Agrégateur de flux

The signatories of the Paris Agreement are required to submit new nationally deter­mined contributions (NDCs) by 10 February 2025, laying out targets for 2035. These third generation NDCs – “NDCs 3.0” – are supposed to serve as comprehensive invest­ment and transformation plans and incorporate the findings of the Global Stocktake (GST). The GST was agreed at COP 28 in Dubai to keep the 1.5 degree target within reach. However, hardened fronts between developing and developed countries obstruct the establishment of a progressive coalition to develop ambitious NDCs. Germany and the European Union could inject new life into the NDC 3.0 process by stepping up techni­cal support, promoting diplomatic initiatives and embracing Brazil as a key actor.

Revue de presse du mercredi 7 août 2024

Les déclarations du Président Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi sur la situation en République démocratique du Congo sont au cœur des contenus exploités ce mercredi par les médias kinois.

« Félix Tshisekedi crache du feu « Joseph Kabila prépare une insurrection. L’AFC, c’est lui », titre Eco News.

Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU a adopté mardi 6 août une résolution par laquelle il autorise la Mission des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), à fournir un soutien opérationnel et logistique à la mission de paix de la Communauté de développement de l’Afrique australe (SADC), une organisation régionale.

Le texte présenté par la France et le Sierra Leone a été adopté à l'unanimité par les quinze membres du Conseil.

- Proverbes

Americas Northrup Grumman won a $24.7 million modification, which adds scope to provide non-recurring engineering risk reduction efforts to support the delivery schedule of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft for the government of Japan. Work will be performed is expected to be completed November 2024. Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Boeing has delivered the first production MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter to the US Air Force. This aircraft, part of a 13-helicopter initial order, will be stationed at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. The new helicopter is part of a Low Rate Initial Production order awarded to Boeing in 2023. The company has already secured an additional order for seven MH-139As this year, bringing the total number of aircraft on contract to 26. Middle East & Africa A rocket attack on a base in Iraq wounded multiple US personnel on Monday, officials said, adding to already heightened regional tensions over an expected Iranian counterattack on Israel. The rocket fire is the latest in a series of attacks targeting Ain al-Assad base in western Iraq, which hosts American troops as well as personnel from the US-led coalition against the Islamic State jihadist group. Europe Poland has […]

The time is right for an Israeli-Saudi deal that could help end the war in Gaza.

American power does not hinge on a single island.

AH-64 in Afghanistan (click to view full) The AH-64 Apache will remain the US Army’s primary armed helicopter for several more decades, thanks to the collapse of the RAH-66 Comanche program, and the retirement sans replacement of the US Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH). Apaches also serve with a number of American allies, some of whom have already expressed interest in upgrading or expanding their fleets. The AH-64E Guardian Block III (AB3) is the helicopter’s next big step forward. It incorporates 26 key new-technology insertions that cover flight performance, maintenance costs, sensors & electronics, and even the ability to control UAVs as part of manned-unmanned teaming (MUT). In July 2006, Boeing and U.S. Army officials signed the initial development contract for Block III upgrades to the current and future Apache fleet, via a virtual signing ceremony. By November 2011, the 1st production helicopter had been delivered. So… how many helicopters will be modified under the AH-64 Block III program, what do these modifications include, how is the program structured, and what has been happening since that 2006 award? The short answer is: a lot, including export interest and sales. The AH-64 Apache Program: Sunset, Sunrise Executive Summary The AH-64E/ Block […]

Summer is the main fighting season in Ukraine, and as it slowly wanes, it is worth doing a tour of the battlefield to assess the situation.

Overall, the situation remains relatively the same. The Russian forces continue to be on the offensive, but they lack the requisite combat power to breach the Ukrainian defenses and achieve an operational breakthrough. On the other end, the Ukrainians are holding fast across the contact line, building their combat capability for a future large-scale counteroffensive.

A Tour of the Battlefield

In the east, the situation remains largely stagnant, with small-scale action on both sides.

“Positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline,” the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed in its latest operational estimate.

There is active fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city in eastern Ukraine. The Russian forces maintain two pockets in the area, but they don’t present a serious threat to Kharkiv.

In May, the Russian forces tried to capture the city, launching a large-scale offensive. However, the Ukrainian defenses held, and the Russian forces lost much of their tactical gains to subsequent Ukrainian counterattacks. Moreover, the Russian military lost over 40,000 men in the operation.

The Donbas remains the center of fighting.

“Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian military blogger claimed that Russian forces seized several Ukrainian strongholds along the Berestove-Pishchane line (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim,” the Institute for the Study of War stated.

The Russian forces continued with their small-scale offensive operations in the direction of Siversk and Chasiv Yar but without any significant success or confirmed advances.

However, in the direction of Toretsk in the southern part of the Donbas, the Russian forces have had more success, making significant tactical advances.

“Russian forces reportedly continue to advance east of Pokrovsk on August 5, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are closer to completing a tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces near the T-0511 (O-054) road southeast of Pokrovsk,” the Institute for the Study of War estimated.

The Ukrainian forces usually won’t retreat until they have to, falling back to better-defended positions.

In the southern part of Ukraine, the Russian forces have made some small gains around Robotyne, in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Last year, the Ukrainian military launched its promising large-scale counteroffensive in the area. However, the Russian forces were well-entrenched and managed to absorb most of the Ukrainian offensive push.

Russian Casualties in Ukraine: An Update 

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take serious losses on a daily basis. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the past twenty-four hours, the Kremlin lost approximately 1,050 men killed, wounded, or captured, as well as fifty-four tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, thirty-nine artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, thirty-six unmanned aerial systems, eight infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six cruise missiles, four main battle tanks, and one piece of special equipment.

