Voir le CV du professeur FERNANDEZ.
With the UK’s general election on 7th May, it is looking highly likely that the Scottish National Party will displace the Lib-Dems as the UK’s third-biggest party, possibly winning almost all of Scotland’s 59 seats at Westminster (where today they hold only six seats, and Labour hold forty-one).
The SNP has campaigned not on independence but on an anti-austerity and ‘progressive’ ticket. In both Scotland and England, the debate has focused on domestic policy even though the Conservatives are committed to an EU referendum, if they win, that could lead to a potential ‘Brexit’.
With the SNP potentially holding the balance of power after 7th May – since neither the Tories nor Labour are expected to get anywhere near a majority – how might the SNP MPs impact on the UK’s approach to the EU?
Scotland and the EU
Humza Yousaf, Minister for Europe and International Development in the Scottish Government, says the campaign is going “phenomenally well in Scotland, as the polls and our own canvass results reflect”. He sees the “tectonic plates of Scottish politics shifting”.
Yousaf thinks that, in Scotland, “there is a more pro-European stance here”. There is much more outside interest in Scotland and its external policies, says Yousaf, with many more ambassadors and other visitors coming since the referendum, despite the ‘no’ vote.
Does Scotland at present have enough influence on British positions on key EU policies? “No, definitely not enough” says Yousaf. He explains there are quarterly joint ministerial meetings between the UK and Scotland on EU issues but “there isn’t enough discussion on policy formation…Smith [the Smith Commission Report which looked at further devolution post-referendum] left the door open a bit and said we would need to discuss more how to represent Scotland’s views on the global stage”. It’s a big issue that has been left hanging.
Yousaf complains strongly that even where Scotland has the most competent and experienced minister – for instance on fisheries – London will not let Scottish ministers speak for the UK in Brussels’ councils, pulling in unelected Lords or British diplomats instead when UK ministers are absent. Pressure for a more fair and rational approach for Scotland in the EU is likely to grow.
Scottish interests overlap with, but are not identical to, England’s. Scotland produces about 25% of the EU’s total wind energy, and has the most ambitious renewables targets in the EU. It has a greater focus on oil, food and drink, and fisheries amongst other areas, as well as its more anti-austerity and pro-EU attitudes, than England.
Asked about Greece’s struggles to escape austerity, Yousaf is sympathetic but cautious: “I don’t believe it is necessary for Greece to leave [the euro] for stability, any member leaving would be a disaster for the EU. I have faith they will find a manageable compromise’. He talks about Syriza having to “navigate” the promises they made to their voters to find a way to a compromise.
EU Referendum and ‘Brexit’ – only for England?
Humza Yousaf sees ‘Brexit’ as possible, if the Tories manage to put together an informal coalition after 7th May. Yousaf says “it [a referendum] is playing with fire, exit could have devastating consequences for the whole of the UK”.
But Yousaf is cautious about the impact of a possible ‘no’ vote on the push for Scottish independence if there is an EU in-out referendum: “This election is not about another [independence] referendum….If Scotland voted to stay in the EU and the rest of the UK to leave and we were about to be dragged out against our will that might be a trigger, and people would say we would rather be an independent country and in Europe.”
Yousaf refers to Irish anxieties about a possible Brexit (given shared borders and other common interests) and obviously sees similar concerns potentially for Scotland. He thinks it is better for the whole of the UK to stay in the EU. There is a conundrum here since while an EU referendum with an English ‘no’ vote might be a positive catalyst for Scottish independence, it would in many ways be better for an independent Scotland if England too remained in the EU.
Asked who might be the main allies of a one-day independent Scotland in the EU, Yousaf says “primarily the [rest of the] UK would be a natural ally in the EU and Ireland, first and foremost, we would work closely with them, and yes with some of the Nordics – Sweden, Finland and Denmark.”
Yousaf says he is sure if they had won the Scottish referendum, Scotland would have stayed in the EU: “Brussels would have found a way, there is no doubt in my mind. The EU is a pragmatic organisation as it was when East Germany joined. We have been in for 40 years and our laws reflect the acquis, we have €100,000 citizens here in Scotland, 25% of EU wind energy….so you could imagine the practical problems if we weren’t in the EU for a day, the disruption.”
