Libération a consacré tout un dossier au vote obligatoire, un débat qui est de nouveau d’actualité en France après les abstentions records des derniers scrutins qui semblent favoriser le FN. Voici l’article que j’ai consacré au modèle belge, premier pays au monde à avoir instauré le vote obligatoire.
Comment éviter que la noblesse et la bourgeoisie ne fuient les bureaux de vote de peur d’être confrontées aux classes populaires ? Comment empêcher que les partis représentant la classe dirigeante ne soient laminés par l’abstention des riches ? C’est simple : il suffit de rendre le vote obligatoire. Ainsi fut fait en 1893 dans le Royaume de Belgique, premier pays au monde à introduire cette innovation. Et depuis 120 ans, les scores de participation, toutes élections confondues, tournent autour de 90 %, de quoi faire rêver les démocraties fatiguées.
Le vote obligatoire en Belgique est le pendant de l’instauration du suffrage universel (masculin, dans un premier temps, les femmes attendront 1948). Jusqu’en 1893, le suffrage est censitaire (le cens a été supprimé en France en 1848), c’est-à-dire lié à des conditions de revenus, ce qui limitait le nombre d’électeurs à environ 1 % de la population. Mais, le Royaume a été rapidement confronté à la chute de la participation : l’abstention est passée de 14 % en 1843 à 65 % en 1855. Aux élections bruxelloises de 1861, sur 6000 électeurs potentiels, seuls 370 se sont déplacés pour le second tour. Bref, il fallait réagir pour sauver la démocratie tout en évitant que le suffrage universel ne se traduise par une poussée des socialistes, les épouvantails de l’époque. « Les classes bourgeoises ont donc tout fait pour limiter son impact : vote obligatoire, mais aussi vote plural (les plus riches avaient deux ou trois voix) qui ne disparaitra qu’en 1919 », explique Christian Behrendt, professeur de droit constitutionnel à l’Université de Liège.
L’effet du vote obligatoire a été immédiat sur la participation : dès les élections de 1894, l’absentéisme chute à 5,4 %, menace de sanctions pénales à l’appui. Elles vont d’une amende (aujourd’hui comprise entre 30 € et 150 €) à l’exclusion des listes électorales pour dix ans. Mieux : « les fonctionnaires, qui doivent montrer l’exemple, peuvent être condamnés à ne pas être promus », s’amuse Christian Behrendt. Mais ces sanctions sont petit à petit tombées en désuétude : depuis 2003, aucune condamnation n’a été prononcée sans que cette impunité de fait n’influe sur le taux de participation. Il est vrai aussi que « comme on oblige les citoyens à s’exprimer, le vote blanc et nul est reconnu », souligne Christian Behrendt. Ainsi, en 2014, il pesait 5,77 % des voix pour les élections fédérales (participation : 89,68 %), 4,97 % pour le Parlement flamand (participation : 92,53 %), 7,41 % pour le Parlement wallon (participation : 87,88 %) et 5,35 % pour le Parlement bruxellois (participation : 83,62 %).
Aujourd’hui, « l’abrogation du vote obligatoire n’est pas un grand débat en Belgique, même si on en discute un peu plus en Flandre », note Dave Sinardet, professeur de sciences politiques à la Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). « Côté francophone, le PS, le parti dominant, craint que cela lui nuise, car les études montrent que ce sont les couches de la population les moins favorisées qui s’abstiendraient », poursuit-il. Au nord du pays, les libéraux de l’Open VLD et, dans une moindre mesure, les chrétiens-démocrates du CD&V sont favorables à l’abrogation au nom de la liberté individuelle, mais aussi pour inciter les partis à aller chercher les électeurs et à ne pas vivre sur leurs acquis.
« Comme le vote est obligatoire depuis 120 ans, il est difficile de dire quels seraient les effets d’une abrogation », estime Christian Behrendt. On peut en tout cas noter que si la Belgique francophone n’a jamais eu de parti d’extrême droite, la Flandre, elle, a longtemps dû s’accommoder d’un parti fasciste, le Vlaams Belang, aujourd’hui en voie d’extinction. Et dans les deux Régions, le vote est obligatoire.
