Agrégateur de flux

La Coordination des organisations de la société civile a animé une conférence de presse ce mercredi 27 septembre 2023 à Ouagadougou. Il s'est agi de dénoncer l'actuelle constitution du Burkina Faso.

Selon Moussa Sanfo, membre du secrétariat de cette coordination, « Nous estimons qu'il est temps d'entamer des profondes réformes qui reflètent les réalités de notre pays ». Les membres de la Coordination des organisations de la société civile sont vent debout contre la constitution actuelle, qui, à leur avis, n'est que la copie collée de celle du « colonisateur impérialiste » rédigée en fonction de sa culture et ses mœurs.

Pour cette coalition d'Organisations de la société civile, il y a nécessité de rédiger une autre constitution qui incarne les valeurs morales et culturelles du Burkina Faso, « car il est temps pour le peuple burkinabè de prendre en main son avenir en se forgeant sur ses propres valeurs endogènes », ont signifié les conférenciers.
« Nous ne pouvons plus tolérer un cadre juridique qui ne nous sert pas à bâtir une société de dignité, d'intégrité, de pardon, d'équité et d'égalité. La constitution actuelle comporte des articles dont certains sont contraires à la moralité africaine et à ses bonnes mœurs. Elle n'est pas conciliatrice d'une part et a aussi contribué à diviser nos familles, nos villages. Notre constitution actuelle a détruit l'éducation africaine et scolaire où le fils peut convoquer son père, ou l'enseignant n'éduque plus son élève, mais plutôt se contente de lui dispenser les cours », a dénoncé Moussa Sanfo, dans la déclaration liminaire.

« Nous avons eu une alerte »

A en croire Moussa Sanfo et ses camarades, la constitution actuelle comporte aussi des « vides juridiques » sur certains aspects très importants qu'il convient de rectifier. Ils ont énuméré notamment la non-interdiction formelle « d'actes inhumains et contre-nature » comme « la pédophilie et l'homosexualité ».
Ainsi, les membres de cette coalition ont appelé à une mobilisation populaire le vendredi 29 septembre 2023 à la Place de la nation de Ouagadougou pour dire « Non à l'ancienne constitution ».

Au cours du tête-à-tête avec les journalistes, Soumaïla Nana, un membre de la coordination, s'est prononcé sur la mobilisation spontanée des manifestants pour « protéger » la transition. « Nous avons eu une alerte. Pour préserver notre nez, nous sommes sortis pour secourir », a-t-il confié, en précisant qu'ils n'avaient pas d'autres informations.
Avec ses camarades, Soumaïla Nana s'est dit favorable à la prolongation de la transition sous le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré, s'ils ont la possibilité de lui formuler la demande.

MLC
Lefaso.net

A l'occasion de la Journée mondiale du tourisme, célébrée le 27 septembre de chaque année, Marguerite Doannio, directrice générale de l'Office national du tourisme burkinabè (ONTB) revient sur l'importance de cette journée, dans cette interview. Lisez donc !

Lefaso.net : Comment se porte le secteur du tourisme au Burkina ?

Marguerite Doannio : Le secteur du tourisme au Burkina est présentement en mode résilience et l'on peut affirmer qu'il tient bon malgré les nombreuses difficultés connues. Les statistiques nous montrent que de 2020 à 2021, les établissements touristiques d'hébergement enregistrent une hausse de 19,3% des arrivées globales, soit 58,8% des arrivées pour le tourisme récepteur et 12,2% des arrivées pour le tourisme interne.

Quelles difficultés rencontrez-vous dans le secteur du tourisme dans un contexte marqué par l'insécurité au Burkina Faso ?

Dans le contexte actuel du pays marqué par l'insécurité sur une partie du territoire national, le secteur du tourisme connaît des difficultés que nous ne pouvons nier. Au nombre de ces difficultés, il y a l'inaccessibilité de certains sites entraînant une fermeture temporaire de ces lieux, la baisse des fréquentations dans les établissements touristiques et hôteliers avec pour conséquences des chiffres d'affaires en moins pour les acteurs du secteur. Il y a également l'insuffisance des ressources financières pour réaliser des projets de grande envergure.

Quel est l'intérêt que les Burkinabè accordent, selon vous, au secteur du tourisme ?

Le secteur du tourisme est considéré par les plus hautes autorités du pays comme un secteur stratégique de développement, en témoigne son inscription dans la Stratégie nationale de la culture et du tourisme (SNCT) 2018-2027. En ce qui est de la pratique du tourisme, il est à relever une dynamique de la pratique du tourisme interne ces dernières années, signe d'un grand intérêt pour les Burkinabè de visiter les potentialités touristiques du pays.

Au passage, nous saluons l'engagement de notre ministre de tutelle pour le tourisme interne et sa volonté d'inculquer la mise en tourisme de tous les grands évènements de notre pays.

Qu'est-ce qui est fait au Burkina pour commémorer la journée mondiale du tourisme ?

En prélude à la journée mondiale du tourisme célébrée le 27 septembre de chaque année, des activités sont prévues. D'ordinaire, nous marquons le coup par des excursions grand public, des conférences publiques. Pour cette édition spécifiquement, s'inscrivant dans la résilience, nous avons décidé de tabler sur la réflexion autour du thème : « Tourisme pour les investissements verts ». Un thème d'actualité car l'écotourisme et le tourisme durable sont des dimensions à prendre en compte dans le secteur touristique.

Marguerite Doannio directrice générale de l'ONTB.

Quelle appréciation faites-vous du port du Faso danfani au Burkina Faso ?

Le port du Faso Danfani lors des cérémonies officielles et dans les établissements d'enseignement s'inscrit dans la politique du gouvernement burkinabè de promouvoir notre identité culturelle et d'inciter à produire et consommer local. C'est une appréciation positive que nous retenons de ces décisions. Du côté de l'Office national du tourisme burkinabé, dans notre quête de nouveaux centres d'intérêt pour notre secteur du tourisme, nous avons décidé de faire de ce textile artisanal un produit touristique de grande valeur. Du reste, nous estimons que tout l'engouement autour de cette étoffe contribuera à accroître l'économie nationale.

Quelles sont les activités menées par l'ONTB pour développer le secteur du tourisme au Burkina ?

L'Office national du tourisme burkinabè a pour mission de promouvoir et de développer les activités touristiques au Burkina Faso, conformément à la politique de développement touristique. À ce titre, l'ONTB se doit d'assurer tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur la diffusion de l'image de marque du Burkina Faso, de recenser et de mettre en valeur les ressources touristiques, de conseiller, d'orienter et d'encadrer les opérateurs privés dans la formation, l'étude et la réalisation des investissements, de rechercher, de mettre en œuvre les moyens favorisant l'investissement dans le secteur du tourisme et de l'hôtellerie. Il doit aussi contribuer à l'amélioration du service par la formation du personnel du secteur, de collecter, traiter et assurer la diffusion des informations relatives au tourisme, assurer la gestion d'unités de production et des sites touristiques.

Est-ce que la détérioration de la relation entre la France et le Burkina Faso a eu un impact négatif sur le tourisme au Burkina ?

