.

To address this injustice, it is crucial to advocate for a Uganda sign language policy that focuses on sign language education and iIt’s accessibility in public sectors.

Efforts should include creating advocacy coalitions that highlight the economic and social benefits of integrating Deaf individuals into the Public service, thereby demonstrating their value to society.

Engaging in public campaigns to raise awareness and support for sign language programs can also shift perceptions among policymakers, reminding them that inclusivity fosters a stronger democracy. Furthermore, pressure needs to be applied on governmental bodies to prioritize budget allocations that support Deaf communities, ensuring the development of robust programs tailored to their needs.

Through the various ministries, the government must as a matter of urgency lead in promoting, respecting, implementing the sign language rights of deaf people and provide adequate and timely funding to meet the public need of sign language in major sectors such as health, education and Justice.

Timothy Egwelu is a lawyer and disability policy and an inclusion consultant.

Ethiopian runner Shewarge Alene dies aged 30, the organiser of the Stockholm marathon confirms.

Event Video 
Photos

jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-vzqrlb").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-vzqrlb").fadeIn(300);});});

IPI, in partnership with The Elders, cohosted a policy forum on “The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism” on September 25th.

The multilateral system is facing its greatest crisis since World War II, creaking under the strain of disordered global power dynamics. The UN has long struggled with a host of threats to multilateral cooperation, including growing disregard for the rule of law, nuclear proliferation, the rise of nationalist policymaking, and backtracking on global climate action and efforts to promote gender equality. Now, in the face of unprecedented funding cuts, the UN is being forced to reduce costs while seeking to retain relevance and improve efficiency across its three pillars. Bold thinking and action are urgently needed for a fairer, more effective, and more responsive UN to emerge from this crisis.

At the event, The Elders introduced their new policy paper, speaking to the failures of the existing multilateral system and calling for bold reform. The paper advocates for renewing the international peace and security architecture, overhauling the international financial architecture, accelerating investment in global public goods, and selecting a woman as the next UN secretary-general. The Elders shared nine “calls to action” to drive forward the process of reform.

Read The Elders’ report>>

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Juan Manuel Santos, Chair of The Elders; former President of Colombia; and Nobel Peace Laureate

Speakers:
H.E. Mary Robinson, Member of The Elders; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and first woman President of Ireland
H.E. Helen Clark, Member of The Elders; former Prime Minister of New Zealand; and former Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Nudhara Yusuf, Co-Chair of the Coalition for the UN We Need

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

The post The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism appeared first on International Peace Institute.

VIENNA, 25 September 2025 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Ambassador Jan Braathu concluded his first official visit to Greece yesterday.

During his visit, Representative Braathu discussed current challenges to media freedom and the safety of journalists with Minister of Justice Georgios Floridis, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Pavlos Marinakis, as well as Secretary General for Communication and Information Dimitris Kirmikiroglu. Braathu also held consultations with investigative journalists, representatives of journalists’ unions, academia and members of Greece’s Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

“Greece has made significant strides since 2022 in enhancing journalist safety through a range of policy initiatives, training and capacity-building programmes,” Representative Braathu underlined. “I was informed of an ambitious and multi-faceted approach by the Government and I urge continued efforts together with representatives of journalists and media. I look forward to the implementation of the government Action Plan for media freedom and safety of journalists and stand ready to provide support and assistance to this end,” Braathu said.

One of the topics addressed was the ongoing work by the government task force, including representatives of journalists’ unions, on draft legislation to counter Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

“It is important not only to transpose the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive, which addresses cross-border cases, but also to adopt legislation countering domestic SLAPPs,” the Representative noted. He added that this development would represent a highly positive step and place Greece among the very few OSCE participating States that have a progressive legal framework aimed at countering all cases of SLAPPs.

Representative Braathu welcomed the legislative measures undertaken by Greece to strengthen the safety and legal protection of journalists and media professionals, including the decriminalization of defamation and the adoption of a collective labor agreement for public sector media and expressed the hope that the private sector media would follow this example as well. It was agreed to explore further co-operation with the International Training Center for the Safety of Journalists and Media Professionals in Thessaloniki. He also stated support for ongoing discussions on the creation of a self-regulatory Media Council in Greece.

The Representative raised the topic of the 2022 surveillance case, “Predatorgate”, as well as the murder of veteran crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in 2021, encouraging authorities to continue investigations and reiterating the importance of preventing impunity for crimes against journalists. Braathu underlined the importance of adhering to the 2018 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on the Safety of Journalists.

