Agrégateur de flux

by Monika Brusenbauch Meislová (Masaryk University)

My article, recently published in JCMS, looks into how ongoing policy processes are discursively legitimated. It argues that that in order to satisfy complex demands on their legitimacy, policy makers tend to legitimate them not only by referring to the status quo (the current – new – state of affairs), but also by legitimating the status ad que (the future state) and delegitimating the status quo ante (the previous state). The article applies this original typology to the empirical case of Brexit, not least because the question of how Brexit is being legitimized is of immense European-wide relevance. Indeed, Brexit acts as a benchmark for citizens’ evaluations of EU membership in other member states, with the literature showing that positive information about the Brexit outcome leads to substantial increases in optimism about leaving the EU.

I specifically focused on the official communications of the UK Conservative government under Boris Johnson published on its website. The findings demonstrate that the government did seek legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance but also legitimated Brexit heavily through an anticipatory future promise and delegitimation of its previous EU membership and the EU as a result. While doing so, it (re)produced particular pasts, presents and futures (and the relations between them) and constructed a distinct sense of place and (non)belonging between self and the EU as the ex-community. Let’s now have a look at how exactly the Johnson’s government did that.

Legitimating the presence

The UK government strongly claimed the output legitimacy of Brexit through its current performance, framing it as a highly effective policy that had achieved all its goals.

There were two dominant narratives within this temporal regime: the narrative of success and the narrative of emancipation. The narrative of success functioned to construct the image of Brexit as a sheer triumph. The main topic here was that of gain. Appealing to people’s collective feelings of national pride, this narrative conveniently served the function of highlighting the great many advantages that Brexit had already brought to the UK and that ‘everyone’ in the country could now reap. With Brexit having already proved a ‘great success’, arguments here were built on a very simple cause and effect logic: the end of EU membership was the direct cause of the UK’s current successes.

The narrative of emancipation served to cast Brexit as having empowered the UK, almost in all every way imaginable, with the topic of control restoration being central to this construction. The main discursive thrust here was the representation of the control which the government had now managed to take back from Brussels (on a plethora of issues, including democracy, borders, waters, money, the economy etc.). Brexit was explicitly marketed as a tool by means of which the UK had restored its national pride. It was only now, with the country ‘finally out of the EU single market and customs union’, that the UK had become a ‘sovereign country’, able to make ‘sovereign choices across a range of different areas of national life’.

Legitimating the future

Despite having become a reality, Brexit (still) functioned heavily as a future imaginary. Representing it as a future benefit, the government foregrounded various aspects of its numerous upcoming (solely positive) implications.

Two dominant narratives here were those of a bright future and that of opportunity. The narrative of a bright future served to convey the vision of UK’s post-Brexit amazing future. A prominent topic was that of better prospects. Replete with pledges for a better future and a bold new future Britain, this promissory discursive construction was characterized by offering up a vision of the expected future of the UK, unhampered by EU membership, which was full of possibilities. Relying on the symbolism of hopeful future-oriented performance and values, the Johnson’s government routinely exploited this topic to send the message that Brexit would increase prosperity in all parts of the UK, across all levels of society.

The narrative of opportunity, built around the topic of potential, functioned to depict Brexit as a source of huge opportunities. The government was eager to cast the end of EU membership as a key precondition for creating a forward-looking, entrepreneurial, and globally ambitious country. Constantly evaluating Brexit’s potential as ‘enormous’, it was only due to Brexit that the UK would ‘thrive as a modern, dynamic and independent country’ and ‘seize new opportunities available to a fully independent global trading United Kingdom’.

Delegitimating the past

Even though the government highlighted its efforts to create a ‘new relationship’ with the EU ‘as friendly trading partners and sovereign equals’, it very much deplored the country’s former EU membership (and the EU as such) in its pursuit of Brexit legitimation.

Two central narratives were those of the oppressive EU and freedom (re)gain, both driven by the exclusionary rhetoric of othering. The former narrative, built around the topic of subjugation, functioned to delegitimate the EU as an outside force which used to prevent the UK from seizing the worldwide economic (and other) opportunities that it was rightfully entitled to. EU membership was invariably construed as a constraint, restricting member states’ actions and unacceptably interfering in domestic affairs.  The government repeatedly refereed to the need of rebuilding the country from the ‘distortions created by EU membership’ and ‘EU restrictions.’ Accordingly, the delegitimation acts are dotted with targeted allusions to the previous EU-imposed burdens, realized mainly via the ‘burdensome’ and ‘excessive red tape’ expressions.

