Agrégateur de flux

By Desmond Dinan (George Mason University) and Sophia Russack (Centre for European Policy Studies)

The reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen in 2024 was more than just continuity at the top of the EU executive. It revealed how power is distributed in Brussels, between the European Council and European Parliament (EP), between national governments and the Commission, and increasingly between the Commission President and the rest of the College. In particular, the process by which the second von der Leyen Commission came into being illustrates two long-term shifts: the presidentialisation of the Commission and the growing, if contested, politicisation of its appointment.

Presidential power and party politics

Von der Leyen consolidated the trend, begun under José Emanuel Barroso and intensified under Jean-Claude Juncker, of centralising power in the hands of the President. She abolished the Vice-President tier, designed diffuse and overlapping portfolios, and ensured that no other “heavyweight” rivals sat at the table. These choices made her the ultimate arbiter within the College.

At the same time, party politics shaped the process more than ever before. Although von der Leyen formally ran as a Spitzenkandidat (the lead candidate of a European political party), her nomination owed more to package-deal bargaining among national leaders. Being a Spitzenkandidat gave her political cover, but the real driver was intergovernmental pragmatism and political party negotiating, especially between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Party of European Socialists. Von der Leyen’s re-election in the EP was smoother than in 2019, but also more transactional. Her speech to MEPs emphasised competitiveness, defence, and migration, while downplaying the once-flagship Green Deal. Symbolically, the Spitzenkandidaten model survived. Substantively, its impact was limited.

Constructing the College

National governments still nominate Commissioners, but von der Leyen exerted clear influence. She informally vetted candidates and, in a striking move, forced out France’s Thierry Breton, a vocal critic. This highlighted the President’s capacity to shape the team, though in practice the decision also reflected personal and political tensions.

The new College was younger and more male-dominated than her first. Party-political calculations were evident: the European People’s Party was over-represented, while the Socialists and liberals held key portfolios as part of a fragile balance. Von der Leyen also created three new portfolios, defence industry, housing, and the Mediterranean, both to reflect pressing EU challenges and to appease national governments and MEPs.

The design of the College reinforced her leadership style: overlapping responsibilities, blurred mandates, and a lack of heavyweight figures all strengthened her own central role.

Accountability under strain

The EP’s confirmation hearings offered another insight. Long a forum for scrutiny, in 2024 they became largely symbolic. All candidates were approved, including those facing strong criticism, thanks to a pre-arranged deal between the main party groups. The hearings looked more like the politics of performance than an exercise in accountability.

The final confirmation vote passed with the lowest share of support ever for a new Commission. That outcome reflected both the EP’s fragmentation and its reluctance to challenge the process head-on.

Why it matters

The making of von der Leyen’s second Commission highlights the maturing of a presidentialised executive in Brussels. The Spitzenkandidaten process remains part of the story, but as a political ritual rather than a binding rule. National leaders in the European Council still control the decisive steps. Parliament’s role is visible, but limited.

In a more fragmented and polarised EU, executive power has concentrated further in the Commission President’s hands. Von der Leyen’s second term shows how this dynamic works in practice: national bargaining determines the President, presidential control shapes the College, and parliamentary oversight struggles to keep pace. What looks like continuity at the top is in fact a window into how EU governance is evolving—more presidential, more politicised, but not necessarily more accountable. Opaque working practices, such as vaccine procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic, paired with the frequent sidelining of key stakeholders and formalised procedures in her first term, fuelled doubts about the level of accountability in decision-making.

Sophia Russack is a Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, one of Europe’s leading think tanks on EU affairs. She holds a PhD from Maastricht University. Her academic and professional work has positioned her as a prominent expert in the field of EU institutions and EU democracy.

Desmond Dinan is a professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Virginia, USA. He teaches and writes on EU history, institutions, and governance. His latest book is A Concise History of the European Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2025).

The post The Making of Ursula von der Leyen’s Second Commission: Politicisation and the Limits of Parliamentarisation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A change in mandate requires unanimous support from all EU states

Une enquête a été ouverte à la suite de la publication d'une vidéo sur Instagram, qui a depuis été supprimée.