In various meetings, Braathu stressed the importance of editorial independence, promoting transparency in media ownership, and safeguarding media pluralism. Regarding the allocation of state advertising and support, he underlined that allocation should be based on objective and transparent criteria.

In line with his mandate, Representative Braathu reaffirmed his readiness to support Greek authorities at all levels in advancing reforms that promote media freedom and safety of journalists.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

Polen, Dänemark, Finnland – in immer mehr Ländern werden mysteriöse Drohnenüberflüge registriert. Die Schweiz ist schlecht gerüstet.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz

The OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of experts undertaken by Professor Hervé Ascensio, Professor Veronika Bílková and Professor Mark Klamberg presented their findings to the OSCE Permanent Council on 25 September 2025, collected in the report entitled ‘Report on Possible Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation’.

The three experts were selected after 41 OSCE participating States, following consultation with Ukraine, invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism on 24 July 2025 to “build upon previous findings, and: [t]o establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of relevant OSCE commitments; violations and abuses of human rights; and violations of IHL, including possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, related to the treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation; [t]o collect, consolidate, and analyze this information including to determine if there is a pattern of widespread and systematic torture, ill-treatment and execution of Ukrainian POWs and soldiers hors de combat and/or at detention facilities by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories and in Russia; and [t]o offer recommendations on relevant accountability mechanisms”.

The Mechanism, established by all OSCE participating States in 1991, allows for one or more participating States to request ODIHR to “inquire of another participating State whether it would agree to invite a mission of experts to address a particular, clearly defined question on its territory relating to the human dimension”.

The Permanent Council is one of the OSCE’s main decision-making bodies, and convenes each week in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions on future activities.

The observations of the mission of experts are available here.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Women stand in a damaged displacement settlement in Khan Younis, Gaza. Credit: UNFPA/Media Clinic

By the Peace Research Institute Oslo
OSLO, Norway, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

The battlefield is no longer distant; for millions of women, it’s next door. An estimated 676 million women – nearly 17 percent of the global female population – lived within 50 kilometres of a deadly conflict last year, according to a new report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). That is the highest figure recorded since the end of the Cold War.

https://www.prio.org/about

Women at risk

2024 marked a historic peak in women’s exposure to armed conflict. The number of women living in conflict zones has more than doubled compared to 1990, reflecting both the rising scale of global violence and the increasing reach of conflicts into densely populated areas.

The study found that last year, around 245 million women lived in areas where conflict caused more than 25 battle-related deaths, while 113 million women were located in zones with over 100 deaths.

Bangladesh recorded the highest absolute number of women exposed, with nearly 75 million living within 50 kilometres of conflict. The violence was primarily linked to nationwide protests in July and August, which culminated in the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

In Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, all women were affected, meaning entire female populations were directly exposed to deadly violence.

Living near conflict zones has severe consequences for women’s lives. Armed conflict undermines inclusion, justice and security, and is consistently associated with higher maternal mortality, greater risks of gender-based violence, reduced access to education for girls, and widening gender gaps in employment.

These impacts threaten women’s immediate safety, but also their long-term wellbeing and economic prospects, weakening the foundations needed for recovery.

‘Conflict doesn’t just happen on the battlefield – it reaches into women’s homes, schools and workplaces, disrupting the very foundations of their lives,’ said PRIO Research Director Siri Aas Rustad, who is the author of the report. ‘While some may find new roles in crisis, these opportunities are fragile. The hard truth is that war widens gender inequalities and leaves women at greater risk.’

Regional variation

The report highlights striking regional and national differences. In Lebanon in 2024, 100 percent of the female population lived within 50 kilometres of a conflict event where the death toll exceeded 100 – this means that all women in Lebanon are exposed to high-intensity conflict.

In the Palestinian territories, nearly 80 percent of women reside near areas with more than 100 fatalities, with the other 20 percent living in conflict areas with between 1 and 99 killed. Over one third of women live close to zones with more than 1,000 deaths. Syria shows a similarly severe pattern, with most women exposed to medium- and high-intensity conflict.

In Nigeria, the report reveals that women in Borno State face particularly high-intensity violence linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State, while women in the South-South region are increasingly affected by separatist violence.

Long-term toll

The developmental costs of the impact on women are profound. Countries with a high proportion of women living near conflict consistently score lower on the United Nations Human Development Index, underlining the long-term effects of violence on education, health and livelihoods.