Most attention on SNP foreign policies has been on their aim of getting rid of Trident. Trident, says Yousaf, has no moral, political or economic purpose. But he goes on to emphasise “we are not a party of pacifists” and attacks the current government for not investing enough in conventional forces.
Migration is another issue where the SNP has positioned itself in a progressive position compared to the UK’s main parties. Yousaf talks of needing a ‘tier and points’ system for migration and insists migration is positive and necessary for Scotland given its aging population. Such an outlook may be helpful in the debate around free movement of labour in the EU, one that is likely to continue even under a Labour government to some extent.
The SNP’s role at Westminster – plenty to discuss
David Cameron has been attacking Labour for much of the election over the possibility that it might end up as a minority government supported by the SNP, a party committed to independence from the UK.
This attack, effectively on the legitimacy of SNP MPs voting at Westminster has gone down very badly in Scotland. “The anger”, says Yousaf, “is tangible. From six or seven months ago”, he goes on, “when Cameron was saying ‘you should not leave the UK’ to saying ‘your voice is illegitimate and you should have no say in a future government’….people are apoplectic, very angry”.
Ed Miliband has also shocked some on the left in England, by not only ruling out a formal coalition with the SNP, but even a so-called ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. This suggests he thinks he can govern as a minority government, with some votes in support on key policies from the SNP, but without negotiating with them – this seems implausible.
Both Scottish and British politics look like being interesting indeed after the results come in on 7th May. The SNP will certainly be a key voice in many areas, even without a formal agreement, if there is a minority Labour government. And a Conservative coalition or more informal agreement with the Lib-Dems, Democratic Ulster Unionists and UKIP may find itself fracturing over an EU referendum – something the SNP would not support – so in a more unstable governing context, watching the SNP is now going to be a key part of following Britain’s politics.
An earlier version of this article was published in Open Democracy.
IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – the SNP
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Cette recension d’ouvrage est issue de Politique étrangère (1/2015). Marion Gaillard propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Europa. La dernière chance de l’Europe (XO Éditions, 2014, 188 pages).
À l’heure où l’Union européenne (UE) traverse une crise multiforme, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing propose aux dirigeants européens actuels et à venir un nouvel horizon pour leur continent. Son objectif est aussi de répondre au problème, crucial selon lui, de l’obésité de l’UE élargie et de faire de l’Europe une puissance dans le monde.
L’idée est de créer une nouvelle entité, Europa, « Union monétaire, budgétaire et fiscale, à l’espace homogène, dotée à terme d’un Trésor public et d’un mécanisme de solidarité financière ». L’auteur précise d’ailleurs que l’union monétaire existe déjà, tout comme l’union budgétaire grâce au Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance (TSCG) de mars 2012.
Dès lors, quels sont les aspects novateurs de la proposition de l’ancien président ? Il s’agirait pour lui d’aller plus loin dans l’unité de cette zone monétaire en l’accompagnant d’une union fiscale. Il suggère qu’Europa constitue un espace neutre fiscalement – à l’exception de la fiscalité locale – au sein duquel les entreprises et les citoyens acquitteraient les mêmes impôts sur les bénéfices, les revenus ou le patrimoine, quel que soit leur lieu d’activité et de résidence. Par ailleurs, alors qu’il récuse l’idée jugée « prématurée, et donc absurde » d’une mutualisation des dettes, l’auteur propose la création, à terme, d’un Trésor public afin d’émettre des emprunts communs au sein de la zone.
