Summary: The U.S. Navy's VX-9 "Vampires" squadron is responsible for testing new weapons and systems before they are deployed on Navy aircraft.
-Recently, an F/A-18E/F Super Hornet from VX-9 was spotted carrying a RIM-176 Standard Extended Range Active Missile (SM-6), raising speculation about new capabilities.
-The SM-6, which has a range of up to 250 nautical miles, was originally designed for anti-air and anti-ship missions.
-If integrated with Super Hornets, it could significantly extend the strike range of U.S. carrier groups, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
-This development suggests the Navy is exploring advanced warfare capabilities for its aircraft.
Navy’s VX-9 'Vampires' Testing New SM-6 Missile on F/A-18 Super HornetsThe aviators of the United States Navy's Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Nine (VX-9) "Vampires" could be described as the sea service's platform testers. Before most new systems make their way to the Navy's aircraft, they're put through various rigors with the pilots and ground crews of VX-9.
According to the U.S. Navy, the squadron "conducts operational test and evaluation of all air-to-ground weapons, air-to-air weapons, sensors, electronic warfare systems and mission software upgrades to aircraft and weapon systems. More than 350 VX-9 Vampires maintain and fly a diverse fleet of approximately 20 aircraft used in the demanding and dynamic role of operational flight test, supporting both Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation."
In other words, they'll be the ones who will determine whether certain weapons and other systems will be employed by U.S. Navy warbirds when it isn't just a test!
Among the aircraft currently operated by VX-9 is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and one of those warbirds was spotted in April carrying a RIM-176 Standard Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) – also known as the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) – near Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) China Lake. Photos of the Super Hornet carrying the SM-6 were shared by photographer @StinkJet via a post on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.
As Defence Blog reported, the sighting has raised questions about the potential new capabilities of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, as the SM-6 was originally developed by Raytheon as an extended range anti-air warfare (ER-AAW) platform that can be employed against fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, drones and as an anti-ship cruise missile. It has been integrated with the U.S. Navy's Aegis Combat System.
It is estimated that on the low end, the SM-6 has a range of 130 nautical miles (240 km), while higher estimates such it could reach a target from a distance of up to 250 nautical miles (463 km). An air-launched variant would be certainly welcome for carrier strike groups (CSGs) operating in the Indo-Pacific, where China has sought to introduce weapons that would force carriers to operate much further out.
According to Naval News, the SM-6 employs an X-band receiver that provides guidance – meaning it would work with an F/A-18E/F AN/APG-79 or F-35C AN/APG-81 AESA radars is possible. It further suggested that a forward-based F-35C – the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter – could be employed to guide the SM-6 to target after it is launched by a Super Hornet from a safe distance, as the F/A-18E/F already can communicate fire control data via the Naval Integrated Fire Control–Counter Air (NIFC-CA) datalink system.
That is still just a matter of speculation.
Moreover, this is not the first time that photos have circulated online showing the F/A Super Hornet possibly putting the SM-6 through the motions. Another image made the rounds in 2021, and it would seem that the U.S. Navy seems very interested in extending how far its Super Hornets could sting.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and Shutterstock.
Summary and Key Points: Houthi rebels recently claimed to have struck the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Red Sea using unmanned aerial vehicles, a claim denied by U.S. Central Command.
-The incident is part of a broader disinformation campaign by the Iran-backed group, which has been targeting international shipping in retaliation for U.S. and UK military actions against them.
-Supported by Iran, the Houthis have increased their attacks in strategic waterways, posing significant risks to global trade and regional stability.
-Despite the claims, there is no evidence that the USS Eisenhower or any U.S. vessel was hit.
Houthi Rebels' False Claims: No Hit on USS Dwight D. EisenhowerHouthi rebels claimed they achieved a “direct hit” on a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Red Sea over the weekend.
A spokesman for the Iran-backed militant group said Houthi forces targeted USS Dwight D. Eisenhower with unmanned aerial vehicles on Saturday in retaliation for Israel’s ongoing military operation against Hamas in Gaza.
Chinese and Iranian state-run media outlets circulated the rumor, publishing a clearly doctored photograph of the American ship on social media (we have compiled several example photos in this article). However, U.S. Central Command denies the claim. According to Voice of America, a CENTCOM official asserted that, “There is no truth to the Houthi claim of striking the USS Eisenhower or any U.S. Navy vessel,” adding that “This is an ongoing disinformation campaign that the Houthis have been conducting for months.”
The Houthis Continue to Barrage Ships in the Red SeaOver the last few months, the U.S. and the United Kingdom have been carrying out frequent barrages against Houthi assets in the Middle East in an effort to further degrade the group’s capabilities.
The Iran-backed militants continue to cause headaches in the Gulf of Oman and Red Sea, attacking international shipping routes frequently. Since the October 7 Hamas massacre in Israel, the Houthis have partnered with regional affiliates to strike vessels they claim are linked to the Jewish state and the West. From October to March alone, the Houthis carried out at least 60 attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
How Iran Is Fueling the ConflictIn a direct response to these unwarranted barrages, UK and U.S. forces target Houthi assets and weapons depots in Yemen. The Houthis have embroiled Yemen in civil war since 2014 after they seized control of the country’s northern Sana’a province and forced out the government. The conflict evolved into a larger and quite lethal war.
Just as the Islamic Republic supports Gaza-based Hamas terrorists via weapons transfers, funding, training and propaganda, so it also backs the Houthis in Yemen. Tehran is proficient in exploiting regional instability to exert control. As detailed by War on the Rocks, “They assemble these parts into working weapons with technical assistance from Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers. This approach has allowed the Houthis to now field short and long-range drones and an increasingly diversified fleet of missiles capable of striking deep inside Saudi Arabia.”
The Houthis’ increased barrages targeting ships in the Gulf of Oman are a dangerous escalation, according to U.S. officials. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s crude oil traded by sea passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran-backed group knows it can interrupt the flow of the global economy using lethal UAVs, missiles, rockets and other projectiles. The rebels may claim to only target ships linked to Israel, but the Pentagon has refuted this claim and provided evidence indicating the group also targets multinational ships. As explained by a Department of Defense spokesperson, “The Houthis continue to endanger commercial shipping that goes through that region, continue to put at risk U.S. forces, other countries’ forces in the region who want to see commerce continue to flow in a very crucial area in the Middle East.”