Protracted conflicts, often overshadowed by more visible wars, steadily erode social and economic structures. At the same time, cuts in international aid threaten to further weaken infrastructure and deepen vulnerabilities

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a world-leading institute for the study of peace and conflict. Through cutting-edge research, PRIO examines the drivers of violence and the conditions that enable peaceful relations between states, groups and individuals.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

598045

On 24 and 25 September 2025, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, with support from the OSCE Secretariat’s Action Against Terrorism Unit, held a training course on media and information literacy in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (P/CVERLT) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan

The training supported the Centre’s P/CVERLT efforts by addressing the challenges stemming from the digital ‘information disorder’, in the context of P/CVERLT. Over the two days, participants discussed and were introduced to tools that can help increase media literacy and thinking skills, incl. regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI), and build resilience to violent extremist and other harmful content. The training also focused on ways to address violent extremist and other illegal content online, while upholding fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression. The training course brough together over twenty participants, including students from universities in Ashgabat as well as representatives of the Youth Union, the National Red Crescent Society of Turkmenistan and a number of local public organizations and media.

Through presentations from international and local experts as well as a number of hands-on exercises in working groups, the training fostered multi-stakeholder co-operation while providing participants with the tools and practical skills to address the misuse of online platforms for VERLT.

“In the context of global information flows and emerging new technologies, the rapidly changing information environment create a source of serious security threats,” said William Leaf, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“Being active users of internet resources, teenagers and youth, may become an easy target for manipulation and aggressive influence by extremist groups,” added Leaf.

“The aim of this project is to increase youth resilience to violent extremism by enhancing their knowledge about media and information security,” he stressed.

The event follows the OSCE-organized training course on media literacy for representatives of Turkmenistan’s national media and state institutions, which took place on 16 and 17 September in Ashgabat and focused on current trends in the modern media environment. It builds on a curriculum developed under “INFORMED: Information and Media Literacy in Preventing Violent Extremism. Human Rights and Gender-Sensitive Approaches to Addressing the Digital Information Disorder".

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership[1]

On 9–10 November 2025, the 4th European Union (EU)–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit is taking place in Santa Marta, Colombia, bringing together European, Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Goverment to  strengthen bi-regional relations. This mechanism constitutes the main forum for dialogue and cooperation between Europe and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is the continuation of the EU–LAC summits held since 1999.

Today, EU–LAC relations unfold within the context of a structural crisis of the international system, marked by the decline of the liberal international order, the fragmentation of global trade, and growing strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China in key sectors such as technology, energy and supply chains. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 Brexit referendum, illiberal and protectionist trends have intensified, while Donald Trump’s second term has deepened these dynamics through unilateral tariffs on countries and strategic sectors. The EU has responded with an “open strategic autonomy” agenda, combining the green and digital transitions with industrial policies and economic security, while LAC seeks to diversify its ties and advance green and digital reindustrialisation processes, despite structural fragilities and a recent decline in foreign direct investment[2]. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to revitalise a bi-regional relationship that, despite a long-standing record of cooperation and political dialogue, has gone through extended periods of stagnation and mutual loss of relevance compared with other actors such as China and Russia[3].

To foster debate ahead of this high-level meeting, on 23 May 2025, the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) hosted a roundtable entitled Beyond the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Shaping the Future of EU–Latin America Relations. The event aimed to encourage dialogue between researchers and policymakers, bringing together academics who participated in the European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) conference, along with EU officials and LAC diplomats.

Organised by Arantza Gomez Arana (Northumbria University, UK), Bruno Theodoro Luciano (ULB and UNU-CRIS, Belgium) and Damián Rodríguez (University of the Republic, Uruguay), and with the support of the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the event opened with a keynote by Professor José Antonio Sanahuja (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), who analysed the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic context surrounding the 2025 EU-CELAC Summit. He stressed that, after a period of “polycrisis” within the EU and accelerated change in the international system, Donald Trump’s re-election has brought a dynamic of contestation to the liberal order, affecting both transatlantic alliances and the development strategies of both regions. In this context, the EU faces the challenge of redefining its integration model and external projection, while simultaneously advancing the green and digital transitions, reinforcing strategic autonomy, and strengthening the resilience of its value chains. However, this process takes place amid internal tensions and macroeconomic constraints, as well as a global environment marked by intensifying US-China rivalry and the risk of economic fragmentation and trade wars.