N.B.: article paru dans Libération du 28/4/15
En l’honneur de la 200e session en région de l’Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN), la mairie de Bordeaux a reçu les auditeurs de cette session,...
Après l’Egypte et l’Inde, et peut-être la Malaisie et les Émirats arabes unis, le Qatar vient d’annoncer à son tour l’achat de 24 avions Rafale. Comment expliquer ce succès après une décennie d’échecs à l’exportation ?
Cela peut paraître étonnant mais cela est un peu dû au hasard. Il y a peu de débouchés pour ce type d’avions. Les échecs sur dix ans, c’est aussi moins d’une dizaine de pays dont certains étaient la chasse gardée des États-Unis comme la Corée du Sud ou Singapour. Avec ces trois contrats, la France atteint un taux de réussite d’environ 30%, ce qui n’est pas mal car il y a en général quatre concurrents sur les marchés à l’exportation : les Américains avec plusieurs types d’avions selon les demandes, les Russes, les Européens avec l’Eurofighter, et le Gripen suédois. Sur les trois contrats, deux d’entre eux étaient attendus car le choix du Rafale était arrêté : celui du Qatar et de l’Inde. En revanche, l’Egypte est une surprise ; la décision finale est liée au refroidissement de ses relations avec les États-Unis.
Une autre raison vient du fait que le Rafale est aujourd’hui à la fois un avion moderne mais éprouvé. Les Américains vont de plus en plus promouvoir le F-35, qui est plus cher, face au Rafale qui, en vieillissant, devient une meilleure option. De plus, le Rafale est un avion qui est régulièrement employé depuis cinq ans dans le cadre des opérations extérieures en Afghanistan, en Libye et au Mali.
En troisième lieu, l’État français et Dassault ont travaillé ensemble pour promouvoir cet équipement, ce qui ne fut pas toujours le cas dans le passé, notamment lors de l’échec au Maroc. On ne peut exporter des équipements aussi stratégiques et aussi chers sans une coordination étroite entre cette entreprise et l’État. Le fait que François Hollande signe en personne le contrat au Qatar, témoigne de l’importance de cette vente.
Enfin – et cela a été peu souligné -, l’Egypte, le Qatar et l’Inde disposaient de Mirage 2000. Les Indiens ont même décidé il y a quelques années de moderniser leur Mirage 2000-5. C’est une preuve de confiance quant à la qualité du matériel qui doit être soulignée.
Que penser de la négociation des contrats de vente des Rafale ? Peuvent-ils être préjudiciables à long terme, notamment ceux concernant l’Inde et le Qatar ?
Pour l’Inde, le contrat qui vient d’être signé ne comprend pas, pour l’heure, de transfert de technologie… et c’est sans doute plus un handicap qu’une bonne nouvelle sur le long terme. A court terme, il est certain que les trente-six avions vendus seront fabriqués en France. C’est de l’emploi garanti pour les cinq prochaines années, notamment en Aquitaine. Sur le long terme, l’Inde souhaite développer son industrie aéronautique militaire et ne peut pas le faire sans partenariat technologique. Nous connaissons parfaitement les mesures à prendre pour conserver une longueur d’avance, même avec des transferts de technologie, et donc limiter les risques de concurrence dans le futur. Le contrat pour la vente de cent vingt-six avions prévu initialement, et qui continuera à être négocié, nous permettrait d’avoir un partenariat avec l’Inde sur le long terme. C’est un choix politique qui est fait, c’est aussi un choix industriel et technologique qui est plus compliqué car il peut nous conduire à des obligations d’assistance technologique qu’il faut maîtriser.
En ce qui concerne le Qatar, on se trouve dans un cas plus classique de troc, c’est-à-dire que le pays acheteur souhaite obtenir des compensations vis-à-vis de son achat, qui ne sont pas directement liés à l’acquisition de Rafale. En l’occurrence, le Qatar aurait demandé des droits de trafic supplémentaires pour sa compagnie aérienne en France sur Nice et Lyon. Dans ce cas, il est donc nécessaire d’arbitrer entre l’intérêt commercial du constructeur aéronautique Dassault et celui d’Air France, qui ont chacun des intérêts qui relèvent de l’intérêt général tant l’impact en termes d’image et d’emploi est important dans les deux cas. Il est sûr que cette vente intervient dans une période très conflictuelle à ce niveau puisque la France et l’Allemagne ont par ailleurs demandé à la Commission européenne de négocier un accord équitable avec les compagnies aériennes du Golfe, accusées de concurrence déloyale.