Intimately related to the previous narrative was the narrative of freedom (re)gain. The main topic here was that of independence, conjuring up the idea that the UK was imprisoned and unsovereign as an EU member. The metaphor of imprisonment played a key role here. Typically, Brexit was characterized by the UK government as ‘freeing’ Britain from the EU, its policies, and various EU restrictions. The ‘newfound freedoms’ were inseparably connected to Brexit, as they were called ‘Brexit freedoms’. As such, Brexit was habitually presented as the sine qua non of the country’s ability to control its own domestic affairs. It is only now, after leaving the EU, that the UK had become ‘an independent nation’.

Problematic practical implications

Johnson’s government’s legitimation discourse of Brexit was problematic for many reasons, but two in particular. Firstly, according to the UK government’s discursive logic, Brexit had produced only winners and no losers. Obvious here was the strategic silence on adverse effects of the EU withdrawal. The government deliberately deployed a discursive strategy of omitting the inconvenient costs that are inherent in (any) disentanglement from the 47-year-old relationship. In doing so, it did not pass on the information necessary to facilitate the (British but also wider European) public’s understanding of the implications of the EU withdrawal.

The second problem pertains to the highly contradictory nature of the official legitimation discourse, with the UK government willingly demonizing the very actor with whom it proclaimed the desire to build a new friendly relationship. The official governmental communication was exceedingly radical in its explicitly exclusionary construction of the EU, promulgating anti-EU sentiment and countenancing mutual polarization. Such discursive handling of relations undermined the trust between the two actors and hampered the advancement of mutual talks.

Dr Monika Brusenbauch Meislová is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. She is also a Visiting Professor at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom, and one of the coordinators of the UACES research network ‘The limits of EUrope’. Her research work covers issues of British EU policy, Brexit and political discourse. Her most recent research has been published in various journals, including The Journal of Common Market Studies, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, European Security, British Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, and The Political Quarterly. She can be followed on X here.

The post Spinning Brexit as a success story: Three temporal regimes of Brexit legitimation by Boris Johnson’s government appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: On June 3, travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport witnessed a rare event when two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings.

-The Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one developed a mechanical problem.

-The runway was closed for 20 minutes, but there were no injuries or damage to the aircraft.

-This incident follows a series of recent aerial mishaps, including a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B crash in New Mexico and a Japan Maritime Self Defense Force helicopter collision in April.

Mechanical Issue Forces F-35A Fighters to Land at Aomori Airport

Travelers at Japan's Aomori Airport in northern Honshu were treated to a rare sight on June 3 as two Lockheed Martin F-35A stealth fighters made emergency landings. 

Both aircraft are in service with the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). They were on a training flight from Misawa Air Base when one of the Lightning IIs developed an unspecified mechanical problem and requested an emergency landing, the Associated Press reported.

The airport was forced to close its runway for about 20 minutes due to the emergency landing. There were no injuries and no damage to either of the F-35As – conventional takeoff and landing variants of the Joint Strike Fighter.

According to manufacturer Lockheed Martin, "As a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) participant, the JASDF has an established program of record of 127 F-35 Aircraft, consisting of 105 F-35 A models and up to 42 F-35 B models. Japan is acquiring the most of any international customer." Misawa is one of three air bases that host the fifth-generation multirole fighter. According to Simply Flying, Misawa AB hosts Japanese and American troops, including the U.S. Air Force's 35th Fighter Wing, which operates and maintains two squadrons of F-16CM (C and D model) Block 50 Fighting Falcons.

The incident in Japan comes just days after a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B – the short/vertical takeoff and landing variant – crashed near Albuquerque, New Mexico, during a flight from Fort Worth to Edwards Air Force Base.

Series of Aerial Mishaps

Fortunately no one was hurt on Monday, but this mishap followed another involving a C-2 transport aircraft that was forced to make an emergency landing at another commercial airport – this time in Central Japan – after a cockpit window reportedly slid open during a training flight. Eight people were on board, but there was no damage and no injuries were reported.

In April, two Japan Maritime Self Defense Force SH-60K Seahawk helicopters collided during a night-time anti-submarine warfare training drill. The two rotary aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean south of Tokyo, killing one crew member while another seven were lost at sea. 

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Pertussis, otherwise known as whooping cough, cases are increasing in France, with almost 6,000 cases reported since the start of 2024, according to data published by the Pasteur Institute, the rench biomedical research center, on Tuesday (4 June).

Summary and Key Points: The war in Ukraine has revived the possibility of nuclear warfare for the first time since the Cold War. During the early months of the conflict, there was significant concern that Russian President Vladimir Putin might order a tactical nuclear strike to avoid defeat.

-Although the situation has stabilized somewhat, the U.S. and Western governments remain vigilant, with contingency plans in place for a possible Russian nuclear strike. The Russian nuclear arsenal is extensive, including 1,710 deployed warheads and thousands more in storage, with a robust nuclear triad comprising land-based missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers.

-The potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia, while currently seen as unlikely, remains a serious concern, especially if the conflict turns against Moscow again.

The war in Ukraine has made nuclear warfare a possibility for the first time since the Cold War. 

During the first months of the war, when the situation looked especially bad for Russian forces – not that it is great now, but things have stabilized – there was a real fear in the United States and the West that Russian President Vladimir Putin would order a tactical nuclear strike on Ukraine to prevent a humiliating defeat. 

By late 2022, the CIA and other government departments and agencies had contingency plans for a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine. Such a strike would most likely be a tactical one, meaning that it would directly target part of the battlefield, rather than taking out a city. 

But what is the state of the Russian nuclear arsenal today, and is Moscow still considering a nuclear strike against its adversary? 

Nuclear Weapons and Decisions 

In its latest report on Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the Congressional Research Service assessed that the Russian military currently has 1,710 deployed nuclear warheads (and many additional thousands stored). In addition, the U.S. government estimates the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads. 

The Russian military has a nuclear triad. On the ground, Moscow has 326 intercontinental ballistic missiles. At sea, the Russian Navy fields 12 ballistic missile submarines that can pack a total of 192 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. In the air, the Russian Aerospace Forces flies 58 strategic bombers capable of launching or dropping a nuclear munition. 

Even though the war is going more favorably for the Kremlin right now, the U.S. government still believes that if Russia’s fortunes flag again, Putin and his Kremlin advisers would resurface the option of a nuclear strike. 

"Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they've faced so far, militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons," CIA Director Bill Burns said in a recent event in Atlanta.

Clearly, the Russian military has the capabilities to conduct a nuclear attack. Much then depends on the political will of Russia. A nuclear strike would likely have serious consequences on Russia, including the potential of a retaliatory strike by the U.S.

"We're obviously very concerned. I know President Biden is deeply concerned about avoiding a third world war, about avoiding a threshold in which, you know, nuclear conflict becomes possible," added Burns, who specialized in Russia and served as a U.S. ambassador in Moscow. 

A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would be the first nuclear weapon detonation in warfare since the U.S. military dropped two bombs on Imperial Japan during the final days of World War Two. 

About the Author: 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The European federation of organic agriculture and its French members obtained a judicial agreement on 4 June to put an end to labels using the name 'Eco-score' for food products, as it can be misleading for consumers.

The U.S. special envoy for Sudan warns that the geopolitical fallout from the spiraling civil war could be immense.

Dans le cadre des commémorations du Débarquement, Emmanuel Macron prendra la parole dans les journaux de 20 heures de France 2 et TF1. Les oppositions sont vent debout dénoncer l'omniprésence médiatique du chef de l'État à quelques jours du scrutin des européennes, à commencer par le Rassemblement national, qui continue de faire la course en tête des intentions de vote.

Economics pundit Noah Smith reports that a meme has been circulating among China-watchers of late. The meme holds that if you would just travel to China you would realize that China doesn’t want a war in the Taiwan Strait, or anywhere else. This is a form of argument from authority or, as Noah puts it, argument from tourism. Now, he and I don’t run in the same circles, but I’ve been hearing variants of the same storyline in recent months. Some who tout it claim, like Noah’s interlocutors, that China doesn’t want war. If not, they imply we should all heave a sigh of relief and stop preparing for Pacific combat. Other travelers maintain that China has burgeoned into such an industrial and military colossus that no eyewitness could countenance opposing it. Abandon all hope. Etc. The common denominator among these arguments from authority is their upshot: stand down. You need not—or cannot—buck China’s will.

To which I reply: Of course China doesn’t want a war over Taiwan. So what?

After all, wannabe conquerors love peace! They want to win without fighting. They long to cow their antagonists into submission, inducing them to lay down arms without putting up a fight. In so doing they spare themselves the ravages and unintended consequences inherent in the clangor of arms. That mode of proceeding has been baked into Chinese strategic culture since antiquity—witness the writings of Sun Tzu. Or ask Western martial sage Carl von Clausewitz. Writes Clausewitz, who took the field against Napoleon, the French god of war, “the aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed.” Bottom line: to prevent an aggressor from triumphing without firing a shot, “one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.” 

Take it from the art of war. Taiwan and its friends had better arm themselves—pronto—lest freedom-loving islanders suffer a Napoleonic fate.

Seldom do senior officials speak so plainly. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was correct to tell this year’s Shangri-la Dialogue that “war or a fight with China is neither imminent” nor “unavoidable.” That comes as cold comfort. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) magnates may not, and in all likelihood do not, relish war. But that doesn’t mean they are prepared to forego or indefinitely postpone their goals for the sake of regional concord. Just the opposite. The CCP leadership has made it glaringly clear that it will unsheathe the sword should it see fit. Short of that, it pursues warlike policies and strategies on a 24/7/365 basis, on the logic that peacetime politics is war without bloodshed.