Ce nouveau projet, qui a le mérite de faire une proposition concrète pour l’avenir de l’UE, présente néanmoins des limites. D’une part, il demeure flou sur les contours de cette Europa, qui n’est en fait qu’une nouvelle version des différentes réflexions autour de la création d’un noyau dur. L’auteur évoque en effet à plusieurs reprises la zone euro comme base de cette union mais, lorsqu’il en détaille la composition, on y trouve les six pays fondateurs de la Communauté européenne, auxquels s’ajoutent l’Espagne, le Portugal, l’Autriche, l’Irlande si elle accepte l’égalité fiscale, la Finlande si elle le souhaite, et la Pologne « le moment venu », c’est-à-dire une fois qu’elle aura intégré l’euro. Cette liste est loin d’inclure tous les membres actuels de la zone euro, y manquent notamment la Grèce et les « nouveaux » États membres qui ont rejoint l’union monétaire. Dès lors, au cas où Europa et la zone euro seraient deux entités distinctes, se poserait la question de leur articulation, qui peut sembler problématique.
D’autre part, le projet de l’ancien président français se révèle relativement intergouvernemental puisqu’il dépouillerait la Commission européenne de son droit de demander des ajustements budgétaires aux États, droit qui serait conféré au Conseil de la zone euro, lequel deviendrait ensuite le directoire d’Europa, composé des chefs d’État et de gouvernement. L’auteur en profite d’ailleurs pour fustiger les dérives de la Commission dans les années 1960 et pour glorifier la création, à son initiative, du Conseil européen en 1974.
On peut à cet égard regretter que l’ouvrage, présenté comme une proposition pour l’avenir de l’Europe, ne consacre finalement qu’une trentaine de pages à celle-ci et préfère revenir sur les grandes lignes de l’histoire de sa construction ainsi que sur l’action conjointe de l’auteur et de son préfacier Helmut Schmidt en faveur de son unification voici 40 ans.
S’abonner à Politique étrangère.
Du 28 avril et jusqu’au 2 mai 2015, le groupe aéronaval composé du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle, de la frégate de défense aérienne Chevalier Paul, de la frégate anti sous-marine Jean de Vienne et du pétrolier ravitailleur Meuse, a participé à la 14ème édition de l’exercice Varuna avec la marine indienne.
Le groupe aéronaval, la Task Force 473 constitué autour du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle, a quitté le samedi 18 avril, la coalition anti-État islamique (EI ou Daesh) emmenée par les États-Unis. Pendant près de deux mois, le GAN a engagé douze Rafale, neuf Super Étendard et un appareil de guet aérien E2C Hawkeye. En moyenne, ce groupe aérien a effectué quotidiennement entre dix et quinze sorties aériennes pour des missions d’appui, de reconnaissance et de contrôle du trafic aérien.
Après avoir franchi le détroit d’Ormuz, le groupe aéronaval (GAN) français a mis le cap sur Goa, en Inde, pour prendre part à l’exercice Varuna au large de la côte ouest de l’Inde avec le groupe aéronaval indien, constitué autour du porte-avions Viraat. Le GAN est arrivé le jeudi 23 avril au large des côtes indiennes pour préparer l’exercice avec les forces armées indiennes. Après la phase de préparation, les deux groupes aéronavals comptant au total dix bâtiments de combat se sont retrouvés pour s’entraîner à partir du mardi 28 avril, dans les différents domaines de lutte aéromaritime, afin d’améliorer leur interopérabilité. Pendant cinq jours, les bâtiments français et indiens, ainsi que les groupes aériens embarqués des Charles de Gaulle et Viraat, ont enchainé les exercices dans les domaines de la défense aérienne, de la lutte anti-navire et de la chasse aux sous-marins. Les Rafale et les Super Étendards Modernisés français ainsi que les Sea Harrier indiens se sont entrainés à l’attaque de cibles maritimes et au combat aérien. Au total, 17 exercices maritimes et 120 sorties aériennes ont été réalisés pendant cette période.
La Marine Nationale était représentée par le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle, la Frégate de Défense Aérienne (FDA) Chevalier Paul, la Frégate Anti Sous-Marine (FASM) Jean de Vienne, le Pétrolier Ravitailleur (PR) Meuse et un avion de patrouille maritime Atlantique 2.
Le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle transporte des chasseurs Rafale marine et Super Étendard Modernisés, un E2C Hawkeye et des hélicoptères Dauphin et Alouette III.