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

En raison de la haute qualité d’image et de la capacité à stocker les détails complexes qu’ils offrent, les fichiers TIFF sont couramment utilisés par […]

L’article Convertir des TIFF en PDF pour les architectes et designers est apparu en premier sur .

Summary and Key Points: The arrival of American-made F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine is seen as a significant boost to the country's air defense and support capabilities. However, while these jets offer advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, their impact on the war is likely to be limited by their numbers and lack of stealth capabilities.

-Ukraine's F-16s, while a valuable addition, face significant risks from Russian air defenses and will not single-handedly change the course of the conflict.

The Great F-16 Debate: Will They Help Ukraine or Not? 

More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, F-16 Fighting Falcons have officially begun arriving in the country, marking what many hope will be a shift in the embattled nation’s air defense and air support capabilities. These Western fighters represent what promises to be a significant increase in combat capability for the Ukrainian Air Force, but despite the potential these aircraft have to tip the balance toward Ukraine’s favor, it’s also important to keep in mind that the war for Ukraine’s future is far too large to be decided by any single platform or weapon system.

“F-16s in Ukraine. We ensured this. I am proud of all our guys who are skillfully mastering these aircraft and have already started using them for our country. I thank our team for this result. I thank all the partners who are truly helping with the F-16s, and the first countries that accepted our request for aircraft – Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States, – and all our partners, – we value your support,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said during a ceremony at an undisclosed location. “I wish our Air Force and all our warriors to feel the pride of Ukrainians in our combat aviation and to bring Ukraine the combat results that will bring our victory closer – our just peace for Ukraine.

But while we need to keep our expectations for these aircraft grounded in reality, these images of Ukraine’s first operational F-16s do offer us a promising glimpse at how these aircraft will be employed (at least early on) and, in turn, how they might affect the fight moving forward.

What types of air-to-air weapons are Ukraine’s F-16s carrying?

In images and video released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, these F-16s were armed with air-to-air focused load-outs comprised of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9M Sidewinder infrared-guided air-to-air missiles.

The AIM-120, which serves as America’s primary beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapon, comes in multiple forms, including the AIM-120C, which is optimized for internal carriage in stealth fighters like the F-35, and the AIM-120D — which is among the most capable iterations of the missile ever to reach service. The AIM-120D boasts GPS guidance, anti-jam capabilities, and a maximum engagement range that extends out beyond 110 miles. It isn’t entirely clear which version of the AMRAAM these aircraft are carrying, but previous statements from Ukrainian officials suggest it likely is the AIM-120D.

The AIM-120D is capable of hitting targets further out than the radar on Ukraine’s F-16s could likely identify them, and the weapon itself is network capable, meaning it could get target data from other assets in the battlespace, but it remains unclear as to whether Ukrainian forces will be able to leverage that capability at this point. This also points to the possibility that Ukrainian officials being quoted about the range of the weapons they were receiving could simply have been mistaken, and Ukraine may actually be receiving a less advanced (and long-ranged) iteration of the AMRAAM.

Regardless of which AMRAAM Ukraine’s F-16s fly with, it will represent a significant improvement over the R-27 semi-active radar-guided air-to-air missiles employed by Ukrainian fighter jets today. The R-27 has a maximum range of better than 60 miles, but is much more difficult to employ against enemy fighters due to its lack of onboard radar guidance. Unlike the AMRAAM, which can transition to its own onboard radar seeker as it approaches its target to close the remaining distance unassisted, Ukraine’s R-27s require continued guidance from the fighter’s onboard radar. This means Ukrainian pilots attempting long-range engagements need to chase the missiles they launch, maintaining a lock on their targets until the missiles make impact.

“After all, these aircraft have powerful airborne radars, technological equipment and, most importantly, missiles with active homing heads,” Col. Yuri Bulavka, a Ukrainian Su-27 pilot, said in April when asked why Ukraine needs Western fighters to say viable in the air war.

Russian forces have been attempting extremely long-range engagements against Ukrainian fighters using R-37M radar-guided missiles launched at high altitude by MiG-31BMs, which have a claimed maximum range of around 250 miles — though in practice, Russian aircraft have primarily been employing these missiles from inside of 80 miles — outside the reach of Ukraine’s R-27s, but well within the reach of AIM-120Ds if Ukraine’s F-16s are indeed carrying them.

The AIM-9M Sidewinder seen in these pictures is not quite as advanced and capable as the latest variants of the AIM-9X in use for the U.S. but is nonetheless seen as an extremely potent short-range weapon. The AIM-9M uses a traditional infrared seeker and control surfaces and is limited to engaging targets within the pilot’s forward field of view (as opposed to the AIM-9X’s high off-boresight targeting capability). Like much of the technology found within the F-16AMs being employed by Ukraine, the AIM-9M was cutting-edge in the early 1990s — being credited with at least 10 air-to-air kills in Operation Desert Storm alone.

However, according to reports from the Wall Street Journal, Ukraine will indeed be receiving AIM-9X variants of the Sidewinder missile, which will further increase the close-quarters combat capabilities of these F-16s. The AIM-9X not only boasts a significantly improved guidance system to better see through the tricks of common missile countermeasures like flares, but it also offers a massive increase in aerobatic maneuverability. The AIM-9X is famously so maneuverable, thanks to its thrust-vectoring rocket nozzle, that it can even engage enemy aircraft flying behind the launching aircraft — targetable through the helmet-cued targeting system Ukrainian pilots have already been seen training on.