Any strategy premised on communist goodwill is a strategy fated to fail. China will not relent in the Taiwan Strait. America, its allies, and its partners must deter it by mounting concerted, convincing, day-in-and-day-out displays of power and resolve.

Defense commentators are blunter than officials on occasion. Over at Defense One, science and technology editor Patrick Tucker hints at how China’s winning-without-fighting strategy works. The inauguration of William Lai, Taiwan’s latest Democratic Progressive Party president, occasioned the latest military outburst out of Beijing. Following Lai’s inauguration People’s Liberation Army warships and warplanes fanned out around Taiwan’s environs for two days of drills dubbed “Joint Sword 2024.” Chinese officialdom crowed that the maneuvers had meted out “strong punishment” for “separatist acts” on the part of the leadership in Taipei. According to Tucker, Beijing has talked itself into believing that it can overawe the balky island through domineering conduct underwritten by shows of naval and military might.

The conceit being that Taiwan’s government, society, and armed forces would rather yield to China’s blandishments than fight against daunting odds to perpetuate their de facto sovereignty.

In other words, Chinese leaders believe playing head games with Taiwan’s leadership could deliver their most treasured goal, rule over the island, without firing a shot. If that happened Communist China would have scaled to the pinnacle of strategic excellence, achieving its aims at minimal cost, danger, and diplomatic and economic blowback. Clausewitz would instantly grasp China’s approach. The Prussian soldier-scribe declared that there are three ways to prevail in martial strife. One, vanquish the foe on the battlefield and impose terms. That charts the swiftest and surest route to victory, but also the one entailing the most forbidding hazards. Two, convince hostile leaders their predicament is impossible. The conviction being that rational but disheartened decisionmakers will decline to fight a fight they deem unwinnable. Or three, persuade hostile leaders they can’t win at a cost that’s affordable to them. Again, the Clausewitzian proposition is that rational cost/benefit analysis could net victory without violence. 

The latter two methods operate in encounters short of violence as well as in open war. These are Beijing’s methods of choice in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in maritime Asia. They inhabit the realm of coercion and deterrence.

But the CCP leadership has a problem. Namely, the leadership seems to have little idea of how to bring about a Taiwanese capitulation without unleashing violent force. Think of strategy as a theory of cause and effect. Strategy postulates that if friendly forces do X, Y, and Z they will generate desirable effects A, B, and C—the ultimate effect being military victory. Now consider China’s theory of success, such as it is. CCP overseers demand that Taiwan consent to its own death as an independent polity simply because China’s armed forces now outclass Taiwan’s by almost any conceivable measure. But what precisely does staging a military deployment—no matter how menacing—do to induce President Lai’s, or anyone else’s, leadership in Taipei to commit assisted suicide?

Precious little.

No obvious mechanism explains how cause begets effect in Chinese strategy, and so China’s theory of success fails the test of strategic and political reality. Beijing demands everything from the islanders yet offers them nothing. It has placed Taiwan on “death ground,” to borrow from Sun Tzu, and the revered general of yore advises a combatant bestriding death ground to fight to its utmost. Taiwan will. You would think Sun Tzu’s disciples on the mainland would get this intuitively. But they don’t.

It turns out nonstop bombast backed by cavalier displays of firepower makes a futile strategy for China, and yet that’s the only trick the CCP leadership knows how to play. Through misbegotten strategy, in short, China has deprived itself of options short of war. It may not want war, but years of overbearing diplomacy may compel it to go to war. It has little alternative.

That’s what we in the biz call self-defeating behavior. Nice work, Xi & Co.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes, U.S. Naval War College

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

In recent years, the relationship between the EU and Kazakhstan has evolved significantly, marked by a growing emphasis on economic cooperation, political dialogue, and partnerships in various fields.

While most politicians and lawmakers have been discussing enlargement prospects for the EU, others have quietly worked to bring together EU citizens and their European neighbours in a much more technical but tangible way: telecommunications.

After having spent years on hydrogen, policymakers should now focus on the direct electrification that could deliver 90% of process heat by 2035, argues a new study by think-tank Agora Industry.

C’est une victoire en demi-teinte pour le Premier ministre indien sortant Narendra Modi. Pour la première fois depuis 2014, l’homme fort du gouvernement et son parti du BJP perdent la majorité absolue qu’ils détenaient au Parlement. Avec une nette progression dans les suffrages, l’opposition, et notamment le parti du Congrès national indien, évoque une « défaite morale » pour Modi et le BJP. Le dénouement de ces 77 jours de scrutin soulève ainsi plusieurs interrogations. Comment se sont déroulées ces élections ? Quels sont les multiples enseignements à tirer des résultats ? Peut-il y avoir une influence sur les positions indiennes à l’international ? Éléments de réponse avec Olivier Da Lage, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, spécialiste de l’Inde et de la péninsule arabique.