Sanahuja argued that the bi-regional relationship must be reframed around mutual interests and tangible results, moving away from the traditional asymmetric logic. Through initiatives such as the Global Gateway initiative and the conclusion and implementation of trade agreements -including the EU–Mercosur, EU–Mexico[4] and EU–Chile agreements- the EU seeks to diversify partnerships and secure critical inputs, while LAC requires access to finance, technology transfer and industrialisation. He warned that the success of this agenda will depend on the ability to coordinate positions in multilateral forums, avoid having CELAC’s internal divisions undermine the relationship, and seize the current window of opportunity to build shared strategic autonomy. In his view, the Santa Marta Summit should not be framed as “against” Trump, but rather as an opportunity to avoid falling into his polarising game and to project an open space based on rules and mutual benefits for both regions.

The second part of the event brought together high-level academic and diplomatic voices. Participants included Anyurivet Daza Cuervo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of Colombia; Detlef Nolte, Professor at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA); María García, Professor at the University of Bath (UK); Renata Zilli, Researcher at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE); and Eduardo Pereira e Ferreira, Minister-Counsellor at the Mission of Brazil to the EU. Each contributed with complementary perspectives on the challenges and opportunities in the bi-regional relationship, from diplomacy and trade to global governance and sustainable development strategies.

The roundtable concluded with an exchange between speakers and participants (academics and students from different nationalities), allowing for a deeper exploration of areas of convergence and the pending challenges to strengthening EU-LAC relations. Participants agreed on the importance of promoting sustained dialogue, encouraging bi-regional research, and exploring synergies between academia and policymaking. The organising team expressed its interest in continuing work on this agenda and in assembling panels for future conferences and international events. Those interested in engaging with these topics or collaborating are warmly invited to get in touch with the organisers, as we aim to expand the network of experts and stakeholders committed to the future of EU-LAC relations.

 

[1]García, M.J. and Gomez Arana, A., 2022. Latin America-European Union relations in the twenty-first century.

[2] Sebastião D. and Luciano B.T.(2023). ‘Moving from EU-centrisms: Lessons from the polycrisis for EU studies and Global South regionalism’ inJournal of Contemporary European Research,19(2): 226-245.https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v19i2.1297

[3]Sanahuja, J.A. and Rodríguez, J.D., 2022. Twenty years of EU–MERCOSUR negotiations: Inter-regionalism and the crisis of globalisation. In Latin America–European Union relations in the twenty-first century (pp. 117-153). Manchester University Press.

[4] Proposed for adoption by the European Commission on the 3rd of September https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1644

The post Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

An article, published on 8 September 2025 in the Kyiv Independent, brandished the headline: ‘Russia’s gains speed up in Ukraine ahead of high-stakes autumn’. Relying on open-source data, the analysis showed how the average pace of Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2025 far outweigh those in 2024. Indicatively, Russia captured 363 km2 of Ukrainian territory in August 2024 as opposed to 464 km2 last month, in August 2025.

Figure 1 – The infographic summarising Russia’s monthly advances, as shared in the Kyiv Independent article published on 8 September 2025.

To make matters worse, according to some intel from the battlefield, the Russian armed forces are moving 150,000 troops, backed by columns of armour, to the frontline in Pokrovsk. These valuable reinforcements will inevitably lead to the deterioration of the situation at the front, with dispatches from the besieged stronghold of Pokrovsk suggesting the Ukrainian forces ‘are almost encircled’. The collapse of Pokrovsk, a strategic logistics and economic hub, would put pressures both on the Ukrainian military and the embattled Ukrainian economy.

Non-experts on the Eastern Mediterranean would be bemused to hear that this region, which only neighbours the Black Sea, maintains decisive influence on the course of events in the Ukrainian battlefield. Yet the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained a critical, even if overlooked, role in influencing the fate of military operations on the Ukrainian theatre. How could this be? I hear you asking.

The main connecting link lies in the trade of energy. Recent evidence shows the significant extent to which the European Union has subsidised the Russian wartime economy, and, therefore by proxy, the Russian armed forces. These statistics show that EU member states alone have funnelled more than €210 billion into Russia through the purchase of fossil fuels between 24 February 2022 and 24 July 2025.

By comparison, the EU plus the UK and EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) contributed €167 billion to Ukraine in the form of military and financial assistance in a similar period, from 24 January 2022 to 30 June 2025.

These valuable revenue flows have enabled Russia to sustain its push on the battlefield. They have enabled the Kremlin to purchase valuable defence components on the global market, replace lost equipment, accelerate the development of weapon innovations, and source domestic and foreign hired guns. The latter has meant that, while Russia has been losing personnel at exorbitant rates, the Russian military has been able to replenish those loses and keep pushing in the battlefield. Best attesting to this is the fact that the Kremlin has avoided the need for a second partial, let alone a full, mobilisation, which would threaten regime stability.

