Agrégateur de flux

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

Le principal aéroport de Belgique a été contraint de fermer pendant environ une heure jeudi 6 novembre dans la soirée après une nouvelle observation de drone. Il s'agit de la troisième fermeture en une semaine, alors que le pays est confronté à une recrudescence d'activités suspectes dans son espace aérien.

The post Drones : l’aéroport de Bruxelles fermé pour la troisième fois en une semaine appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Nous faisons une petite pause à l’occasion de la journée de l’armistice en Belgique (et en France). Rapporteur sera de retour dans votre boîte mail le mercredi 12 novembre. Bienvenue dans Rapporteur. Je suis Nicoletta Ionta, avec Eddy Wax à Bruxelles. Vous avez une info à nous communiquer ? Écrivez-moi. À savoir : Omnibus : […]

The post Le PPE et le S&D suivent une thérapie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

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5 – 6 November 2025, Santeri Leinonen, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Youth, Peace and Security, visited Tashkent to deepen dialogue on the positive, active and inclusive role of young people in the efforts towards sustainable peace and security.

During a full day of meetings, Mr. Leinonen met with representatives of the Youth Affairs Agency of Uzbekistan, Nordic International University and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, as well as with young representatives of civil society

At the Youth Affairs Agency, discussions focused on strengthening youth participation in policy-making and peacebuilding, highlighting shared priorities in empowering young people as drivers of positive change.

Mr. Leinonen visited Nordic International University and the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, where he presented the outcomes of the OSCE Chairpersonship Youth Forum, held in Helsinki in late July 2025. Young people from across the OSCE region – including Uzbekistan – contributed to shaping the OSCE-wide Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) Roadmap to be launched under Finland’s OSCE Chairpersonship. He also shared Finland’s experience in youth cooperation and the process of drafting the country’s National Action Plans on YPS, followed by an open exchange with students and members of university youth and diplomatic clubs about the role of youth in fostering peace, dialogue and mutual understanding.

The visit concluded with a meeting with young civil society representatives, where participants discussed opportunities for regional collaboration and youth-led initiatives.

Reflecting on his visit, Santeri Leinonen said: “Meeting so many active and committed young people here in Tashkent has been truly inspiring. Their energy, creativity and dedication to building bridges across communities are at the heart of sustainable peace. Strengthening youth cooperation across regions and cultures is essential to creating a more inclusive and secure future for all. Field visits have been most rewarding part in my role as Special Representative.”

Throughout the day, discussions highlighted how Uzbekistan’s young people are taking an active role in shaping their communities and contributing to regional cooperation – a reflection of the shared spirit of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda across the OSCE area.

AMENDMENTS 124 - 306 - Draft report Amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence
Antonio Decaro, Aura Salla, Sven Mikser

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

AMENDMENTS 124 - 306 - Draft report Amending Regulations (EC) No 1907/2006, (EC) No 1272/2008, (EU) No 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 and (EU) 2021/697 as regards defence readiness and facilitating defence investments and conditions for defence industry
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
Committee on Security and Defence
Antonio Decaro, Aura Salla, Sven Mikser

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

A háborús népességpusztulás és nemzethalál kategóriájában a világrekord minden bizonnyal a XIX. századi Paraguayhoz köthető, melynek férfilakossága szinte felfoghatatlan arányban, minimum 70 százalékban veszett oda a napóleoni ambícióihoz ragaszkodó elnökük szolgálatában. (Egy későbbi, 1886-os népszámlálás adatai szerint a 30 évnél idősebb felnőttek között három nő jutott egy férfira.) A latin-amerikai országot letarolták és teljesen megszállták az ellenséges seregek; mint az ismert, ugyanez történt Szerbiával is az első világháborúban – azzal a fontos különbséggel, hogy a végső vereséget sikerült elkerülnie (ami magyar szemszögből mondjuk azért nem volt kifejezetten szerencsés). Ezzel magyarázható, hogy az említett gyászos dobogón is „csak” a második hely jutott számára – öt szerb férfiból átlagosan kettő élte meg a háború végét.

