Agrégateur de flux

Commerce, normes, géopolitique : la rivalité sino-américaine se déploie dans tous les domaines. Alors qu'aux passes d'armes entre les deux géants succèdent les rencontres « chaleureuses », une constante semble se dégager : l'Union européenne se trouve systématiquement laissée sur le bord du (…) / Énergie, Chine, États-Unis, Industrie

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the joint press conference of the European Digital Sovereignty Summit, Berlin, November 18, 2025. (picture alliance / Andreas Gora)

In November 2025, the European Union crossed a decisive threshold in its effort to safeguard its digital backbone from strategic vulnerabilities linked to Chinese technology. On November 10, Vice-President Henna Virkkunen introduced a legally binding proposal requiring all EU member states to phase out Huawei and ZTE equipment from their 5G and future telecommunications networks. This marked a sharp departure from the EU’s 2020 ‘5G Toolbox,’ which relied on non-binding recommendations and lacked enforcement mechanisms. The new plan—complete with financial penalties for non-compliance—makes clear that Beijing’s expanding technological influence, and Huawei’s entrenched position in particular, has become the central threat to the Union’s digital sovereignty.

Only a week after the phase-out announcement, EU leaders convened in Berlin for the Summit on European Digital Sovereignty on November 18. There, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly emphasized that Europe must rapidly strengthen its strategic autonomy if it hopes to remain competitive in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and semiconductors. Although the summit’s official agenda avoided explicitly naming China, Europe’s accelerating policy shift—including the renewed push to remove Huawei from its networks—made the underlying target difficult to miss. The subtext became even clearer when placed alongside Merz’s remarks at a business conference days earlier, where he outlined Germany’s new course: “We have decided within the government that wherever possible, we will replace components, for example, in the 5G network, with components that we produce ourselves,” he said, before adding, “and we will not allow any components from China in the 6G network.”

Europe’s consolidating consensus on a Huawei phase-out now sits alongside the EU AI Act of 2024 and the Cyber Resilience Act of the same year—two frameworks that impose strict cybersecurity and data-protection requirements designed to privilege trusted vendors over high-risk Chinese suppliers.

Unified Export Controls and Sanctions Might Accelerate Transatlantic AI Governance Convergence

The United States’ AI full-stack strategy, outlined in the July 2025 AI Action Plan, seeks to secure American advantage across the full technological chain—from semiconductor chips and high-performance computing to foundational models, data governance, and downstream applications. It blends restrictive measures and incentives: export controls, licensing rules, and standards-setting diplomacy operate as “sticks” to slow China’s access to frontier systems, while subsidies, joint research initiatives, and preferential integration into U.S.-led supply chains serve as “carrots” to draw allies into a shared technological ecosystem. Yet despite the strategy’s breadth, transatlantic coordination remains thin, lacking the institutional depth needed to support a truly integrated approach.

Europe’s recent moves, when viewed through the logic of the U.S. strategy’s sticks and carrots, provide new momentum for narrowing this gap. If Washington can translate this moment into practical institutional mechanisms, the full-stack strategy could serve as a strategic scaffold—offering political reassurance, regulatory leverage, and innovation resources that help Europe consolidate its trusted telecommunications infrastructure while advancing its broader digital sovereignty. In such a coordinated transatlantic framework, the United States and Europe together reinforce the foundations of a shared ‘free world’ technological space, reducing the free world’s dependence on Chinese digital and hardware ecosystems.

This convergence, however, remains fragile. Major EU regulatory projects, including the 2024 AI Act, must still reconcile competing demands from domestic constituencies and both European and American technology firms. The bloc’s struggle over the Huawei question illustrates these tensions vividly. Years of friction between security hawks and economic pragmatists meant that, after the 2020 ‘5G Toolbox,’ only 10–13 member states implemented meaningful restrictions. Germany hesitated largely because Huawei offered a 20–30 percent cost advantage over Nokia and Ericsson, compounded by significant sunk investments in its already‑deployed infrastructure—factors that made a rapid, full ban economically burdensome. Spain faced similar incentives: Telefónica had renewed a Huawei 5G core contract through 2030 and relied heavily on Huawei’s lower‑cost equipment and existing deployments, making an abrupt shift technically and financially challenging. Even so, by July 2025 Madrid committed to phasing out Huawei equipment in Spain and Germany to comply with tightening EU‑level security requirements, while maintaining Huawei systems in Brazil, where no such restrictions applied. Ultimately, Germany and France converged on a stabilizing middle path. Berlin sought to reconcile economic pragmatism with mounting security imperatives by offering subsidies to Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefónica to complete equipment swaps by 2027. Paris—more hawkish from the outset—reinforced this trajectory by consistently framing Chinese vendors as fundamental sovereignty risks, helping steer the broader EU toward a more unified and security‑driven position.

