The EU-Ukraine relations started with Ukraine’s independence in 1991, but they were not unproblematic. Ukrainian leaders wanted to get benefits both from the EU and Russia, at the same time not coming too close to either. Ukrainian citizens were divided on whether the country should integrate with East, West or stay on its own. The EU was not sure in its policy towards Ukraine and many EU members valued partnership with Russia more. Yet 24th February 2022 changed EU-Ukraine relations. Apart from freezing its cooperation with Russia and providing military help for Ukraine’s fight against Russian invasion, the EU made Ukraine an EU candidate country on 23rd June 2022. How and why did this rough change in the EU’s policy towards Ukraine happen?
EU-Russia & EU-Ukraine
Cooperation with Russia was important for the EU for many reasons and the fear to disturb it kept the EU from developing better ties with Ukraine. Beneficial EU-Russia partnership was a core reason of the EU’s weak response to Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas in 2014. Russian full-scale invasion in 2022 made a difference. Already a day before the invasion the EU introduced its first sanctions’ package against Russia, a few days after the invasion Russian banks were switched off from SWIFT and by the time when Ukraine became an EU candidate country, there were already six EU’s packages of sanctions against Russia. This shows a substantial change in the EU’s policy towards Russia.
Not only EU countries understood Russia better in 2022, but Eastern EU member-states made an effort to convince countries like Germany, France and Italy to stop their trade with Russia. For instance, Germany supported embargo on Russian oil in mid-spring only after other European countries’ were able to push and shame Germany for trading with the aggressor. When ‘business as usual’ with Russia became not possible, closer EU-Ukraine relations was a possibility.
Ukraine chose the EU
Russian full-scale invasion destroyed also Ukrainians’ hopes for friendship with Russia. Ukrainian politicians finally applied for EU membership on 28th February 2022. The support of ordinary Ukrainians for joining the EU skyrocketed from 47% in 2013, 52% in 2021 to 82% in 2022. This, together with Ukraine’s successful resistance to Russia, was convincing EU’s decision-makers to support faster EU-Ukraine integration.
The need to protect Europe
The EU was always afraid to provoke Russia, but its caution did not prevent Russian unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The EU’s leaders’ awareness about the need to change the strategy was growing. Eastern EU-member states’ politicians had a real fear of Russian possible attack on their own countries and even Western Europeans felt Russian threat. It was the moment when European decision-makers agreed that the EU had to develop a stronger response to Russia and fostering relations with Ukraine was one of the new measures.
On the other hand, Russian brutality and war crimes created a huge wave of sympathy among EU citizens and politicians. The EU as a perceived promoter of human rights and security in Europe felt pressure to support Ukraine with all means. In spring 2022, the majority of Europeans (60-88% in different countries) condemned Russia, sympathized Ukraine (89%) and supported Ukraine’s integration into the EU. The EU politicians felt the moral need to help Ukraine to win this war and to become an EU member afterwards.
A new EU candidate
With all the above arguments in place, an EU candidate country status was still a symbolic gesture, which did not require final decisions from EU member-states. The threat to the EU and the moral obligation were crucial in the EU’s decision to make Ukraine an EU candidate country, but this status was a sign of a moral support for Ukraine with no big real impact.
Currently, Ukraine is already on the accession track and EU-Ukraine relations are deepening every day. It seems that the EU did not stop with its first step and the candidate status received a bigger meaning. The future will show if and when Ukraine will become a new EU member. However, it is relevant to understand how the first big step towards Ukraine’s membership in the EU happened after Russia invaded Ukraine and the EU felt the need to amend its relations with both Russia and Ukraine.
The post The renewed chance for the EU’s enlargement by Ukraine appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
Unity is strength. These were the words of the German Chancellor Scholz as he met with President Macron and Prime Minister Tusk in Berlin. Similarly, in his Sorbonne speech, President Macron appealed to more unity in face of constant geopolitical changes, calling for a strong bloc who is capable of leaving its footprint in the international setting. Unity has then become a hot debate topic in everyday politics, as leaders often proclaim that a united EU is able to better assert itself in the international arena.
This link between unity and external action is reflected in the approval of EU sanctions against Russia in February 2022, as these passed with an unprecedent speed. Thus, as the EU displayed a united front, it emanated strength and influence. On the flip side of the coin, the EU might struggle to display a united front in certain geopolitical issues, as EU Member States (MS) demonstrate divergent domestic interests. In the Middle East, for instance, the EU has been facing difficulties in conveying a united message. Consequently, if the EU is not able to speak in a single voice, its credibility may be undermined vis-à-vis third parties.
So, could a lack of European unity lead to an undermined role for Europe? Though the answer to this question would entail delving into the various complexities of EU policy, it is possible to take a positive outlook to external action. In fact, despite being internally divided, the EU nonetheless concludes international agreements. Take trade policy as an example. Within the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) MS displayed polarised views, but the EU still reached an internal position and effectively concluded the negotiations. Therefore, the key question should not be whether there is a correlation between internal cohesiveness and effectiveness, but instead, how EU unity can be forged. Indeed, in the article I presented at the UACES Conference in Amsterdam, I argued that there is no strict correlation between EU internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness, as a disunited EU is capable of achieving its goals by forging unity during the negotiation process.