Although Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claims that the Eisenhower was damaged in recent barrages, this narrative is clearly pure fiction. However, the militant group is well supplied with UAVs thanks to Iran, and eliminating the Houthis’ weapons depots should remain a top priority for U.S. and Israeli forces alike.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
Images of fake aircraft carrier attack via social media screenshots.
Summary and Key Points: The Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, has been plagued by persistent operational failures and extensive repairs, casting doubt on its future effectiveness.
-Originally launched during the Soviet era and designed to project power, the Kuznetsov has suffered from technical issues and accidents, including aircraft losses and fires.
-Despite these challenges, Russia claims it will rejoin the fleet soon.
-Historically, Russia's naval ambitions have faced setbacks, and the Kuznetsov’s troubled legacy highlights ongoing struggles.
Admiral Kuznetsov: Russia’s Troubled Aircraft Carrier Faces Uncertain FutureAs Russia inches closer to commissioning its second Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, the gap in capabilities between Russian and Western naval power remains stark.
While the U.S. Navy is inching closer to commissioning its second Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier, Russia remains dependent on its semi-defunct Admiral Kuznetsov for sea-based power projection. Despite the former Soviet Union’s military prowess and development during the Cold War, the completion of robust aircraft carriers never came to fruition. Once the USSR collapsed in 1991, any hopes for the Soviet’s carrier aspirations came crumbling down. Due to poor planning and timing over the years, Russia possesses a singular aircraft carrier in its naval fleet. To make matters worse, Admiral Kuznetsov has proven to be a massive disappointment.
The history of Russia’s Navy:Following the death of Peter the Great in the early 18th century, the Imperial Russian Navy sharply declined. In fact, between 1726-1730, only 54 ships were constructed. During the second half of this century, Russia saw an uptick in its naval development due to its domination of the Black Sea. By the turn of the 19th century, Russia’s progress on this front ramped up quickly. The Russian Navy became the second most powerful naval force across the globe at this time, second to the United Kingdom.
However, the naval might Russia possessed was soon nixed following the Russo-Japanese War, which resulted in a tremendous loss of Russian ships. To rectify this downfall, Tsar Nicholas II launched a hefty shipbuilding development program, which granted Russia a larger sea-based fleet than its Central Power enemies when the First World War broke out.
The trajectory of the Russian Navy would remain tumultuous for years to come. During the Russian Civil War, which would ultimately lead to the rise of the new Soviet Union, Russia’s naval fleet was completely weakened as a fighting force. With the Bolsheviks in charge, a renewed interest in building up the naval fleet was prioritized.
Although the USSR worked hard to quickly develop advanced battleships, destroyers, and cruisers around the WWI era, the U.S., Japan, and Great Britain pivoted toward adopted aircraft carriers. In a sense, the Soviets missed the boat on taking advantage of these years to build up their career potential.
The rise of the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrierIt wasn’t until the late 1930’s that aircraft carriers would be prioritized by the Soviets in one of Stalin’s five-year plans.
The “Project 71” class, however, was largely put on hold when the Second World War broke out. Over the next few decades, additional carrier class prototypes were introduced, yet they never came to fruition due to frequent changes in the country’s political leadership. By the mid-1980s, the push to develop a homegrown aircraft carrier was finally fruitful.
Admiral Flota Sovetskoho Soyuza Kuznetsov was constructed at Chernomorskiy Shipyard and officially launched by the middle of the decade. Initially, the ship was named Riga before being redesignated as Leonid Brezhnev, Tbilisi, and finally Kuznetsov over the years.
Kuznetsov was designed to be the lead ship of the Admiral Kuznetsov-class of aircraft carriers. However, when the USSR collapsed, Kuznetsov’s sister ship- Varyag- was not complete. The Kuznetsov became the sole carrier to sail for the new Russian Federation in 1991, serving as the flagship of its navy. In addition to helicopters, the Kuznetsov can carry an array of Sukhoi Su-33 and MiG-29 fighters. The carrier has a complement of a dozen long-range surface-to-surface anti-ship P-700 Granit cruise missiles, giving it its “heavy aircraft-carrying missile cruise” designation.
On paper, Kuznetsov displaces roughly 60,000 tons and can sail at speeds in excess of 30 knots. The carrier is also fitted with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. As detailed by Naval Technology, “The ship is equipped with an Udav-1 anti-submarine system with 60 anti-submarine rockets. Udav-1, supplied by the Splav Research and Production Association in Moscow, protects surface ships by diverting and destroying incoming torpedoes. The system also provides defence against submarines and saboteur systems, such as underwater vehicles. The system has ten barrels and is capable of firing 111SG depth charge projectiles, 111SZ mine-laying projectiles and 111SO diverting projectiles. The range of the system is up to 3,000m and the submarine engagement depth is to 600m.”
Despite these abilities, Kuznetsov has suffered from a litany of failures and mishaps over the years. In fact, Russia’s sole carrier has remained dry-docked for the better part of the last decade. During the carrier’s first-ever deployment to aid the government-backed forces in the Syrian Civil War in 2016, two aircraft were lost, partaking in carrier operations. Faulty arresting wires were reportedly to blame for losing one Su-33 and one MiG-29K.
Following these mishaps, Kuznetsov was rendered useless as the carrier ceased launching and landing airframes. In addition to this tragic deployment, Kuznetsov has suffered from many incidents onboard, including fires, falling cranes and deck holes.
Even if Kuznetsov sets sail again as the flagship of Russia’s Navy, the carrier is limited in its capabilities when compared to its foreign counterparts.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons.
Summary: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, plagued by a history of technical failures and mishaps, has been out of service since 2017.
-Initially built in the Soviet era and intended for high-profile roles, the carrier's outdated mazut fuel system and subpar construction have led to operational issues, including a fatal fire and a crane collapse that caused significant damage.
-Despite Russian claims that Kuznetsov will return to service, its history of limited deployments and continuous setbacks suggests that retiring the vessel might be a more practical option.
Why Russia’s Admiral Kuznetsov Might Never Sail AgainRussia’s sole aircraft carrier should be relegated to the scrapyard.