Nous n'allons pas circonscrire la question à la France car les Occidentaux, de façon générale, ceux que nous appelons les touristes récepteurs, se font de plus en plus rares à cause de la situation nationale marquée par l'insécurité.

Avez-vous un appel à lancer aux Burkinabè pour contribuer à développer davantage le secteur du tourisme ?

L'appel que nous avons à lancer aux Burkinabè est cette invite à aller à la découverte des immenses richesses touristiques dont regorge notre pays. Aussi, nous les invitons à investir massivement dans le secteur du tourisme afin de maintenir le Burkina au rang des pays les plus visités en Afrique.

Interview réalisée par Carine Daramkoum
Lefaso.net

L’ancien ministre des Droits de l’homme de la transition, Djovi Gally s’est éteint mercredi 27 septembre en Allemagne alors qu’il était en séjour médical. De partout, la famille reçoit les hommages de ceux qui l’ont considéré comme un grand homme.

Le président sud-soudanais, Salva Kiir, est arrivé à Moscou dans la soirée du mercredi 27 septembre, pour une visite d’État de deux jours. Au programme des discussions bilatérales, l’intensification des liens de coopération sécuritaire entre le Soudan du Sud et la Russie. Coopération aussi dans les domaines de l’éducation, de la santé et du développement économique. Juba espère en outre recevoir le soutien de la Russie pour que l’embargo sur les armes soit levé prochainement par le Conseil de sécurité.

La Guinée vient de se doter d’une nouvelle institution financière : le Fonds de garantie des prêts aux entreprises (FGPE). Cette nouvelle institution unique en son genre a pour mission de faciliter l’octroi de crédits bancaires aux Petites et moyennes entreprises par un mécanisme de partage des risques. Le FGPE bénéficie de l’appui technique et financier de la Banque mondiale.

Les élections législatives anticipées sont organisées samedi 30 septembre en Slovaquie et ce scrutin revêt une importance particulière dans ce pays de cinq millions et demi d'habitants, frontalier de l'Ukraine. Démissionnaire sur fond de grave crise sociétale il y a cinq ans, l'ancien Premier ministre Robert Fico occupe à nouveau le devant de la scène, avec une rhétorique très favorable à la Russie pendant la campagne électorale. 

The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its growing influence on the global stage has become a central theme in contemporary international relations, challenging the longstanding dominance of the United States and the Western world. This global rivalry spans multiple dimensions and is characterized by a complex interplay of economic, technological, geopolitical, and ideological factors. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is an exciting development in this context. It represents an alternative economic integration and connectivity vision that could counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The corridor could offer countries an alternative path to economic integration and development by connecting regions across Asia and Europe. However, it remains to be seen whether it can effectively challenge the scale and scope of China’s BRI.

The IMEC vision’s potential as a counterbalance to the BRI framework is rooted in its strategic positioning and objectives. The IMEC carries significant global geopolitical significance, reflecting Washington’s ambition to be more prominent in shaping connectivity, trade, and economic integration worldwide in the twenty-first century. By aligning the United States with the interests of India, Gulf states, and European nations, this initiative creates a global strategic partnership that has the potential to challenge the PRC’s dominance in the Eurasian landmass. Moreover, Eurasian countries concerned about over-reliance on China’s BRI can view the IMEC as an attractive connectivity, trade, and economic integration net alternative. Thus, the IMEC could emerge as a formidable initiative with the potential to alter the global economic and geopolitical landscape significantly. Nevertheless, IMEC’s potential as a game changer and counterbalance to the BRI remains contingent on Washington’s ability to manage and implement this ambitious project effectively. 

The BRI and IMEC: Comparative Analysis

On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in New Delhi 2023, the United States, India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to establish the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). IMEC aims to bolster economic development by fostering connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. It consists of two separate corridors: the east corridor connecting India to the Gulf region and the northern corridor connecting the Gulf region to Europe. This project aims to establish commercial hubs, expand access to clean energy, enhance telecommunication lines, and ensure secure and stable internet connections.

The IMEC, if executed, will have significant implications for Asia, the Middle East, and Europe’s political, economic, and energy dynamics. Economically, the corridor has the potential to transform the nature of international trade and transportation, ushering in a new era of inter-regional cooperation. The project will boost economic growth by strengthening regional connectivity, commerce, investment, innovation, logistics, and competitiveness, ultimately leading to sustained prosperity throughout the corridor. It could create new opportunities for economic growth, development, and stability in the participating states and regions outside of them (job creation, increased investment, financial improvement, and enhanced access to markets). According to estimates, the IMEC has the potential to make India-Europe cargo flows significantly faster (will reduce the transit time from eighteen to ten days) by a 40 percent reduction in travel time and a 30 percent reduction in transportation costs for goods. 

Energy, the corridor is set to play a vital role in facilitating the trade of renewable energy sources, including hydrogen, through its networks of pipelines. The IMEC aims to link the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel by railway and connect them to India by port, cutting shipping times and costs and reducing fuel usage. IMEC’s focus on sustainability and clean energy is consistent with the worldwide trend to develop environmentally friendly and sustainable infrastructure that addresses environmental issues.

Political, the IMEC can change and forge new alliances to transform world power relations amid a rising regional and global rivalry for economic integration and transportation corridors. The corridor allows member countries to diversify their economic partnerships and lessen reliance on powerful international entities. This change in power relations may impact traditional alliances and alignments, leading to a rebalancing of influence. Further, it holds significant potential to create complex interdependence among rival states (e.g., connecting Haifa port in Israel with the rail line passing through Saudi Arabia), which would be mutually beneficial and strengthen ties. More importantly, the corridor directly challenges China’s BRI by providing BRI member countries with an alternative for infrastructure development and economic cooperation. The planned transport corridor will shorten the supply chain and reduce the dependence of developing countries on China.

The PRC launched the BRI, a massive infrastructure project, in 2013 and has signed BRI-MoUs with nearly 150 countries (75 percent of the world’s population.) and over thirty international organizations, mobilizing almost $1 trillion and creating over 3,000 projects (financed and built roads, power plants, ports, railways, and digital infrastructure). However, there are signs that China is slowing down on BRI because of its flagging economy and the global economic slowdown, which coincides with rising interest rates and inflation. Recent reports indicate that China plans to introduce BRI 2.0, a revised version that aims to exercise greater control over project expenditures and implement stricter scrutiny when announcing new projects. Thus, the question inevitably arises as to whether the IMEC would complement or compete with China’s BRI.

While the IMEC and the BRI share similarities (they feature some of the same keywords such as “connectivity,” “integration,” and “development”) in promoting connectivity, trade, and economic integration, there are significant differences in terms of scale, funding, transparency, and objectives. First, The BRI is much more prominent in scale, the world’s largest global infrastructure undertaking, with nearly 150 member countries, thirty international organizations, and thousands of projects. At the same time, the IMEC includes several dozen countries (mainly from the Middle East and Europe) but does not include African, Central Asian, Southeast Asian, or other South Asian countries besides India. Second, the BRI has been operational since 2013, giving it a decade-long head start over IMEC. 