Both the AMRAAM and the Sidewinder (in various iterations for each) will prove valuable not just for air-to-air combat, however — they’ll also be essential for expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Both AMRAAMs and Sidewinders are capable of downing long-range subsonic cruise missiles like Russia’s air-launched Kh-101, and the Sidewinder is a relatively low-cost option for engaging larger enemy drones than Patriot interceptors.

What types of air-to-ground weapons will these F-16s fly with?

One of the most important air-to-ground munitions these F-16s will leverage is America’s AGM-88 HARM, or High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile.

Ukrainian forces have already been using the HARM since August of 2022 or earlier, but because these weapons were being launched by dated Soviet jets that were never intended to use them, their utility has been dramatically limited.

Anti-radiation missiles like the HARM work by honing on the electromagnetic radiation broadcast by radar arrays – in other words, radar waves – making them uniquely suited for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) role. American Wild Weasel pilots often fly their aircraft into contested airspace, waiting for enemy air defense systems to power up in an attempt to target them or their wingmen. Once the air defense systems are broadcasting radar waves, Wild Weasel pilots launch their HARM missiles to hone in on those radar waves and destroy the air defense equipment.

Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters are only able to leverage the HARM missile in what many call the “pre-briefed” mode. In effect, the missile is pre-programmed with a target area and then launched by an aircraft, often at a fairly long distance. The missile flies toward its intended target area, using its seeker to look for any air defense systems powering up and broadcasting radar waves for it to then close with and destroy.

This method can be very effective, especially when launching these missiles in volume, as even if they don’t ultimately destroy enemy radar sites, their presence alone will often prompt air defense crews to power down their arrays. This effectively amounts to suppression of air defenses, as those powered-down arrays allow aircraft to operate inside the contested area for a short time, but of course, once the HARM threat has passed, these arrays can power back up and begin hunting for Ukrainian jets all over again.

However, if operated by an aircraft carrying NATO-standard busses, like Ukraine’s new F-16s, pilots can leverage the HARM’s full capability set, including two more operational modes that can be very handy in a fight: “Self-protect” mode and “target of opportunity” mode.

In self-protect mode, the aircraft’s onboard radar warning receiver identifies an enemy radar array that’s broadcasting. It then passes that target data over to the HARM, which can hone in on either the broadcasting radar or the specific location that waves were coming from in the event the enemy powers the system down. The target of opportunity mode is similar but allows the AGM-88’s onboard seeker to spot enemy radar arrays powering up, which then alerts the pilot to launch the weapon.

Another very important weapon system we can expect to see these F-16s leverage is the extender range iteration of America’s long-serving Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. JDAM kits are, effectively, guidance systems that can be installed on conventional “dumb bombs” to turn them into GPS-guided precision munitions, usually capable of engaging targets from ranges of 15 miles or so. In February 2023, however, the U.S. announced its plans to equip Ukraine with the JDAM-ER, which adds a deployable set of wings to the system to triple its engagement range out to 45 miles or better. Russian forces have seen a great deal of success in recent months using a very similar glide-bomb system, meaning Ukraine should soon be able to give them a taste of their own medicine in that regard.

How do Ukraine’s F-16s compare to those operated by the US?

Ukraine’s new (old) fighters are being transferred from the inventories of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway — and while these aircraft do share the same design as America’s in-service F-16s, the hardware and software found onboard is often quite a bit more dated. These F-16AMs were built and delivered in the 1970s, before undergoing what’s called a “Mid Life Update” (MLU) in the early 2000s to bring them more-or-less on par with the Block 50/52 F-16Cs and Ds operated by the United States during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s.

One of the most important elements of this update was the inclusion of the Texas Instruments Modular Mission Computer (MMC), which in conjunction with a cockpit refresh helped to bring these 1970s hotrods into the digital age, making it possible to leverage a breadth of new weapons and auxiliary systems through an improved pilot interface.

While Ukraine’s F-16s do lack the Active Electronically Scanned Array radar found in many American F-16s, they do carry the updated AN/APG-66(V2) Fire Control Radar, which is a medium-range pulse-doppler planar array said to offer a 25% improvement in detection range over the aircraft’s original array. This system is capable of tracking up to ten targets simultaneously while scanning the area and offers what’s commonly called a “six on six” AMRAAM capability — which means the radar can support long-range engagements of up to six targets at once using an onboard complement of AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles.

The original AN/APG-66 was said to have a target detection range out beyond 90 miles (150 km) and the ability to track fighter-sized targets at ranges of roughly 35+ miles (60 km), but the APG-66v2 found in Ukraine’s new F-16s is said to boast a roughly 25% improvement in detection and tracking performance. That pushes those ranges out to roughly 110+ miles for detection and a bit north of 43 miles for targeting fighters, though it should be noted that these are unclassified figures and should be taken with a hearty helping of salt.

As first reported by The Warzone, Ukraine’s F-16s shown in recent images and videos seem to be equipped with Denmark’s Pylon Integrated Dispensing System Plus (PIDS+) and possibly with the Electronic Combat Integrated Pylon System Plus (ECIPS+). These systems, which you can see in the images look sort of like weapon pylons with optical sensors, include integrated radar-warning receivers to notify the pilot of nearby threats and missile approach warning sensors (MAWS) to let them know when trouble’s coming. This will be of particular value in attack and air defense suppression missions, as the Su-25s employed by Ukraine to date don’t even have radar-warning receivers onboard to speak of.

“Our jets don’t have a system to warn about [Russian rocket] launches,” said a Ukranian Su-25 pilot with the call sign Pumba. “It’s all visual-based. If you see them, then you just try to escape by firing off heat traps and maneuvering.”

