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By Andrea Pareschi (University of Bologna and Ca’ Foscari University of Venice)

Across EU member states, Eurosceptic parties – especially on the radical right – are thriving. Not long ago, they had only limited support and were stuck in opposition. But in recent years, many of them have ‘come in from the cold’ and gained real traction. Since 2023, parties vehement in their criticism of the EU have come out on top in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, the Netherlands, France and Austria. In other places – like Finland, Romania, Germany, and Portugal – Eurosceptic parties came in second. And after the 2024 European elections, right-wing Eurosceptic groups Patriots for Europe (11.7 per cent of the seats) and European Conservatives and Reformists (10.8 per cent) are the third and fourth largest in the European Parliament.

Against this background, it is more important than ever to properly understand the different types of Euroscepticism among parties, since that helps us identify what kind of challenges they pose to the EU. The most common way to do so still amounts to the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. First introduced by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, this approach basically separates those who oppose the EU on principle from those who just have specific issues with it. Lately, however, a number of researchers have started using the ‘hard Eurosceptic’ label only for parties wanting out of the EU altogether. What I have argued in a recent research note is that this narrower view drifts away from what Taggart and Szczerbiak originally meant – and that it actually hides how much principled opposition to European integration is really out there.

To begin with, it is really instructive to go back to the two scholars’ original work. Initially, Taggart and Szczerbiak linked hard Euroscepticism to rejection both of EU membership and of the project of European integration. Yet, they soon accepted that classification should not revolve around party stances towards membership, which are too superficial to convey a party’s ‘deeper position […] on the broader underlying issue of European integration’. Instead, they argued that the main thing to look at should be ‘underlying support for or opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU’. Their following contribution to the Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism made clear that a party’s stance on the European integration project should be the main factor, when it comes to deciding whether the party is hard Eurosceptic, soft Eurosceptic, or none.

A drift has instead come to affect the concept of hard Euroscepticism. Too often, these days, hard Euroscepticism is equated to the ‘nuclear option’ of exit, whereas every other kind of party stance or behaviour attacking the EU is seen as soft Eurosceptic. To be fair, there are some understandable reasons for this shift. Twenty years after Taggart and Szczerbiak proposed their definitions, the idea of a European integration project looks a lot fuzzier. Does European integration have a stable, recognisable core at all? Some scholars would say no. If one takes this view, indeed, interpretations of hard Euroscepticism centred on exit are justified. If, in other words, the EU is whatever political actors make of it, then the only party position which corresponds to uncompromising opposition to it is wanting out. If one, instead, takes the view that an essence of European integration exists, things are different. In this case, manifest and consistent rejection of such an essence is surely the most appropriate litmus test for hard Euroscepticism.

After looking at what existing research says on the substantive core of the European project, I attempt a redefinition of hard Euroscepticism which is rooted in such a fundamental basis. A party is then defined as hard Eurosceptic if it systematically demonstrates principled opposition towards either of four elements. First, the EU as an integrated common market. Second, the legitimacy of the institutions which form the supranational layer of the EU. Third, the possibility of expanding the EU’s competencies. Fourth, any of the core values set out in the Treaty on European Union and the Copenhagen criteria for eligibility to join the EU. Following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s logic, I suggest that a party should count as hard Eurosceptic if its policies imply being strongly and consistently opposed to any of the above elements.

There are two main reasons why it makes more sense to define hard Euroscepticism this way, instead of the other. First, tying hard Euroscepticism only to exit ends up limiting the label to opposition parties. As a matter of fact, the conditions leading even strongly anti-EU governing parties to pursue EU withdrawal only materialise very rarely. Many of those parties have realised that it is more effective to oppose the EU from within, as like-minded political forces abound in other countries. If only rejection of membership amounts to hard Euroscepticism, the category is applied to parties which flirt with exit while in opposition only to be pulled back once they, having entered government, confront the EU through less blunt strategies. This makes the category too unstable, turning it into the by-product of tactical moves rather than a consistent position.