[...] Bővebben!

Global warming is linked to increasingly dry conditions and devastating wildfires across the UNECE region covering Europe, North America, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Credit: Unsplash/Caleb Cook / Source: UN News

By Cian Delaney
BRUSSELS, Belgium, Nov 7 2025 (IPS)

President Prabowo Subianto welcomed his counterpart Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil to Jakarta recently to strengthen ties between the fast-growing economies.

The timing is significant. The meeting was just weeks before Brazil hosts the COP30 climate change talks in Belém, a bustling port city at the mouth of the Amazon River.

Like Brazil, Indonesia is home to expansive rainforests that attract intense international scrutiny because of their rich biodiversity and globally-important role as carbon sinks. And like Brazil, Indonesia has implemented new policies designed to boost biofuel use.

The leaders, who agreed to expand cooperation as two of the world’s largest biofuel producers, contend that the energy sources are needed to reduce reliance on imports and cut emissions.

But Indonesia has been down this road before.

Cian Delaney

In the mid-2000s, booming international demand for highly versatile palm oil—a key ingredient for biofuels—led the country to clear millions of hectares of rainforest and peatland to make way for vast plantations.

The gold rush for the oil displaced indigenous communities, smallholder farmers, and destroyed vital ecosystems that critically endangered species like orangutans, Sumatran tigers, and the Javan rhinoceros depend on to survive.

In Borneo alone, far from reducing carbon pollution, slash and burn agriculture caused the largest single-year global emissions increase seen in 2,000 years, according to NASA.

Falling demand and the introduction of conservation measures helped slow deforestation over the subsequent decade, however, the Subianto-Lula meeting reflects a troubling resurgence of biofuels as a global commodity.

Brazil will ask the international community at COP30 to sign a pledge calling for a quadrupling of so-called “sustainable fuels”—biofuels chief among them—over the next decade.

The proposed pledge rests heavily on a new International Energy Agency (IEA) report that shows a fourfold increase can be achieved through innovative fuel developments and a doubling of biofuel use. In the fine print, however, the IEA notes that no additional land should be needed to meet the goal.

Brazil’s COP30 pledge makes no such distinction—raising concerns that growing demand will incentivize deforestation and heighten competition for land that is already scarce.

In August, Brazil lifted a soy moratorium that environmentalists credit for the significant conservation gains made over the past two decades to make way for more cultivation.

There is also the question of food.

Globally, about 90 percent of biofuel production relies on food staples. In 2023, the biofuel industry used around 200 million tonnes of corn, 8 million tonnes of wheat, 40 million tonnes of vegetable oil and enough sugarcane and sugarbeet to make 50 million tonnes of sugar.

By one estimation the energy stored in these crops could satisfy the minimum caloric requirements for 1.3 billion people, while it takes nearly 3,000 litres of water to produce enough biofuel to drive a car only 100 kilometers.

Biofuels also have serious implications for the atmosphere. Litre for litre it is estimated that, when the full impact of land use change caused by biofuel production is accounted for, they emit an average of 16% more carbon than the fossil fuels they replace.

But transitioning away from biofuels cannot ignore social and economic realities on the ground. Indonesia’s new policies, for example, stem from the country’s palm oil surplus and a need to maintain rural employment.

In response, Indonesian NGOs have increasingly been advocating for a holistic solution that would put caps on expansion, improve traceability, and invest in community-based governance, including a decentralized energy system.

At the beginning of the year, Indonesia formally joined the BRICS, an influential bloc of developing nations that make up almost half of the global population and conduct nearly a quarter of all trade.

The countries also account for 51 percent of emissions. In recent years, the bloc has made statements that suggest climate change is its top foreign policy priority and last July committed to increasing peer-to-peer climate finance.