Depending on the system in use, these integrated systems can either provide additional flares and chaff to confuse inbound missiles or more advanced Northrop Grumman-sourced electronic warfare capabilities.

Be prepared: F-16s will be shot down

Put simply, these are fairly modern F-16s with all the bells and whistles you might expect to find in such a fighter operated by nations without top-tier funding for the latest and greatest gadgets, making them a significant threat to Russian aviators, but not necessarily the technological overmatch one might expect in an engagement between American F-16s and Russian fighters. In practical terms, Ukraine will soon be operating between 60 and 80 total F-16s, which is certainly a significant development but is far from enough to offset the numerical advantage represented by Russia’s fighter fleets.

The F-16 is a highly survivable fighter, as demonstrated by its performance in conflicts like Operation Desert Storm, where one F-16 managed to dodge six incoming surface-to-air missiles in rapid succession without the use of countermeasures at one point — but it’s important to remember that Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are the most advanced these fighters have ever squared off against in modern warfare. The F-16 is not a stealth fighter, and as such, is still very vulnerable to being detected and targeted by Russian air defenses, just as the rest of Ukraine’s fighters have been throughout this conflict. But more than that, Russia will be making it their business to engage and destroy as many F-16s as they can as quickly as they can to limit the positive effect these fighters can have on Ukrainian morale and Western support.

Russia’s emphasis on managing the perceptions of the world at large through concerted disinformation campaigns tightly interwoven with real and manufactured news out of the battlefield is sure to be working overtime to find ways to portray these F-16s as ineffectual or highly vulnerable, and that will almost certainly will come with a heavy allocation of resources meant to down these jets for the sake of that narrative (and of course, to minimize their actual strategic impact). These fighters are most vulnerable on the ground, meaning Russian airstrikes will be placing a large emphasis on not just destroying the jets, but runways and support facilities required to operate them.

To put it simply, these aircraft will be operating with a big target on their back, and the nature of warfare all but assures that some of them will go down fighting or likely, be destroyed on their runways. These losses will be framed in the media as a significant development — for the sake of driving clicks in the West, and for the sake of driving narrative out of Russia — but losing aircraft is just what happens in the war-fighting business.

F-16s will not win this war for Ukraine, but they could play a vital part in a broader strategy aimed at doing so — and to use them effectively to that end, risk will be an inherent part of the job. So, as these jets slowly start getting into the fight, it’s important to maintain a realistic perspective about what they are and what they can do… But just as importantly, what they can’t. F-16s are incredible jets that can do some positively mind-bending things, but at the end of the day, they’re not invulnerable, especially when sitting on the tarmac.

Of course, there will be some pro-Russian commenters who will pretend this sort of pragmatic realism is a new development, as Western analysts try to hide their fear that NATO’s super fighters might not be as invincible as we once claimed… But let’s not fall for that tired old narrative either, folks. There’s no such thing as an invincible fighter, tank, or anything else for that matter. There are only tools, strategies, and incredibly brave men and women tasked with employing the first for the sake of the second.

Warfare is a dirty business, and while the F-16 won’t end that for Ukraine, it will equip them to fight just a little bit dirtier than ever before.

And that’s really what transferring these jets has always been about.

About the Author: Alex Hollings 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's investment in Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) like the HELIOS laser system reflects its urgent need for advanced defense against evolving threats such as hypersonic missiles and drone swarms.

-Despite decades of research and significant funding, these systems are still under development, with the Navy facing challenges in integrating DEWs into existing platforms like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

-Waiting for the DDG(X) warships to be built for DEW deployment could be a strategic error, and the Navy should focus on integrating these technologies into current systems and unmanned platforms.

The U.S. Navy's Laser Drama Show 

For almost 20 years, the U.S. Navy (as well as the Air Force) has worked on various concepts for directed energy weapons (DEW), or lasers. 

Gobs of U.S. tax dollars have been spent on the technology, and many promises have been made by the military. And, as U.S. Navy Adm. Fred Pyle told reporters earlier this summer, “Sometimes [the Navy has] a tendency to over promise and under deliver.”

That is an understatement. 

To be clear: The U.S. military needs to possess a reliable and robust DEW capability. The reason it has lacked this capacity is not because the technology is not there yet. It surely is. But there has been a lack of direction, funding, and initiative over the course of many decades on this technology. 

As Adm. Pyle had to admit, the Navy needs these weapons more now than ever. 

China is ascendant. Russia is resurgent. Iran appears poised to upend the U.S.-led Mideast order. Latin America is aflame as Venezuela implodes. And North Korea is, well, who really knows these days? 

The Flaws of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)

Pyle wants the Navy to concentrate on developing DEW for surface warfare purposes. He’s right to fixate on that like a laser. That’s because America’s enemies are overcoming the strategic advantages that ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other missile defense systems have conferred upon the countries employing these capabilities. Israel’s Iron Dome, for example, has allowed for that country to mitigate what could be catastrophic damage from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rockets fired at the country. 

Similarly, U.S. Navy warships employ a coterie of systems meant to defend against incoming missiles. This allows for those Navy warships to operate with relative impunity near enemy shores while knocking those enemies around with their offensive systems. 

But these times, they are a-changin’, as Dylan warned us so long ago. 

Ultimately, conventional ballistic missile defenses run out of ammunition with which to fire at incoming rockets and missiles. These systems can be overwhelmed by swarming tactics that fast-moving drones and modern anti-ship ballistic missiles employ. 