The two leaders unveiled about 20 flagship projects, spanning energy to trade

Des accords de partenariats sont signés, des intentions d'investissements sont annoncées et des centaines de milliards de dollars sont promis à l'Afrique lors des sommets avec les puissances étrangères. Mais le continent peine encore à amorcer son développement tant attendu. Quelles en sont les raisons ?

EU Ministers of Defence met today, 29 August 2025, in Copenhagen.

Troels Lund Poulsen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Denmark, and Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, chaired the meeting, during which Ministers discussed the EU's military support to Ukraine, European defence readiness, and the EU's military missions and operations.

When it comes to European defence readiness, several Ministers recalled the key role of EDA as the established platform for national Ministries of Defence to cooperate on capabilities at EU level.  

In line with its mandate, EDA will continue to support all 27 Member States and adapt its capability expert groups to reflect the new security environment and our common objective to enhance European defence readiness by 2030.

Budapest has long played a spoiler in EU statements over the war

Dans le sud du Malawi, la chaîne de montagnes dominée par le mont Mulanje a été inscrite en juillet sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l’Unesco. Cette reconnaissance souligne son importance pour les peuples autochtones, ainsi que son statut de l’un des plus grands massifs isolés au monde. Pour les chefs traditionnels, la montagne abrite les esprits de leurs ancêtres.

In one of her most forceful criticisms yet of the Russian leader, the Commission president called on “all of Europe” to step up its military readiness

Democratic unity may determine military survival.

The French egg sector warns of "a significant health risk for consumers", as supermarkets minimise the issue

The plan builds on proven global strategies, but rare disease experts say full implementation will be critical, and EU leadership is needed

The move follows the French prime minister's surprise gamble to hold a confidence vote on 8 September

Monitoring Iran and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Credit: IAEA
 
The IAEA applies safeguards to verify states are honouring their international legal obligations to use nuclear material for peaceful purposes only.

By Kelsey Davenport
WASHINGTON DC, Aug 29 2025 (IPS)

The decision early this week by the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) to initiate the process to snap back UN sanctions on Iran that were modified as part of the 2015 nuclear deal must be paired with an effective diplomatic strategy that restarts talks between the United States and Iran.

If the E3 and the United States fail to prioritize pragmatic diplomacy in the coming weeks and provide assurance that there will be no further military attacks while bilateral talks proceed, they risk pushing Tehran closer to nuclear weapons and putting the region back on a path to war.

Under the so-called snapback process outlined in Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, the Security Council now has 30 days to pass a resolution continuing the UN sanctions relief.

If such a resolution does not pass, there will be an automatic reimposition of the UN sanctions and nuclear restrictions—including a prohibition on uranium enrichment—contained in resolutions passed by the Security Council between 2006 and 2010 as part of the global pressure campaign that contributed to the negotiation of the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Iran has threatened to respond to the snapping back of UN measures, including by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a step that would put the United States and Iran back on a path to conflict.

To avert this crisis, the Trump administration must take advantage of the 30-day window before snapback is finalized to reach an interim agreement with Iran that stabilizes the current crisis and extends the option to snapback UN sanctions.

Such an arrangement would reduce the risk of further conflict and create the time and space for the complex negotiations that will be necessary to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear deal.

In any interim agreement, the Trump administration must prioritize the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s announcement that inspectors returned to Iran and Tehran’s decision to allow inspectors access to the Bushehr site is a positive step, but it is imperative that Iran meets its legal obligations by allowing the full resumption of IAEA safeguards inspections at all sites and cooperating with IAEA efforts to account for Iran’s stockpiles of nuclear materials, particularly the uranium enriched to 60 percent.

An interim deal should also take into account Iran’s legitimate concerns about further illegal attacks on its nuclear facilities and scientists by solidifying the ceasefire that ended the 12-day war between Israel, Iran, and the United States and recognizing Iran’s NPT right to a peaceful nuclear program under IAEA safeguards.