Third, China has funneled $1 trillion to BRI, and this number may grow to $8 trillion, dwarfing IMEC’s estimated cost of $20 billion. This IMEC is part of the Build Back Better World (B3W), now rebranded as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII), including the G7 nations. PGII aims to channel private capital to invest in four areas: climate and energy, ICT, gender equity, and health. Hence, the BRI is centrally designed and opaque, with its funding coming from just China. The IMEC corridor is based on consultations with all concerned for a while, and its focus is on viability backed by funding from multiple sources, primarily through public-private partnerships.

Fourth, the BRI has since outgrown its original corridors, becoming global in scope, and has always kept its participants from any state or region. The IMEC, in contrast, is aimed at linking India, the Middle Eastern nations, and Europe. Several IMEC member countries, including Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are concurrently involved in the BRI. While still technically part of the BRI, Italy strongly desires to withdraw from the initiative. Finally, unlike the BRI, which aims at securing the PRC’s access to natural resources, the IMEC intends to serve the common benefit of all the participants while offering an alternative model of development based on shared values, transparency, sustainability, and respect for sovereignty.

Game-changer or Dud?

We can view the IMEC as Washington’s strategic response to Beijing’s growing influence across Eurasian through the BRI. By cultivating stronger bonds between these critical geopolitical zones, the corridor has the potential to offer an alternative pathway for states seeking to diversify their economic ties and reduce dependency on China. While complicated and multifaceted, the IMEC initiative has the potential to alter regional and global dynamics. The corridor is not only an economic project but also a political and strategic one that reflects the aspirations and values of its partners. Washington supports the IMEC to counter the PRC’s influence and challenge its BRI framework (as part of the PGII), threatening its interests and values. It also sees the corridor as a way to reshape global connectivity, enhance trade and investment opportunities, address common challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and pandemics, and strengthen its strategic partnerships with India, Europe, and the Middle Eastern countries.

Nevertheless, the future of the IMEC is uncertain, and it is premature to call this a severe counterweight to China’s BRI. The corridor is still in its early stages, and it is unclear how it will be implemented. The IMEC can be a major game-changer in global connectivity and economic integration by serving as an alternative option for states cautious about over-dependence on China. This would be contingent on IMEC’s ability to present a more sustainable and transparent model for infrastructure development, effectively addressing some of the criticisms directed at the BRI (debt concerns, lack of transparency, environmental issues, and geopolitical tensions).

The realization of IMEC (expected to take over a decade) hinges on many factors, including a significant Western commitment, navigating geopolitical tensions, addressing environmental concerns, ensuring security and stability along the corridor, regional cooperation, financial viability, and technological advancements. Therefore, while IMEC holds immense promise, its successful implementation necessitates meticulous planning, robust governance mechanisms, and unwavering commitment from all participating countries. Additionally, the corridor’s multimodal nature, spanning land and sea, will cost tens of billions of dollars and face substantial logistical challenges. The corridor’s potential as a game changer and counterbalance to the BRI remains contingent on the United States’ ability to manage and implement this ambitious project effectively. This endeavor holds far-reaching implications for the economic and geopolitical dynamics of the regions it encompasses.

In short, while the IMEC concept appears attractive as a vision or idea, much remains to be done to see it through to completion—a result that, with previous announcements concerning the B3W and the PGII schemes, leaves some skepticism as concerns the United States’ ability to make the corridor proposal a working reality.

Dr. Mordechai Chaziza is a senior lecturer at the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College (Israel) and a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russia is spent. Foreign investors and some of the country’s best minds have fled, the economy is hobbled by sanctions, and its military is bogged down in Ukraine, with many of its elite soldiers dead and best equipment destroyed. The revolt of Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in June 2023 seemed a final humiliation, revealing a once-feared dictator reduced to bargaining with individual commanders. This weakness is real: if Russian president Vladimir Putin could turn back the clock, it is hard to imagine he would again choose to invade Ukraine. 

Russia’s massive losses will probably make Putin cautious about conventional military operations in the foreseeable future. Even if Putin were tempted, the United States has increased the number of its ground forces in Europe to their highest level in nearly two decades, and NATO’s conventional and nuclear deterrence is robust. Nor would the Russian people and elite be eager to support an invasion of a NATO country and risk escalation to nuclear war.

Yet Putin shows no sign of leaving power. He continues to harbor revisionist aims and expresses admiration for Russian conquerors like Peter the Great. Russia still seeks influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. As long as Putin is in power, he will undermine any future Ukrainian government and attempt to deter and punish Western countries that support Kyiv. The expansion of NATO to include Finland and eventually Sweden, the military build-up of NATO forces in Eastern Europe, and continuing military aid to Ukraine are particular affronts to Putin, even though they are justified as necessary responses to Russian aggression. Putin sees the United States, which he refers to as the “main enemy” (or glavny vrag), engaged in both hard and soft power actions to encircle and overthrow his regime.

There is a way for Russia to square this circle of maximal ambitions and weak conventional capabilities: gray zone warfare, which we define as covert operations, disinformation, subversion, sabotage, cyber-attacks, and other methods that advance a state’s security objectives but fall short of conventional warfare. Russia has numerous skilled intelligence officers, paramilitary forces, elite hackers, and other personnel who enable it to excel in this arena. Moreover, Russia’s track record in gray zone warfare is impressive, in contrast to its poor performance on the battlefield.

Russia’s future gray zone warfare will likely take many forms. European countries could suffer clandestine attacks against oil and gas pipelines and underwater fiber-optic cables. Border states like Poland, Finland, and Estonia could face a flood of illegal immigrants massing on their borders. Central Asian and African leaders who stand up to Moscow might find local insurgents awash in Russian weapons and trained by Russian special operations forces. Local critics of Moscow might suddenly suffer a series of suspicious accidents, including poisonings. Cyber attacks might take down financial systems and other critical infrastructure. Disinformation on social media platforms might be used to divide the West, while propaganda explains away Russian misdeeds, with artificial intelligence (AI) being used for even more creative mischief.

Despite Russia’s impressive gray zone capabilities, however, it has significant weaknesses. Moscow’s gray zone efforts are often uncoordinated, and the country’s technical talent is limited compared with that of the United States and Europe. Its private military companies, like Wagner, may face many additional restrictions as Putin questions their loyalty.

Bolstering U.S. and allied cyber and border defenses, sharing intelligence, and providing training and advice to local militaries can reduce the danger of gray zone warfare. But the West does not only have to play defense. Russia is also vulnerable to gray zone tactics by the United States and its European allies in Belarus, the Middle East, Africa, and even Russia itself.

Russia’s Gray Zone Toolbox 

Russia’s gray zone warfare draws on a long and robust history. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union excelled at conducting covert intelligence operations and subverting its enemies, tarnishing global views of the United States and at times creating opportunities for near-bloodless communist takeovers of governments. KGB active measures included creating front organizations, backing friendly political movements, covertly funding political parties, provoking domestic unrest, and churning out forgeries and other types of disinformation.

These operations continued after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s support for separatists in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria; assassinations of dissidents; cyber and information campaigns in the Baltic states; and use of private military companies in Africa and the Middle East to project its influence all are experiences on which Russia will build as it pursues an aggressive foreign policy while seeking to avoid all-out war. Such organizations as the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Foreign Security Service (FSB), and Spetsnaz have a robust history of gray zone warfare.