What’s more, hypersonic weapons completely circumvent the ability of conventional missile defenses to protect the ship or territory they are charged with defending. 

So a U.S. aircraft carrier and its attendant battle group could soon be in the unenviable position of its defensive systems either being totally overwhelmed in the early phase of a conflict – or they will be rendered obsolete with a small batch of hypersonic weapons systems. Sure, the Americans are always building better systems. The Pentagon is supposedly prioritizing the creation of hypersonic weapons of their own, as well as defenses against them. 

Sadly, for now, China and Russia have the Americans beat in this domain.

Making DEW or Lasers Work 

That leaves the U.S. military with a limited set of options in the near term. That’s where DEW comes. If the American military can make DEW work reliably – and scale it up – it’s an additional layer of defense for U.S. surface warships or bases that could overwhelm the swarming tactics that America’s enemies are preparing to deploy against U.S. assets in war. 

There are two DEW systems the Navy is investing in. The first is the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance system (HELIOS). Navy leaders claim that the system can “blast more than 60 kilowatts of directed energy at targets up to five miles away,” and these systems were being tested on Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

As if trying to justify the cost of such systems, the Navy is trying to marry these new innovations to a platform that has yet to materialize: the replacement for the Navy’s Ticonderoga-class destroyers, the mythical DDG(X) warship. Whatever the Navy says about the timelines for the DDG(X), it is all up in the air, as the US economy struggles, politicians are distracted, and America’s industrial base is all but broken. 

The Navy Should Not Hold Out for the DDG(X) Program

Hoping and waiting for the DDG(X) to be delivered in any meaningful numbers so that they can utilize the Navy’s lasers is strategic malpractice on the part of American war planners. 

Of course, the Navy needs DEW to ensure its surface fleet is not a total wasting asset in the age of A2/AD. Thus far, however, the Navy has failed to accomplish even its baseline goals for achieving real DEW capabilities and then having a platform that can deploy them in combat. The Navy should rededicate its resources toward building its lasers. But it must merge these systems with existing platforms. 

UUVs and Subs: Where DEWs Should Be Deployed 

As for platforms that are still being built, it would be wiser to place such weapons on large unmanned undersea vehicles.

Wasting time and money trying to do everything at once, as the Navy is currently doing, will ensure nothing is done on time or properly. Without the DEW capability, Navy warships risk being destroyed, or at least forced to stay out of any fight with an A2/AD-wielding enemy.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

The first presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump resulted in a media blitzkrieg of hysteria about Biden’s performance, which continued through the Republican convention and led to Biden’s eventual withdrawal from the race. The New York Times editorial board and other prestige media sites, supported by some leading Democratic fundraisers and politicians, including from the Democratic Senate and House leaders, called for Biden to withdraw from the race for the White House. It’s understandable to some extent that the media, whose professional obsession is with communication, and the many Democratic members of the House and Senate, who are concerned about their own elections, would declare Biden’s performance a disaster. On the other hand, with respect to the substance of policy, as opposed to the optics of stage performance, the debate was one blip in a journey that will require more months of campaigning and electioneering between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris to sort out.

Of particular importance in this regard are the candidates’ and parties’ respective positions on foreign policy and U.S. military strategy. The world is transforming an immediate post-Cold War euphoria of American triumphalism and liberal democratic hubris to a more complicated picture. The return of wars and other conflicts among major powers, especially with respect to the rising capabilities and aspirations of China and Russia, creates uncertainty about the United States’ political objectives and military readiness in Europe and Asia. In addition, unprecedented challenges in climate change and pandemics; efforts to dethrone the dollar as the benchmark currency for international transactions; mass migration in unprecedented numbers; and new technologies for cyberwar, artificial intelligence, and the military uses of space all contribute to a possible bow wave of political regime destabilization and military planning vexation. Today’s certainties for politicians and their military advisors are tomorrow’s guesswork. 

Therefore, in choosing among competing presidential candidates, we need to understand their perspectives on this international environment of political complexity and military uncertainty. No country has unlimited resources, and even the United States, facing a cumulative deficit of more than $35 trillion, cannot continue unrestrained binge spending on domestic and foreign policy priorities. What, going forward, is America’s preferred geopolitical orientation or grand strategy? What military commitments and obligations derive from that grand strategy? And third, what assumptions should drive military preparedness for deterring wars and, if necessary, for fighting them?

Broadly speaking, the options for U.S. grand strategy include: (1) Godzilla Rex, or what has sometimes been termed “liberal hegemony”; (2) offshore balancing; (3) globalization unlimited; and (4) selective engagement and enlargement. Isolationism is eliminated as an option because, in today’s world of complex interdependence and media saturation, it would not be possible, even if deemed desirable by some.

Godzilla Rex was the U.S. position in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. An end to history and the perpetual triumph of liberal democracy was assumed by optimists about the post-Soviet world. The United States was a singular global superpower with no serious military rival. However, President Clinton reduced national focus on security and defense, including intelligence, which came back to haunt us after the attacks on 9/11. Nonetheless, the United States invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban in 2001 and struck down the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. A Global War on Terror was declared, and both conflicts became “forever wars” that lasted well into the second decade of the present century. 

Offshore balancing was an alternative grand strategy favored by some academics and prominent policy analysts. From this perspective, the United States should limit large-scale military intervention to threats by a hostile power to dominate an essential region in ways inimical to U.S. and allied vital interests. Regional rivals would include a resurgent Russia in Europe, a rising China in Asia, and lesser but still dangerous disruptors in Asia (North Korea) or the Middle East (Iran). Under this approach, the United States would first seek to rely on regional allies to take the lead if they were prepared to do so, although the United States would otherwise act if our vital interests were threatened.