Dans quel contexte politique, économique et social se sont tenues les élections législatives indiennes ? Avec 970 millions d’électeurs attendus, plus grandes élections de l’histoire, comment s’est déroulé ce suffrage ?

Le scrutin proprement dit s’est déroulé en sept phases qui se sont étirées du 19 avril au 1er juin, soit 77 jours au total ! Cette durée a été exceptionnellement longue, même s’il est habituel en Inde que le vote se déroule en plusieurs phases, compte tenu de l’étendue du pays. Cela permet de déployer dans les différents États à tour de rôle les forces de sécurités chargées de veiller à ce que les opérations électorales se déroulent dans l’ordre. Mais cette extension de la durée de vote a pour effet de modifier la tonalité de la campagne au fur et à mesure de l’avancement dans le temps. Certaines candidatures ne sont pas encore déclarées que les opérations sont déjà achevées dans d’autres régions du pays. Les thèmes de campagne évoluent aussi en fonction du ressenti des débuts de la campagne (et bien sûr également des thématiques propres à chaque région). Tout bien considéré, les élections proprement dites se sont déroulées dans le calme et dans l’ordre, si l’on excepte quelques violences localisées et qui sont habituelles dans l’histoire électorale du pays. Mais les opérations ont également été marquées par une vive défiance de l’opposition à l’encontre de la Commission électorale, un organe constitutionnel composé de trois personnes nommées par le gouvernement et qui venait d’être remanié par le Premier ministre Narendra Modi. Le fait que la Commission électorale, contrairement à l’habitude, ait refusé de publier les chiffres absolus de la participation électorale, se contentant de donner des pourcentages – avant de changer de position, abruptement et sans explication, a ajouté à la confusion, tout comme le refus de confirmer, jusqu’à l’avant-veille du dépouillement que les bulletins envoyés par la poste seraient décomptés avant de commencer à compter les résultats des machines à voter. En fin de campagne et au début des opérations de vote, le BJP du Premier ministre Narendra Modi était donné grand gagnant et annonçait même viser 400 sièges sur les 543 que compte la Lok Sabha (Assemblée nationale). Dans la législature sortante, le BJP disposait de la majorité absolue avec 303 sièges, rendant superflue l’alliance NDA avec des partis supplétifs qui n’étaient pas en mesure de peser sur les décisions. Mais au fil du temps, les échos du terrain ont montré que les candidats du BJP rencontraient plus de difficultés que prévu et que la «magie » Modi ne fonctionnait plus aussi bien que par le passé. Or, toute la campagne du BJP s’est faite sur la personnalité du Premier ministre et son programme pour les cinq ans à venir était très général et se résumait largement au slogan « Modi ki guarantee » (la garantie de Modi). On a alors pu sentir une nervosité croissante dans les rangs de la majorité sortante tandis que dans ses meetings et ses interviews, le Premier ministre a accusé le Parti du congrès d’emprunter son programme à la Ligue musulmane pakistanaise et de vouloir dépouiller les femmes hindoues de leurs bijoux en or pour les donner aux musulmans. Alors que la campagne de Modi en 2014 s’était déroulée sur le thème de la bonne gouvernance et celle de 2019 sur la sécurité aux frontières du pays, en 2024, il a donné le sentiment de s’en prendre aux 200 millions de musulmans indiens, tout en s’en défendant par ailleurs.

Annoncé grand favori pour un troisième mandat, quelle analyse peut-on faire des résultats de Narendra Modi et du Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ? Quels sont les autres enseignements à tirer de ces élections ?

Le BJP a perdu la majorité absolue qu’il détenait depuis 2014 et renforcée en 2019. Il a dû sentir le risque, car en cours de campagne, il a ressuscité l’Alliance NDA qui était virtuellement inexistante depuis 2014. Peu auparavant, le président du BJP avait pourtant laissé entendre qu’avec le temps, il n’y aurait plus qu’un seul parti en Inde : le BJP. Avec ses alliés, y compris l’imprévisible chef du gouvernement du Bihar Nitish Kumar qui avait été à l’origine de l’alliance des 28 partis d’oppositions réunis au sein de la coalition INDIA avant de rejoindre à la coalition au pouvoir par un revirement dont il a le secret, Narendra Modi peut toujours compter sur une majorité au parlement. Mais d’une part, ses alliés vont probablement monnayer cher leur soutien et limiter les volontés que l’on prête à Narendra Modi de transformer en profondeur l’Inde pour en faire un État officiellement hindou, d’autre part, cette victoire à la Pyrrhus est un camouflet personnel pour le chef du gouvernement sortant dont le pouvoir était aussi personnalisé. Pour sa part, le parti du Congrès échappe à l’effacement qui menaçait et sa stratégie électorale d’alliance avec des partis régionaux s’est avérée payante pour lui comme pour ses partenaires, ce qui permet à l’opposition de revenir en force à la Lok Sabha, même si elle y demeure minoritaire.