Gray zone warfare also fits Moscow’s worldview. Russian security elites, not just Putin, see the world as full of secret threats and have an operational culture that considers the best defense as a good offense. As former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper contends, Russians “are almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favor, whatever.”

Consequently, Russia poses a multifaceted threat through its use of covert action, cyber operations, disinformation, and political subversion. These components of gray zone warfare are not mutually exclusive. Moscow frequently uses a combination of them to weaken its adversaries and expand its influence.

Covert Action

Moscow has long conducted covert action to deter or punish defectors and opposition leaders, subvert U.S. and NATO policies, and expand Russian influence. During the Cold War, the KGB assassinated several foreign leaders, such as Afghan president Hafizullah Amin, in pursuit of Russian foreign policy interests. The KGB’s 13th Department was particularly notorious for targeted assassinations abroad, including the killing of Russian revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky in Mexico City in 1940.

Moscow targets political opponents abroad for two major reasons. The first is to exact revenge on Russian spies, diplomats, soldiers, and even journalists and academics who flee the country, criticize the Kremlin, and aid Moscow’s enemies. A second goal is to deter future betrayals and send an unambiguous message that defectors will be hunted down. In March 2006, Russian agents poisoned Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer who defected to the United Kingdom, at a London hotel. In March 2018, Russian agents poisoned Sergei Skripal, a former GRU officer that defected to the UK, who Putin called a “scumbag” and a “traitor to the motherland.”

Russia’s war in Ukraine triggered an exodus of technocrats, soldiers, spies, oligarchs, and journalists who fled to the West, disenchanted with Putin’s authoritarianism and strategic blunders. Those who cooperate with Western governments or publicly speak out against the Kremlin could become targets of Russian intimidation and even assassination.

Russian security agencies have also conducted paramilitary activity abroad to further Russian foreign policy interests and undermine its adversaries, including the United States. Perhaps the quintessential example was in Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin effectively used masked special operations forces, or “little green men,” to seize Crimea from Ukraine without firing a shot. Russia also conducted sabotage operations in Europe, including planting bombs at two weapons depots in 2014 in the Czech Republic that were allegedly storing arms headed to the Syrian opposition, which Moscow opposed. In March 2023, Polish authorities uncovered a GRU operation to bomb rail lines that transported weapons and other aid to Ukraine. Russian actors with ties to Russian intelligence also plotted to organize protests in Moldova in 2023 as a pretext for mounting an insurrection against the Moldovan government, which Moscow viewed as too pro-Western.

U.S. and European critical infrastructure are potential targets of paramilitary activity. One example is the underwater fiber-optic cables that connect Europe with North America and link European countries with each other. There are currently sixteen cables running under the Atlantic that link the United States with mainland Europe, which are critical for global communication and account for roughly 95 percent of all transatlantic data traffic. Russia has already signaled that it could target these cables with special operations forces, intelligence units, and submarines. In January 2022, the Russian Navy allegedly mapped out the undersea cables off the coast of Ireland and carried out maneuvers, raising serious concerns in Europe and the United States about Russian sabotage.

Other potential Russian gray zone activities include weaponizing immigrants and targeting Europe’s intricate network of gas and oil pipelines, which serve as the lifeblood of European energy. Migration, especially from Africa and Muslim countries, is an emotional issue in Europe. In 2021, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko threatened to “flood” the European Union with “drugs and migrants.” His government then sent thousands of migrants from Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and especially Poland. In August 2023, leaders from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia warned that they were seeing growing tensions on their borders with Belarus and threatened to seal their borders if Lukashenko weaponized immigration. The Italian government claimed in 2023 that the Wagner Group was behind a surge in migrants from Libya, where Wagner is active.

Despite Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin could also use private military companies in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions to increase Russian influence, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as a security partner, and gain military access and economic opportunities. Russia could also work with partners like Iran to covertly target U.S. or other NATO forces overseas. During the war in Syria, Russia and Iran worked closely with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias to retake territory for the Bashar al-Assad government. These covert tools give Moscow numerous options to hit back at the West.

Cyber Operations

Russian security agencies, such as the GRU, SVR, and FSB, have increasingly conducted cyber attacks to target critical infrastructure, undermine democratic institutions, steal government and corporate secrets, and sow disorder within or between Western allies. In some cases, Russia has conducted cyber attacks in tandem with military or paramilitary operations.

One frequent tactic is to sabotage adversaries’ critical infrastructure or to plant malware in critical infrastructure for use in a future war. Russian malware is designed to do a range of malicious activities, such as overwriting data and rendering machines unbootable, deleting data, and destroying critical infrastructure, such as industrial production and processes. Russia and Russian-linked hackers use a range of common intrusion techniques, such as exploiting public-facing web-based applications, sending spear-phishing e-mails with attachments or links, and stealing credentials and using valid e-mail accounts.

In 2017, for example, the GRU deployed NotPetya, a data-destroying malware that proliferated across multiple networks before executing a disk encryption program, which destroyed all data on targeted computers. NotPetya’s global impact was massive, disabling an estimated 500,000 computers in Ukraine, decreasing Ukraine’s GDP by 0.5 percent in 2017, and affecting organizations across sixty-five countries. Global victims included U.S. multinational companies FedEx and Merck, which lost millions of dollars because of technology cleanup and disrupted business.

In 2022, Russia conducted multiple cyber operations against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. A day before the invasion, Russian attackers launched destructive wiper attacks on hundreds of systems in Ukraine’s energy, information technology, media, and financial sectors. Russia’s goal was likely to undermine Ukraine’s political will, weaken Ukraine’s ability to fight, and collect intelligence that Russia could use to gain tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Over the next several weeks, Russian actors linked to the GRU, FSB, and SVR conducted numerous cyber attacks utilizing such malware families as WhisperGate and FoxBlade.

The West is also a target. In 2020, the SVR orchestrated a brazen attack against dozens of U.S. companies and government agencies by attaching malware to a software update from SolarWinds, a company based in Austin, Texas, that makes network monitoring software. The DarkSide, a hacking group operating in part from Russian soil, conducted a ransomware attack against the U.S. company Colonial Pipeline, which led executives to shut down a major pipeline for several days and created fuel shortages across the southeastern United States.

In 2023, Polish intelligence services claimed that Russia hacked the country’s railways in an attempt to disrupt rail traffic in the country, some of which are used to transport weapons to Ukraine. According to U.S. government assessments, Russia has targeted the computer systems of underwater cables and industrial control systems in the United States and allied countries. Compromising such infrastructure facilitates and demonstrates Russia’s ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.

Russian agencies also use cyber attacks during elections to undermine faith in democracy by influencing public sentiment during an election campaign and raising questions about the democratic process. Moscow has targeted specific candidates by stealing or forging documents and then leaking them on public websites or social media platforms. Often referred to as “hack-and-leak operations,” the objective is to undermine faith in political candidates. Another tactic is to disrupt the voting or counting process by targeting computer systems. In addition, Russia has conducted cyber attacks during elections in an attempt to influence issues of importance to Moscow. For example, Russian security agencies have conducted cyber attacks during multiple European elections to weaken support for the European Union, NATO, and the United States.