For years, Admiral Kuznetsov has been dry docked undergoing frequent repairs. The ship’s history is marred with unfortunate events, causing some to refer to the carrier as a complete failure. From abysmal deployment performance to fire outbreaks and falling cranes, bad luck just seems to engulf the Kuznetsov. Russia’s carrier has remained out of service since 2017, however, state-run news outlets allege that Kuznetsov could re-commission with the fleet by the end of this year. Considering the ship’s history and Moscow’s tendency to over-exaggerate, this timeline seems murky at best.
The History of Russia's Admiral Kuznetsov Aircraft Carrier :During the Cold War, Admiral Kuznetsov was designed to serve as the lead ship of the two-ship Admiral Kuznetsov class in the Soviet Navy. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the second planned ship- Varyag- was not fully constructed. Ultimately, Ukraine sold this incomplete carrier to China and it was commissioned as the People’s Liberation Army’s Liaoning. The carrier was built within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at Chernomorskiy Shipyard during the late 1980’s to early 1990’s. Initially, the carrier was named Riga, which was eventually changed to Leonid Brezhnev and later Tbilisi. It was not until 1990 that the ship was designated Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N.G. Kuznetsov (shortened to Admiral Kuznetsov.
Specs & CapabilitiesAdmiral Kuznetsov has at least two dozen rotary-style vertical launch systems, with eight missile cells each. According to The Drive, these systems could potentially fire 192 SA-N-9 “Gauntlet” point air defense missiles, which would be instrumental in defending the carrier against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, and surface ships in wartime. Additionally, Russia’s sole carrier is fitted with several anti-submarine defenses with two UDAV-1 anti-submarine/anti-torpedo rocket systems.
While Western ships developed around this time typically used gas turbines or nuclear power for energy, Kuznetsov was conventionally powered by mazut. This fuel source is notoriously black and tarry, giving off a heavy and visible trail of dark smoke when used. For an aircraft carrier, this fuel source is subprime, considering enemy warships can view the mazut from miles away. To make matters worse, mazut is a particularly challenging fuel source that requires proper boiler and piping installations to ensure adequate preheating and pressurization. When the Kuznetsov was constructed, however, insufficient piping incorporated on the ship made it challenging for its boilers to operate at full capacity simultaneously.
In addition to its shoddy construction and difficult power source, the carrier has underperformed in its intended role. Over Kuznetsov's 30-year career, it has only been deployed one time. In 2015, Russia deployed its sole carrier to the Syrian coast as part of the Kremlin’s campaign in support of the government forces in the civil war. During this operation, both a MiG-29 and an Su-33 fighter jet were lost.
As detailed by USNI News, “A fighter assigned to the Russian carrier operating in the Eastern Mediterranean crashed during a landing approach on Sunday. The Mikoyan MiG-29K was part of a trio of MiGs that had sortied from Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov headed over Syria. At one point, for unknown reasons, one of the fighters turned back to the carrier and crashed while on approach to the carrier, the official said.”
Russian state-run media outlets also verified these claims, asserting that a “technical fault during the approach landing” was to blame for the two losses.
Following these mishaps, the rest of the airframes positioned on the carrier were moved to an airbase in Syria, essentially rendering the presence of the ship useless. This incident appeared to be the first of many unfortunate mishaps that would plague the aircraft carrier. In 2018, a floating crane fell onto the carrier’s deck, killing one worker and injuring several others. Since the crane opened up a 200-square-foot hole in the flight deck, it took some time for the wreckage to be cleared. While waiting to be delivered to dry dock, another incident occurred.
A fire caused by a welding error in the ship’s engine room killed two workers and injured more than a dozen others. Overall, the repair bill for this mishap alone ballooned to roughly $8 million. Kuznetsov has not been impervious to additional incidents since being relegated to dry dock, however.
In 2022, another fire erupted onboard. Alexei Rakhmanov, head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, said that "All the relevant fire systems worked normally. There was no damage and no casualties.”
While the Kremlin claims that Kuznetsov will re-enter service with its naval fleet sometime this year, the prospects for this remain dim. In fact, Moscow may want to consider scrapping its sole carrier altogether.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons.
Véritable carrefour entre les océans Indien et Pacifique, la mer de Chine est un espace hautement stratégique en ce qu’elle est un point de passage vital pour les économies des pays qui la bordent; un quart du commerce mondial y transite. Cet espace est de fait le théâtre de différends maritimes et territoriaux entre les pays riverains mais aussi le lieu de remise en cause du droit international de la mer. Les États côtiers se disputent la souveraineté de plusieurs îles et récifs de cet espace qui leur offriraient des droits sur les eaux territoriales et les zones économiques exclusives de ces terres émergées. À ces conflits régionaux s’ajoute la présence d’acteurs extérieurs faisant de la région une priorité dans leurs agendas de politique étrangère. C’est en particulier le cas des États-Unis.
Dans cette vidéo agrémentée de cartes, de photos et d’infographies, retour sur les conflits en mer de Chine, les multiples revendications des États riverains, et en particulier les ambitions chinoises, mais aussi l’implication d’acteurs extérieurs à la région.
With Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran joining the BRICS at the beginning of 2024, the group now embodies a group of influential states on the international stage, representing 46% of the world’s population and 29% of global GDP. While 2024 is synonymous with an important electoral year for several BRICS members, further enlargements could take place in the coming years. Are we heading for an alternative international order? What are the strategic advantages of the BRICS+? Can they embody the voice of the global South? Interview with Jean-Joseph Boillot, Associate Research Fellow at IRIS, specialised in the Indian economy and the emerging world.
A new mandate for Vladimir Putin in Russia, a historic setback for the African National Congress (ANC) in the South African elections, a narrow victory for Narendra Modi in India, new elections to come in Iran following the death of Ebrahim Raissi and in Ethiopia… 2024 is a pivotal electoral year for many BRICS+ countries. Should we expect any repercussions from these elections on the international agenda of the BRICS+ states?