If Indonesia and its new partners are serious about building a new kind of economy that works for the Global South without undermining progress made toward cutting emissions, they will need to match their lofty rhetoric with tangible action. Starting an honest conversation about biofuels in Belém would be a good place to start.

Cian Delaney is Campaign Coordinator, Transport & Environment

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Credit: United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 7 2025 (IPS)

“Has the world given up fighting climate change?” was a rhetorical question posed recently by the New York Times, perhaps with a degree of sarcasm.

It might look that way, says Christiana Figueres, a founding partner of the nongovernmental organization Global Optimism, “as US president Donald Trump blusters about fossil fuel, Bill Gates prioritizes children’s health over climate protection, and oil and gas companies plan decades of higher production.”

But that’s far from the whole picture, said Figueres, pointing out that the overwhelming majority of the world’s people — 80 to 89%, as Covering Climate Now partner newsrooms have been reporting — want stronger climate action.

Clean energy technologies are attracting twice as much investment as fossil fuels, and solar power and regenerative agriculture are surging across the Global South, she said.

Meanwhile, the United States will not send any high-level officials to the COP30, according to the White House.

John Noel, campaigner with Greenpeace International, told IPS the current administration is ceding leadership and leverage over the clean energy future to other countries.

“It is tragic, but not surprising. But for those of us heading to Belem from the United States, we are on solid ground with public opinion in broad support of the Paris Agreement and are more committed than ever.”

There are avenues, he pointed out, for climate ambition at the subnational level, such as ‘polluter pay’ mechanisms and state incentives for clean energy during the federal lapse in support.

“Global leaders at COP30 must move forward to adopt ambitious climate targets, end global deforestation by 2030, and advance a just energy transition and climate action must continue on” Noel declared.

Addressing the plenary of leaders at the Belem Climate Summit, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said November 6 “the hard truth is that we have failed to ensure we remain below 1.5 degrees.”

“Science now tells us that a temporary overshoot beyond the 1.5 limit – starting at the latest in the early 2030s – is inevitable. We need a paradigm shift to limit this overshoot’s magnitude and duration and quickly drive it down”.

Even a temporary overshoot will have dramatic consequences. It could push ecosystems past irreversible tipping points, expose billions to unlivable conditions, and amplify threats to peace and security.

Every fraction of a degree means more hunger, displacement, and loss – especially for those least responsible. This is moral failure – and deadly negligence, he warned.

The United Nations, however, will not give up on the 1.5 degrees goal, he declared.

While clean energy technology is rapidly progressing, political will is seen as weakening, and current efforts are insufficient to prevent significant warming. For example, despite a pledge to cut methane emissions, a new U.N. report indicates the goal will likely not be met.

Anuradha Mittal, Executive Director, The Oakland Institute, told IPS people must be very concerned that governments, especially Western countries that bear most of the responsibility for the climate crisis, are far from fulfilling their commitments in terms of decreased reduction of GHG, and far from assisting countries with adequate levels of financial assistance for mitigation and adaptation.

“It should be as concerning that the same governments, and prominent financial institutions like the World Bank, are promoting false climate solutions such as carbon markets, which have been proven to be totally ineffective at reducing emissions” she said.

Moreover, it must be clear for everyone that the new mining rush “we are witnessing for so-called critical minerals has nothing to do with the energy transition but rather with the global competition over minerals for various industries such as military, communication technologies, as well as electric vehicles”.

The massive amount of minerals such as lithium and cobalt will be impossible to supply without creating another environmental and human crisis. It is time for governments to make responsible choices towards a real energy transition and stop expanding sectors such as the military that divert public resources and contribute greatly to emissions, she pointed out.

It is widely documented that simply replacing existing gas-powered cars with electric vehicles is impossible. If today’s demand for EVs is projected to 2050, the lithium requirements of the US EV market alone would require triple the amount of lithium currently produced for the entire world.

“We need aggressive policies to reduce the number and size of personal vehicles and deploy effective public infrastructures and other low-carbon means of transportation” declared Mittal.