The Eastern Mediterranean has played a crucial role in these energy flows’ continuity. While additional jurisdictions, like China and India, have become important intermediaries in the sale of Russian fossil fuels amidst western sanctions, the Eastern Mediterranean state of Türkiye has best leveraged the region’s proximity to the European market.

Benefiting from reduced logistics costs due to the short distance, Türkiye emerged as the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil products in 2023. With increases in domestic consumption being unable to account for such surges in fuel imports, the safe conclusion is that Türkiye has been a ‘strategic pitstop’ enabling the circumvention of western sanctions. Concurrently, the TurkStream pipeline remains the sole active pipeline feeding Russian natural gas into Europe.

This explains why the US President, Donald Trump, has proposed placing American secondary sanctions on Russian oil if Europe initiates. While some have called this a stalling tactic, a unilateral US sanction would likely do more to harm the American economy while Europe continues to buy vast volumes of Russian fossil fuels.

The fact that this proposal come from the US also reveals the precarious position Europe has placed itself in. While European leaders have been quick to pronounce that they are ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ for Ukraine, in reality they have failed to heed to a US warning that emerged as early as 2014.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, (most) NATO member states (re)securitised Russia as a national security threat. This prompted the US to publicly encourage Europe to close its most significant security vulnerability: the continent’s dependence on Russian energy. One of the core propositions that accompanied the US position on European energy security has been to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean as a most suitable alternative supplier. This position became codified in 2019 in the ‘Menendez-Rubo Act’, co-sponsored by then Senator and current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Beyond the region’s proximity to the European market, two EU member states – Cyprus and Greece –, amongst others in the region, maintain sizable hydrocarbon reserves. This reaffirms the Eastern Mediterranean’s suitability.

Yet, at the face of military threats by no other than Türkiye, the EU has been unable to offer the protective umbrella to Cyprus and Greece necessary to salvage European energy security.

As a result, the EU has failed to arrest its energy imports from Russia even after nearly four years since Russia begun its invasion. The REPowerEU policy – EU’s response to this conundrum – only emerged three months after the full-scale invasion commenced and does not envisage the full phasing out of Russian energy until at least 2027. By that time, if the war drags on, Russia will have been waging an effectively EU-subsidised war on Ukraine for five years.

In the absence of decisive action to leverage the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves, the EU will continue to situate itself between rock and a hard place. Instantly stopping Russian energy imports would cripple the embattled European economies. Before Germany bypassed its own sanctions by indirectly importing Russian gas mainly through France, key German executives spoke of the ‘permanent damage’ to Germany’s economy from the energy crisis. Continuing to buy Russian fuel will of course lead to more Ukrainian deaths in the battlefield and beyond.

Yet, despite the challenges and the collective EU’s inaction, some, but nonetheless important, progress has been made in the Eastern Mediterranean, which further reaffirms the region’s potential. The Greek Alexandroupolis LNG terminal’s construction has enabled non-Russian gas to flow into Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, including Ukraine.

The logistics of the endeavour further reiterate the prospect for energy to play a necessary role in bringing about lasting stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Egypt is the world’s seventh largest natural gas producer, domestic demand means that it heavily relies on Israeli imports to conduct its exporting business. Amidst interminable turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is an encouraging sign for the region. Importantly, it builds on the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s establishment in 2021, which includes both Israel and the Palestinian Authority along with six other regional states. The Gaza Marine hydrocarbon reserves, which remain intact, mean that they can be used to reconstruct Gaza and develop the West Bank once hostilities end.

Undoubtedly, the continued use of fossil fuels leads to environmental concerns. Paradoxically, exploiting these natural gas reserves can lead to an end to highly polluting instances of warfare. It could have also prevented warfare in the past. Beyond rescuing European energy security and the war in Ukraine, unleashing the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy potential will reaffirm its potential as a global strategic conduit.

A memorandum signed at the G20 in New Delhi in 2023 between the US, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy, and India resolves to establish the ‘India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’ (IMEC). The Eastern Mediterranean is a critical and necessary conduit in this strategic initiative to counter China’s economic, cultural, and political influence through the parallel Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Similarly, energy constitutes an important, albeit merely one, IMEC dimension.