Ces 84 avions de combat vendus ou en passe de l’être, et bientôt 50 hélicoptères en Pologne, font de l’année 2015 une année record pour la vente d’armes à l’exportation de la France. Peut-on imaginer que cette situation perdure à l’avenir ou n’est-ce finalement qu’une bouffée d’oxygène sans lendemain ?
En moyenne, nous vendons pour six à sept milliards d’euros d’armement par an. En 2015, le chiffre des prises de commandes pourrait avoisiner les dix-huit milliards d’euros. C’est sans précédent. C’est une conjonction extraordinaire et cela va permettre d’alimenter notre industrie pendant cinq à six ans dans la mesure où on ne construit pas 84 avions de combat et 50 hélicoptères du jour au lendemain. Par le passé, nous avions déjà connu une autre année exceptionnelle en 1984, avec un montant de 61 milliards de francs. Si on prend en compte l’inflation, le montant n’était donc certainement pas très éloigné de celui qui sera atteint en 2015. La mesure des ventes d’armes se fait donc plus sur des périodes de cinq ou dix ans. L’objectif pourrait être de maintenir une moyenne de huit à neuf milliards d’euros, plus élevé qu’il ne l’est actuellement, mais en deçà du chiffre que l’on atteindra en 2015.
Here’s the second installment of my reporting from the 2015 MCIS conference. This one and the next will focus on Russian views of NATO as the primary source of military threat to the Russian Federation. The first speech was by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff. His topic was the military threats and dangers facing Russia in the contemporary period. He launched into a discussion of how the West saw Russia’s efforts to stabilize the situation in Ukraine as unacceptable independence in standing up for its national interests. He argued that this reaction was the cause of the increase in international tension over the last year, as the Western countries have sought to put political and economic pressure on Russia in order to “put it in its place.” He argues that while many Western experts believe that the Ukraine crisis has led to a sudden and rapid collapse of world order, the reality is that the situation has been developing since the start of the 1990s. The problems were caused by the collapse of the bipolar system, which allowed the US to consider itself the winner of the Cold War and to attempt to build a system in which it had total domination over international security. In such a system, the US would decide unilaterally which countries could be considered democratic and which were “evil empires,” which were freedom fighters and which terrorists and separatists. In doing so, the US stopped considering the interests of other states and would only selectively follow the norms of international law.
Russia has had to respond to this threat and has done so in its new military doctrine, which strictly follows international norms. The key points, as presented by Gerasimov in the slide below, include using violent means only as a last resort, using military force to contain and prevent conflicts, and preventing all (but especially nuclear) military conflicts. At the same time, the doctrine states that the current international security system does not provide for all countries to have security in equal measure. In other words, Russian military leaders continue to feel that Russian security is infringed by the current international security system and imply that they would like to see it revised.
The most significant threat facing Russia, in Gerasimov’s view, comes from NATO. In particular, he highlights the threat from NATO enlargement to the east, noting that all 12 new members added since 1999 were formerly either members of the Warsaw Pact or Soviet republics. This process is continuing, with the potential future inclusion of former Yugoslav republics and continuing talk of perspective Euroatlantic integration of Ukraine and Georgia. Political arguments about creating a single Europe sharing common values have outweighed purely military and security in enlargement discussions, with many new members added even though they did not fulfill the economic and military criteria for membership. This expansion has had a serious negative effect on Russia’s military security.
In addition to NATO enlargement, NATO has also expanded cooperation with non-member countries in the region through programs such as the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which includes Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine among 24 priority countries for cooperation, and Privileged Partnership, which will allow NATO to use infrastructure in Finland and Sweden to transfer troops to northern Europe. Furthermore, NATO is actively seeking to increase its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
NATO is using the crisis in Ukraine as an excuse to strengthen the forces it has arrayed against Russia. It has openly blamed Russia for aggressive policies in the post-Soviet space and has made containment of Russia the prime force for future development of NATO. The decisions made at the Wales NATO summit in September 2014 confirm this.