Second, as a definition based on exit gradually empties the box of hard Eurosceptic parties, very different political forces end up being squeezed together into the adjacent box of soft Eurosceptic ones. There,  ‘Euroalternativist’ parties, that support the EU’s institutional structure while demanding different policies, are unsuitably mixed with parties which barely agree on the ‘principle’ of cooperation, refusing both the ‘practice’ and the ‘future’ of European integration. Conversely, the approach I propose labels as hard Eurosceptic any party demanding little less than a total overhaul of the key tenets of the EU. Soft Eurosceptic parties are only those whose opposition to European integration is indeed contingent.

Within my article, I have dwelled on two parties which serve as good examples: Matteo Salvini’s League and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz. Having not campaigned for exit, they are classified as soft Eurosceptics by renowned contemporary overviews. Nevertheless, the League regards the supranational layer of the EU as bereft of legitimacy, at odds with the ‘Europe of peoples’ (and its wholesale indifference to migrants’ human rights may negate an EU core value). Fidesz may cross the line on more than one criterion, too. Anyway, nowhere is this more evident than in its sweeping refusal of multiple EU core values. Arguably, a definition qualifying both parties as hard Eurosceptic fits better, as they both fundamentally oppose the European project on principle.

In conclusion: pushing for EU withdrawal certainly makes a party hard Eurosceptic, but if hard Euroscepticism means fundamental opposition to European integration, there is so much more to it than demanding exit. Within national politics, a hard Eurosceptic party may choose different options: asking for a referendum on membership, calling for complete renegotiation of all Treaties, demanding retroactive opt-outs, and so on. At EU level, a hard Eurosceptic party may confront the substantive core of European integration through the behaviour of its representatives in institutions such as the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.

My recent article with JCMS aims, as a minimum, to stoke debate on how interpretations of European integration should bear on definitions of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. More ambitiously, this contribution warrants adding a piece to current debates around Euroscepticism. Radical right Eurosceptic political forces are bidding to get into the EU control room by forging linkages with the mainstream centre-right, which at times appears receptive to the lure of the so-called ‘Venezuela majority’. Are hard Eurosceptic parties across EU member states actively seeking to modify the essence of the European project? May any such attempts be traced back to coordinated action among them? Last but not least, is there any evidence showing the success of such endeavours? In the Europe of 2025, these are all questions worth asking.

Andrea Pareschi is affiliated with the University of Bologna and the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, European Politics and International Relations. His research interests comprise European politics, Euroscepticism, mass-elite congruence, and the EU issue in British politics. His articles have appeared in Journal of Common Market Studies, Italian Political Science Review, Journal of Contemporary European Research, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, and other reviews. https://unibo.academia.edu/AndreaPareschi

The post How hard does it have to be? Why hard Euroscepticism is not just about exiting the EU appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Length of video : 15'

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President Metsola opened the 8-11 September plenary session in Strasbourg with a minute of silence to remember lives lost in various tragedies in the EU and its neighbourhood.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

President Metsola opened the 8-11 September plenary session in Strasbourg with a minute of silence to remember lives lost in various tragedies in the EU and its neighbourhood.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

President Metsola opened the 8-11 September plenary session in Strasbourg with a minute of silence to remember lives lost in various tragedies in the EU and its neighbourhood.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Le Conseil constitutionnel a dévoilé ce lundi 8 septembre la liste définitive des candidats à l’élection présidentielle du 25 octobre 2025. Retrouvez dans ce guide toutes les informations concernant ce scrutin.

Credit: brutto film / shutterstock.com

By Anna Naupa
Sep 8 2025 (IPS)

 
Globally, there is a 0.36% deterioration in average levels of peacefulness, as more countries are increasing their levels of militarisation against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, increasing conflict, and rising economic uncertainty.