These internal pressures help explain the endogenous nature of broader transatlantic divergences—differences that analysts at the Atlantic Council characterize as structural, rooted in the EU’s more precautionary regulatory philosophy, its deeper emphasis on market fairness, and its persistent drive for ‘strategic autonomy,’ especially in digital governance.Yet despite unresolved frictions, convergence is strong where both sides perceive systemic risk—data security, supply-chain resilience, and preventing the militarization of AI and quantum technologies by authoritarian states. The real task is, thus, to translate these shared anxieties into structured cooperation before divergences harden.

Coordinated export controls and sanctions offer a particularly strong pathway for accelerating transatlantic AI governance convergence. These instruments cut to the core of what makes uncoordinated national responses inadequate in an era defined by overproduction, supply-chain dominance, and state-supported technological scaling by Chinese-linked firms. For individual states, unilateral measures against China’s rapid advances are insufficient. But the United States and Europe possess complementary strengths—American technological leadership, European regulatory capacity, and the combined market power of the transatlantic economy—that can turn coordination into the linchpin of a coherent strategy. When synchronized, such controls help bridge differences in high-risk AI safety practices, fortify supply chains, and close loopholes that currently undermine enforcement.

Building this coordination requires elevating emerging-technology policy into a top-tier transatlantic channel—most naturally through a strengthened Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Within such an upgraded framework, Washington and Brussels could operationalize a common approach to high-risk technologies by jointly defining safety expectations for advanced AI systems, aligning listings and sanctions on sensitive Chinese-linked firms, tightening oversight of technology and data flows, coordinating early on outbound investment, and cooperating to disrupt diversion networks operating through Russia and other intermediaries. As analysts at the Atlantic Council note, these mechanisms offer more than technical alignment: they create the institutional fabric that allows the United States and Europe to manage systemic technological risks together rather than in parallel.

A fully developed TTC of this kind would also serve as the platform for narrowing existing regulatory gaps. The United States, for instance, could work with the European Commission (EC) to build an ‘AI-governance bridge’ that provides companies with predictable operational expectations across jurisdictions even when the laws are not identical. Synchronizing sanctions and export restrictions with the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) would tighten enforcement and limit opportunities for evasion. Simultaneously, deeper collaboration with the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE) would help Europe construct a more coherent export-control regime that complements the protective goals embedded in Washington’s AI Action Plan. Reciprocal notification requirements and shared-risk taxonomies for outbound investment would round out this architecture, laying the foundation for a future transatlantic screening system capable of managing strategic leakage at its source. Such alignment would extend the reach of transatlantic AI export controls and sanctions beyond bilateral borders, establishing global standards that shape technology flows worldwide through tiered licensing and extraterritorial enforcement mechanisms.

Rising International Multi-Layer Governance Threats from China to Transatlantic AI Governance

LGU+’s Huawei-linked IoT lab exposes how corporate dependencies can strengthen China’s leverage over allied digital systems.

Recent developments in Northeast Asia illustrate why transatlantic coordination on AI governance and high-risk technology controls must extend far beyond national capitals. In 2020, the U.S. State Department publicly warned LGU+ that continued reliance on Huawei equipment could expose the operator to serious reputational, legal, and security risks—part of Washington’s broader push to discourage high-risk vendors within allied 5G ecosystems. Five years later, during a 2025 parliamentary oversight hearing, LGU+ was again criticized for still operating Huawei-supplied 5G equipment, underscoring how entrenched procurement decisions can harden into long-term structural dependencies even after security concerns become explicit.

In September 2025, Mayor Kang Ki-jung’s Gwangju delegation visited Huawei’s 1.6 km² Shanghai Research Campus, revealing how municipal engagement can strengthen China’s strategic leverage.

Municipal dynamics reveal a similar vulnerability. Last September, Gwangju conducted an official visit to Huawei’s 1.6 km² Shanghai research campus as part of its effort to benchmark smart-city and AI-hub strategies. Though framed as a technical mission, the visit created an opening for Beijing to cultivate influence over subnational officials whose infrastructure preferences increasingly shape the region’s technological trajectory. Such episodes highlight how Chinese firms strategically leverage local development incentives to embed themselves in urban infrastructure planning—well beyond the oversight reach of national authorities.

These cases illuminate a broader strategic tension: while the free world benefits from maintaining limited, cooperative grey zones that allow behavioral observation of Chinese technological conduct, these same spaces create opportunities for Beijing to conduct its own counter-conditioning. The challenge is therefore not simply to preserve channels for observation, but to define the permissible boundaries of these grey zones and discipline the risks associated with them. Without clearer parameters, cooperation intended to generate insight can gradually drift toward structural dependence.

Taken together, these developments are not merely warning signs; they constitute a new frontier of strategic challenge for the transatlantic community. They underscore an underappreciated reality: high-risk technology penetration increasingly occurs through governance layers that traditional export-control systems were never designed to monitor. Ensuring technological security now requires policy mechanisms that span the full chain of decision-making—from national ministries to regional telecom operators to municipal administrations—each capable of introducing vulnerabilities that adversarial firms can exploit. Strengthening vendor‑risk standards, aligning licensing rules, and coordinating penalties across jurisdictions have thus become essential to prevent subnational gaps from crystallizing into strategic footholds for authoritarian influence.

Conclusion: Cultivating Carrots to Advance Transatlantic AI Coordination

Yet institutional alignment alone cannot build a durable front. Sustained cooperation depends on credible economic incentives that make participation strategically and commercially viable for allies. The next phase of transatlantic technological strategy must therefore pair regulatory ambition with material commitments that reduce the political and economic friction of compliance. If Washington couples its institutional efforts with meaningful economic commitments—co‑funded infrastructure, joint R&D programs, and clear assurances that export controls will not become instruments of unilateral commercial gain—its AI full‑stack strategy could evolve from a national blueprint into the backbone of a transatlantic technological alliance.

Such an alliance would not only strengthen the free world’s ability to resist Chinese technological influence but would also offer a coherent model for global technology governance—one grounded in transparency, high‑standard safety, shared economic opportunity, and a rules‑based order capable of shaping the next generation of advanced technologies. In this sense, transatlantic coordination is no longer a desirable accessory to national strategies; it is the essential foundation for securing the free world technological frontier in the decade ahead.

 

Le Centre Hospitalier International de Calavi (CHIC) franchit un nouveau cap dans la qualité de prise en charge de ses patients et de son personnel. Cette semaine, les équipes de SERVAIR ont intégré les cuisines de l'établissement, marquant le démarrage officiel de la restauration collective.

Bonne nouvelle pour les patients et personnels du Centre Hospitalier International de Calavi. La restauration dans cet établissement est désormais opérationnelle. Elle sera assurée par les équipes de SERVAIR.

Ce projet s'inscrit dans une vision globale du bien-être des patients, en associant sécurité alimentaire, qualité nutritionnelle et plaisir gustatif. Les menus proposés sont élaborés par un chef, et privilégient des produits locaux valorisant ainsi la richesse de la cuisine béninoise.

« Le repas n'est pas un simple service. Il est pensé comme un véritable moment de plaisir et de réconfort pleinement intégré au parcours de soins et au séjour hospitalier », souligne la direction du CHIC. Avec ce lancement, le CHIC confirme sa volonté d'offrir à ses patients et à son personnel une bonne expérience hospitalière.

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Le Professeur et ancien député Octave Cossi Houdégbé a rendu l'âme mardi 9 décembre 2025.