Quite possibly, as the BRICS+ are a fairly heterogeneous group. All it takes, as we saw in Argentina, is for Javier Milei, a pro-American liberal, to be elected to leave this group. But what is interesting is to see that, even with the Indian elections, the results of which returned Narendra Modi with a small majority, most of the countries of the so-called ‘Global South’ are fundamentally united, with a strong internal consensus to finally free themselves from the Western international order known as Bretton Woods. So, with one or two exceptions, there can be changes of government without undermining this very strong consensus. And while some would like to see the BRICS+ as a confrontational anti-Western club, in reality it is clear that, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt joining the group recently, the consensus is more along the lines of multi-alignment, rather like India, which has recently moved closer to the United States without severing its relations with Russia, for example. For the time being at least, elections in the developing world do not seem to be challenging this majority consensus in the South, and I am not talking about fake elections like the one in Russia with the election of Putin.
Since the expansion of the BRICS+ at the beginning of 2024, what analysis can be made of the group’s economic expansion? What are its strengths and strategic advantages?
We can see that the myth of a BRICS+ grouping that is more powerful than the Western economies and capable of turning the tables has not been borne out, nor are the BRICS+ a marginal phenomenon in the evolution of the world economy. What we can see is that the BRICS+ are more a fairly flexible grouping, born of the political will of the countries of the South to be taken seriously in international forums – which are still largely dominated by the West – rather than an alternative world order, except no doubt in Moscow’s mind. One example of this is Russia’s assumption of the BRICS presidency this year, because Brazil held the G20 presidency and could not do both. If you look at the way Russia is leading the preparatory sessions for the Kazan summit in October, you will see that the agenda is relatively empty. There are hardly any meetings, and no decisions have been taken. On the monetary front, for example, there was the idea of a common currency, but this has not progressed.
In a way, this reassures us that, instead of moving towards a confrontational world between two blocs, we are moving towards a South-North confrontation, but within the existing international architecture and in particular around institutions that need to be reformed, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which are still largely dominated by Western countries, unlike the United Nations, where the countries of the South are much more represented.
It should be noted, however, that the entry of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates is tending to reinforce a certain ‘cartelisation of the world’ under the BRICS umbrella in the key areas of raw materials, food, energy and metals. Some countries in the South now have strong political leverage over the critical raw materials they claim. This poses a problem, because most of the so-called countries of the South are not in fact producers of these raw materials. There is therefore a risk that within the BRICS+ club, there will not be a confrontation for the time being, but a difficulty in finding a point of balance between the interests of the producer countries and the interests of the consumer countries. For example, Africa, one of tomorrow’s giants in raw materials, is being courted by China, but also by Russia and the Gulf States. The challenge for the continent will be to avoid becoming dependent on this cartel.
With Thailand having recently applied to join the BRICS+ and numerous countries such as Mexico, Algeria and Turkey likely to join the group, what are the possible horizons for the BRICS+? Can they embody in a homogeneous way the voice of the so-called ‘global South’?
It seems unlikely that not only will the BRICS+ become a structured organisation, but that the club will be able to be ‘THE’ voice of the countries of the South. The reason for this is that a majority of countries tend to adopt positions of multi-alignment, of double-dealing between Western countries and the emerging or re-emerging powers of the South in the broad sense of the term, including Russia. The vast majority of the developing world does not wish to fall into a dependency that would be Russian-Chinese, for example. Those who gave during the Cold War, such as Angola, are now biting their fingers. The expansion of the BRICS, which will continue – albeit very probably at a moderate pace – relatively dilutes power within the organisation and prevents any one group from gaining the upper hand. This explains why progress has been so slow on the question of a monetary alternative to the dollar, or on actual disbursements from the BRICS bank, which is now headed by a Brazilian.
We would therefore be moving more towards what could be described as a meeting forum, and in particular a pre-G20 forum – since the BRICS have got into the habit of meeting before every G20 or other major international summit, with the aim of harmonising the positions of the South and collectively influencing decisions, as the G7 countries did. It is therefore rather positive that the BRICS are being enlarged to include countries that represent visions and interests that are a little different from those of the five founding countries, such as Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, which seems to be serious about its application. It will also be interesting to see whether the election of Mexico’s new president alters the country’s thinking about joining the club at a time when the United States is totally opposed.
In the four possible scenarios described by French researcher Julien Vercueil, it seems that we are heading towards a scenario of continued expansion of the BRICS rather than its break-up and decline, as some had thought. But in this expansion scenario, rather than the world economy being divided between the South and the North, we would be moving towards growing contestation leading progressively to reforms of the global economic order. This seems the most likely scenario, given the way the first enlargement was carried out. The second enlargement may not take place in 2024 because India and Brazil are not very keen on it. So the countries that have applied will certainly have to wait until 2025. But what’s a year when you’re talking about reforming the architecture of the world?
Translated by Deepl.
Summary: The fighting in Ukraine's Donbas region sees slow Russian advances, but their large-scale offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast has failed, leading to heavy casualties and little strategic gain.
-The failed offensive, launched in May, has rallied international support for Ukraine and led to the deployment of advanced weaponry like HIMARS and ATACMS.
-Despite high casualties, with estimates of 320,000 to 515,000 Russian soldiers killed, wounded, or captured, the Kremlin continues to mobilize replacements.
-Russia’s attritional strategy involves costly, small-scale wave attacks, reflecting a focus on quantity over quality in its military operations.
Failed Russian Offensive in Kharkiv Sparks Increased Support for UkraineThe fighting in Ukraine continues, with Russia making very slow but steady gains in the Donbas. Village after village, the Russian military advances forward. But that is not the case in the east, where a large-scale Russian offensive has failed to achieve anything meaningful at the cost of tens of thousands of casualties.
A Failed Offensive?In May, the Russian military launched a large-scale offensive in the Kharkiv Oblast, in eastern Ukraine. The goal was to approach Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine and about 25 miles from the border with Russia, and also stretch the Ukrainian forces and their resources.
After several weeks of heavy fighting, it looks like that the offensive has failed. The Russian forces failed to make any meaningful progress, and Ukrainian counteroffensives have been liberating some of the territory lost. Currently, there are two large pockets of fighting but they are a good distance away from Kharkiv.