But this statistic omits most Pacific island countries. In 2025, only three are ranked by the Global Peace Index (GPI): New Zealand in 3rd place, Australia in18th and Papua New Guinea ranking 116th out of 163 nations.

As regional dialogue about an ‘Ocean of Peace’ concept advances, a dedicated Pacific Peace Index—as suggested by Solomon Islands’ Professor Transform Aqorau at the July 2025 Pacific Regional and National Security Conference—might provide additional form to an evolving political dialogue amongst Pacific Islands Forum member states.

But, how is Pacific peace defined? How might our own Pacific measure of peacefulness complement existing efforts to safeguard peace and security in the region?

What is Pacific Peace?

Peace is more than the absence of conflict or violence; it is a global public good that enables people to live full, healthy and prosperous lives without fear.

“Peace must serve the people, not geopolitics, not elites in the region, not distant interests,” Professor Aqorau says, in articulating a vision for Pacific peace. Peace must also tackle broader factors affecting safety and wellbeing across the Pacific, particularly for women and vulnerable populations, says Fiji’s Shamima Ali.

Peace and development are two sides of the same coin. The Pacific 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent places peace alongside harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity, as a key element for attaining free, healthy, and productive lives for Pacific peoples. Delivering Pacific peace, therefore, entails securing well-being; protecting people, place and environment; advancing development; and securing futures for present and future generations, the latter efforts entailing climate action and protection of sovereignty.

While global indices are variably critiqued for omissions of Pacific Islands data, unilateral development and indicator bias, poorly contextualized methodologies, or the significant resourcing required to produce Pacific datasets, indices can nonetheless usefully inform policy-makers.

What could a Pacific Peace Index measure?

The current starting point for measuring and monitoring peace in the region is found in the form of existing country commitments to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 (the ‘Peace Goal’).

The Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development has contextualised eight SDG 16 indicators for regional reporting that address experiences of violence, access to justice, civil registration and legal identity, transparency of public expenditure, and public access to information and views on participation in decision-making processes.

In 2022, a regional monitoring report led by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat found that limited data availability for SDG16 hampered measurement of progress in the Pacific. This is broadly reflective of global trends, where investment is needed in further data generation efforts and statistical capacity to measure SDG 16.

The report also found that the Pacific was regressing on advancing effective institutions, transparency, and accountability.

But are SDG16’s Pacific contextualised indicators sufficient to meet the expectations of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security and the Pacific 2050 Strategy’s Peace and Security pillar? Can this type of reporting serve as a potential proxy ‘Pacific Peace Index’?

While answers to these questions are both technical and political in nature, there are two things to keep in mind:

1) Peace has deep roots in Pacific social and cultural structures

Despite close alignment with regional strategies, the current SDG 16 contextualised indicators do not encapsulate the depth of a Pacific vision for peace.

Pacific Islands Countries’ policy commitments to aspects of peace are well-documented. Each year new initiatives are announced that respond to an expanded concept of security, ranging from traditional security cooperation to tackling gender-based violence, climate mitigation and humanitarian assistance or investing in democratic processes.

But, knowledge gaps remain about the contribution of locally driven peace initiatives to national and regional efforts, and how these contribute to overall Pacific well-being. Addressing these gaps allows for a more comprehensive telling of an aggregated Pacific narrative of peace, which could be factored into a Pacific Peace Index. For example, peace-building dialogues following the Bougainville crisis, Solomon Islands’ ethnic tensions, and series of Fiji coups have highlighted the important contributions of locally-driven approaches, including drawing on traditional dispute resolution.

2) Telling a story of purposeful peace

Yet, Pacific peace is more than a collection of discrete data points and time-bound security-related projects. Peace is an evolving process, it is future-oriented and a proactive, purposeful exercise.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretary-General Baron Waqa has stressed that peace must be “anchored in sovereignty, resilience, inclusion and regional solidarity.” Many Pacific scholars agree, arguing that there is no real peace without addressing longstanding issues of colonisation, militarisation, restricted sovereignty and justice, which continue to bear on many Pacific islanders.