Figure 2 – A visualisation of the strategic projects associated with ‘IMEC’, which includes energy infrastructure passing through the Eastern Mediterranean

If the EU is seriously interested in doing whatever it takes, then ensuring the development of the Eastern Mediterranean plan occurs unimpeded is the best next step. For academics, the highly consequential linkages between the Eastern Mediterranean, European energy security, and Ukrainian military security expose the increasing interconnectedness between security sectors and regions in a globalised world where international competition is on the rise.

The post How energy streams via the Eastern Mediterranean have been shaping the fate of the Ukraine war to Europe’s oblivion appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

598030

Representatives of the State Energy Institute of Turkmenistan discussed best practices of establishing technological energy parks during an OSCE-organized study visit to Milan, Italy, that took place from 22 to 24 September 2025.

The experts from Turkmenistan held meetings with their counterparts from the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre “Energy Efficiency and Renewables and the Polytechnic University of Milan. They discussed with their Italian counterparts the organizational, legal, engineering and technological dimensions related to the establishment and operation of technological energy parks.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized this study visit as part of its co-operation with the government of Turkmenistan in the area of developing the renewable energy sector and energy-saving technologies,” said Olivera Zurovac-Kuzman, Economic and Environmental Officer of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“We anticipate this visit offered a comprehensive platform for detailed discussions on various aspects of establishing technological energy parks and enhance the capacities of Turkmenistan’s experts in this cutting-edge field,” she added.

The delegation members had an opportunity to gain first-hand experiences of the operation of a technological energy park during a site visit to the Environment Park “Parco Scientifico Tecnologico per l’Ambiente” in Turin.

“This activity is particularly relevant, as Turkmenistan adopted the Law on Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency and is committed to implementing these measures,” emphasized Zurovac-Kuzman. “In this context, the visit to the technological energy parks serves as an extension of our ongoing support to the host country in advancing sustainable energy initiatives.”

The study visit was organized in co-operation with the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

This publication builds on the paper “Sustainable Finance at an Inflection Point: The EU Taxonomy and its Impact” presented at the “EU Law and Policymaking” panel of the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference, held at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece (29–30 May 2025). The support of UACES in organising and facilitating my participation in the conference is gratefully acknowledged.

Abstract

What counts as “sustainable” in the EU? The answer is not just political, but increasingly codified through technocratic tools. This article examines the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities as a key instrument of sustainability governance. Originally developed to steer green finance and prevent greenwashing, the taxonomy now plays a constitutive role by establishing the fundamental classification system that defines Europe’s green technological trajectory. Its scientific and technical logic, designed to create market clarity, provides a coordinative framework that aligns investment, industrial policy, and research priorities. Drawing on debates in innovation studies and institutional economics, this article argues that the EU Taxonomy functions as a de facto industrial policy instrument, creating a coordinated selection environment that shapes Europe’s green technological trajectory.

 

Introduction: Defining Sustainability, the EU Way

The global financial landscape is undergoing a profound transformation: concerns about climate change and environmental degradation are increasingly redirecting capital towards sustainable investment. This shift is particularly striking in Europe. The European Union (EU) aims to achieve net zero by 2050 under the European Green Deal, with member-states rallying behind this vision. The EU Taxonomy has emerged as “a cornerstone of the European Union’s sustainable finance framework and an important market transparency tool.” Enacted through Regulation (EU) 2020/852 in 2020, the green rulebook establishes a rigorous, science-based system to classify environmentally sustainable economic activities. Yet the sustainability classification system’s influence extends far beyond its original financial transparency mandate. What began as a tool to prevent greenwashing in capital markets has gradually evolved into an instrument that shapes innovation priorities, industrial policy, and research funding across Europe

This analytical puzzle raises a fundamental question: How does the EU Taxonomy shape technological innovation and industrial development in Europe? This article argues that the EU Taxonomy exerts its influence by structuring a “coordinated selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) – a framework of incentives and signals that guides the decisions of innovators, investors, and policymakers. It does so by establishing the foundational technical criteria that regulations like the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB), and policies like the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) incorporate. In doing so, it creates a coordinated selection environment that powerfully structures economic and innovative activity around its classification of sustainability.

The discussion argues that by defining the boundaries of “sustainable” activity, the Taxonomy shapes “technological paradigms”: the shared cognitive frameworks that guide search activities within innovation communities (Dosi, 1982). This science-based classification system aligns the incentives of investors, firms, and policymakers, thereby structuring the development and selection of green technologies and fundamentally orienting Europe’s industrial trajectory.

 

What Is the EU Taxonomy, and Why Was It Created?