Speaking a press conference in Qatar November 4, Guterres said governments must arrive at the upcoming COP30 meeting in Brazil with concrete plans to slash their own emissions over the next decade while also delivering climate justice to those on the frontlines of a crisis they did little to cause.

“Just look at Jamaica” he said, referring to the catastrophic devastation caused last week by Hurricane Melissa.

The clean energy revolution means it is possible to cut emissions while growing economies. But developing countries still lack the finance and technologies needed to support these transitions.

In Brazil, countries must agree on a credible plan to mobilize $1.3 trillion annually in climate finance by 2035 for developing countries, he said.

“Developed countries must honour their commitment to double finance for adaptation to at least $40 billion this year. And the Loss and Damage Fund needs to be capitalized with significant contributions.”

COP30 in Belém must be the turning point – where the world delivers a bold and credible response plan to close the ambition and implementation gaps, he said.

“To mobilize the 1.3 US trillion dollars a year by 2035 in climate finance for developing countries; And to advance climate justice for all. The path to 1.5 degrees is narrow – but open.
Let us accelerate to keep that path alive for people, for the planet, and for our common future,” declared Guterres.

Meanwhile New research by Oxfam and CARE Climate Justice Centre, finds developing countries are now paying more back to wealthy nations for climate finance loans than they receive- for every 5 dollars they receive they are paying 7 dollars back. 65% of funding is delivered in the form of loans.

This form of crisis profiteering by rich countries is worsening debt burdens and hindering climate action. Compounding this failure, deep cuts to foreign aid threaten to slash climate finance further, betraying the world’s poorest communities who are facing the brunt of escalating climate disasters, says the joint report.

Some key findings of the report:

• Rich countries claim to have mobilized $116 billion in climate finance 2022, but the true value is only around $28-35 billion, less than a third of the pledged amount.
• Nearly two thirds of climate finance was made as loans, often at standard rates of interest without concessions. As a result, climate finance is adding more each year to developing countries’ debt, which now stands at $3.3 trillion. Countries like France, Japan, and Italy are among the worst culprits.
• Least Developed Countries got only 19.5% and Small Island Developing States 2.9% of total public climate finance over 2021-2022 and half of that was in the form of loans they have to repay. 
• Developed nations are profiting from these loans, with repayments outstripping disbursements. In 2022, developing countries received $62 billion in climate loans. We estimate these loans to lead to repayments of up to $88 billion, resulting in a 42% “profit” for creditors.
• Only 3% of finance specifically aimed at enhancing gender equality, despite the climate crisis disproportionately impacting women and girls.

“Rich countries are treating the climate crisis as a business opportunity, not a moral obligation,” said Oxfam’s Climate Policy Lead, Nafkote Dabi. “They are lending money to the very people they have historically harmed, trapping vulnerable nations in a cycle of debt. This is a form of crisis profiteering.”

This failure is occurring as rich countries are conducting the most vicious foreign aid cuts since the 1960s. Data by the OECD data shows a 9% drop in 2024, with 2025 projections signalling a further 9–17% cut.

As the impacts of fossil fuelled climate disasters intensify —displacing millions of people in the Horn of Africa, battering 13 million more in the Philippines, and flooding 600,000 people in Brazil in 2024 alone – communities in low-income countries are left with fewer resources to adapt to the rapidly changing climate, according to the study.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Why the Argentine president will struggle to exploit his new mandate.

BBC Verify tracks how the RSF killed unarmed people in a massacre that humanitarian officials believe left 2,000 dead.

Ismaila Sarr shines as Crystal Palace earn first home victory in Europa Conference League this term.

Ce documentaire de 52 minutes sera projeté jeudi 6 novembre à 20h au cinéma CHRISTINE CINEMA CLUB, 4 rue Christine, 6e, Métro Odéon.