But the Russian offensive was a disaster on more than one level. Beyond the tactical and operational defeats, the failed offensive rallied international support for the Ukrainian cause and pushed the United States and several NATO countries, including Germany, to greenlight the use of long-range precision weapon systems against targets within Russia.
Now, the Ukrainian forces can use the advanced weaponry at their disposal, including M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), against high-value targets inside Russia.
However, the Russian offensive in the east was also very costly in terms of casualties.
Russian Casualties in Ukraine are MassiveIn the few weeks that the offensive lasted, the Russian forces lost tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of heavy weapon systems.
Indeed, over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian military claims to have killed, wounded, or captured approximately 1,300 Russian troops and damaged or destroyed around 63 tactical vehicles and fuel tanks, 51 artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, 41 unmanned aerial systems, 40 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 22 main battle tanks, 7 pieces of special equipment, and 1 anti-aircraft weapon system.
Overall, the Russian casualties continue to rise and range between 320,000 to 515,000 men killed, wounded, or captured.
“The elevated casualty rate is highly likely a reflection of Russia’s ongoing attritional offensive which is being conducted across a wide front,” the British Military Intelligence estimated in a recent operational assessment.
Although those numbers start to resemble those of the two world wars, the Kremlin has shown an impressive force generation capability. For every Russian soldier killed or maimed in Ukraine, Moscow finds two others to replace him.
“It is highly likely that most Russian forces receive only limited training, and they are unable to carry out complex offensive operations. As a result, Russia employs small-scale but costly wave attacks in an effort to weaken Ukrainian defenses,” the British Military Intelligence added.
Quality might be an issue, but the vast quantity that the Kremlin pours into the war covers any training deficiencies.
About the AuthorStavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
All images are Creative Commons.
Avec l’arrimage de l’Égypte, de l’Éthiopie, de l’Arabie saoudite, des Émirats arabes unis et de l’Iran au sein des BRICS début 2024, le groupe incarne aujourd’hui un ensemble d’États influents sur la scène internationale, représentant 46 % de la population mondiale et 29 % du PIB global. Alors que 2024 est synonyme d’année électorale importante pour plusieurs membres des BRICS, de nouveaux élargissements pourraient intervenir dans les prochaines années. Va-t-on vers un ordre international alternatif ? Quels sont les avantages stratégiques des BRICS+ ? Peuvent-ils incarner la voix du Sud global ? Entretien avec Jean-Joseph Boillot, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, spécialiste de l’économie indienne et du monde émergent.
Nouveau mandat pour Vladimir Poutine en Russie, revers historique pour le Congrès national africain (ANC) aux élections sud-africaines, victoire étriquée pour Narendra Modi en Inde, nouveaux scrutins à venir en Iran à la suite de la mort d’Ebrahim Raïssi et en Éthiopie… 2024 constitue une année électorale charnière pour de nombreux pays des BRICS+. Doit-on s’attendre à d’éventuelles répercussions de ces élections sur l’agenda international des États des BRICS+ ?
Ce serait fort possible car les BRICS+ forment un ensemble assez hétérogène. Il suffit, comme on l’a vu en Argentine, que Javier Milei, libéral proaméricain, soit élu pour sortir de ce groupe. Mais ce qui est intéressant, c’est de voir que, y compris avec les élections indiennes dont les résultats reconduisent Narendra Modi avec une petite majorité, la plupart des pays dit du « Sud Global » sont fondamentalement unis avec un fort consensus interne pour enfin s’affranchir de l’ordre international occidental dit de Bretton Woods. Il peut donc y avoir des alternances sans que cela remette en cause ce consensus très fort à une ou deux exceptions près. Et si certains voudraient que les BRICS+ soient un club anti-occidental confrontationnel, dans la réalité on voit bien qu’avec l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et l’Égypte qui ont intégré le groupe récemment, le consensus évoqué concerne davantage sur des positions de multi-alignement, un peu comme l’Inde qui s’est plutôt rapprochée des États-Unis ces derniers temps sans rompre ses relations avec la Russie par exemple. Pour l’instant en tout cas, les élections dans le monde en développement ne semblent pas remettre en cause ce consensus majoritaire au Sud, et je ne parle pas des fausses élections comme en Russie avec l’élection de Poutine.
Depuis l’élargissement des BRICS+ début 2024, quelle analyse peut-on délivrer sur l’expansion économique du groupe ? Quels sont ses forces et avantages stratégiques ?
On s’aperçoit que le mythe d’un groupement BRICS+ plus puissant que les économies occidentales et capable de renverser la table ne se vérifie pas, sans non plus que les BRICS+ soient un phénomène marginal pour l’évolution de l’économie mondiale. Ce que l’on observe, c’est que les BRICS+ sont plus un regroupement assez souple, issu d’une volonté politique des pays du Sud d’être pris au sérieux dans les enceintes internationales – dominées encore aujourd’hui très largement par le monde occidental – plutôt qu’un ordre mondial alternatif, sauf sans doute dans la tête de Moscou. En témoigne justement la présidence des BRICS assurée cette année par la Russie parce que le Brésil à la présidence du G20 et ne pouvait assurer les deux. Quand on regarde la façon dont la Russie anime les sessions préparatoires du sommet de Kazan qui aura lieu en octobre, on remarque que l’agenda est relativement vide. Il n’y a quasiment pas de réunions, ni de décisions prises. Sur le plan monétaire par exemple, il y avait cette idée de monnaie commune, mais qui n’a pas avancée.
Cela rassure d’une certaine façon sur le fait que, au lieu d’aller vers un monde confrontationnel entre deux blocs, l’on se dirige plutôt vers une confrontation Sud-Nord mais à l’intérieur de l’architecture internationale existante et notamment autour d’institutions qu’il s’agit de réformer comme le Fond monétaire international (FMI) ou la Banque mondiale largement dominés par les pays occidentaux encore à la différence des Nations unies où se retrouvent beaucoup plus les pays du Sud.