A third grand strategy, favored by many postmodern politicians and a worldwide community of activists, would emphasize transnational challenges over national rivalries and argue for moving issues such as climate change, poverty, migration, urbanization, pandemics, and disarmament to the front end of national policy agendas. From this perspective, great power rivalries and wars for hegemony are outdated relics of hyper-nationalism and excessive military influence over policy. Resources spent on defense and war-fighting should be diverted to international scientific collaboration and peacekeeping overseen by the United Nations or other international bodies. 

A fourth grand strategy is selective engagement and enlargement. This approach was supported by some in the Bill Clinton administration and emphasized economic growth through international cooperation and investment. Although there was broad agreement among Democrats and Republicans in the 1990s that liberalized free trade would be a rising tide that lifted all boats, it eventually became clear that some states would benefit much more directly than others. Military interventions were undertaken in the wake of a famine in Somalia in order to curb the power of warlords, resulting in the “Blackhawk Down” episode that led to a U.S. military withdrawal from that failed state. Elsewhere, the United States and NATO intervened to restore order in Bosnia in 1995 and waged war against Serbia in 1999 in order to prevent ethnic cleansing and sectarian strife in Europe. NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999 enraged the Russian government and its otherwise U.S.-friendly President Boris Yeltsin, a precursor of later objections to NATO enlargement by his successor, Vladimir Putin.

Among these competing grand strategies, the foreign and defense policies of the Biden administration have included some elements from each of the first three options. A Harris administration would most likely expand them. Growing defense budgets and robust U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine against Russian invasion show that Godzilla Rex remains aspirational among both Democrats and many Republicans in Washington. U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East is close to offshore balancing against dangerous regional rivals (Iran and its proxies). Also, it reflects the historical American commitment to defending Israeli sovereignty against regional enemies. 

But so-called progressives in the Biden administration, including globalists as described above, have objected to Israel’s military tactics in the war against Hamas in Gaza. With regard to China, the Biden policy has been divided between options one and two: emphasizing a U.S. defense buildup and greater preparedness for an attempted Chinese military takeover of Taiwan or seeing China as more of an economic and informational competitor than an immediate military threat—although China’s growing capabilities for cyberwar and in space are admittedly of major concern. Still, others see China’s rise as a science and technology challenge that does not have to evolve into an arms race or war, which is more like option three. 

Where would a second Trump administration place itself in selecting among these grand strategies (or others)? It’s unknowable at the moment because Trump relies on his personal ability to engage with other heads of state in order to resolve international disputes. Some of his comments seem to endorse option one, Godzilla Rex. Still, he also prizes his ability to woo hostile leaders into more favorable alignments by grand summitry and selective engagement. Trump promises to crack down on illegal migration and on trade deals that disadvantage U.S. producers and manufacturers. 

In this respect, he combines old-style nationalism with an aggressive globalism turned upside down. He claimed credit for keeping the United States out of major wars during his administration, although he did authorize selective strikes against terrorists and rogue regimes. In public events during this year, he asserted that he would end the war in Ukraine between the time of his election in November 2024 and his inauguration in January 2025. Whether Ukrainian president Zelensky and Russian president Putin are on board with this timetable remains to be seen. In addition, during his term in the White House, some members of Congress and other commentators worried about Trump’s finger on the nuclear button should a Cold War-style nuclear crisis present itself. However, others noted that the U.S. decision-making process has safeguards against any presidential impetuosity.

Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues. 

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy Captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.

Image: GreenOak / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The railgun, an advanced artillery system using electromagnetic force to launch projectiles at high velocities, has faced significant challenges, leading to the U.S. Navy canceling its program in 2021.

-The main issues included durability, integration with ship power systems, and underperformance in tests. Despite this, China claims to be advancing its railgun technology, potentially incorporating it into their naval forces.

-While some analysts believe China may be bluffing to provoke U.S. spending, others worry about China's genuine progress in this field.

The Great Railgun Debate

When the catapult was introduced into warfare, it changed history forever. Empires were built or destroyed by this ingenious weapon. They seem antiquated today, but the concept of taking an object and hurling it at enemy formation or fortification keeps its appeal. 

We are obviously well beyond the era of catapults. But the U.S. military and others have toyed with a more high-tech version of this artillery piece: the railgun.

What is the Railgun?

Basically, a railgun uses electromagnetic force to propel an object toward a target at an extremely high velocity. The innovation is that the railgun uses electricity rather than chemicals to give the projectiles their speed.

The speed we are talking about leaves little time to react. There is in theory little defense against this type of attack. 

But while this technology was the great dream of many U.S. military engineers, it never came to fruition. 

What Happened to This Weapon?

According to ExecutiveGov, the Navy canceled the program because “the rails could easily experience wear and tear from firing multiple projectiles, resulting in a very high surface temperature, which can magnify durability issues even more.” 

Further, these weapons are power hogs, and their inability to integrate into the warship’s electrical grid made them useless as weapons. 

Finally, when railguns were tested at the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in the Utah desert, they didn’t hit the range their designers had promised. 

All of this left the Navy with nothing to show for over a decade of work and hundreds of millions of dollars invested. In 2021, the Navy canceled the program and redirected its resources to more conventional defenses as well as its hypersonic weapons program.

The Navy couldn’t make it work, and we were told that it wasn’t that big of a deal. If the Navy couldn’t do it, certainly no one else, especially a foreign power, could ever attain this radical technology.

China Enters the Chat

But China claims it is proving these Western leaders wrong. 