The breadth of Russian activity is impressive. Russian cyber campaigns have attempted to disrupt elections in the United States, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, and dozens of other countries, according to the Dyadic Cyber Incident Database compiled by U.S. academics. These attacks are likely to continue, including during the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign.

Disinformation

Russia has long used disinformation, often more effectively than its rivals, to supplement other tools and as a weapon by itself. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union successfully promoted the falsehood that the CIA was linked to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and that U.S. scientists invented the AIDS virus, a campaign referred to as Operation Denver.

Russia uses information campaigns abroad to make the Putin regime look good at home. By highlighting pro-Russian sentiment in Europe, the corruption of Russia’s enemies, and unpopular European policies on immigration, Moscow tries to make its own regime more popular as well as discredit its enemies. Similarly, Russia has tried to create an image of itself as a muscular Christian nation, contrasting its policies with LGBTQ+ and immigrant-friendly Europe and the United States.

Beyond bolstering Putin, disinformation is a way to weaken and divide Russia’s enemies. Famously, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm, used disinformation in an attempt to influence the 2016 U.S. election, seeking to discredit Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and promote Donald Trump. On YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, trolls pushed propaganda on immigration, race, and gun rights to conservative accounts while other parts of the Russian effort encouraged Black Americans to protest, inflaming tension among Americans.

In subsequent years, Russia has spread disinformation related to COVID-19 and other conspiracies, used a false news site in 2020 to get legitimate U.S. journalists to write stories on social disruption in the United States, and magnified the potential side effects of COVID-19 vaccines to decrease support for the Biden administration.

Ukraine is both a subject and a target of disinformation. In the years between Russia’s 2014 proxy war and 2022 invasion, Russian propaganda stressed that Ukraine was a failed, Nazi-led state, whose army was brutal to the local population. After Russia invaded Ukraine, the disinformation machine kicked into overdrive, both to justify the invasion at home and to undermine support for helping Ukraine abroad. To European audiences hosting large numbers of refugees like Poland, Russian propaganda claimed that the government was helping refugees over their own citizens. In Africa and other parts of the developing world, Moscow pushed the idea that the EU had banned Russian agricultural products while keeping Ukraine’s grain, causing a global food crisis.

Russia exploits overt and covert information sources, ranging from official government media to disinformation via government agencies, often in combination. Russia’s Foreign Ministry, for example, has played up false reports from Russian media of immigrants raping a thirteen-year-old Russian-German girl to stir up divisions in Germany and accusing the German government of not doing enough to protect its people, a sentiment that undermined German confidence in government and bolstered Russia’s image as tough on criminal immigrants. Even the Russian Orthodox Church, whose patriarch is staunchly pro-Putin, is involved. The church spreads propaganda while allowing its facilities to be used as safe houses for Russian priests to work with Russian intelligence agents.

Social media offers numerous, and cheap, additional ways to spread disinformation. Moscow uses fake accounts, anonymous websites, bots, and other means to spread its message, often using these sources to spread RT and Sputnik propaganda and to provide “evidence” for further lies from official media. Some of this involves troll accounts monitored by humans. Moscow also uses bots to try to amplify content and tries to exploit social media company algorithms to target particular audiences. At times, Russia will create innocuous accounts focused on health, fitness, or sports and then later, when they have a substantial following, begin to introduce political messages.

The wide array of actors each has its own audience. In addition, they amplify each other, with state voices and seemingly independent ones validating each other. Halting some are more difficult than others: it is one thing to block Russian state television or take down fake accounts, but it is another to block the Orthodox Church with millions of adherents outside Russia.

Generative AI offers a new means of disinformation. At the outset of the Ukraine war, Russia attempted to use a deepfake of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that led it to appear that he had fled the country and was urging troops to lay down their arms. Less dramatically, Russia spread deepfakes on Facebook and Reddit that showed Ukrainian teachers praising Putin. The technology has improved by leaps and bounds since then. Deepfakes will be increasingly cheap and easy to produce, and this can be done at scale, allowing Russia to flood the zone with convincing falsehoods.

There are myriad potential uses of deepfakes. Russia’s attempt to blame Ukraine for instigating the 2022 invasion could be more convincing in the future by “leaking” deepfakes of Ukrainian generals planning an attack on Russian territory. Moscow can spread scurrilous rumors about anti-Russian leaders and undermine their political support by releasing fake videos of them in compromising situations or saying offensive remarks. Moscow could try to further polarize the United States or other countries, worsening existing racial tension by releasing videos of supposedly violent Black Lives Matter rallies or of police abuses of members of minority communities. In Europe, variations of this might play out with anti-migrant videos showing migrants committing rape and murder, often mixing genuine crimes and violence with false information.

Such efforts might not sway people to Russia’s position. However, they are likely to sow discord and decrease confidence in government in general. All information, even the truth, would be suspect.

Political Subversion

In the Soviet days, Moscow aggressively subverted unfriendly governments, and these efforts helped it install Communist regimes in several Eastern European states at the end of World War II. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union infiltrated trade union movements in Africa, encouraged radical nationalist parties, and otherwise tried to shape the politics of countries it sought to influence.

Although Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and disinformation related to the Brexit vote that year correctly gathered considerable attention, Russia has also subsequently interfered in elections throughout Europe. In 2017, Russia pushed conspiracy theories and other radical ideas into the Czech Republic, played up migrant crime in the March 2018 Italian election, and used fake news, social media trolls, and other means to target Emmanuel Macron’s campaign in France. In Sweden, Russia spread disinformation about a joint military exercise with NATO. Russian disinformation also heated up during large-scale protests, such as pro-independence ones in Catalonia in 2017 and “yellow vest” demonstrations in France in 2018-2019. Russian propaganda regularly questioned the legitimacy of the European Union, blaming it for problems with migrants, and used disinformation to try to depress turnout in the May 2019 EU elections. Indeed, data from the University of Toronto suggests that almost every European country was targeted in one way or another. 

At times, Russia supports political parties that share its interests. Some of these are anti-establishment parties, like the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, the latter of which also received a loan from a Russian bank. In Greece, Russia backed both far-left and far-right parties, as both were Euro-skeptical. A 2020 study by the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy found at least sixty cases of Moscow supporting political campaigns outside Russia, although the evidence on some cases is weaker than others. As of August 24, 2023, the figure was 199 cases of interference overall, with techniques including “malign finance,” information operations, and civil society disruption.

Russia also seeks to create, and then exploit, economic dependencies. Russia uses its extensive energy sector to create links to its oil and natural sectors with leaders in other countries, giving them a personal and financial interest in having a country with a strong relationship with Russia. Moscow also has developed close relationships with smuggler networks in neighboring states.

Instigating protests is another way of shaping perceptions and increasing support for Russia in preparation for more aggressive measures. In Ukraine, Russia originally sought to use its agitators to create extreme right-wing anti-Russian protests, infiltrating them with paid criminals and agent provocateurs who would then attack the police. Russia would then use these protests as proof of a “far-right coup” to justify its invasion. Indeed, Russia intended to defeat Ukraine quickly in 2022 in part by fomenting instability and chaos in Ukraine itself and, in so doing, undermining trust in government, tarnishing Ukraine as an ally for potential partners, and promoting pro-Russian voices in the country.

Russia sees such subversive operations in part as a tit-for-tat response to Western pressure. Moscow viewed the various color revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine as fomented by the West, and it also blames the United States and the West for anti-government street protests in Moscow, such as those that occurred in 2011 and 2012. U.S. efforts to promote democracy and build the rule of law are viewed as transparent attempts to undermine Moscow and its allies.

Russian Weaknesses

Gray zone warfare is a necessity for Russia in part due to its weaknesses. Russia’s military is a shell of the Red Army that posed a serious threat to Western Europe during the Cold War. Its economy is stagnant, even without the impact of Western sanctions, and is roughly the size of Canada. The threat from Russia is not a return to the Cold War when two superpowers wrestled over control of the world. Instead, Russia is a weak challenger trying to play a bad hand to its advantage.

Although numerous Russian actors are involved in gray zone activities, they are generally uncoordinated. These actors include military intelligence, domestic and foreign intelligence services, state-owned enterprises, official media, private military companies, self-proclaimed patriotic groups in Russia including biker gangs, various oligarchs, co-opted hackers, the Russian Orthodox Church, and many others. This broad set of actors allows more opportunism and creativity, but it makes unity of effort harder. Many of Russia’s front groups and local allies are also of limited loyalty, especially in a crisis. In Ukraine, Wagner Group contractors and the Russian military clashed over high casualty rates and a shortage of ammunition. Even some structures created by Russian intelligence in Ukraine, such as organizations composed of retired KGB special forces, stayed loyal to Ukraine when the invasion occurred.

Although Russian cyber attacks can be disruptive, Moscow’s capabilities are limited if countries can build a strong defense. Ukraine successfully blunted Russia’s cyber attacks during its 2022 invasion, thanks to help from the United States, the United Kingdom, and private companies such as Microsoft. Russia is at best middling in its AI capabilities and comparable to Canada, rather than to the United States or China. The exodus of much of Russia’s tech talent following the 2022 invasion and subsequent conscription only worsens Moscow’s problems.

Russia itself is also vulnerable to gray zone activity. Views of Russia across the globe are highly negative, according to a 2023 Pew Research Center poll that covered twenty-four countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A median of 82 percent of respondents had an unfavorable view of Russia, and 87 percent had little or no confidence in Vladimir Putin. These sentiments create opportunities for subverting Russian diplomatic, military, and other actions.

The same is true of Russian private military companies, which are active in Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America. Prigozhin was instrumental in expanding Russia’s influence by using his Wagner Group to train foreign forces, conduct military operations, extract resources, and help coup-proof local regimes. But Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, almost certainly at Putin’s instruction, is likely to undermine the morale, leadership, and effectiveness of some Russian private military companies. Social media channels linked to Wagner blamed Putin and other Russian officials for orchestrating Prigozhin’s death and threatened retaliatory action against Moscow. Leaders in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Sudan, and other countries may opt to break ties with Wagner and consider alternatives to improve security.

Recommendations

Training and aid packages must focus not only on stopping Russian conventional aggression but also on fighting gray zone warfare. Russia’s efforts are most successful when a country has weak border controls, poor counterintelligence, internal divisions, is awash in firearms, and is unprepared for Russian machinations, according to a RAND study. All these conditions can be countered or at least reduced.

The specifics will vary by country and area. Efforts to combat corruption, improve border security, fight low-level insurgencies, and encourage political reform are vital for reducing Moscow’s influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. In Europe, assistance should focus on intelligence coordination, cyber defense, and border control measures. Europe must prepare for a surge of migrants facilitated by Russia, especially in such frontline states as Finland, Poland, the Baltics, and Romania. Finland is building a three-meter-high fence made of steel mesh and barbed wire in case Russia attempts to flood its 1,343-kilometer border with illegal immigrants. But it could use additional assistance in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection from drones and other systems. The Baltic states’ military leaders warned that they would shoot any “little green men” and otherwise quickly respond to covert Russian military attacks.

Moscow’s cyber and AI skills, while impressive, are far less than those of the United States and its European allies, and bolstering cyber defenses will reduce some dangers. Intelligence sharing and training of allied militaries can diminish the impact of Russian support for insurgency and terrorism. Public exposure of Russian election manipulation can, in some cases, reduce its impact, and U.S. influence operations may prove more effective given the shaken condition of the Russian regime today. Most of all, the United States and its allies should link sanctions relief and other current punishments to Moscow’s gray zone meddling as well as its invasion of Ukraine.

The United States and its allies should also prepare efforts to discredit Russian private military companies around the world and counter Russian propaganda that promotes Putin as a successful leader. This would involve highlighting increases in terrorism in areas where groups like Wagner are used in Africa, the corruption of Russian officials, and videos that highlight the challenges for ordinary Russians due to Putin’s rule. More specific information efforts may target Russian elites that help hold up the regime: this may decrease their support for Putin or at the very least increase mistrust within elite circles.

Allies need to stand firm against Russian gray zone warfare—and Washington must back them. Moscow may be economically weak, and its conventional military is a far cry from the feared Red Army of the Cold War. But Russia is not down and out. The most effective way to contain Putin is to limit his ability to operate in the gray zone.

Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His latest book is Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism.

Seth G. Jones is senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He was a plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan, as well as the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W.W. Norton).

Image: Shutterstock.

Tram des Balkans invite Mélissa Zantman pour une rencontre intense, en haute altitude, autour d'un répertoire inédit de chants du monde et de compositions originales. Mélissa entraine le quintet lyonnais dans son univers vocal alliant puissance et finesse. Certains virages harmoniques sont bien serrés, alors TRAM attache sa ceinture et fonce en conservant son énergie décomplexée.
« Au centre, un seul micro posé comme un totem où viennent se rencontrer les 6 voix et les instruments. Tous (...)

- Agenda / Région parisienne

Une attaque jihadiste d'importance a eu lieu ce jeudi matin 28 septembre au Niger, dans la zone des trois frontières. Une forteresse de l'armée située près de Kandadji, où un barrage hydro-électrique est en construction, a été visée. Il n'y a pour le moment pas de bilan officiel, mais le chiffre d'une douzaine de militaires tués circule.

Dans le cadre des festivités du trentenaire de l'ONG CREDO, des enfants et jeunes parrainés ont été gratifiés de bourses d'études pour la rentrée scolaire 2023-2024. La cérémonie de remise s'est déroulée le jeudi 28 septembre 2023, à Ouagadougou, sous le patronage de l'ancien Premier ministre Tertius Zongo.

CREDO fait de la scolarisation des enfants, l'une de ses nobles missions. En août 2023, l'ONG lançait une activité de collecte de fonds dénommée « Opération 6 000 bourses », qui se déroule durant toute l'année. La valeur de la bourse est estimée à 120 000 francs CFA. Des entreprises, des ONG et des personnes ressources ont cru à cette vision, et ont laissé parler leur cœur. Ce jeudi 28 septembre 2023, le palais de la culture Jean Pierre Guingané a refusé du monde, à l'occasion de la cérémonie de remise des bourses d'études collectées.