Il faut cependant noter que l’entrée de l’Arabie saoudite, de l’Iran ou des Émirats arabes unis tend à renforcer une certaine « cartellisation du monde » sous le parapluie des BRICS dans les domaines clés des matières premières, alimentaires, énergétiques et des métaux. Certains pays du Sud possèdent désormais un levier politique fort sur les matières premières critiques qu’ils revendiquent. Cela pose problème parce que la majorité des pays dits du Sud ne sont en réalité pas producteurs de ces matières premières. Ils risquent donc d’y avoir à l’intérieur du club des BRICS+, non pas un affrontement pour l’instant, mais une difficulté à trouver un point d’équilibre entre l’intérêt des pays producteurs et l’intérêt des pays consommateurs. À titre d’exemple, l’Afrique, un des géants de demain dans les matières premières, est courtisée par la Chine mais aussi par la Russie et les pays du Golfe. Tout le jeu pour ce continent va être d’éviter de tomber dans la dépendance vis-à-vis de ce cartel.
Alors que la Thaïlande a déposé il y a peu sa candidature pour rejoindre les BRICS+ et que de nombreux pays comme le Mexique, l’Algérie ou la Turquie pourraient rejoindre le groupe, quels sont les horizons possibles pour les BRICS+ ? Peuvent-ils incarner de façon homogène la voix dite du « Sud global » ?
Il semble peu probable que l’on s’achemine non seulement vers une organisation structurée des BRICS+, mais aussi vers une capacité du club à être « LE » porte-parole des pays du Sud. La raison en est qu’une majorité de pays sont plutôt sur des positions de multialignement, de double jeu entre les pays occidentaux et les puissances émergentes ou réémergentes du Sud au sens large de Russie comprise. L’immense majorité du monde en développement ne souhaite pas tomber dans une dépendance qui serait russo-chinoise par exemple. Ceux qui ont donné pendant la guerre froide, comme l’Angola, s’en mordent aujourd’hui les doigts. L’élargissement des BRICS qui va se poursuivre – mais très probablement à vitesse modérée – dilue relativement le pouvoir dans l’organisation et empêche un groupe de prendre l’ascendant. Ceci explique qu’on aille si lentement sur la question d’une alternative monétaire au dollar, ou bien encore dans les décaissements effectifs de la banque des BRICS pourtant dirigée désormais par une brésilienne.
On irait ainsi plutôt vers ce qui pourrait être qualifié de forum de rencontre et notamment un forum pré-G20 – puisque l’habitude a été prise par les BRICS de se réunir avant chaque G20 – ou autre sommet international important, avec l’objectif d’harmoniser les positions du Sud et de peser collectivement sur les décisions comme le faisaient d’ailleurs les pays du G7. Il est donc plutôt positif d’avoir un élargissement des BRICS à des pays qui représentent des visions et des intérêts un peu différents des cinq pays fondateurs, comme l’Algérie, l’Indonésie, le Viêtnam ou la Thaïlande qui semble sérieuse dans sa candidature. Il sera aussi intéressant d’observer si l’élection de la nouvelle présidente du Mexique infléchit la réflexion du pays dans son souhait de rejoindre le club alors que les États-Unis y sont totalement opposés.
Dans les quatre scénarii possibles décrits par le chercheur français Julien Vercueil, il semble que l’on se dirige vers un scénario de poursuite de l’expansion des BRICS plutôt que vers son éclatement et son déclin, comme certains le pensaient. Mais dans ce scénario d’expansion, plutôt que d’aller vers un découpage de l’économie mondiale entre le Sud et le Nord, on se tournerait vers une contestation croissante conduisant progressivement à des réformes de l’ordre économique mondial. Cela semble être le scénario le plus probable compte tenu de la façon dont le premier élargissement s’est fait. Le second élargissement ne se fera peut-être pas en 2024 parce que l’Inde et le Brésil n’y sont pas très favorables. Les pays qui ont fait acte de candidature vont donc certainement devoir attendre 2025. Mais qu’est-ce qu’une année quand on parle de réformer l’architecture du monde…
Summary: Northrop Grumman's X-29, developed during the Cold War to compete against Soviet fighters, is one of aviation history's most unique experimental aircraft.
-Introduced in the 1980s, it featured forward-swept wings, providing exceptional maneuverability and supersonic performance.
-The aircraft required advanced composite materials and a computerized fly-by-wire system for stability.
-Although only two prototypes were built and the program was eventually discontinued, the X-29's innovative design and capabilities left a lasting impact.
-Russia later attempted a similar design with the Sukhoi Su-47, which faced significant issues and was also shelved after producing just one prototype.
The X-29: Northrop Grumman's Revolutionary Jet with Backward WingsManufacturer Northrop Grumman may be best known for developing the F-14 fighter popularized by the blockbuster film Top Gun, however, the company is behind one of the most obscure experimental airframes in aviation history. In fact, the X-29 never even made it past its testing phase. This airframe was developed more than four decades ago, yet it remains a fan favorite for aviation experts.
An overview of the X-29’s historyWhen the Cold War was heating up back in the 1970s, the U.S. military began seeking a dynamic fighter platform to better compete against the Soviet’s own aerial fleet.
The X-29 was submitted to fulfill this need, going up against the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon. When this prototype was introduced, it became the first airframe of its kind to feature forward-swept wings that made it appear as though they were installed backward.
Incorporating this unique feature was new. However, the concept driving it dated back further. Both the U.S. and Nazi Germany experimented with forward-swept wings during the Second World War. Like design issued that would persist to plague the X-29, these earlier conceptions were also flawed.
The X-29 notably achieved the ability to fly supersonically with this unique wing design.
As detailed by NASA – “The complex geometries of the wings and canards combined to provide exceptional maneuverability, supersonic performance, and a light structure. Air moving over the forward-swept wings tended to flow inward toward the root of the wing instead of outward toward the wing tip as occurs on an aft-swept wing. This reverse airflow kept the wing tips and their ailerons from stalling at high angles of attack (direction of the fuselage relative to the airflow).”
NASA and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency collaborated to make sure the wing design functioned on the X-29. Advanced composite materials enabled the wing structures to be lightweight and rigid. While the X-29 was very agile even flying at fast speeds, it required a computerized fly-by-wire control system for stability.
More specs and capabilities:The X-29 measured roughly 48 feet long and its unique wingspan stretched to just over 27 feet.
The fighter was powered by the General Electric F404-GE-400 engine, which produced 16,000 pounds of thrust.