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Quelle peut être l’influence de ces élections sur les ambitions internationales indiennes ?

Probablement aucune. D'un côté, la politique étrangère qu'aurait menée un gouvernement dirigé par le parti du Congrès n'aurait guère été très différente de celle conduite par Narendra Modi, d'autre part, le fait que l'opposition ait obtenu un score plus qu'honorable peut être présenté comme un démenti à ceux qui affirmaient que la « plus grande démocratie du monde » n'était plus qu'une « autocratie électorale ». Mais surtout, les réalités géopolitiques n'ont pas changé avec les résultats publiés ce 4 juin : la Chine est toujours la voisine de l'Inde et sa puissance perçue comme une menace à la fois par l'Inde et les pays occidentaux. Ces derniers vont donc continuer de courtiser New Delhi et pour sa part, l'Inde poursuivra sa politique de « multialignement » qui consiste à rester amie avec la Russie et Israël tout en étant proche des pays arabes et des Occidentaux. Jusqu'à présent, cette politique de funambulisme a plutôt réussi à l'Inde dont le taux de croissance (8,2 % pour l'exercice budgétaire 2023-2024) suscite bien des convoitises commerciales chez ses partenaires, notamment occidentaux.

 

Summary and Key Points: The conflict in Ukraine has escalated as the U.S. and other Western countries have authorized Ukraine to strike high-value military targets inside Russia using advanced weaponry such as the M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS.

-This new phase in the conflict saw Ukraine successfully targeting Russian S-300 and S-400 air defense systems near Belgorod. Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on Russian troops, with recent reports indicating significant losses in personnel and equipment.

-Despite high casualties, Russia's ability to rapidly regenerate its forces, as demonstrated historically, poses a significant challenge. Ukraine and its Western allies must consider this force generation capability in their strategies.

Ukraine Authorized to Strike Inside Russia as Conflict Escalates

The fighting across Ukraine rages on as the Russian military continues with its offensive in the east toward the city of Kharkiv.

In response to the renewed Russian attack, the United States has allowed Ukraine to take off the gloves and use powerful weaponry inside Russia.

A New Phase in the Conflict

The war has entered a new phase after the United States, followed by several other Western countries, gave the green light to Ukraine to engage high-value military targets inside Russia with weapon systems provided as part of a security assistance package.

The Ukrainian forces can now use their highly effective M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) to launch precise munition and take out targets within Russia.

In the latest such strike, a Ukrainian M142 HIMARS took out two S-300 or S-400 air defense systems and their supporting vehicles near the Russian city of Belgorod, more than 30 miles from the border with Ukraine. These are the best air defense systems the Russian military has at its disposal and mark a significant loss. In the coming weeks, such incidents are expected to rise as the Ukrainians become more adept at identifying and tracking high-value targets within Russia.

Mounting Casualties and Russia’s Force Generation

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian forces continue to inflict heavy casualties on their Russian adversaries. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the past 24 hours, the Russian forces lost 1,280 troops killed, wounded, or captured, 69 support vehicles and fuel trucks,40 artillery pieces, 39 unmanned aerial systems, including several Iranian-made Shahed suicide drones, 16 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 12 main battle tanks, 12 pieces of special equipment, 3 anti-aircraft weapon systems, and 2 cruise missiles.

These casualties are quite heavy for 24 hours of fighting. Indeed, losing more than a battalion worth of men, as well as almost 200 pieces of heavy equipment in a day could be debilitating for military forces without Russia’s force generation capacity. But this is the capability that hasn’t only kept Moscow in the war but could eventually turn the tide on its favor.

On February 24, 2022, Moscow launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine with approximately 200,000 regular and paramilitary troops. More than 23 months later, Russian casualties are estimated between 320,000 and 515,000. Even at the lowest end of the casualty spectrum, the Kremlin has lost more than 150 percent of its initial invasion force. Nevertheless, today, the Russian military has approximately 470,000 troops in Ukraine and has mobilized many more within Russia. This ability to regenerate forces at rapid intervals has historically been an ace up Moscow’s sleeve. Russia is vast. Russian leaders have understood that they can buy time by giving up territory and sacrificing hundreds of thousands of troops, like in the Napoleonic Wars and World War Two.

Ukraine and the West should take Russia’s force generation ability into close consideration.

About the Author 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Suivez en DIRECT sur FRANCE 24 la cérémonie internationale du 80e anniversaire du débarquement en Normandie à Omaha Beach en présence notamment d'Emmanuel Macron, Charles III, Joe Biden et Volodymyr Zelensky.