Les enfants lors de la cérémonie de remise de bourses d'études

Ces bourses de scolarisation sont accordées aux enfants issus de familles démunies, aux orphelins et aux enfants déplacés internes. La répartition se présente comme suit : 90 000 FCFA pour les élèves du primaire, 105 000 pour ceux du collège et 225 000 FCFA pour ceux du supérieur. Les bénéficiaires du jour, par la voix de leur représentante, ont remercié l'ONG CREDO. « Nous sommes contents car chaque année, CREDO apporte un soutien pour le paiement des frais de scolarité, la prise en charge de nos tenues et cantines scolaires et l'accompagnement médical à travers les visites médicales annuelles et un appui des consultations, et des frais d'ordonnances en cas de maladie », ont-ils dit.

Le parrainage des enfants vulnérables est au cœur des activités de CREDO depuis sa création en 1993. « Nous travaillons dans douze régions du Burkina Faso sur les treize sans distinction de races, ni d'ethnies. Notre parrainage touche tous les enfants de toutes les confessions possibles. Aujourd'hui, c'est la poursuite d'une œuvre entamée depuis 30 ans », a fait observer le secrétaire général, Josias Sanogo, tout en insistant sur le caractère endogène de l'opération 6 000 bourses.

Le secrétaire général de l'ONG CREDO, Josias Sanogo

Il s'agit, selon lui, d'interpeller les Burkinabè à parrainer des Burkinabè. « Nous avons, depuis très jeunes, entendu parler de parrainage. C'est le Blanc qui parraine un Africain. Mais depuis un certain temps, nous sommes inscrits dans la dynamique que, désormais, ce sont des Burkinabè qui parrainent des Burkinabè. Nous voyons les fruits. Nous sommes fiers de notre pays », poursuit M. Sanogo.

Dans son discours, il a souligné l'importance de l'éducation en tant que vecteur incontournable pour sortir du cycle de la pauvreté. A ce titre, « elle offre aux enfants de nouvelles perspectives, stimule leur développement personnel et leur donne les compétences nécessaires pour réussir dans la vie. Dans ce combat, nous avons toujours bénéficié de la générosité des hommes et de la grâce du Seigneur ».

Le parrain, Dr Daniel Zopoula, président Fondateur de l'ONG Bridges of Hope Canada a réitéré son engagement à accompagner l'ONG

Le conseiller technique François Compaoré est porteur d'un message du ministre de l'éducation nationale : reconnaissance et gratitude. « L'éducation, comme le disait quelqu'un, est une chose trop sérieuse pour qu'on laisse sa conduite à l'État seul. Aujourd'hui, le Burkina Faso est en proie à une crise sécuritaire qui frappe au premier plan nos écoles, c'est-à-dire l'avenir de notre pays, nos enfants, nos élèves. C'est la raison pour laquelle il est important que les efforts soient fournis et que le ministère reconnaisse tous les efforts qui sont fournis pour permettre à des enfants burkinabè de continuer d'apprendre, de se cultiver, afin que demain les idées de paix, de vivre ensemble prennent le dessus sur les idées de violence et de guerre. C'est ce message que le ministre voudrait apporter à l'ONG CREDO qui se bat pour le devenir de nos enfants », a-t-il livré à cette occasion.

Le secrétaire général de l'ONG CREDO, Josias Sanogo

Pour sa part, la marraine Céline Yoda a remercié et félicité CREDO pour son engagement en faveur des enfants vulnérables au Burkina Faso, et ce, en dépit du contexte sécuritaire national difficile. « Beaucoup d'ONG ont fermé mais par la grâce de Dieu, elle continue ses interventions sur le sol burkinabè », se réjouit-elle. L'ancienne ambassadrice a joint sa voix à celle de CREDO pour interpeller tous ceux qui peuvent accompagner la vision du parrainage endogène afin de ne pas dépendre continuellement de l'aide extérieure.

Le conseiller technique, François Compaoré, a représenté le ministre de l'éducation nationale

Le parrain, Dr Daniel Zopoula, président fondateur de l'ONG Bridges of Hope Canada, est sensible aux questions liées aux enfants. Résident au Canada, il a effectué le déplacement pour célébrer CREDO. Lors de la cérémonie de remise de bourses d'études, Pasteur Zopoula a pris l'engagement devant un parterre d'invités de parrainer 100 enfants. « J'ai connu des moments difficiles dans ma vie. Aujourd'hui, Dieu m'a béni. Je suis revenu au Burkina Faso pour apporter mon aide aux autres ».
En termes de performances, l'ONG CREDO a parrainé environ 120 000 enfants au Burkina Faso depuis sa création.

Aïssata Laure G. Sidibé
Lefaso.net

Selon l'Agence d'information du Burkina (AIB), les vecteurs aériens ont neutralisé des terroristes parmi une centaine en mouvement aux environs de Quargaye (Koulpelogo, Centre-est) , ce 28 septembre 2023.

Les assaillants ont quitté les forêts de Kankanmogré et de Kabonga pour mener une attaque.

Ils ont été repérés par les vecteurs aériens qui les ont suivis jusqu'à leur point de convergence, situé dans un hameau aux environs de Ouargaye.

Autre victoire, près de Silmangué (région du Centre-nord), le système de surveillance aérien a découvert une base terroriste dans un hameau à Pelhoute.
Une quinzaine d'hommes armés installés dans un bâtiment servant de quartier général ont également été neutralisés par des frappes.

Lefaso.net
Source : AIB

Le maréchal Haftar, qui dirige l'Est de la Libye, s'est entretenu jeudi à Moscou avec Vladimir Poutine et le ministre russe de la Défense Sergueï Choïgou. Cette rencontre intervient alors que la Russie mène depuis plusieurs années une offensive diplomatique en Afrique pour y supplanter les puissances occidentales traditionnelles.

Il s’agit de la première rencontre entre les deux hommes depuis 2019, selon des médias libyens. « La situation en Libye et dans l’ensemble de la région a été discutée », a fait savoir le porte-parole du Kremlin, Dmitri Peskov.

Le Conseil constitutionnel a ouvert la voie jeudi à d’éventuels nouveaux procès dans l’affaire des "emplois fictifs", impliquant l'ancien Premier ministre François Fillon, ainsi que dans le dossier "Bismuth", impliquant l'ex-président Nicolas Sarkozy.

Dans son édito datant du 27 septembre 2023 et intitulé « Mon capitaine, il faut changer votre fusil d'épaule », notre confrère de l'Observateur Paalga faisait le bilan des actions du MPSR 2 , un an après sa prise du pouvoir ( 30 septembre 2022).
Le journal souligne qu'il y a eu des acquis. Cependant, il y a des dérives qui sont constatées depuis l'arrivée au pouvoir du capitaine Ibrahim Traoré.

Lefaso.net

« … En un an, de nombreux actes souvent volontaristes et mâtinés d'idéologie ont été posés. Ainsi, et à titre d'exemples, de la dénonciation des accords militaires et fiscaux qui nous liaient à la France, du renvoi de la force Sabre qui stationnait à Kamboinsin, de la mise en œuvre de l'actionnariat populaire, de l'offensive agro-sylvo-pastorale, des nouvelles bornes légales imposées aux promoteurs immobiliers, de la résiliation du contrat sur l'aéroport de Donsin qui liait l'Etat à une société française, de la cession d'actifs miniers d'Inata et de Tambao à AfroTurc, etc.