Décès de l'homme politique béninois Octave Cossi Houdégbé. L'ancien député et promoteur de l'université privée Houdégbé North American University of Benin (HNAUB) est décédé à l'âge de 80 ans. Le défunt a occupé plusieurs postes en République centrafricaine sous le président André Kolingba à partir de 1981. Il a été chargé de mission du Président de la République ; Secrétaire d'Etat du Président de la République, Chargé des Affaires Financières et Economiques ; Président du Conseil d'Administration des Lignes Centrafricaines et ministre Résident de la NANA-MEMBERE. Il a aussi occupé les postes de Secrétaire d'Etat du Président de la République ; délégué au Ministère de l'Energie, des Mines et de l'Hydrauli­que et ministre Conseiller du Président de la République, Chargé des Dossiers de l'Economie et Finances, avec rang et Prérogatives de Ministre d'Etat. Octave Cossi Houdégbé est aussi le président fondateur de Houdégbé North American University au Ghana et en Centrafrique.

Il a été élu député à l'Assemblée nationale du Bénin, 7e et 8e législature. Marié et père de plusieurs enfants, Octave Houdégbé porte aussi le titre de Sa Majesté Dada Awignan Médjèmadokokpon. Il a reçu plusieurs distinctions honorifiques telles que Commandeur de l'ordre des Palmes Académiques ; Commandeur de l'Ordre du Mé­rite Centrafricain ; Grand Officier, Cordon Rouge de l'Etoile Brillante de Chine et Docteur Honoris Causa (HNAUB).
Les condoléances au domicile du défunt au quartier Akpakpa CENSAD débutent le 29 décembre 2025.

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Roger Lumbala, ancien chef rebelle congolais, a été condamné, lundi, par la cour d'assises de Paris à 30 ans de réclusion criminelle pour complicité des crimes contre l'humanité commis par ses soldats en 2002-2003 en RD Congo. L'accusé, qui a dix jours pour faire appel, a refusé d'assister à son procès.

Dire que le renseignement militaire danois [Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste – FE] voit dans les États-Unis une possible menace contre le royaume, comme ont pu l’avancer certains médias, est exagéré. En tout cas, il ne l’a pas dit explicitement dans le rapport annuel de 64 pages qu’il a publié la semaine dernière. Ce document insiste surtout sur...

Cet article Le Danemark commande trois radars de surveillance aérienne à Lockheed Martin est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

Written by Clare Ferguson with Sara Raja.

One of the European Parliament’s most important priorities is to ensure all EU policy promotes respect for people’s fundamental freedoms and human rights. Parliament has therefore awarded its Sakharov Prize to individuals and organisations making a remarkable effort to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms since 1988. Previous laureates include Nelson Mandela, Alexei Navalny and Malala Yousafzai.

This year, the Parliament awards its Sakharov Prize to individuals who show great personal courage in defending these freedoms and rights: Andrzej Poczobut of Belarus and Mzia Amaglobeli of Georgia, journalists who have fought for democracy in their respective countries. Both have been imprisoned for standing up for freedom of expression and democratic values. The Sakharov Prize award ceremony takes place during Parliament’s December plenary session.

The award is named in honour of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident, human rights advocate and recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Indeed, several of the laureates have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize –including María Corina Machado, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad.

Parliament’s political groups and individual Members (at least 40) nominate the candidates at a joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Development Committee and the Human Rights Subcommittee each September. The Parliament publishes a shortlist of three candidates in October and the Conference of Presidents selects the winner. Parliament then awards the prize at a plenary session at the end of the year. The prize confers an endowment of €50 000 on the winner, and the Sakharov network supports laureates in their efforts to defend their cause. When awarding the Prize, Parliament, through the voice of its President, usually calls for jailed laureates’ release from prison. Parliament also uses all the means in its parliamentary diplomacy toolbox to protect laureates from state repression and to keep human rights defenders’ struggle in the spotlight.

The Sakharov Prize therefore has a long history, featuring many distinguished names in the struggle to protect human rights and freedoms for all. Since 2014, the European Parliamentary Research Service produces a paper on the laureates of each prize, the human rights situation and the Parliament’s position. These papers are available in several EU languages:

A concerning deterioration in the human rights situation In Venezuela and election irregularities under the Maduro regime led to María Corina Machado, leader of Venezuela’s democratic forces, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia winning the 2024 Sakharov Prize. The second time the prize has been awarded to Venezuela’s democratic opposition activists (the first time was in 2017), they represent all Venezuelans both inside and outside the country who are fighting to restore freedom and democracy.