With China becoming a wealthy and modernizing nation-state, it is inevitable that they would enhance their military capabilities. As part of the effort, China is working on some radical, advanced new military technologies. One such new capability, they claim, is the railgun. 

Beijing announced the existence of their program just two years after the Pentagon abandoned theirs. 

Some in Washington, such as the analysts at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), don’t think that the Chinese have the railgun. They believe China is bluffing on the topic. They see a sort of reverse-Reagan approach to handling the U.S. threat to China. U.S. President Ronald Reagan got the USSR to spend itself into oblivion partly by lying about what new systems the Americans were building, and China is doing that to the U.S. today.

But after every Chinese advance, the Western press enters the scene to downplay the threat and disparage anyone who would believe such sophistry. Beijing is undoubtedly turning some variation of the Reagan plan against the U.S. Yet China is also truly developing some advanced – and fearsome – technologies to combat the Americans.

Enter the Chinese railgun. They purportedly have a rudimentary version of the one the Americans had been developing. Chinese strategists also claim that the new railguns are being easily incorporated into their warships to give their naval force added protection and power-projection capabilities. 

The United States military, meanwhile, is struggling with all these problems. If China can build a railgun when the U.S. cannot, that is good reason to worry. 

About the Author

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

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Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Eliminé dès l’entame aux Jeux Olympique de Paris, le 27 juillet dernier par l'Israélien Yam Wolczac chez moins de -60kg, Arnold Kisoka, judoka congolais affirme affuter ses armes pour les Jeux Olympiques de 2028, prévus à Los Angeles (Etats-Unis d’Amérique).

Cet athlète congolais de 23 ans a annoncé ces ambitions au cours du magazine Okapi Sport du dimanche 4 aout 2024.

Joint depuis le village olympique à Paris, Kisoka assure avoir acquis de l’expérience du très haut niveau.

Auf der Weltgesundheitsversammlung im Mai 2024 wurde beschlossen, die Verhandlungen über ein internationales Pandemieabkommen zu ver­längern. Gleichzeitig wurden die Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften von 2005 umfassend reformiert. Ziel beider Instrumente ist es, bei Gesundheitsnotfällen und Pandemien eine bessere Verteilungsgerechtigkeit medi­zinischer Güter zu gewährleisten. In beiden Instrumenten steht diese »Equity« im Mittelpunkt. Dieses Ele­ment ist für mehrere Länder des globalen Südens nicht verhandelbar. Für die Wirksamkeit beider Instrumente ist es nötig, dass die Länder des globalen Südens ihnen beitreten – dies ist unerlässlich für eine bessere Prävention, Vorsorge und Bekämpfung zukünftiger Pandemien. Da Deutschland und die EU das Pandemieabkommen und die Inter­nationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften unterstützen und werden umsetzen müssen, sollten sie Equity als Leitprinzip vorantreiben. Dies sollte sowohl Garantien für einen gerechteren Zugang zu Arzneimitteln bei künftigen Pandemien beinhalten als auch Finanzinstrumente zur Stärkung der Gesundheitssysteme. Bestehende rechtliche Hindernisse für eine schnellere Verteilung pan­demie­bezogener Produkte lassen sich überwinden. Ein gesetzlich ver­ankertes System des Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing kann im Ergebnis dazu führen, dass Hersteller einen bestimmten Prozentsatz ihrer Echtzeitproduktion pandemiebezogener Güter der Weltgesundheits­organisation zur Verfügung stellen, die diese dann weltweit verteilt. In der aktuellen Fassung des Pandemieabkommens wird bestätigt, dass die Weltgesundheitsorganisation keine weiteren Befugnisse erhalten wird, die nationale gesundheitspolitische Gesetz­gebung zu steuern. Bei der Formulierung anderer neuer völkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen zur Gesundheitspolitik bei Pandemien sollten diese Vorrechte der nationalen Behörden ebenfalls anerkannt werden.

Le chef de l’Etat Félix Tshisekedi a accusé, mardi 6 août, son prédécesseur, Joseph Kabila d’alimenter la crise sécuritaire dans l’Est de la RDC par le soutien qu’il apporterait à l’Alliance du Fleuve Congo (AFC).

Il l’a dit dans un entretien accordé à la Radio Top Congo, depuis Bruxelles (Belgique) où il séjourne pour des raisons de santé.

Summary and Key Points: China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reportedly developing a "jam-resistant" Yu-10 torpedo, designed to effectively strike moving targets with high accuracy. This torpedo, launched from a Type-039B submarine, was demonstrated in a test that reportedly sunk a retired landing vessel.

-The Yu-10's capabilities are seen as a significant threat to large naval targets, including aircraft carriers.

-The ongoing development of such advanced torpedoes highlights China's efforts to enhance its submarine warfare capabilities, posing a growing challenge to U.S. naval forces.

China Developed Jam-Resistant Torpedo

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly touted the capabilities of its DF-21D and DF-26B "carrier killer" missiles that can be fired by land-based mobile launchers. Beijing's deployment of such weapons could deny access to a potential adversary in the East and South China Seas, but now it seems that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have in its arsenal a weapon that could be employed anywhere its submarines can travel.

China state media broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) highlighted the capabilities of what was believed to be the PLAN's Yu-10 torpedo. In a video presented on the media outlet last month to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PLAN's submarine, a Type-039B diesel-electric submarine (NATO reporting name Yuan class) fired the torpedo at a Type 074 amphibious landing vessel.

"Its stern was lifted out of the water by the explosion shock wave, accompanied by a column of water nearly 100 meters (328 feet) high," reported The South China Morning Post, adding that the Yu-10 is believed to have entered service around 2015, quoting an article in the Ordnance Industry Science Technology, a Chinese military magazine.