The contribution of the UACES Conference
Attending the UACES Conference in June was utterly beneficial for the development of valuable skills and new connections, as I had the opportunity to get to know interesting colleagues who work in a similar field. As a result, I enriched my perspective of EU studies, gaining new insights into the role of feminist and LGBTQ+ theories on the understanding of complex phenomena. Moreover, the establishment of these links, allowed me to reflect on different forms of evolving my research. Here, I highlight the perspective of international law – an area I am very captivated by.
In addition, the conference was marked by its welcoming atmosphere where great feedback was provided – though I focus on trade policy in my research, I had the opportunity to reflect on the importance of analyzing the link between cohesiveness and effectiveness in security negotiations. In fact, obtaining results in this field would be of remarkable societal relevance, as it could lead to a thorough understating of current geopolitical issues (e.g. military support for Ukraine), therefore paving the way for the understanding of collectively beneficial outcomes.
I would therefore like to thank UACES for the opportunity to present my research in such a dynamic and thought-provoking event.
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In recent years, Europe has witnessed a notable surge in the popularity and influence of populist radical right parties. This trend has been particularly evident in the 2024 elections for the European Parliament, where this party-family has secured significant victories, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape across the continent.
One of the most prominent figures in this phenomenon is Giorgia Meloni, leader of Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). Meloni is the first female Prime Minister of the country and managed, in only a decade, to take FdI from being a smaller political to the first party in Italy. In Meloni’s agenda emerge many of the populist radical right ideological traits, particularly the return to conservative social values, such as, the traditional family, women appointed to their roles of mothers, as well as stances against immigration and the LGBTQ+ community. The success of FdI is mirrored in other European countries, suggesting a growing resonance with populist radical right ideologies.
For instance, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) represents the complex dynamics of the populist radical right on the EU level. Although the AfD did not perform particularly well in the 2021 federal elections, losing parts of the votes obtained in the previous 2017 elections, it has consistently achieved stronger results in the recent European Parliament elections. This apparent discrepancy highlights the different dynamics at play in national versus European elections, suggesting that the AfD’s message resonates more with voters when framed within the broader context of European governance and identity politics.
In France, the Rassemblement National (RN), led by Marine Le Pen, further underscores the persistence of the populist radical right in Europe. The RN has made significant inroads in French politics, despite challenges in securing Le Pen’s presidency in 2022 and the majority in the July 2024 legislative elections. The party has, nonetheless, been able to secure substantial representation over the years, highlighting its growing influence in the French political scene. This success reflects the RN’s dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) – the strategic rebranding to shed its extremist image and appeal to a broader – and possibly younger – electorate. This process, initiated by Marine Le Pen, involved softening the party’s rhetoric and distancing it from its more controversial and radical past.
Other parties in Europe have seen its share of influence, such as in the Netherlands with the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Known for his outspoken stance against Islam and the European Union, Wilders has managed to maintain a significant following despite facing legal and political challenges. Similarly, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has also become a stronghold of populist radical right politics, through the implementation of policies that emphasise national identity, and against the European Union, immigration and the LGBTQ+ community.
In this light, the success of these parties in various European countries points to a larger phenomenon that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. The populist radical right’s ability to tap into the public’s fears and frustrations about immigration, cultural change, and globalisation has proven to be a powerful political strategy. This trend should not be overlooked and considered as just a passing phase, but it reflects deep-seated concerns among significant portions of the European electorate.
Moreover, the rise of the populist radical right has had profound implications for the European Union. These parties often challenge the very foundations of the EU, advocating for policies that prioritise national interests over collective European goals. This has led to increased tensions within the EU, as member states navigate the complex dynamics of sovereignty and integration.
The persistence of populist radical right parties in European politics indicates a fundamental shift in the political landscape. As long as issues like immigration, economic inequality, and cultural identity remain contentious, these parties will continue to find fertile ground for their messages. The challenge for Europe will be to address the underlying causes of this political shift while maintaining the principles of democracy and unity that have long defined the continent.
The post The Success of the Populist Radical Right – What does it mean for the European Union? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
L'homme fort de Budapest n'a pas attendu longtemps pour se rapprocher, de nouveau, de la Macédoine du Nord. Quelques semaines après le retour au pouvoir des nationalistes conservateurs du VMRO-DPMNE, il accorde un vaste crédit. L'opposition macédonienne s'inquiète.
- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Orban Balkans, Macédoine du Nord, Relations régionales, EconomieLe 16 octobre 2016, jour d'élections législatives, le régime Đukanović avait assuré avoir déjoué un mystérieux coup d'État pro-russe. Aucune preuve solide n'est jamais venue étayer l'accusation et la justice monténégrine vient de relaxer définitivement toutes les personnes inculpées dans cette affaire.
- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Monténégro, Après Milo, Défense, police et justice, PolitiqueAfter nine eventful months which saw extensive operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean Sea, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) finally arrived back in the United States [...]
The post USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Returns to the United States After Momentous Nine Month Deployment appeared first on The Aviationist.
Une victoire du Rassemblement national au soir du 7 juillet aurait des conséquences dramatiques pour la France, mais aussi pour l'Europe toute entière et bien sûr pour les Balkans. Dans cette période de tous les dangers, Le Courrier des Balkans a plus que jamais à cœur d'informer sur ce que sont et ce que font les extrêmes droites.
Depuis ses débuts, Le Courrier des Balkans est témoin des ravages de l'idéologie nationaliste, de la désintégration de la Yougoslavie jusqu'à aujourd'hui, où (…)