Suivez sur FRANCE 24 les commémorations du 80e anniversaire du débarquement en Normandie : la cérémonie britannique de Ver-sur-Mer en présence de Charles III, la cérémonie canadienne avec Justin Trudeau et les hommages au cimetière américain de Colleville-sur-Mer avec Joe Biden.

Summary: Recent months have seen several tragic military aircraft incidents. An F-35 Lightning II and an F-16 Fighting Falcon both crashed in New Mexico, while a vintage Supermarine Spitfire from the UK's Battle of Britain Memorial Flight (BBMF) crashed in Lincolnshire, killing Squadron Leader Mark Long.

-The UK's Defence Accident Investigation Branch is investigating the cause of the Spitfire crash.

-This incident has reignited debates about the safety of flying vintage warbirds, following other recent crashes involving World War II-era aircraft.

-The BBMF has grounded its fleet, including Spitfires, Hurricanes, and a Lancaster bomber, pending investigation outcomes.

Vintage Spitfire Crash: UK's Battle of Britain Memorial Flight Under Scrutiny

The past few months have been a dark time for military aircraft. An F-35 Lightning II crashed last weekend after an F-16 Fighting Falcon crashed just weeks earlier – both in New Mexico. The F-35 crash overshadowed the loss of a military aircraft in the UK, this one involving a vintage Supermarine Spitfire.

On May 25, the World War II-era aircraft – part of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight – went down in Lincolnshire near Royal Air Force Coningsby. Squadron Leader Mark Long, who was piloting the Spitfire, was killed. The UK's Defence Accident Investigation Branch has put out a request for images and video to help determine what led to the crash.

"An investigation into the cause of this tragic event has now begun," RAF Group Captain Robbie Lees, commander of the display air wing, said in a statement. "The RAF will not be offering any comment on the accident until that investigation has concluded."

The Battle of Britain Memorial Flight maintains a small fleet of vintage aircraft, including two Hawker Hurricanes, an Avro Lancaster four-engine bomber, a C-47 Dakota, and around half a dozen of the remaining airworthy Spitfires. All of its aircraft have been grounded, and its visitors center is also currently closed. It is unclear when the group’s flights will resume.

Another Old Warbird Down

Though this is the first fatal loss involving a BBMF aircraft since the unit was formed in 1957, some aviation experts are again questioning whether such flights should continue, given the age of the aircraft.

Last month, a World War II-era Douglas C-54 crashed in Alaska, killing two. In November 2022, a B-17 bomber and a P-63 Kingcobra fighter plane collided at the Wings Over Dallas air show, leaving six people dead. That followed another crash involving a B-17 in October 2019, when the bomber crashed at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut. Seven of the 13 people on board were killed, while the other six and one more on the ground were injured.

The Spitfire – The D-Day Warbird

As reported by 19FortyFive.com, the Spitfire is most closely associated with the Battle of Britain, even though the Hawker Hurricane shot down more enemy planes over the course of that campaign in 1940.

The Spitfire’s close association with that campaign might have been helped by the 1968 film Battle of Britain – far more Spitfires were available for filming, and few scenes showed the Hurricanes. As a result, many now believe that the Spitfire was the dominant fighter used at the time.

The Spitfire went on to play a significant role in the D-Day landings 80 years ago, with a total of 55 squadrons supporting the invasion of Normandy.

About the Author: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary and Key Points: Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree made dubious claims over the weekend that the Houthi rebels had successfully targeted the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in the Red Sea. Following these claims, images purportedly showing damage to the U.S. Navy's Nimitz-class aircraft carrier circulated online.

-However, these images were quickly debunked as they actually depicted the Russian Navy's Admiral Kuznetsov, currently undergoing extensive repairs in Murmansk.

-The Pentagon has denied any damage to the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. The incident highlights ongoing issues with misinformation on social media, particularly on X (formerly Twitter).

Houthi Claims of Attacking Aircraft Carrier USS Eisenhower Debunked

We'll be the first to suggest it: Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree should be dubbed the Lying Yemeni – as his claims are as dubious as those of the now infamous "Baghdad Bob" more than two decades ago. Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf earned the nickname "Baghdad Bob," as well as "Comical Ali," for his outrageous claims made during the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003.

While Saree hasn't declared anything quite as outlandish as "The infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gates of Baghdad," the Houthi rebel mouthpiece claimed twice over the past weekend that the Iranian-back insurgent group had successfully targeted the United States Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in the Red Sea. . 

Following those claims, images were posted online that purported to show damage to the U.S. Navy's warship, the second oldest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in service. An example is at the very top of this post. 