"From the CCTV video, the power of this torpedo means even an aircraft carrier could hardly escape the fate of sinking, let alone destroyers or landing docks. Even if not sunk, they would be essentially out of operation," the Chinese military publication had stated. "This technology uses the wake generated by the target vessel to correct the torpedo’s orientation to better track and effectively strike moving targets, which greatly improves the responsiveness and accuracy of the torpedo, making it more resistant to jamming."

Though the report from The China Morning Post claimed the Yu-10 has an estimated range of fifty km (thirty miles), which is comparable to the U.S. Navy's MK-48 Mod 7, the exact specifications of the Yu-10 torpedo have not been published, nor has its use in sinking the amphibious landing vessel been independently verified.

Chinese SINKEX – Response to U.S. RIMPAC?

The apparent sinking of a retired Type 074 amphibious landing vessel was likely conducted in response to a pair of Sinking Excercise (SINKEX) drills carried out during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024 multinational exercises, and follows a similar event in June in which the amphibious transport dock ex-USS Cleveland (LPD-7) was sunk during the Valiant Shield (VS) 2024.

The Austin-class amphibious transport dock – the third ship of the U.S. Navy to be named for the Ohio city – had been maintained at the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, since November 2017. The retired vessel was sunk as a target on June 17, during a naval-fire exercise.

During RIMPAC 2024, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber successfully sank the ex-USS Dubuque (LPD-8) – another Austin-class amphibious transport dock – with a GPS-guided bomb. Even more impressively, the decommissioned U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-1) was sunk after being hit by a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) from a U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet.

That Sinking Feeling

These recent U.S. and Chinese exercises highlight that sinking a warship may be the easy part, at least with the right ordnance. The trick would be getting through the vast screen of guided-missile destroyers and other defenses.

The danger for the U.S. Navy is that submarines like the PLAN's Type 039B are noted for employing an air-independent power (AIP) system that can allow them to remain submerged for long periods, operating quietly and stealthily.

As previously reported, several U.S. carriers have been notionally "sunk" in exercises by similar submarines, raising concerns about the safety of the floating air bases against such threats. Coupled with a "jam-resistant" submarine could make for a dangerous threat indeed.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points - F/A-18 Fighters for Ukraine?: While Ukraine's receipt of F-16 fighter jets is seen as a significant boost, the limited number of these non-stealth aircraft may restrict their impact in the ongoing conflict.

-The F/A-18 Super Hornet, though versatile and capable, would face similar challenges, such as detectability by advanced Russian air defenses.

-Both aircraft would likely be used defensively, offering improvements but not dramatically altering the conflict's course. The war is expected to continue as it has for nearly three years.

Would the F/A-18 Super Hornet Better Serve Ukraine’s Defense?

Would the Ukrainians benefit from the gifting of Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet?

The Ukrainians are celebrating the arrival of the F-16 fighter jet – a gift from the Americans that has been billed as a potential game changer in the two-and-a-half-year-old conflict. But does the F-16 provide the Ukrainians with game-changing capabilities? And was the F-16 the best airframe for the Ukrainians?

What can the F-16 offer?

Despite making its first flight fifty years ago in 1974, the F-16 is still a reliable and capable fighter. This single-engine fighter is equipped to operate in all weather conditions and a variety of different roles, making the F-16 well-suited for the volatile conditions of conflict. The F-16 is distinct for its frameless bubble canopy, which permits the pilot an exceptional, unobstructed field of vision. In production (almost) continuously since 1973, the F-16 is numerous, with 4,604 airframes built.

Yet only a handful of the F-16s have been sent to Ukraine, where officials believe at least 130 F-16s will be needed to neutralize Russian air power. The Ukrainians have not disclosed exactly how many F-16s they received, but it has been estimated that the number does not come close to approaching 130, meaning the effectiveness of the F-16 will be limited – in large part because the jet will be used conservatively in account of how finite the resource is.

Also limiting the effectiveness of the F-16 is the lack of stealth capabilities. Whereas modern fighters have minuscule radar cross sections, which permit operations in contested air space, the F-16 was designed before such stealth technology had been developed, and thus is easily detectable with modern air defense systems. The result is a jet that would have limited use in the conflict’s front lines. Instead, the F-16 would likely be used primarily in defensive situations.

Would the F/A-18 Have Been a Better Option?

As the F/A designation suggests, the F/A-18 is a versatile aircraft, offering impressive capabilities in both offensive and defensive situations. And while the F/A-18 is commonly associated with carrier operations, the jet is of course capable of operating from land, as well.

The F/A-18 has been built in far fewer quantities (1.480) than the F-16 and has been distributed far less (just three countries operate the F/A-18, whereas about twenty-five operate the F-16), meaning the Ukrainians are not going to receive the F/A-18 in quantities exceeding that of the F-16.

The F/A-18, also designed in the 1970s, is equally lacking in stealth technology. The result would be similar: the F/A-18 would struggle to survive against Russia’s advanced air defense systems and would likely be confined to a purely defensive role.

To be clear, the Ukrainian’s circumstances will be improved with the addition of the F-16 – and would be improved with the addition of the F/A-18; both airframes offer a quantity and quality increase over the existing Ukrainian inventory. But the improvements yielded won’t be sufficient to expel the Russian invaders, or to force Putin into some sort of peace agreement, or capitulation. The war will likely persist in much the same way it has persisted for nearly three years.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

After experiencing regular power cuts for 17 years there are signs things are now working properly.