In 2023, following the murder of Jina Mahsa Amini’s by Iran’s security forces for her refusal to wear a hijab, and repression of women’s rights protesters in Iran, Parliament awarded the 2023 Sakharov Prize to Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran in support of the protesters’ aspirations for a free, stable, inclusive and democratic country.

The brave people of Ukraine have fought hard and sacrificed a great deal to protect their country from Russia’s aggression. A number of individuals and organisations were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize in recognition of their resistance to Russian attack.

Political repression was already intensifying in Russia in 2021. To honour his courageous defence of human rights and democratic freedoms despite severe personal risk and his imprisonment for his anti‑corruption activism and criticism of the Kremlin, Parliament awarded the 2021 Sakharov Prize to opposition leader Alexey Navalny. Parliament strongly condemned Navalny’s murder in 2024 and underlined that the Russian Government and Vladimir Putin should personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent.

Following contested presidential election in Belarus and a severe crackdown on peaceful protests, Parliament awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize to the democratic opposition in Belarus, represented by the Coordination Council, in tribute to their courage and determination to resist repression and advance democratic freedoms.

In 2019, in response to escalating repression against Uyghur minorities and civil society activists in China, the Parliament awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize to Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti, in recognition of his advocacy for ethnic minority rights and peaceful dialogue. Tohti remains in prison in China, serving a life sentence.

Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize to Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, imprisoned on politically motivated charges against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Parliament aimed to spotlight Sentsov’s plight and underscore broader concerns about political prisoners and human‑rights abuses in Russian‑controlled territories.

Amid a severe erosion of democratic institutions and repression of political freedoms in Venezuela, the European Parliament awarded the 2017 Sakharov Prize to the Democratic Opposition in Venezuela, notably the National Assembly and political prisoners, in support of their struggle for democratic transition, human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms.

The 2016 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Nadia Murad Basee Taha and Lamiya Aji Bashar to highlight the fate of their people, the Yazidis, one of the communities most affected, in proportion to their total population, by the violence committed by ISIL/Da’esh (or ‘Islamic State’), particularly during the conflict in Syria.

Saudi Arabian blogger, Raif Badawi was awarded the 2015 Sakharov Prize following his arrest and sentence to 10 years in prison, 1 000 lashes and a hefty fine for insulting Islam (his site hosted material criticising senior religious figures and a Saudi university). In his writings, Badawi advocates liberal Islam, freedom of thought and expression, and separation of state and religion.

Europe’s top human rights prize was awarded in 2014 to Dr Denis Mukwege, a gynaecologist from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in recognition for his perseverance and courage in his efforts to help rape survivors. A fervent advocate of women’s rights, Dr Mukwege has received many international awards, but has also been the target of death threats, and even a 2012 assassination attempt.

Any AI-generated content in this text has been reviewed by the author.

More information on the Sakharov Prize and the laureates:

• 30 Years of the Sakharov Prize: The European Parliament upholding freedom of thought
• Sakharov’s legacy on the centenary of his birth
• Laureates of the 2025 Sakharov Prize: Andrzej Poczobut and Mzia Amaglobeli, journalists fighting for democracy in Belarus and Georgia
• Sakharov Prize laureates in difficulty: Facing repression for defending human rights
• Laureates of the 2024 Sakharov Prize: María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, fighting for democracy in Venezuela
• 2023 Sakharov Prize laureate: Jina Mahsa Amini and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in Iran
• 2022 Sakharov Prize laureate: The brave people of Ukraine
• 2021 Sakharov Prize laureate: Alexey Navalny
• 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate: The democratic opposition in Belarus
• 2019 Sakharov Prize laureate: Ilham Tohti
• Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate
• The 2017 Sakharov Prize
• The Yazidis: An ongoing genocide
• The 2015 Sakharov Prize
• Sakharov Prize 2014: Tending the scars of sexual violence in DRCEuropean Parliament Sakharov Prize