To tell a regional story means connecting, for example, Tuvalu’s international statehood recognition, the recent landmark ICJ advisory opinion on climate change, the nuclear legacies in the region, political instability, elections, and well-being measures, to the region’s vision of peace. Combined, we can then begin to grasp all the elements that contribute to a cumulatively peaceful region.

So, where to from here?

Another tool is the Positive Peace Index which measures the ‘attitudes, institutions and structures that sustain and create peaceful societies’. It assesses socio-economic development, justice, good governance and effective institutions, inclusion, resilience and diplomacy. A Pacific Peace Index could adapt this to incorporate Pacific indigenous philosophies of peace and values of social cohesion, well-being and reconciliation that are absent from existing global indices, for example, and track the region’s journey, disaggregated by country.

Multi-country indices demand considerable capacity so a State of Pacific Peace assessment may instead offer a simpler option. This could entail a dedicated section in the existing Pacific Regional Security Outlook report produced by regional organisations. Alternatively, the region’s academic institutions (e.g. via Track 2 mechanisms) could be invited to assist. Investing in peace summits also provides the opportunity for ongoing regional peace dialogue.

The emphasis, however, must be on building, not duplicating, existing regional mechanisms.

The opportunity of a Pacific Peace Index would be in owning and telling a coherent peace narrative that: a) bridges security and development and, b) reflects how the peace interests and dignity of Pacific peoples are being upheld over time.

As political dialogue about a Pacific ‘Ocean of Peace’ evolves, Pacific peoples’ visions of peace must drive any framing and subsequent action. Professor Aqorau offers further wisdom: ” Our peace should not depend on choosing sides, but on asserting our needs, on our terms and on our collective aspirations.”

Related articles:
Peacebuilding: The Missing Peace in COP30 Climate Ambition

Climate Change in Pasifika Relational Itulagi

Anna Naupa is a ni-Vanuatu PhD candidate at the Australian National University.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.

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Die EU-Handels- und Agrarkommissare Maroš Šefčovič und Christophe Hansen reisen diese Woche nach Neu-Delhi, um die Verhandlungen über ein Handelsabkommen mit Indien voranzutreiben – besonders der Agrarsektor sorgt für Hürden.

Die Abteilung Staat (Public Economics) des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine

studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

(für 10 Wochenstunden)

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches

Panel (SOEP) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div)

(für 10 Wochenstunden)

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureirnichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) ist eine der größten und am längsten laufenden multidisziplinären Panelstudien weltweit, für die derzeit jährlich etwas 30.000 Menschen in knapp 15.000 Haushalten befragt werden. Das SOEP hat den Anspruch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel zu erfassen und steht immer neuen vielfältigen Themen- und Aufgabenfeldern gegenüber.

Alles deutet darauf hin, dass François Bayrou am Montagabend nicht mehr Premierminister Frankreichs sein wird. Präsident Emmanuel Macron steht damit vor schwierigen Entscheidungen – und Frankreich vor unruhigen Tagen.

Obwohl sie eine wesentliche Rolle in der globalen Lieferkette für Palmöl spielen und die regionale und nationale Wirtschaft unterstützen, werden Kleinbauern, die Ölpalmen anbauen, in den Mainstream-Diskussionen nur am Rande erwähnt.

Der Klimawandel ist nicht die einzige Ursache für Spaniens Brände. Auch andere Faktoren verschärfen die Lage – und die sind politisch beeinflussbar.

Monday 8 September

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Monday 8 September

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Monday 8 September

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Next AFET committee meeting will be held on:

• Monday 22 and Tuesday 23 September, room SPAAK (3C50), Brussels

Meetings are webstreamed with the exception of agenda items held "in camera".

AFET - DROI calendar of meetings 2025
Meeting documents
Webstreaming
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