Sauf à pécher contre l'esprit, on ne peut donc pas nier que de nombreuses mesures ont été prises même si pour certaines, il faut attendre d'en mesurer l'efficacité et l'impact dans le temps. Cependant, douze mois après l'avènement du MPSR II, force est de reconnaître que le problème qui a justifié l'irruption du capitaine Traoré sur la scène politique nationale est loin d'être réglé.

Bien au contraire, malgré l'acquisition de moyens substantiels, notamment en matière de vecteur aérien (drones et hélicoptères), le recrutement massif de Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP) la réorganisation du maillage sécuritaire du territoire qui avait déjà commencé avec Roch et Damiba, malgré la neutralisation par centaines de ces fourmis rouges qui s'incrustent dans tous les coins et recoins du pays et la destruction de leurs bases, on ne perçoit toujours pas de résultats objectivement mesurables dans la reconquête du territoire même si, fort opportunément, une dizaine de jours avant l'anniversaire, le Conseil des ministres, en sa séance du mercredi 20 septembre dernier, a annoncé le retour de 191 937 personnes déplacées internes dans leurs localités d'origine. Un chiffre très précis, à la PDI près, dont on ne peut que se féliciter en espérant que toutes les conditions (sécuritaires en l'occurrence) ont été réunies sur place pour qu'elles y restent et ne soient pas de nouveau contraintes de fuir et, surtout, que cette tendance positive se poursuivra.

Car pendant que certains regagnent le bercail, d'autres prennent toujours le chemin inverse.
Ces douze derniers mois, le nombre de PDI a franchi allègrement la barre des 2 millions, le nombre d'écoles, de centres de santé fermés continue sa courbe ascendante et le retour de l'Etat dans ces zones où la vermine fait la pluie et le beau temps se fait attendre.

(…)Si donc, sur le terrain miné de la reconquête du territoire, les indicateurs objectivement mesurables et constatables ne sautent pas forcément aux yeux nonobstant l'engagement sans faille de nos FDS et des VDP qui continuent de tomber chaque jour au champ d'honneur, les restrictions des libertés individuelles et collectives, elles, par contre, sautent aux yeux.

Qu'on se comprenne bien. En temps de péril, il est normal que pour sauver la patrie en danger, chaque citoyen concède une partie de ses droits et que la cité remette pour un temps déterminé son sort entre les mains d'un « dictateur », détenteur de l'imperium au sens noble où on l'entendait dans la Rome antique. Mais de là à instaurer une chape de plomb sous le couvert de la lutte contre le terrorisme juste parce qu'on ne souffre pas la contestation, il y a un pas que le capitaine aurait gagné à ne pas franchir.

Des partis politiques et des OSC mis sous coupe réglée, des tentatives de musèlement des journalistes dont la plume tremble chaque fois qu'ils doivent opiner sur la situation nationale (beaucoup ne s'y risquent même plus), des magistrats tenus en laisse par le premier magistrat…pour le capitaine Traoré, tout le monde doit marcher au pas et gare à celui qui ne file pas droit.

Pendant ce temps, d'autres campent sur la place publique et sont autorisés à manifester. Ce n'est pas juste comme l'Etat doit savoir l'être en toutes circonstances et s'il suffisait de bâillonner toutes les voix discordantes, d'installer une forme de terreur kaki pour que la paix revienne, il y a longtemps que le problème aurait été réglé. Or deux putschs après, on est loin d'apercevoir le bout du tunnel.
Il ne faut donc pas se tromper d'ennemi.

On aurait tort en effet de prendre ceux qui sont d'un avis contraire pour des « apatrides » qu'il faut abattre alors que dans le même temps, on proclame l'union de tous les Burkinabè car nous vaincrons ensemble ou nous périrons ensemble.

Au demeurant, depuis sept ans que nous sommes embourbés, et pour ne parler que des pisse-copies, Dieu seul sait combien de fois les médias ont permis aux politiques et aux FDS de rectifier le tir là où il le fallait. On ne le dira jamais assez, les vérités qu'on n'aime pas entendre sont celles qu'on gagnerait à méditer le plus.

Et s'il est bien une catégorie d'individus dont l'homme du 30-Septembre doit se méfier, c'est moins ceux qui critiquent son action pour lui permettre de se corriger et de nous sauver que ceux qui lui chantent chaque jour qu'il est le plus beau, le plus fort et le plus intelligent. Ils seront les premiers à retourner leur veste au moindre pépin comme on l'a si souvent vu dans l'histoire récente du Burkina. Comme le disent les Ecritures, ils vous auront renié trois fois avant que le coq n'ait chanté. C'est juste un conseil d'ami.

Autre chose, mon capitaine, si le discours officiel chante les vertus de la bonne gouvernance, les actes trahissent parfois une gestion patrimoniale des affaires publiques.

Certes, on ne gouverne qu'avec ses amis et non avec ses ennemis et comme le dit un adage bien de chez nous, « le naam se bouffe en famille ». Qu'à cela ne tienne, avec ses petits et grands frères, ses oncles, papas et tantes qui gravitent dans les premiers cercles du pouvoir, on a parfois le sentiment d'un IB & Co plutôt gênant, surtout quand on veut jouer au révolutionnaire au-dessus de tout soupçon comme la femme de César.

Comparaison pour comparaison à Sankara, le leader de la révolution d'août-83 n'aurait pas fait cela. Seulement voilà, 40 ans après, les officiers subalternes qui roulent carrosse, au propre comme au figuré, savent que la révolution à la sauce potasse de leurs devanciers n'était pas particulièrement ragoutante. On l'a bien compris, « la révolution n'a jamais aboli les privilèges, elle change juste les privilégiés » (Albert Camus). Seulement, ça fait tache au moment où la majorité des Burkinabè étouffent à cause des multiples taxes et impôts créés pour soutenir l'effort de guerre et des conditions de vie on ne peut plus difficiles.

Pour toutes ces raisons et bien d'autres, il n'y a vraiment pas de quoi pavoiser et les zélateurs du régime qui s'apprêtent à commémorer l'An I du MPSR rectifié devraient se garder de plastronner. S'il fallait faire le bilan d'une année de rectification du MPSR, au lieu de se gargariser sur les acquis, ce serait bien de s'appesantir sur les lacunes et insuffisances pour redresser la barre pendant qu'il est temps

Et si commémoration il devait y avoir, ça devrait être une journée d'hommage, de souvenir et de recueillement pour les martyrs de Koumbri, de Nassoumbou, de Foutouri, de Bourzanga, de Seytenga, de Solenzo, de Solhan, de Déou-Oursi, d'Ougarou… de tous ces éléments des FDS et VDP ainsi que des nombreux civils fauchés par les balles assassines de ceux qui ont juré notre perte. Pas pour faire le panégyrique d'un homme, soit-il messianique, et de son régime.
Pas en ces temps troubles. »

Source : L'Observateur Paalga

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