An agreement along these lines would be insufficient to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, but it would be a positive step that de-escalates tensions and creates time for further diplomacy to reduce Iran’s proliferation risk in the long term.

Failure to use the 30-day window to reach an agreement that staves off snapback risks putting the United States, Israel, and Iran back on the path to conflict and could drive Tehran to follow through on its threat to withdraw from the NPT, a step that increases the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran and weakens the treaty.

Despite President Donald Trump’s claims that the U.S. and Israeli military strikes set Iran’s program back by years, military action is incapable of addressing Iran’s proliferation threat. Iran’s nuclear knowledge cannot be bombed away, and Tehran still possesses nuclear capabilities and material that pose an urgent proliferation threat.

And now some of those materials, including Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to near-weapons grade levels, remain accounted for and unmonitored. It is highly likely that Iran retains the capabilities and materials to quickly return to the threshold of nuclear weapons or weaponize if the decision were made to do so.

If Trump fails to seize this moment, he risks dragging the United States back into a military conflict with Iran, weakening the NPT, and driving Tehran closer to the bomb. It is in neither the interest of Tehran nor Washington to miss this window of opportunity to pursue a lasting diplomatic solution that verifiably blocks Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons and provides Iran with benefits in return.

The Arms Control Association is an independent, nongovernmental, nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to the providing authoritative information and practical solutions to eliminate the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons.

Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy, and is a leading expert on nuclear and missile programs in Iran and North Korea and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
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Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.

Russia considers multilateralism to be an instrument for promoting and managing multipolarity. It regards the UN as an important component of the international system and would like to see it reflect a multipolar world order, which in Russia’s rhetoric is marked by the dominance of principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This shapes Russia’s approach to the UN development pillar, where it seeks to advance its geopolitical interests, including countering Western influence.
Financially, Russia remains a marginal player in the UN development pillar. Between 2018 and 2022, it was the smallest contributor to UN development activities among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and ranked 23rd among all UN member states. In terms of international professional staff, the share of Russian nationals in the UN system has remained below 1 per cent over the past five years, with the majority concentrated in the UN Secretariat. However, its diplomatic missions – particularly in New York and Geneva – are relatively well-staffed and are recognised for their diplomatic skills and expertise.
Lacking prominent material weight, Russia leverages diplomatic and rhetorical tools to project its power. It portrays itself as an “anti-colonial leader” and champion of the Global South. Russia positions itself as an advocate of an alternative approach to development cooperation, affirming in its rhetoric that developing countries have the right to independently choose their model of socio-economic development without external influence or pressure. In line with this, it rejects the imposition of what it argues are Western liberal values on developing states – which it equates with conditionality in development assistance and infringement on sovereignty – and presents itself as a defender of what in Russian discourse are referred to as “traditional values”, which are usually in opposition to individualism and progressivism.
Although Russia’s arguments resonate among Global South states – because they tap into legitimate grievances – there are cases in which its rhetoric appears instrumental and does not match its practices.
While Russia’s material capacity to project its power and position itself as an alternative development partner is limited, its diplomatic efforts, rhetoric and ability to capitalise on the grievances of the Global South as well as Western double standards amid global power shifts position it as a noticeable actor in UN development work, suggesting it should not be prematurely disregarded based on its modest role as a donor.
Main takeaways:
• Strategic use of UN development pillar: Russia engages in UN development work as a platform to advance its broader geopolitical objectives and its view of the international system, including positioning itself rhetorically as a counterweight to Western influence. While already politicised to some extent, this further reinforces the role of UN development work as a stage for power politics.
• Diplomatic leverage: Although Russia’s material weight in UN development pillar is modest, it uses diplomatic channels and discursive engagement in decision-making processes across UN entities and fora to pursue its interests.
• Anti-colonial narratives and normative contestation: Russia rhetorically appeals to the grievances of the Global South and challenges Western-driven norms and approaches to development. It promotes the vision of a multipolar world order with Moscow as one of the poles of power.