- Agenda / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Région parisienne

By Marylou Hamm (Science Po, France / European University Institute, Italy)

From the Greek debt crisis and the 2015 migration crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the European Union has faced overlapping emergencies over the past fifteen years. These crises have tested not only financial actors and member states, but also the very foundations of solidarity at the European level. In response, new instruments proliferated – budgets, calendars, databases, and monitoring tools designed to coordinate national policies across borders.

This wave of innovation, described by some as a trend towards coordinative Europeanisation, came at a cost. The 2010s produced one of the deepest legitimacy shocks in EU history, nowhere more visibly than in Greece. There, the European Commission became directly involved in national policy implementation through the infamous ‘troika’ model. And what began as a firefighting exercise soon evolved into a lasting experiment in Brussels’ intervention in domestic reform processes.

While much has been written about the outcomes of this period – the tightening of fiscal rules, the rise of ad hoc coordination structures, and the expansion of conditionality – far less is understood about how these transformations unfolded from within EU institutions: the concrete conditions through which crisis-born instruments become institutionalised. This is paradoxical, since institutional change depends not only on crisis improvisers, but also on the ‘translators’ who enact learning by interpreting feedback, adjust procedures, and transform ad hoc responses into organisational norms.

The politics of routinisation

In my recent Journal of Common Market Studies article, I examine this process through micro-level observation of EU staff negotiating the routinisation of technical assistance services first developed in Greece and Cyprus in the 2010s (i.e. support to reform design and implementation—studies, training, advice, missions). I define routinisation as a contested process through which crisis learning is debated, negotiated, and institutionalised.

My analysis of the creation of the Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS), now known as SG REFORM, reveals enduring tensions in how the EU conceives its involvement in national reforms – tensions that still shape flagship instruments such as the European Semester and the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

Competing Narratives and Logics

By 2014, even as the financial crisis subsided, its political and legitimacy aftershocks continued to shape Brussels’ internal dynamics. The Greek episode was interpreted in multiple, often conflicting ways: as a test of European solidarity, a story of technocratic overreach and austerity, or evidence of member states’ limited administrative capacities. These narratives did not just circulate in public debate – they divided the Commission itself.

Officials who had worked on Greece faced a dilemma: how to preserve the expertise and networks developed during the crisis, while distancing themselves from the unpopular troika model. Within the Commission, they clashed over the future of these crisis-era instruments – over what it meant to ‘learn’ from crisis. Between March 2014 and June 2015, EU staff circulated draft proposals, concept notes, and organisational charts, each advancing a different vision. Two competing logics emerged:

• The economising logic, defended by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), framed technical assistance as an extension of economic surveillance – a tool to ensure reforms aligned with macroeconomic targets, embedded within the European Semester.
• The integrative logic, defended by the Task Force for Greece, viewed reform support as a partnership instrument – a means to build trust, ownership, and cooperation rather than enforce conditionality.

These perspectives collided in internal debates. DG ECFIN wanted the new service under its authority; the task force argued it should report to the Secretariat General or the President’s office, reflecting its cross-cutting and coordinative role. Even seemingly minor wording choices – ‘responsibility’ versus ‘solidarity’ – carried political weight, reflecting deeper disagreements within the Eurocratic field.

By mid-2015, the economising logic appeared to dominate. Yet, in a last-minute intervention, the Secretariat General opted to preserve the task force’s structure and keep it under its own authority. This decision endorsed the integrative vision while allowing for a compromise where staff from DG ECFIN were integrated into the new unit, and adjustment programmes and European Semester monitoring remained central to its mission.

This episode marked a pivotal transition in the Eurocratic space away from the emergency policies that dominated the 2010s. It revealed how critiques of past crisis management could align with broader political ambitions – in this case, Juncker’s effort to re-centralise cross-cutting policy tools and politicise the Commission’s role as a managerial and coordinating hub.