"CONFIRMED: uss eisenhower (pictured docked for repairs in souda bay) hit and severely damaged by multiple houthi ballistic missiles. judging by extensive tent city developing on the flight deck, we assess it is unlikely eisenhower will return to service in the foreseeable future," noted @iAmTheWarax on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

That Image Is Wrong on So Many Levels: No Aircraft Carrier Damage 

The image shared on X isn't actually of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and it isn't even a Nimitz-class carrier.

Moreover, it isn't even a nuclear-powered vessel, and that's because as many users on social media quickly pointed out, it is the Russian Navy flagship Admiral Kuznetsov, which as The National Interest has reported on multiple occasions is undergoing an odyssey of a refit at the 35th Ship Repair Plant in Murmansk since 2018.

About the only part of the post that was believable and fairly accurate is that the carrier (Admiral Kuznetsov) is unlikely to "return to service in the foreseeable future."

Misinformation and disinformation remain serious problems on X, and the issue has gotten worse since tech entrepreneur Elon Musk acquired the service in late 2022 for $44 billion. Many of the guardrails that attempted to quickly dispel such disinformation have been removed, and it was only thanks to more qualified users that the warship was quickly identified. Now in fairness, it is possible that the original post was made in jest, but it is still hard to tell for certain.

Another giveaway that the photo was a fake was that it suggested that CVN-69 was in Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete. Here is where there was an inkling of truth – notably that the carrier and elements of her strike group did make a port visit to the port earlier this spring. However, anyone with knowledge of geography or access to a map would quickly point out that it would require transiting the Suez Canal and sailing approximately 4,000 nautical miles. It would take days, and perhaps a week for the carrier to reach that point.

Finally, if the warship had taken any damage and needed repairs it would have almost certainly traveled to Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military in Africa.

The Pentagon has denied that the carrier took any damage.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit for main image X. All others are Creative Commons. 

The United States has the power to halt ongoing atrocities in El Fasher.

Summary: The success of the D-Day invasion of Normandy was pivotal in World War II, but it almost ended in failure.

-Issues such as missed landing spots, strong currents, and heavy German defenses, especially at Omaha Beach, caused significant casualties and nearly led to the operation's abandonment.

-Had D-Day failed, it would have boosted German morale, potentially shifted Nazi forces to the Eastern Front, and put immense strain on British resources.

-The failure could have prompted significant political repercussions in the U.S., including possible resignations and an election loss for President Roosevelt.

-The failure of D-Day would have dramatically altered the course of world history.

What If D-Day Had Failed? The Potential Consequences for World War II

What if the D-Day invasion of Normandy had failed?

What if U.S. forces had gained no footing in France?

Would the Soviets have been able to defeat Nazi Germany alone? If not, then what would a Nazi-controlled Europe have looked like? And if the Soviets had prevailed, how much of the European continent would they have claimed for themselves?  How far would the Iron Curtain have fallen? 

According to the Department of Defense, D-Day almost was a failure.

“While the ultimate goal of liberating France and ousting the Germans did happen, a lot went wrong on D-Day – especially for the Americans, who were the first to launch the invasion,” the DOD website reads. “Thousands of U.S. paratroopers died during their drop behind enemy lines at Utah Beach, having been shot out of the sky by enemy fire or weighed down and drowned in flooded marshlands. Many also missed their landing spots, as did the seaborne forces, which landed more than a mile from their intended destination, thanks to strong currents.”

Further problems awaited the Allies at Omaha Beach.

“The Omaha offensive turned out to be the bloodiest of the day, largely in part because Army intelligence underestimated the German stronghold there. Rough surf caused huge problems for the amphibious tanks launched at sea; only two of 29 made it to shore, while many of the infantrymen who stormed off the boats were gunned down by Germans. Gen. Omar Bradley, who led the Omaha forces, nearly considered abandoning the operation. Somehow, though, both sectors of U.S. troops managed to advance their positions for overall success.

Historians have spent decades considering what failure on D-Day might have meant.

“Had D-Day failed, it would have been particularly costly for Britain. They were already running out of manpower, particularly the Army,” Professor Gary Sheffield told the BBC. 

“Had D-Day failed, it would have given a major boost to morale in Germany,” Professor Soenke Neitzel added. “The German people had expected this to be the decisive battle, and if they could beat the Allies, they might be able to win the war. I think Hitler would have withdrawn his core division from the West to fight on the Eastern Front.”

In America, failure might have had significant repercussions, too. “Had D-Day failed, there would have been an agonizing reappraisal among the Americans who had pushed for a cross-channel invasion. Eisenhower would almost certainly have offered his resignation; it would almost certainly have had to be accepted. It’s also possible that US President Roosevelt could have lost the November 1944 election, so there could have been a change in administrations,” Professor Dennis Showalter said. 

D-Day was significant. Had the results of D-Day been different, world history would have changed in a big way.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is the Senior Editor with over 1,000 articles published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

All images are Creative Commons.