The concept of sustainable finance has long faced definitional challenges. In 2008, Sandberg et. al. identified fundamental heterogeneity in Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), describing it as “terminological, definitional, strategic and practical.” While acknowledging that SRI was the predominant term for investments integrating social, ethical, environmental, and corporate governance concerns, the scholars expressed scepticism about standardization unless implemented through top-down regulation. This definitional ambiguity persisted, with Strauß noting in 2021 that “the discussion about SF lacks consistency and a common understanding of SF.”

The European Commission (EC) acknowledged that achieving sustainable finance objectives required “a common language and a clear definition of what is ‘sustainable'” (EU, 2020). EUR-Lex (2021) offered a broad definition of sustainable finance as “the process of taking due account of environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations when making investment decisions in the financial sector, leading to increased longer-term investments into sustainable economic activities and projects.” However, this definition, while highlighting the importance of environmental factors in investment decisions, lacked specific criteria for measuring sustainability.

The introduction of the EU Taxonomy marked a significant shift toward technical precision. As outlined in Regulation (EU) 2020/852, this classification system establishes concrete criteria for environmentally sustainable economic activities. The regulation targets six key environmental goals: mitigating climate change, adapting to its effects, ensuring the sustainable management of water and marine ecosystems, advancing a circular economy, preventing and controlling pollution, and protecting and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems. To qualify, an activity must meet four key criteria: it must make a substantial contribution to one of the environmental goals, avoid significant harm to the others, comply with safeguards, and meet technical screening criteria. This transformation represents a fundamental shift from principles-based to rules-based regulation, replacing interpretative flexibility with science-based technical specifications. The EU sustainability assessment framework functions as a comprehensive checklist that defines what counts as an “environmentally sustainable activity” for investment and policy purposes – a seemingly technical exercise with far-reaching consequences.

The shift in terminology from “sustainable finance” to “EU Taxonomy” represents a significant rhetorical evolution with important implications for governance approaches. The term “sustainable finance” evokes normative goals and principles, emphasizing the purpose of financial activities. In contrast, “taxonomy” carries scientific and technical connotations, suggesting objective classification based on empirical criteria. However, despite the technical framing, normative judgments remain embedded throughout the taxonomy. The selection of environmental objectives, the thresholds for “substantial contribution,” and the accommodation of transitional activities all reflect value judgments about environmental priorities and the appropriate pace of sustainability transitions.

 

From Finance to Innovation: When Classification Becomes Direction

The expansion of EU’s sustainability assessment tool from financial classification to broader policy influence is significant, because it demonstrates how technical standards can become powerful instruments of economic steering. Rather than remaining neutral tools, classification systems like the Taxonomy actively shape which technologies receive investment, which research priorities get funded, and which industrial strategies governments pursue.

 

Capital Coordination and Market Formation

The EU Taxonomy’s most direct impact lies in its capacity to align investment flows across public and private sectors. Originally designed to provide clarity for financial market participants under the SFDR, the green classification system has established mandatory disclosure requirements for large financial institutions. The European Banking Authority has noted substantial engagement with the green rulebook’s criteria across the EU banking sector, with institutions reporting significant exposure to both green rulebook-aligned and non-aligned activities in their climate risk assessments. EIB has integrated sustainability assessment tool’s criteria into its lending decisions, effectively making compliance a prerequisite for accessing Europe’s largest source of public investment capital. This alignment mechanism transforms the green rulebook from a mere classification tool into what a “market-shaping” instrument that actively constructs the boundaries of legitimate sustainable investment (Mazzucato, 2021).

 

The New Architecture of Industrial Policy

While the EU Taxonomy was originally designed as a classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities, its influence extends beyond financial markets into broader policy and research frameworks. The Green Deal Industrial Plan, unveiled in February 2023, does not directly cite the EU sustainability assessment framework. Yet, its entire architecture is built upon the same strategic logic and targets the same sectors. The Plan identifies “net-zero technologies” – including batteries, windmills, heat pumps, solar, electrolysers, and carbon capture and storage – as its core priorities. This list is not arbitrary; it is a direct reflection of the economic activities designated for climate change mitigation within the EU green rulebook (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). The Plan operates on this pre-defined policy environment, focusing on accelerating production and competitiveness in sectors already validated by the Taxonomy’s scientific screening criteria. This alignment demonstrates how the sustainability assessment framework has helped establish a common understanding of strategic green technologies, which indirectly informs the selection of sectors for industrial development.