While NATO military activity near Russia was relatively stable through 2013, it has increased substantially over the last year. NATO states’ naval presence in the Black Sea has quadrupled, flights by reconnaissance and tactical aviation have doubled, and flights by long range early warning aircraft have increased by a factor of nine. US UAVs are flying over the Black Sea, while German and Polish intelligence ships are constantly present in the Baltic. The number of NATO exercises increased by 80% in 2014 compared to the previous year. The character of these exercises has also changed. Whereas in the past they were focused primarily on crisis response and counter-terrorism, now they are clearly aimed at practicing military action against Russia.
The action plan approved in Wales included a significant increase in NATO military presence in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, including a rapid reaction force and a constant presence of a limited contingent of forces rotating through the region. This will allow a large number of NATO military personnel to be trained to conduct operations against Russia. At the same time, military infrastructure, including weapons storage facilities, is being built up in Eastern Europe. Gerasimov argued that on the basis of all of these developments, it is clear that efforts to strengthen NATO’s military capabilities are not primarily defensive in nature.
Gerasimov then turned to the question of US efforts to develop global ballistic missile defense systems. He argued that Russia views the development of these systems as yet another move by the US and its allies to dismantle the existing international security system on their way to world domination. Over the last four years, US BMD systems have begun to appear near Russian borders, including Aegis-equipped ships in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, Aegis Ashore systems in Romania and Poland, and anti-missile systems being deployed in the Asia-Pacific region with Japanese and South Korean cooperation.
These forces present a real threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces and could also strike Russian satellite systems. Washington has so far refused to share command authority for global BMD systems, even with its allies, making it clear that it alone will decide which NATO member states it will defend from missile threats. Since Russia will have no choice but to take counter-measures against global BMD systems, this may subject non-nuclear NATO-member states to the risk of being early targets of Russian response measures.
What’s more, the deployment of anti-missile systems violates the INF treaty, since the Aegis Ashore systems can be armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles as easily as with SM-3 anti-missile systems.
Russia is also concerned with the development of the concept of Prompt Global Strike, which will also damage the strategic nuclear balance that currently provides the main guarantee for international stability.
In its efforts to “put Russia on its knees,” Washington and its NATO partners continue to create crises in territories on Russia’s borders. Having successfully carried out regime change scenarios under the guise of colored revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the US was able to place anti-Russian governments in power in a number of states bordering Russia. The radicals and Russophobes who came to power in Ukraine in 2014 have based their policies on blaming Russia for all of Ukraine’s problems while persecuting the country’s Russophone population. They are now trying to use force to repress their own citizens who expressed a lack of confidence in this new government. As a result, Ukraine has been plunged into civil war. Gerasimov said that it is difficult to know how the conflict will end, since “we don’t know what directives Ukrainian leaders will receive from their Western ‘curators’ and where Kiev’s aggression may be directed in the future.” But it is clear that these actions pose a military threat to Russia, much as the Georgian attacks on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia in 2008 did. Gerasimov also noted that Mikheil Saakashvili, who ordered these attacks, is now an advisor to Ukrainian President Poroshenko.
Gerasimov then moved on to a discussion of other frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, noting the increased risk that these conflicts may be “unfrozen” as a result of the currently heightened threat environment. He noted statements by the current Georgian government reflecting its intention to restore control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force. The Moldovan government has been pressing for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Transnistria while continuing its economic blockade of the region. This is all leading to an increase in tension in these regions and may result in response measures from the Russian side.
In conclusion, Gerasimov turned to the threat posed by global terrorism. He noted that the number of members of various extremist organizations has grown from 2000 in the 1960s-70s, to 50,000 in the 1990s, to over 150,000 today. He also expressed concern about the growth of transnational terrorist networks, including some such as ISIS that have developed certain aspects of statehood. Some ISIS fighters are Russian citizens. These fighters threaten the entire world and attempts to fight the threat by a US-led airstrike operation have so far not achieved visible results. As a result, Washington and Brussels have once again turned to developing new armed groups among so-called “moderate Islamists.” But such projects do not take into account how such terrorist empires have formed in the past. Al-Qaeda, for example, formed from mujahideen who were funded by the US and its allies. Similarly, ISIS fighters until recently were “good” fighters but have now gone out of Western control and started to threaten their former sponsors.