The value of drafts

This story offers a rare inside look at how EU institutions ‘learn’ from crisis. Learning is not automatic: it is political work involving framing, negotiation, and the legitimation of competing experiences. Officials did not merely design new instruments; they continuously rewrote the meaning of the crisis itself. Micro-level practices – drafting memos, circulating notes, timing decisions – produced macro-level effects, shaping institutional architectures and the balance between rival visions of European integration. Where a service is located, or how its mandate is described, can tilt the balance between different understandings of EU governance. Studying these internal disputes helps explain how crisis improvisations become organisational routines.

Ongoing Relevance

The lineage from SRSS to SG REFORM, now managing expertise for the Recovery and Resilience Facility, illustrates the persistence of these old dilemmas: fiscal oversight versus national ownership, solidarity versus responsibility. Today, ‘conditionality’ often bridges these poles – combining coercive and coordinative logics in new hybrid forms.

My research on the hidden politics of routinisation reveals not only what the EU does, but how it decides what it wants to become. Rather than treating the Commission as a homogeneous policy entrepreneur, we can see how its evolution depends on the situated work of professionals – individuals shaped by crises, who interpret lessons, negotiate compromises, and embed new routines in everyday practice.

Institutions, ultimately, are made by the people who inhabit them – people who must make sense of crises as they unfold, and who turn emergency measures into the quiet routines of governance.

Marylou Hamm is a Civica Fellow at Sciences Po (France) and the European University Institute (Italy). Her research examines (post-)crisis management, public administration reforms, and the role of experts in EU governance, through a sociological lens.  https://me.eui.eu/marylou-hamm

The post From Crisis to Routine: Learning from the Greek Experience appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 06 November 2025, EUHealthGov hosted Julidè Mayer for a webinar exploring the EU relations with neighbouring third countries in the area of health. Julidè Mayer is a second-year MPH student in Global Health Management and Policy at the University of Michigan School of Public Health, and has been researching EU cross-border regional cooperation in health. Over the summer 2025, she held a visiting researcher position at City St George’s, University of London, where she was co-hosted at the Department of International Politics and the Law School.

In her talk, Julidè presented the findings of the research project. The aim of the project was, first, to map EU relations with different types of third countries (selected EFTA members and accession states, as well as the UK) using the WHO health systems building blocks framework to assess different areas of health governance and identify distinct cooperation models. Secondly, the instruments characterising those models were analysed along a set of criteria developed by Dayan and Hervey (2024): the extent to which they are formal or informal; narrow or broad; technical or political; and whether they are oriented towards trade or security. 

The findings highlight the multifaceted nature of EU relations with third countries, challenging assumptions of homogeneity in external relations, and underscoring the complexity of health and healthcare governance. As a common thread, we could see that relations with EEA countries (Iceland and Norway) showed the deepest level of integration, with broad, formal and technical cooperation covering both trade and security elements. Relations with accession states were marked by a clear power asymmetry, wherein the EU plays a capacity-building role intended to support the aspiring member to meet the EU’s requirement in a highly formalised setting. The relation between the EU and Switzerland, as well as EU-UK relations on the other hand, are much more reflective of the outcomes of political negotiations relating to narrowly delimited issues, with the emergence of what Mayer described as a UK-EU ‘legacy model’ and Switzerland’s relationship reflecting specific and bespoke outcomes of decades of negotiations.       

Of particular interest in the Q&A discussion was the ‘health data and information’ category, which was an outline where no clear cooperation model could be identified. Several points were raised, both by Julidè and audience members, on why establishing systematised cooperation in health data may be more difficult than in other areas such as health workforce or service delivery. Data protection is a particularly politically sensitive area at domestic levels in many member states, and one in which the EU has always tended towards a precautionary approach. Sensitivities may be exacerbated in the context of the rising prominence of generative AI. Health data is also of particular relevance to health security, notably through epidemiological surveillance and preparedness monitoring. With each health crisis, the EU is becoming more and more involved in health security governance, while at the same time, the securitisation of health in a geopolitically unstable global context also represents a barrier to cooperation. 

The post EUHealthGov with Julidè Mayer: Mapping EU health policy relations with neighbouring third countries appeared first on Ideas on Europe.