NZIA (2023) and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) (2024) similarly focus on key technologies and raw materials that underpin decarbonization and green innovation. While these policies do not explicitly cite the Taxonomy, they operate within the same sustainability-oriented policy environment that the Taxonomy helps define. The Net Zero Industry Act (2023) establishes manufacturing targets for “net-zero technologies” that closely mirror the green rulebook’s-eligible activities. CRMA aims to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of raw materials critical for strategic technologies. The list of these technologies: permanent magnets, batteries, fuel cells, solar panels, wind turbines, and electrolysers, directly mirrors the technologies and economic activities deemed strategic and sustainable under the Taxonomy’s climate mitigation objectives (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). In these cases, the sustainability assessment framework functions less as a legal mandate and more as a normative and technical reference point, shaping the boundaries of strategic industrial and technological activity in Europe.

Thus, critical raw materials strategies, renewable energy deployment targets, and clean technology manufacturing incentives are increasingly aligned with the same environmental objectives that the EU Taxonomy codifies, creating a powerful ‘landscape pressure’ – a broad macro-level impetus – that shapes industrial development pathways (Geels, 2014). While these policies do not formally reference the green rulebook, they operate within the broader sustainability framework that the sustainability assessment framework defines.

The Taxonomy contributes towards shaping norms and expectations around sustainable activity that anchor the EU’s industrial strategy. Policies may not reference it directly, because they are already operating within the framework of sustainable economic activity that the EU sustainability framework codified into law. This integration represents a significant departure from traditional industrial policy approaches, where governments typically selected strategic sectors based on economic competitiveness or national security considerations. Instead, the Taxonomy’s technical criteria now provide the scientific and regulatory foundation for industrial strategy.

 

Shaping Technological Paradigms and Innovation Pathways

Beyond capital and policy, the Taxonomy also influences research and innovation funding. Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research program, prioritizes projects that contribute to climate action, environmental sustainability, and the Green Deal objectives. Its strategic plan (2025–2027) earmarks significant shares of funding for climate-related activities and biodiversity projects, effectively incentivizing research aligned with EU environmental objectives. While the program does not explicitly require applicants to reference the green framework, its priorities reflect the broader sustainability and Green Deal framework.

In practice, this means that successful proposals increasingly need to demonstrate how their activities contribute to decarbonization, ecosystem preservation, or the circular economy, echoing the classification logic of the Taxonomy. In this sense, the green rulebook functions as a definitional framework that indirectly guides the direction of EU-funded research, shaping innovation priorities even at the earliest stages of project conception. This creates a powerful “selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that steers R&D toward Taxonomy-eligible pathways. The alignment also illustrates a broader pattern: the EU is using technical standards not just to regulate markets but to actively steer research and innovation trajectories, creating positive feedback loops between policy, funding, and technological development.

Yet, this function is dual-edged. While it creates momentum for aligned technologies (e.g., stimulating R&D in green hydrogen, which meets the Technical Screening Criteria (TSC)), it also risks creating path dependency. The novel classification system is in not only “opening up,” but also “closing down” innovation pathways (Stirling, 2008). Despite rhetoric about technology neutrality, the Taxonomy’s specific criteria inevitably privilege certain technical solutions over others. Technologies that are not (yet) recognized by the EU sustainability framework, or that represent a more radical departure from the status quo, may find it harder to attract funding and attention. Furthermore, the contentious inclusion of nuclear power demonstrates that achieving green rulebook alignment is a key strategy for technologies to secure long-term viability, influencing not just current investment but future R&D portfolios.

 

Conclusion: Classifications That Shape Futures

The EU Taxonomy’s journey from a narrow financial tool to a broad-based governance instrument reveals a core mechanism of modern economic steering: the use of technical standards to orchestrate complex transitions. This analysis has argued that the sustainability classification system’s power derives not from direct mandate but from its role as a constitutive framework – one that actively creates new realities and categories – that creates a coordinated selection environment. By providing a coherent and sanctioned guidance on sustainable activity, it aligns the incentives of investors, public banks, and industrial policymakers. This environment, in turn, shapes technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982), steering R&D and industrial strategy toward Taxonomy-aligned pathways.

Ultimately, the EU Taxonomy demonstrates that today governance is increasingly exercised through the quiet power of classification. The ongoing evolution of its TSC will therefore remain a central, and intensely political, process in determining the structure of the European green economy

The post Technical Standards, Political Effects: The EU Taxonomy’s Expanding Role in Industrial Policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.