Additional details surrounding the X-29’s specs were outlined by NASA:
“The aircraft had a maximum operating altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 and a flight endurance time of approximately one hour. The only significant difference between the two aircraft was an emergency spin chute deployment system mounted at the base of the rudder on aircraft No. 2. External wing structure is primarily composite materials incorporated into precise patterns to develop strength and avoid structural divergence. The wing substructure and the basic airframe itself are aluminum and titanium. Wing trailing edge actuators controlling camber are mounted externally in streamlined fairings because of the thinness of the supercritical airfoil.”
In the mid-1980s, the X-29 took its first flight from Edwards Air Force Base. Northrop Grumman’s Chief Test Pilot Chuck Sewell flew the airframe.
A second X-29 prototype flew two years later. In total, both aircraft were in the air 242 times between 1984 and 1991. The first X-29 to fly was relegated to display duties at the Research and Development Gallery of the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.
The Second airframe found its way back to the Armstrong Flight Research Center on Edwards Air Force Base.
What about Russia's "copycat" X-29 fighter?Roughly five years after the X-29s flew on their final missions, Russia debuted its own version of a fighter jet with forward-swept wings. This copy-cat airframe was designated the Sukhoi Su-47.
Like its American counterpart, the Soviet fighter has many issues. Without munitions, the Su-47 weighed a whopping 18 tons. This added pressure on its wings, which were already over-worked when flying high-speed movements. Two D-30F-11 turbojet engines powered the Soviet fighter, enabling the aircraft to fly at speeds of Mach 1.65, comparably slower than the U.S. X-29.
Ultimately, the experimental plane was nixed, and only one was ever built.
About the Author: Maya CarlinMaya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.
All images are Creative Commons.
Summary: The B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.'s first jet bomber, was introduced in 1951, marking a significant transition in military aviation.
-Designed for high-altitude, long-range missions to deliver nuclear weapons, it featured advanced technologies like swept wings and powerful jet engines.
-Despite early issues with stability and maintenance, the B-47 became a pivotal aircraft in the Cold War, with over 2,000 units produced.
-Its role extended beyond its initial design, including electronic intelligence missions.
-The B-47 set the stage for subsequent jet bombers and represented a critical leap in U.S. strategic bombing capabilities.
The Forgotten Pioneer: The B-47 Stratojet’s Impact on Cold War StrategyA slew of U.S. bomber aircraft have transcended the military community to become iconic weapons of war in the eyes of the general public.
The stable of World War II bombers, for example, like the B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator, and B-29 Superfortress, which are typically associated with the liberation of Europe and Asia.
Then you’ve got the B-52 Stratofortress, a massive eight-engine brute that has been in service for seven decades without any plans for retirement.
But there were also machines that debuted in the small window between the iconic classes of U.S. bombers; after World War II but before the B-52 became a mainstay of U.S. aerial power. And generally, understandably, those bombers have been forgotten as relics of a transitional period in military technology.
But one such example is particularly important: the B-47 Stratojet, the U.S.’s first jet bomber.
Research and Development of the Early Jet BomberThe B-47 Stratojet was introduced in 1951 as a long-range, high-altitude, jet-powered strategic bomber. The B-47 was designed to avoid enemy interceptor aircraft and deliver nuclear weapons deep within the Soviet Union’s territory.
In 1943, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) made an informal request for the design of a jet-powered reconnaissance bomber. Jet technology was sparkling new in 1943 and had not yet been applied to a bomber platform – but the merits of such an application were obvious. Several aerospace companies responded to the USAAF’s request, and began conducting research into jet bomber technology.
By 1944, the USAAF had formalized its request, asking for proposals for a jet bomber with impressive specifications: 550 mile per hour top speed; 450 mile per hour cruising speed; 3,500 mile range, and; 45,000 foot service ceiling. North American Aviation, Convair, Boeing, and the Glenn Martin Company each submitted proposals – and all four companies were awarded study contracts. NAA and Convair were asked to focus on four-engine designs – which would become the B-45 and XB-46 respectively. Boeing and Martin were asked to focus on six-engine designs – which would become the B-47 and XB-48 respectively.
Design Influence from German AeronauticsIn 1945, the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Board inspected a secret German aeronautics lab. Embedded with the inspection team was George S. Schairer, the chief of Boeing’s technical staff. During the inspection, the team found German airplane models incorporated something novel, something rumored but unconfirmed: swept wings. Extensive wind tunnel data confirmed that the swept wing design was quite effective. Urgently, Schairer wired back to Boeing.
“Stop the bomber design,” Schairer wrote. The new bomber, under development back home with Boeing, featured straight wings. But Schairer was now a convert; he wanted the new bomber to have swept wings.
Back home, Boeing redesigned its jet bomber to include wings and tail that swept back at 35 degrees. Further revisions were to follow, especially with respect to engine placement and landing gear placement.
By April 1946, Boeing was satisfied with all of its tweaks. The USAAF ordered two prototypes, which were designated as the XB-47. The XB-47s rolled off the assembly line, ready for flight testing, just a few days before the USAAF separated from the U.S. Army to become a distinct service, the U.S. Air Force. The newly formed USAF set to work, exhaustively testing the new XB-47.
A New Jet Bomber in the New Air ForceBecause the new jet bomber incorporated so many cutting-edge technologies, the platform was heavily tested. Test pilot Robert Robbins, who helped debut the XB-47, was initially skeptical about the new bomber. “Oh God, please help me through the next two hours,” Robbins prayed before the XB-47’s first flight. Robbins' fears were alleviated, however; the XB-47 could fly.
There were some problems, however. The prototype had a tendency to “Dutch roll,” or weave side to side in an uncontrolled yawing motion. A “yaw damper” control system was installed to prevent such yawing. The bomber also had a habit of pitching up at maximum speed – a dangerous flight characteristic caused stalling due to upward pitching of the outboard section of the wing. To remedy the upward pitching, Boeing installed “vortex generators” to prevent the airflow separation that led to upward pitching and stalling. And tragically, during an early test flight, pilot Scott Osler was killed when the XB-47’s canopy ripped off at high speed. The co-pilot managed to land the bomber safely – and Boeing redesigned the canopy.