Russia’s state debt increased by 2.8 percent between January and October 2025, reaching 32.9 trillion rubles, according to data released by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. While the absolute number appears substantial, the pace of growth remains moderate and notably lower than earlier preliminary estimates. An operational report from the Accounts Chamber had previously indicated a ten percent rise in public debt between January and September, bringing the total to 31.98 trillion rubles. The discrepancy between the two estimates is largely explained by statistical adjustments and the clarification of debt parameters as of early November. Updated accounting methods and revised data on obligations resulted in a more restrained assessment of the annual increase.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Avec une température moyenne supérieure de 1°C par rapport aux normales, 2025 figurera parmi les années les plus chaudes enregistrées en France, selon un bilan provisoire publié lundi par Météo-France. Au niveau mondial, elle est en passe de devenir la deuxième année la plus chaude jamais enregistrée, quasiment au même niveau que le record de 2023.

On Dec. 15, 2010, sixteen Harriers took off from RAF Cottesmore for a farewell formation flight marking the end to 41 years of British Harrier operations. Originally scheduled to remain in service until 2018 or beyond, ideally overlapping with the introduction of the F-35B Lightning II, budget cuts instituted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and […]

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Première nation d'Afrique à avoir accueilli les championnats du monde de cyclisme sur route, en septembre 2025, le Rwanda finance aussi des équipes de football de renommée mondiale. Si cette diplomatie sportive en plein essor lui permet de redorer son image, abîmée par un régime autoritaire et (…) / Rwanda, Sport

A Cotonou, la police a procédé à l'arrestation de quelques figures de l'opposition, une semaine seulement après le putsch manqué du lieutenant-colonel Pascal Tigri, en fuite.

EP President Roberta Metsola will hold a press conference with the representatives of the 2025 Sakharov Prize laureates on Tuesday 16 December at 11.30 CET in Strasbourg.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The president’s pay-to-play mentality is undermining U.S. foreign policy.

Washington wants a free hand for Silicon Valley and Russia investment. The EU is an obstacle—and the far right is an ally.

La mise en œuvre du Programme d'Assainissement Pluvial de Cotonou (PAPC) transforme peu à peu plusieurs quartiers de la ville. C'est le cas du quartier Ladji, autrefois insalubre, régulièrement inondé et enclavé.

Situé dans le 6e arrondissement, Ladji bénéficie désormais d'infrastructures modernes qui améliorent la mobilité et le cadre de vie. Grâce au financement de la Banque Européenne d'Investissement et à la coordination de la SIRAT SA, plusieurs ouvrages d'assainissement et aménagements urbains ont été réalisés.

Le PAPC a notamment permis la construction d'un collecteur primaire de près de 1,3 km et le pavage de 1,4 km de rues, soit environ 41.000 m². Lancés en février 2022, les travaux ont rencontré des défis techniques qui ont prolongé leur durée initiale de 12 mois. La supervision a été assurée par le groupement INROS-LACKNER/IGIP AFRIQUE/IGIP/DECO et le pool PAPC de la SIRAT, avec AGETUR pour la maîtrise d'ouvrage déléguée.

« Avant, la voie était impraticable. Personne ne pouvait traverser le rond-point Sainte-Cécile. C'était un calvaire », raconte Georges Gnonlonfoun, chef du quartier. Aujourd'hui, la circulation est fluide, la zone assainie, et de nouvelles activités économiques se sont développées. « Quand vous venez ici les soirs, c'est un autre marché. Aïmonlonfidé, Toyôyômè sont des agglomérations qui ont des constructions sur pilotis. Les jeunes viennent donc ici les soirs pour se distraire, et faire des achats », a indiqué le chef quartier de Ladji.

Le PAPC a également généré jusqu'à 65.000 emplois à l'échelle du programme. « Nous remercions le président Talon de nous avoir donné la possibilité de rentrer chez nous plus facilement. Aujourd'hui, le Bénin a changé. Les bas-fonds sont devenus de grandes voies », confie un riverain.
Malgré ces avancées, certaines voies restent à aménager et des défis structurels persistent, notamment en matière d'électricité et d'accès à l'eau potable. Le chef du quartier appelle les autorités à accompagner la population pour libérer les espaces réservés et protéger les infrastructures contre le vandalisme.