L’Inde était représenté par son porte-avions Viraat, le destroyer lance-missiles Mumbai, les frégates Tarkash et Gomati, le pétrolier ravitailleur Deepak, le sous-marin Shankul et des avions de patrouille maritime P-8 Poseidon
Le porte-avions Viraat transporte des chasseurs Sea Harrier ainsi que des hélicoptères Sea King.
Depuis de nombreuses années, les forces armées françaises et indiennes se rencontrent régulièrement pour des manœuvres bilatérales, non seulement Varuna au niveau naval, mais aussi Garuda pour les aviations des deux pays et Shakti pour leurs armées de terre. Ces exercices permettent de renforcer l’interopérabilité et la coopération entre Français et Indiens.
Le porte-avions Charles de Gaulle devrait être de retour à Toulon au mois de juin.
Why is this election important for Britain?
It is important because it represents new political ground. Most of the elections since World War II have returned a clear Labour or Conservative majority. The last one didn’t and proved that a coalition government, which is very unusual in the UK, could actually govern for five years.
This election is a test of whether a multitude of opinions can be expressed without achieving a clear majority in Parliament. The British first-past-the-post system means that if there are only two parties you are going to have a clear majority. Now, in addition to the LibDems, UKIP probably won’t get any seats. The Scottish National Party will take what Labour used to have in Scotland away from them. So it’s becoming a multiparty system and this is the first test of how that multiparty system will evolve.
What is also interesting is that this election is not important for any policy reasons. The probability is that whoever wins, there will not be any big changes.
Why are neither Labour nor the Tories in a position to win a majority?
It’s because neither of them has any ideas. There is no electoral battleground and consequently the campaign has been virtually devoid of substance and the leaders have virtually nothing concrete to propose.
Is foreign policy a factor in these elections?
With respect to foreign policy, it is not important that Britain is not important. There is no question that Britain is in the midst of an identity crisis, but I think it is going back to what it always was, which is a kind of turntable, not really part of Europe, definitely part of the Atlantic, very much an offshore island and one that is capable of supporting a lot of globalized phenomena. France, on the other hand, could not possibly do that because it is at the heart of Europe. It is very strategic about its military. The Brits are not strategic about anything. The Brits are pathetic at strategy, but they are fantastic at keeping calm and carrying on, “muddling through.”
There is minimal substance to this election and very little at stake. The reason why it is said to be the most important British election in a generation has to do with how the political system works, but it’s not about the policies that will be implemented afterwards.
What does a waning Britain mean for the United States? Is the “special relationship” between the United States and Britain still special?
The “special relationship” is waning on both sides. There is an increasing feeling in Europe generally that the United States is simply not as much a part of the strategic equation globally as it used to be.
The United States is seen as having fallen short strategically ever since 9/11. Obama has tried to repair this by means of a strategic retreat. But there is certainly the conviction in Britain that they don’t wish to toady to the American superpower because the American superpower has got it wrong repeatedly. There is no scope for repeating what is perceived as Tony Blair’s rather slavish following of George W. Bush.
The special relationship was born out of a situation of absolute desperation, which was Winston Churchill needing the United States to get into World War II. Indeed, Franklin Roosevelt was quite reluctant to get into an alliance with Britain, which was seen very much as an imperial and imperialist power.
Britain today doesn’t have any significant capability to project power globally. The only member of NATO besides the US that has that ability now is France. Britain’s military is at its lowest level since the 18th century—since England lost the American colonies and the United States came into being. They have no aircraft carrier, they have no homegrown defense industry, and their nuclear capability is essentially controlled by the United States.
The EU has basically discounted Britain as a political actor. Britain does not have that much significance in NATO because its defense capability is quite limited.
From a policy standpoint, the special relationship with the United States is less and less meaningful because there is no appetite amongst the British public to have their government follow a policy made by people in Washington that they disagree with.
There have been articles saying that, viewed from Washington, the special relationship isn’t that special. Viewed from London it’s not really that special either. The fact that the Brits decided to become members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank at the invitation of the Chinese—and against American wishes—just shows that they are going back to historical type, which is to be a kind of international platform. They have little or no domestic industry of their own, they don’t have much besides financial services and media and retail in terms of business sectors, but they are a very globalized place that is excellent at attracting wealth and talent.
Under David Cameron, defense spending has fallen below the suggested NATO minimum of 2 percent of GDP. Is that likely to change?
I don’t think so. If you look at France, there is an absolute determination across all party lines that France should remain globally important in terms of diplomacy and defense. The British version of that is: “We are important anyway. We have the English language. We used to have a big empire.” Britain tends to see things in historical terms. They have no plan for the future.
Cameron’s success in making a coalition government work has been actually pretty impressive. Not that he has got that much done, but he certainly has managed to stay in power and more or less keep the coalition together.
Cameron’s coalition with the LibDems is in question. Where will the LibDems throw their support now?
They’ll support whoever offers them a better deal. Nick Clegg has made it reasonably clear that he is going to feel free to swing to the left or swing to the right. It is pretty certain that neither Labour nor the Conservatives are likely to get a parliamentary majority that enables them to govern on their own. If either of them has a chance to do this, it is probably the Conservatives.
This morning’s polls gave 34 percent support for the Conservatives and 33 percent for Labour. These percentages don’t mean anything more in Britain than they do in the United States in terms of the popular vote. What counts is whether you win seats in Parliament in individual constituencies.
The LibDems are not going to be as big a force as they were, and the SNP could actually end up with more seats than the LibDems. But both the Tories and Labour have ruled out doing a deal with the SNP. Consequently, even with fewer seats than before, the LibDems could still be the kingmakers.
What are the main issues in this election?
Personalities, taxes to some extent, and competency to run the economy. What you would expect to be the main issue after five years of rather ineffectual coalition government would be either a major, visionary strategy for Britain in the 21st century or the desire for some very strong, clear government policy that requires a majority for one party so it can implement its program. But there is no vision of any kind for Britain in the 21st century except muddle through, keep calm and carry on, and being a kind a globalized platform, which Britain is very good at.
Don’t forget: Britain is not a republic. Brits get one vote for one member of Parliament every five years and that’s it. So the British people are not especially politically engaged: they just want the freedom to earn a living, educate their children, amass some wealth, and go on holiday. The election is really about no more than that. And then it becomes, basically: Who do I have more faith in?
One of the more controversial actions taken by the Juncker Commission in its still-short life was January’s move to make the EU’s crisis-era budget rules more “flexible,” an announcement many took as a signal it was preparing to let both Italy and France off the hook for their recent fiscal transgressions. Which it ultimately did.
According to Commission officials, the so-called “flexibility communication” caused ructions among the 28 commissioners both because of its substance and the process by which it was agreed: the college was only allowed to see a hard copy of the highly-technical document for about a half hour before it was taken away, and then presented for adoption later in the day.
Among those who were angered by the way it was forced through the college over the complaints of some of the Commission’s budget hawks was Chancellor Angela Merkel who, according to our friends and rivals at the German weekly Der Spiegel (no relation), complained to Juncker that “her commissioner” – German Günther Oetttinger – had only received the document a few hours before it was to be approved. “Why ‘your’ commissioner?” Juncker reportedly replied coolly. “That’s my commissioner.”
Now it seems that Berlin is not the only place where objections are being raised about some of the decisions taken in the “flexibility communication”. According to a leaked opinion by the European Council’s legal service – which Brussels Blog got its hands on and has posted here – last month, lawyers on the other side of Rue de la Loi appear to have decided a central part of the new guidelines might be illegal.
Read moreAction contre la Faim (ACF) et l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS) présentent “GEOTALK, improving our world’s understanding” :
Conférence du 16 avril 2015 avec Gérard Prunier, Consultant international pour l’Afrique centrale et orientale, sur la situation en Somalie.
Introduction de Mike PENROSE, Directeur Général d’Action contre la Faim, France. Présentation de Marie SARDIER, Référente Sécurité Alimentaire et Moyens d’Existence, ACF.