Stratojet in ServiceThe exhaustive tweaking and testing paid off in dividends – although the finished B-47 Stratojet still had problems.
The finished B-47 Stratojet was regarded as the fastest bomber in the world. USAF Col. Walter Boyne described the new bomber as a “sleek, beautiful outcome that was highly advanced.” The B-47 was said to fly with a light touch, more like a fighter jet than a bomber. The B-47 was so aerodynamically clean that high-speed landing gear (180 knots) was required; the landing was assisted, however, with a ribbon-like drag chute that would slow the bomber down. And because of the hazards associated with such high-speed landings, the B-47 was the first mass-produced aircraft to be equipped with an anti-skid braking system (ABS).
Still, the B-47 was criticized for its high landing speed – which, when paired with the bomber’s sluggish takeoff performance made for a dangerous combination. The B-47 was also very particular about its landing attitude. If landed at the wrong attitude, the bomber would porpoise – and sometimes skid onto one wing before cartwheeling. Another serious problem: the wings flexed in flight, which had a tendency to affect flight control. Also, the B-47 was a “maintenance hog.”
Despite the drawbacks, over 2,000 B-47s were produced. The standard variant served proudly until 1969, while the electronic-intelligence variant, the EB-47, served until 1977.
About the Author: Harrison KassHarrison Kass is a prolific defense writer with over 1,000 published articles posted online and around the world. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, he joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. He lives in Oregon and listens to Dokken. Follow him on Twitter @harrison_kass.
Image Credit: Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
The role of the UN in American foreign policy has become more of an afterthought than a priority these days. As the world descends into great power competition, the idea of multilateral institutions as a panacea for global challenges seems like a relic of a bygone era of optimism. With frightening levels of polarization in the U.S. and elections in November, the last thing voters are pondering is how the next president will engage the UN. This disregard is neither new nor surprising and certainly not the fault of individual voters. For years, U.S. attitudes toward the UN have oscillated between disengagement and retrenchment depending on the administration. Amidst this cyclical vacillation, the U.S. has diminished its organizational leverage while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its influence.
Unlike the U.S., the PRC leverages its UN membership as a force multiplier to advance its interests and reshape global norms and the international order. Through economic coercion, strategic placement of its officials in key positions, and pressure on foreign officials, Beijing has undermined the UN’s institutional integrity to accommodate its domestic and international agenda. It has also successfully silenced critics of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) human rights violations and malign activities.
Under President Xi Jinping’s hallmark “wolf warrior diplomacy,” Beijing has recognized that it cannot accomplish its maximalist objectives within the confines of the current international order. Consequently, PRC officials within the UN system have silently pushed for resolutions and norms that reflect its global vision. Foremost, the PRC prioritizes non-interference and state sovereignty over democracy and human rights. Moreover, the CCP’s conceptualization of human rights promotes the right to economic development at the expense of political and civil rights. Other authoritarian regimes support the PRC’s vision for the international system, as it would enable them to operate without criticism, accountability, or consequences.
Perhaps most egregious is the PRC’s abuse of UN committee positions. Despite its well-documented repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, which Beijing has whitewashed as “vocational education,” China retains its position on the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The PRC has routinely used this position to silence and shield itself from criticism.
In 2019, 22 Western countries sent a letter to the UNHRC that urged the CCP to close its Xinjiang re-education camps. The PRC responded by rallying 50 countries–nearly all with poor human rights records and economic dependence on China–to sign a joint letter that praised its “remarkable achievements in Xinjiang.” The UNHRC rejected a similar Western bid to hold a debate on PRC crimes against humanity against Uyghurs in October 2022. However, efforts to suppress debate extend beyond the situation in Xinjiang, with Beijing marshaling 53 countries to defend its imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law. Uncoincidentally, 43 were recipients of PRC investments through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China also weaponizes its role on the NGO Committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). This committee grants applicant organizations consultative status, a mechanism necessary to participate in the UN’s activities, events, and negotiations. Unfortunately, Beijing has conditioned its vote of approval on whether the organization recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China.
The subversion of institutional integrity is not limited to committees, most recently exhibited during the World Health Organization’s (WHO) response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Alongside blatant failures to adhere to International Health Regulations, the CCP launched a pressure campaign on the WHO to downplay the virus’s severity. This was coupled with obfuscation efforts and a general lack of transparency that left the world woefully unprepared for what was to come. The PRC has also long pressured countries to reject Taiwan’s membership in the WHO despite the island’s medical expertise.
Additionally, the CCP makes concerted efforts to install its nationals in leadership positions within the UN’s specialized agencies. In 2019, when no other country held more than two leadership positions, China had four, with another candidate under nomination. For eight years, Houlin Zhao oversaw the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which regulates and standardizes telecommunications and information technology. During his time, Zhao leveraged his influence to benefit domestic companies like Huawei and promoted PRC internet norms of surveillance and censorship. CCP officials have also held leadership positions in INTERPOL, the UN Industrial Development Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Like Zhao at the ITU, the agency heads brazenly pursued PRC interests in violation of the agency’s neutrality mandates.
President Xi’s inauguration of the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF) provides another compelling example of Beijing’s self-interested pursuits. Launched in 2015, the much-vaunted fund is run by a steering committee of mostly CCP officials. Unsurprisingly, over one-third of its approved projects have fallen under China’s flagship BRI. While CCP malpractices at the UN do not end here, the picture is clear.
Fortunately, the U.S. is the UN’s largest contributor and possesses the alliances necessary to counter the PRC’s expanding influence. Washington should utilize its power of the purse to drive structural reforms that improve transparency and accountability. For example, it is clear that the UNHRC is broken, and the U.S. should advocate for prerequisites that prevent the world’s worst human rights abusers from holding panel positions. Moreover, U.S. and European diplomats should collaborate to create coalitions that coordinate leadership roles and voting strategies.
However, nothing is possible without sustained U.S. engagement across administrations. This is not to say that the UN will become the supranational authority some envisioned in the aftermath of World War II. Many Americans will remain skeptical of the UN. Nonetheless, even UN skeptics would agree that countering China is America’s top foreign policy priority. Doing so requires a comprehensive diplomatic approach that ensures Washington defends its interests and those of the free world in every possible arena.