In response to this range of threats, Russia has continued to develop its armed forces. Nuclear forces are maintained at a level designed to guarantee nuclear deterrence, including modern systems that can overcome US BMD systems. Russian Air-space defense systems continue to be developed. Defensive forces have been placed in Crimea. Russian bases have been placed in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These bases will serve as a guarantee of stability and security in these regions.
At the same time, Gerasimov noted that Russia understands that most modern security threats affect entire regions and even the whole world so that their solution requires international dialog and cooperation.
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I’ll have some reactions to this speech in a follow-up post. For now, let me just say that it was interesting to see the shift to the discussion of “old school” military threats, following last year’s focus on colored revolutions and hybrid warfare.
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A group of high-level international diplomats and government representatives said the proliferation of conflicts in Africa points to the need for the United Nations (UN) to rethink the way it works with the African Union (AU) in promoting peace and security on the continent.
This emerged from a May 4th policy forum on the topic of “Advancing Chapter VIII: The AU-UN experience” co-hosted by IPI, the African Union Commission, and the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN. During the event, top AU and UN officials said that when it comes to solving Africa’s conflicts, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter should serve as the main point of reference. However, they also lamented that its text has largely been neglected over the years.
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that UN members should “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” Over the years, the provision has been interpreted as urging the UN to support such regional arrangements in order to help maintain the peace.
“The very simple conclusion is that we cannot do it alone,” said UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson. “There is no organization, whether it’s the United Nations, regional organizations, or a government, that can handle today’s problems alone. In today’s globalized, complex world,” he continued, “we have to find solutions together.”
Mr. Eliasson said some of the conflict-mediation tools used so far are no longer relevant because the changing nature of conflict and the rise of new military actors have changed the calculus when it comes to war and peace. Organizations like the UN and the AU, he said, should adjust to this switch and realize that effective conflict resolution can only come through cooperation.
The first step to take would be for the UN to change the mindset with which it operates, he said, going from a vertical to a horizontal approach to regional organizations. “This means [we have to] look at the competences we have, identify the problems, put the problem at the center, and then ask ourselves who can do something about it,” he said, adding that this would ideally lead to an effective division of labor between the UN and other organizations.
The deputy chairperson of the African Union Commission, Erastus Mwencha, agreed with Mr. Eliasson on the need for better communication between the UN and regional bodies such as the AU. “Let’s be candid and agree that we are sometimes part of the problem and therefore should be part of the solution,” he said. Africa currently hosts the vast majority of UN peacekeeping missions, he said, and at the various meetings and summits the discussions are always the same, covering the same issues.
“There is a danger that we are either working in silos [or] prescribing the same things,” he said. “We should ask ourselves: Can we be more innovative? Can we be active on the ground? Can we see action?”
Better cooperation in maintaining peace and security is all the more timely, the panelists said, given recent global developments. According to Peter Wallensteen, professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden, 2014 was one of the deadliest years in recent history in terms of battle-related casualties.
“We calculated that last year about 100,000 people died in political battles involving the use of weapons for political purposes,” he said. “Half of those deaths are recorded in Syria.”
The most striking factor behind these conflicts, Mr. Wallensteen said, is how internationalized they have become. “They are not just fought in a territory of one country,” he noted. “[There’s] a lot of international involvement, not only by far away countries but by neighbors”—which indicates that regions are also failing to ensure the peace.
For its part, the AU has been actively involved in conflict management and resolution on the continent, the panelists said. Annika Söder, Sweden’s vice-minister for Foreign Affairs, praised the work carried out by the AU over the past 15 years, noting that the situation now is very different from what it was back then. That said, she also stressed that there are some aspects of the AU-UN relationship that could be reassessed, first among them the issue of inclusivity, especially when it comes to peacebuilding efforts.
“If you do not involve ordinary people, if we do not see to it that there’s an ownership of the processes that we engage in,” she said, “they will obviously not last.”
Watch event: