Európai Unió : hírek magyarul

Ahead of US President Donald Trump's trip to Beijing on 14 May, China hawks in Congress are ramping up efforts [...]

The Qatari Air Force has informed its Turkish counterpart that it is suspending the planned delivery of 12 second-hand Typhoon [...]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's choice to appoint his current military adviser Roman Gofman to head the Mossad next month, [...]

Restricting the flight path of Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft belonging to the US Air Force and its Australian and [...]

French police Commissioner Xavier Claudel, head of the 2nd Paris [...]

Why Beijing has failed to exploit Trump’s missteps,

Washington has more demands—and Tehran has more leverage.

A smarter war on drugs begins with selective punishment.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

How the war created a new geopolitical divide.

How the summit could change the course of U.S.-China competition.

High level meetings were organized today at the European Parliament in Brussels following Berlin Summit with Khalid Omar Youssef former minister of cabinet affairs in Sudan and rapporteur of the civil democratic alliance “Somoud “ .Mr Youssef met with several members of the European Parliament members of Foreign Affairs committee as well as EU-Africa committee including Meps Carlo Fidanza, Paolo Inselvini, Pietro Vecchi and Carlo Ciccioli to highlight the civil society’s main concerns and call the EU to support the democratic transition and the peace process in Sudan .

He started by highlighting the recent developments in Sudan, particularly the humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the war, which is considered the greatest global tragedy of the 21st century. He also thanked the efforts of the EU by mentioning the important role played by the European Union in organizing the Berlin Conference and the significant pledges made by European countries regarding humanitarian aid and support to the population in need.

He also emphasized the importance of pressing for an immediate and unconditional humanitarian truce throughout the country, and the necessity of coordinating all initiatives to reach a peaceful solution. Mr Khalid Omar Youssef stressed the fact that the Quartet’s roadmap represents the optimal path to ending the war. He also explained the destructive role played by the Sudanese Islamist movement in fueling the war and obstructing all peace initiatives by infiltrating the Sudanese military establishment and hijacking its decision-making.

The civil society in Sudan does not support the Islamist ideology and it is highly important to designate this group as a terrorist organization across Europe, following the recent decisions issued in the United States and several European countries.  Sudanese population has been suffering for decades under the Islamist rule and the revolution following the Arab spring in 2019 aimed at overthrowing the Islamist regime but later the Islamists came back to power through the military coup in 2021.

Sudanese civil society really hopes that these meetings will yield to a coordinated international stance that will help the Sudanese parties expedite serious steps towards ending the war and establishing a just and comprehensive peace that will end the ongoing suffering endured by the population mainly the most vulnerable groups such as women, children and minorities who have been suffering from famine and displacement since the beginning of the conflict.

EU leaders thanked the efforts of Mr Youssef together with the Sudanese civil society and showed solidarity with the population as well as highlighted that they are ready to act to help the Sudanese people put an end to the conflict and achieve freedom, democracy peace and dignity.

Le samedi 9 mai 2026, à 20 h, la basilique cathédrale de Saint-Denis accueillera un concert exceptionnel rassemblant les chœurs de cinq traditions orthodoxes byzantines présentes en région parisienne : grecque, bulgare, roumaine, antiochienne et serbe. L'événement, porté par l'association Choeurs Byzantins, dépasse le cadre d'une manifestation musicale ordinaire : il propose une rencontre des écoles psaltiques d'Orient autour d'un même patrimoine liturgique millénaire.
Une prière chantée (…)

- Agenda / Région parisienne

A plastic model of the famous “Ghost of Ukraine”, made of plastics that are based on oil products, a shortage of Persian Gulf oil may greatly affect the plastics industry in Asia.

As fluctuations in the oil and gas markets come from almost daily policy changes in the Middle East, purchasers of Persian Gulf dependant oil exports nervously plan contingencies on how to manage possible outcomes. While allies like Europe, South Korea and Japan try to figure out the intricacies of producing and manufacturing with reduced petroleum production, all industries try to adapt while missing key resources. Ironically, the oil based products used to make simple things like a model kit of some of the planes and ships now fighting as American icons in the Persian Gulf might not be able to be produced as the plastics used to make model kits will become harder to obtain with a reduction in petroleum products in places like Japan. Despite this, the larger effect of these policies is a benefit to Western aligned powers in the Asia-Pacific if it denies China the low cost energy imports it would need to fuel a war with Taiwan. While economic pains are temporary, all allied nations from Japan to India to Australia prefer not having to respond to a PLA attack on Taiwan when current Middle Eastern energy policy could prevent the next Great World War from commencing in Asia.

The source of indirect and direct funds and power for regimes like Cuba and China often came through oil supplies from places like Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela replacing much of the free oil provided to Cuba by the Soviet Union after the Cold War. China was purchasing upwards of 90% of Iran’s sanctioned oil exports while also depending on Venezuelan and Russian oil and gas imports to run its growing economic boom, with many profits from their modern industrialisation going directly into China’s weapons manufacturing industry. While Russian and Iranian oil was sanctioned, many countries sought out low cost energy being sold by those regimes under sanction. With Western powers during the Ukraine War either denying energy exports to their allies, or simply purchasing Russian oil via third party countries that would send re-branded Russian oil into Europe, policies in Allied countries lead to the indirect funding of Russia’s war efforts. Effecting this dark energy exports market is key to ending adversarial funding for conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and a future conflict in Asia.

Unlike support by many in Russia for its Government’s actions in Ukraine, most of the Iranian population do not support their Government, and it would likely be the case that a conflict between China and most of their neighbouring countries would not be popularly supported by average citizens in China. The current policy approach in challenging Venezuela and Iran is being done in order to establish deterrent control over oil and gas that could tie any aggression to consequences. If China were to take military action against Taiwan or India, give overwhelming support to their allies, or attempt Covid 2.0 or increases in the Fentanyl trade, the West could strain China’s military complex by starving it of energy resources. This might be preferential to one of the largest naval engagements in human history and a massacre of young soldiers on both sides of the line. It is doubtful that many Chinese nationals would wish to die in that unneeded conflict, especially when they currently one of the most stable economic engines in the world economy with little restrictions by foreign powers on local rights issues. While a conflict with India in the mountain regions would be witnessed by few, a conflict with Taiwan would be seen by millions in cities and regions on the coast of China closest to Taiwan, with massive losses of young men being suffered by every family in the region. For most, the cost of a war with Taiwan is simply not worth the gains.

A thought experiment would be useful in a scenario where we consider not the interests of China’s ruling party elites, but that of the people of China itself. In the current conflict, it would be agreed by those on both sides of the fence that no one wants to put Chinese cities or their citizens in the dark, and like with the Iranian people, the conflict is with the regime and not the people who always made up one of the great cultures of humanity. We must consider that if China was a like minded democracy, what would their strategic initiatives be, and would they maintain the same adversaries due to that strategic position? With a current China and a Mirror Universe China, both countries would be able to maintain a strong industrial base, but like many Western economies, would be destined to be stable at around 3%-4% rate of growth. In both cases, the Government would be subject to the will of its people, with the current Government being afraid of its citizens uprising in tough times and the Mirror Universe version being constrained by elected votes and its international reputation. Both China’s would be challenged by competing economies from India, Japan and South Korea, but would also be integrated with those industries with a commonality of commercial entities present in all markets in the region. China would still look to expand its markets, its influence economically and culturally, and seek lost territories from when they were unable to challenge opposing powers. The difference seems to be one of stability through fear as opposed to peace through innovation, stability and strength. As long as the former is appeased and ignored while threats increase internationally, or overtly accepted as a mean to disrupt and dismantle healthy Western democracies, the potential of not only the Persian and Chinese people, but those young and innovative minds in the West will be subjected to an uncertain future. What is apparent is that freedom is a rare gift, coming from a long tradition of development, ideas and ethics, and is not a commonly occurred achievement throughout the history of human civilisation.

On 9 May, Europeans will celebrate Europe Day.

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP