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Czech Republic v Commission
Agriculture and fisheries
The dairy spread known as ‘pomazánkové máslo’ may not be registered as a traditional speciality guaranteed

République tchèque / Commission
Agriculture
La matière grasse laitière dénommée « pomazánkové máslo » ne peut pas être enregistrée comme spécialité traditionnelle garantie

In a surprise to nearly everyone, the Conservatives have won the UK’s 2015 General Election with a (small) overall majority. Following his audience with the Queen after the election, David Cameron reiterated his commitment to holding an in/out referendum on Britain’s EU membership. It seems therefore that we can now expect several years of negotiation, campaigning and debate on the UK’s future in the European Union.

Maduarte, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Renegotiation

Central to the Prime Minister’s pledge is the promised renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership in the Union. He has stated previously that he wants to be able to recommend a vote to stay in the EU. However, to date we’ve had only hints of what the government hopes to achieve from a renegotiation.

Opting the UK out of the aim of ‘ever closer union’ and increasing the length of transitional controls for new Member States (such as temporarily limiting free movement with those states) have come up as possible demands. We’ll need the details of what the Prime Minister aims to accomplish from these negotiations in order to judge whether they are a success. The absence of clarity of course brings with it greater room for manoeuvre should talks with EU partners prove more difficult than hoped.

Referendum

The proposed timeline is as yet unclear, but negotiations would have to start soon. It is now mid-2015 and the Prime Minister has pledged that the referendum will take place by the end of 2017, leaving at most a year and a half to successfully complete a renegotiation and hold a campaign and vote. David Cameron might also hold the referendum early to capitalise on his electoral success and to head off any demands from within his party, further limiting the window to negotiate with other Member States and the EU institutions.

The specific details of the referendum will also have to be decided. An EU referendum bill will need to go through Parliament and, while the PM has a thin majority in the Commons, he has no majority in the Lords, potentially making agreement on the bill more difficult. Parliamentary process aside, this EU plebiscite will be only the third nationwide referendum to take place in the UK (the others being the EC membership referendum in 1975 and the Alternative Vote referendum in 2011).

The Scotland independence referendum can undoubtedly provide insights into the mechanics of holding such a vote. However, in some key respects, an EU referendum will be completely different. In the Scotland debate, many organisations and individuals remained neutral on the vote – this would not be the case here. The vast majority of the political establishment, the business community and civil society is very likely to come out strongly in support of continued EU membership. In this sense, the official landscape will be very lopsided. At the same time, UK public opinion on the EU is mixed, but it’s also consistently higher under the hypothetical that the government is successful in its renegotiation (a seemingly rare moment of trust in political leaders).

If Britain votes to leave

Should the UK electorate choose to leave the EU, a process of negotiation will have to begin with the EU institutions on behalf of the remaining Member States to agree Britain’s future relationship with the rest of the EU. The EU treaties (Article 50 TEU) now set out a procedure for a Member State to withdraw from the Union, giving some clarity in this respect. Negotiations can last up to two years and must be approved by a qualified majority of EU members and by the European Parliament. Unless talks are extended, after time elapses the UK would leave automatically, even if no deal is reached.

A plethora of matters would have to be discussed, including the UK’s future participation in the single market, which of course incorporates the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. In the current political context, free movement of persons would likely be a particularly challenging issue, affecting the rights both of EU citizens in the UK and of UK citizens in the EU. Britain’s role in every other EU programme, such as Erasmus, would all need to be agreed.

Such negotiations would be time-consuming, difficult and costly and require a great deal of expertise. Interestingly, the UK is scheduled to hold the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 2017. Britain may find itself at the same time chairing part of an organisation it is debating or has decided to leave.

In these circumstances, the question arises of whether a second referendum would be held to approve the UK’s new relationship with the EU. Alternatively, a vote might be held in Parliament to endorse the negotiated terms for the UK’s EU exit and whatever relationship might replace it. A second referendum would provide an opportunity for the electorate to confirm their support for the proposed alternative to membership.

If Britain votes to stay

If UK voters decide to stay in the EU, Britain’s membership would apparently continue much as before. Any provisions secured as part of the renegotiation would presumably take effect, giving Britain additional opt-outs or other special arrangements or indeed changing how the EU itself works.

A renegotiation could range from modest to radical, depending on the appetite of the rest of the EU to compromise. If the result falls short of dramatic change, it is unlikely to be from a lack of desire on the part of the UK government. It would be extremely ambitious to expect full treaty change under the above timescale. A more likely scenario is an agreement on principles and a commitment to include them in future treaty reform where necessary (some points might be achievable within the current treaties).

Britain is not unused to confrontation on Europe. Nevertheless, this chapter in its relationship with the EU could prove particularly high stakes. Possible outcomes include a more sustainable EU membership, a more distanced relationship with the EU or a situation not dissimilar to the status quo. The EU referendum result could have constitutional implications as well, at a time when the UK’s constitutional future is the subject of ongoing debate.

The shape of Britain’s future relationship with the EU will have a profound impact on its economy and its place in the world. The consequences of this debate will be numerous, and many will only become apparent over time.

Please read the comments policy before commenting.

Shortened link: britainseurope.uk/20150512

How to cite this article:

Salamone, A (2015) ‘Britain’s EU membership: The debate and the referendum, Britain’s Europe (Ideas on Europe), 12 May 2015, britainseurope.uk/20150512

The post Britain’s EU membership: The debate and the referendum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España / Kommission
Institutionelles Recht
Das Gericht der EU stellt fest, dass der Schriftwechsel zwischen der Kommission und einer nationalen Wettbewerbsbehörde im Rahmen eines Verfahrens wegen Zuwiderhandlung gegen die Wettbewerbsregeln grundsätzlich nicht der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich ist

Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España kontra Bizottság
Intézményi jog
The General Court finds that documents exchanged between the Commission and a national competition authority in proceedings concerning an infringement of the competition rules are not, in principle, accessible to the public

Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España v Commission
Law governing the institutions
The General Court finds that documents exchanged between the Commission and a national competition authority in proceedings concerning an infringement of the competition rules are not, in principle, accessible to the public

Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España / Commission
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal de l’UE juge que les documents échangés entre la Commission et une autorité nationale de la concurrence dans le cadre d’une procédure d’infraction aux règles de la concurrence ne sont, en principe, pas accessibles au public

Egy igazi különlegesség kerül kalapács alá hamarosan: egy olyan Spifire, amelyet a II. világháborúban lőttek le Dunkerque-nél. A gépet, melynek Peter Cazenove volt a pilótája, teljesen helyreállították és 2,5 millió fontért szándékoznak eladni. 

KYIV, 12 May – The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) will hold a presentation of its Thematic Report “Protection of Civilians and their Freedom of Movement in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” on Wednesday, 13 May.

Alexander Hug, Deputy Chief Monitor of the SMM along with Mission’s Human dimension experts will present the key finding of the thematic report.

Journalists are invited to attend the presentation on Wednesday, 13 May, at 13:00 (Kyiv time), in the SMM’s Head Office, at 26 Turhenevska street.

Journalists should request accreditation by sending an e-mail to tetiana.tesliuchenko@osce.org by 11.00 on 13 May, with the following information: name, media outlet, contact details (e-mail and phone number).

Any possible changes in timings and places will be communicated via social media (@OSCE_SMM, www.facebook.com/oscesmmu).

Live online streaming of the event will be available at http://ustre.am/1jT6S.

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Since Ryan Heath‘s been kind enough to mention all the work I do on this site on Brexit, it seems like a good opportunity to mention a new project I’ve been working on.

‘A Diet of Brussels‘ is a podcast about the referendum here in the UK on EU membership. In it, I want to try and explore the issues, to help inform debate and produce a more considered outcome. It’s not aimed at being ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but rather that raising the level of knowledge about the process and the key issues.

Each podcast is 5 minutes – for everyone’s sanity – and if you have a question to be addressed, then you can just send in a request and I’ll try my best.

I’ll happily admit my technical abilities might not yet be up to much, but it’ll improve over time, plus you all get to enjoy Berlaymonster’s excellent logo at regular opportunities.

So have a listen in: any feedback most welcome.

The post A Diet of Brussels appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 131'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.4Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

KYIV, 12 May 2015 – The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine and the Donetsk Oblast Military and Civilian Administration and Foundation for Support of Reforms are organizing East Ukrainian Forum on “Reconstruction Through Dialogue. The event will be held on 13-15 May 2015 in Kramatorsk.

It will bring together key stakeholders in the region, including officials, community leaders, entrepreneurs and activists and representatives of international organizations to identify joint efforts needed to achieve sustainable recovery of the region. Discussions will focus on five main areas: economic development, including business environment and infrastructure projects; community security; humanitarian situation; improvement of cooperation of between authorities and civil society; development of free and responsible media.

Ambassador Vaidotas Verba, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine will open the discussions.

NOTE TO MEDIA

The Forum will be held in Jewelry House SA&GA (41 Kramatorskyi Blvd, Kramators'k, Donetsk Oblast, 84300, Ukraine) and will involve the civil initiatives fair to take place from 15:00 to 19:00 on 13 May 2015. The dialogue sessions will be held from 10:00 to 16:00 on 14 May 2015.

Media are cordially invited to attend the opening of the dialogue sessions on 10:00 of 14 May 2015 (registration begins at 9:30) and the press-briefing at 10:45. Journalists are also encouraged to join the discussions on development of free and responsible media to take place from 11:30 to 16:00.

Media professionals wishing to cover the event are kindly requested to confirm their participation by calling +38096 043 66 05 (press-office of Donetsk Oblast Military and Civilian Administration). Civil initiatives fair on 13 May 2015 is open to the press.

 

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• OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine to hold news briefing in Kyiv today
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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 8 May 2015

Les Nations Unies ont fermement condamné mardi l'escalade de la violence au Soudan du Sud, manifestée par l'intensification des combats dans l'Etat d'Unité et l'éruption de tensions intercommunautaires entre personnes déplacées internes à Juba, la capitale du pays.

La Procureur de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), Fatou Bensouda, a estimé mardi devant le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU que la communauté internationale devrait étudier des solutions pour lutter contre l'impunité en Libye, notamment la formation d'un groupe international de contact sur les questions judiciaires.

Lors de la deuxième rencontre mondiale de la « Fondation des Amis de la Hongrie », samedi à Budapest, Viktor Orbán a donné l’impression de souhaiter la mort de la démocratie.

La Hongrie est-elle sur la voie d’une démocratie despotique ? Cette question, Hulala l’a posée au début du mois d’août 2014, quelques jours après que le Premier ministre hongrois ait affirmé « construire un état illibéral », prenant exemple sur des pays comme la Russie, la Turquie et la Chine. Ce discours tenu à Băile Tuşnad en Roumanie est resté depuis comme l’un des grands tournants de « l’Orbanisme ».

« La nation hongroise n’est pas une simple addition de personnes, mais une communauté qui doit être organisée, renforcée et construite, a-t-il argumenté. En ce sens, le nouvel État que nous construisons en Hongrie est illibéral ».

Le discours qu’a tenu Viktor Orbán samedi à Budapest est du même acabit : c’est au peuple hongrois qu’il revient de prendre son destin en main face à un Ouest décadent. Aucun tabou ne saurait se mettre en travers du chemin qui doit le conduire vers son destin glorieux.

Mais le Premier ministre hongrois est allé plus loin, en questionnant non plus seulement la nature de ce que doit être la démocratie (libérale ou pas), mais en remettant en cause explicitement la démocratie en tant que système politique capable, et en remettant en cause implicitement la démocratie en tant que système politique souhaitable.

« Comment se fait-il que pendant que les Européens – y compris nous-mêmes – prônons la démocratie contre les systèmes non-démocratiques, ce sont eux qui ont le plus de succès aujourd’hui ? Est-ce que la démocratie dans les décennies à venir – comme nous aimerions le penser – sera un bon système politique ? »

Puis de fustiger la perte d’identité européenne, l’immigration et le multiculturalisme, ses nouveaux chevaux de bataille depuis les attentats à Paris au début de l’année et qu’il a mentionné une nouvelle fois dans ce discours.

Et enfin de se lancer dans une diatribe contre le progressisme :

« Aujourd’hui, la majorité pense que l’Europe devrait se concentrer sur le respect des droits individuels, et cela signifie trois choses. Qu’il serait bon pour notre liberté individuelle de se débarrasser de notre identité sexuelle. Ils pensent aussi que se débarrasser de notre identité nationale fera avancer la cause de la liberté. Ils pensent que nous serions mieux si nous pouvions nous débarrasser de ce qui fait de nous des créatures de Dieu. […] Mais nous ne sommes pas d’accord. Il est préférable de l’admettre ouvertement. À notre avis, l’homme ne sera pas libre s’il supprime les obstacles qui lui ont été imposés en étant qu’entité créée. À notre avis, nous ne devons nous débarrasser ni de notre identité sexuelle ni de notre identité nationale. Nous ne pouvons pas transiger sur cela, même si notre réputation doit en pâtir. Sur ces questions, nous ne pouvons pas mentir. »

Sources : MTI, le site gouvernemental kormany.hu et le blog Hungarian Spectrum pour les traductions des passages du discours.

Crédit photo : Gergely BOTÁR

Instead of being resolved, the long power struggle between parliament and the Provincial Councils (PC) about how much and what kind of authority the councils would have has entered a new round in 2015 – with no end in sight. In 2014, under the previous president, a new law was designed to solve this issue. But it was caught in a three-way controversy between the new head of state, parliament and the councils during which the authorities demanded by the councils were taken away and returned and taken away again. The PCs reacted with street protests, asking for a presidential decree. They got one of a lesser status that resulted in some clarifications and even restored their desired “oversight” authority. But the decree still needs to be turned into law – and parliament has no reason to approve it this time. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane and Thomas Ruttig reveal how the controversy evolved, provide an update on the state of the affair and take a closer look at why it is still unresolved and bogged down in confusion – it is a story of poor previous legislation, conflicting interests and shifting positions.

Since they were elected for the first time in 2005, Afghanistan’s Provincial Councils (PCs) have been suffering from ill-defined and, its members think, too little authority. Those elected to the councils ten years ago found out, once in their positions, that they had few facilities and no budget and that governors were often reluctant to work with them. The key issue is ‘oversight’ – which could be of any or all – or none – of the following: government budgets spent in the province, government services, the implementation of development projects and detention centres.

A new provincial council law signed by former president Hamed Karzai in 2007 contained wording that gave the PCs “oversight” authority in their respective provinces, but it remained vague in defining this authority. Even this was too much for the Wolesi Jirga, the parliament’s lower house. Arguing with a provision in the constitution, it claimed exclusive “oversight” rights for itself, and wanted only to concede an “advisory” function to the PCs (for previous reporting, see here). Ever since, this has remained the unresolved core issue.

The PCs’ quest for a new provincial council law

After the 2007 law was passed, the provincial councils started to lobby for another amendment of the law that would define their “oversight” authority, with the purpose of generally increasing their role. Four years later, in May 2011, with still no satisfactory solution in sight, the chiefs of all 34 PCs met for the first time to organise joint action (see here). After that meeting, which took place in Herat, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), in charge of coordination between the various branches of government at the local level, started drafting another law.

This took another three years. During that time, the draft law was first submitted to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), which has to ensure that all laws are in accordance with existing law but which also has the authority to change draft laws without going back to the author. This is exactly what it did in this case: It removed the PCs’ oversight authority. Then the revised draft was put before the Council of Ministers for decision. The Councils of Ministers, ignoring IDLG’s lobbying to retain the original text, approved the MoJ version and sent it on to the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of parliament, in January 2014. In another attempt to lobby for their oversight right, representatives of all 34 provincial councils met the administrative board of the lower house and asked it to adopt the IDLG version of the draft (see here). The lower house, instead, approved a version of the law that gave “advisory” rather than “oversight” authority to the provincial councils (for more details see here).

The provincial councils did not take this in silence. They met with the senators a week later, in the presence of IDLG representatives (see here and here), demanding that the senators return the oversight authority into the law. (The senate, the upper house, has to approve all laws passed by the Wolesi Jirga.) The senate did indeed amend the law again on 20 April 2014 and subsequently managed to convince the lower house members in the joint commission (that now needed to hammer out the differences) to return this authority to the provincial councils. Finally, both houses approved a version of the law on 20 October 2014 that did indeed give oversight authority to the provincial councils. The law was sent to the president for his signature on 16 November 2014.

On 29 December 2014, the president sent the law back, unsigned. According to the lower house speaker, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, addressing the house on 28 January 2015, the president had refused to sign the law because he was not happy with the oversight authority for the provincial councils. (1)

When the president refuses to sign a law, the lower house – according to Article 94 of the constitution – can still pass the rejected draft by a two-thirds majority. This authority is given to uphold parliament’s role as the main legislative body and to prevent the president from overruling it.

On 28 January 2015, before the lower house discussed and voted on the rejected law again, Ibrahimi appealed to the MPs to exert their authority “to approve the law by a two thirds majority or amend the law in the normal process.” (In the latter alternative, the law would be sent back to one of its 18 commissions for more discussion, then would be voted on again in the lower house, then would move on to the upper house and to the president for his signature.) Instead, however, the MPs did both; they amended the law and then accepted it by a two-thirds majority. Noticing that the president supported their initial position, they reneged on their compromise with the senate and removed the PCs’ oversight authority again.

The majority of the MPs argued that such authority was against the constitution, as it only mentions an advisory role for local government institutions, (Article 139). Overseeing government activities, both at the national and local level, they say, is the exclusive responsibility of the lower house and a shared authority would cause conflict between it and the provincial councils. Indeed, controversies have erupted over how responsibilities should be divided. On 19 April 2014, for example, MPs from Jawzjan province accused members of the Jawzjan provincial council of interfering with their tasks, circumventing the MPs and discussing provincial affairs directly with some ministers – after PC members accused them of carelessness towards the local population;  (see here).

This argument – that giving PCs oversight of local government institutions is unconstitutional – had, however, already been rejected by the Independent Commission for Oversight over the Constitution’s Implementation (ICOCI); it had earlier ruled that neither giving nor withholding such an authority would be against the constitution.

What is really at stake?

The lobby for a new law focused on three main issues. The first and most important was to increase the role of provincial councils by boosting their oversight authority. According to the 2007 PC law, they could only oversee the effectiveness of provincial budget expenditures. (2) The new draft law, rejected by the MPs and the president, gave PCs the authority to also oversee the implementation of development projects, the quality of these projects and service delivery by the local government. (3) A second issue was increased financial independence. In the 2007 law, the provincial governor’s office was to pay PC members’ salaries and expenditures, which made them dependent on the governor’s office. In the new draft law, salaries and expenditure was provided by the central government through the IDLG. (There were also problems with the wording, which needed to be corrected.)

The main point of contention has been the oversight authority. Supporters of this authority argued that boosting the role of the elected PCs could help control corruption and abuse at the local government level. Others, however, argued that the greater power could further corrupt PC members, or enhance their chances to use their position for exacting undue influence, for example by pushing for the appointment of people close to them. This is what, according to Ahmad Khamush who is in charge of IDLG’s Local Council Affairs Unit, the president refers to when he says this authority could lead to “new cycles of corruption” at the local level (see also here).

A decree, instead of a law

In response to the Wolesi Jirga’s turn-around on the law, on 29 January 2015, 16 of the 34 provincial councils closed their offices in protest and sent representatives to Kabul to make their case. They met President Ashraf Ghani on 3 February 2015 who, according to this Palace statement, said that he now agreed with the supervisory role of provincial councils but “within a specific set of criteria with transparent accountability.”

On 4 February 2015, Ahmad Khamush from the IDLG, which initially drafted the new law and advocated for adding the oversight authority, in a press conference – reported by Afghan media – tried to explain this shift in the president’s position:

President Ghani rejected the provincial council law because some members of the provincial councils misused their authority in the past. The president thought giving such authority to the provincial councils would create a new cycle of corruption at the local level. But after the president met with representatives of 16 provincial councils, on 3 February, he agreed with the nature of oversight authority for the Provincial Councils, but he stressed this authority should be implemented based on specific mechanisms and within particular scopes [sah-e nezarat].

But although the president apparently now agreed to the oversight authority in principle, no practical action was taken. So PC members – including the heads of all 34 provinces – stepped up their campaign, came to Kabul and took to the streets in protest, blocking the road to Kabul’s international airport on 12 February 2015 (see here and here). On 16 February 2015, second vice-president Sarwar Danesh met PC representatives (see here) and promised on behalf of the president that a presidential decree would be issued in the next cabinet meeting, planned for 25 February 2015 (see here). On 26 February 2015, Ali Yazdanparast, a member of Kabul’s provincial council told AAN that the cabinet had indeed decided to return the oversight authority by a presidential decree, but that no one had seen the decree yet.

When faced with further delays, the PC representatives staged a two-day sit-in at the Office for Administrative Affairs (see here) on 3 and 4 March 2015, refusing to leave until the president issued the decree they demanded. Finally, after 38 days of protests, Ghani issued an ‘administrative’ decree – as opposed to a full-fledged ‘legislative’ one – on 5 March 2014 (see here).

Why an administrative decree and what does it say?

The president can issue two kinds of decree: administrative and legislative. An administrative decree is a directive for governmental officials and does not need the approval of the parliament. A legislative decree, usually simply called a ‘presidential decree,’ however , has the status of a law. The president can issue such decrees on pressing issues when the parliament is in recess, but they should be approved by the parliament as soon as it returns. (4)

After the parliament went into its winter recess (and after it had voted down the PCs’ oversight authority) in January 2015, the provincial councils asked for a legislative decree. The cabinet approved the request on 25 February, but the president, instead, issued an administrative decree. A reliable source within the palace told AAN that after the cabinet agreed to issue the decree, some of the president’s advisors persuaded him not to confirm the decision of the cabinet. That at least an administrative decree was issued appears to have been the result of the pressure of the provincial councils’ sustained protests.

The decree on the PCs’ oversight authority has three articles. Based on these articles, they have been given back the oversight authorities that were contained in the 2007 law. However, the provisions in the decree also do not exceed those already given in the 2007 law, and the exact mandate and mechanisms continue to remain vague. Nevertheless, the IDLG is now tasked with providing the facilities to implement the new provisions. (5)

The 2007 PC law mentions the word oversight (nezarat) twice. The first time, in Article 2, it says that the “Provincial Council . . . advises the local administration and oversees [it]” and the second time, in Article 4.2, the law gives power to the PCs to “advise on and oversee the effective use of financial resources at the provincial level.” The law, however, does not specify the mechanism: how practically a provincial council should oversee the provincial administration and what it can do with the oversight authority. The law is also silent about the responsibility of the local administration, in particular whether and how it should react to the provincial council’s recommendations and if not, what the next step would be. In fact, referring back to the 2007 law with regard to the overseeing authorities means a continuation of uncertainties – one of the things that those lobbying for the new law had hoped to address.

Following the issuance of a law with a clarifying decree, as president Ghani did, is not unprecedented. Former president Hamed Karzai did something similar after the issuance of the 2007 PC law when, on 11 May 2007, he issued a decree (6) saying that the provincial governors should prepare their development budget plans together with the PCs and that the plans should be approved by them before submitting them to the central government. Karzai’s decree also made the provincial governors responsible for providing PCs with facilities and specified that the councils’ oversight authority included “monitoring the implementation of law, balanced reconstruction, reform and good governance.” The mechanism for overseeing and the obligation to implement decisions of the provincial councils were, however, also not addressed in Karzai’s decree. This decree is no longer valid.

Whereas Karzai’s decree was mainly a clarification of the law existing at the time, one could argue that Ghani’s decree in practice overrules the law. Although the newly adopted law does not explicitly say that PCs cannot have oversight authority, this provision was clearly removed from the final version of the law. According to a source from the presidential office, the decision to issue an administrative decree rather than a legislative one was taken after some of the president’s advisers argued that returning the oversight authority would damage the relationship between the president and the Wolesi Jirga. This was particularly relevant as the government, at that point, still needed the lower house’s vote of confidence for the remaining members of its cabinet. So far none of the MPs has reacted against the decree.

The president’s conditions

When the president said he would return the oversight authority to the provincial councils, he did so under two conditions: The oversight should be based on a specific mechanism, and the PCs should issue quarterly reports of their activities to him. Or as described in this palace statement:

[The] President added that the supervisory role has to be in the frame of a clear contract bearing mutual accountability. The IDLG has been instructed to come up with a draft identifying the legitimate supervisory discretion of Provincial Councils, continued President Ghani stating that the amendment will, after Provincial Councils’ consensus, be placed before the parliament.

This is based on Article 40 of the current PC law that gives authority to IDLG to approve procedures (such as how the PCs can use their oversight authority in practice), in coordination with PC heads. According to the customs of Afghanistan’s legislative system, administrations have the right to develop and approve procedures by themselves, and there is no need for confirmation by the president or the Council of Ministers. The drafting of the procedure also would, finally, involve PC members in fixing what and how they can exercise their oversight right and how their findings will be dealt with.

Accordingly, the IDLG drafted a procedure and presented it to the PC representatives on 7 February 2015. The representatives suggested certain amendments, including making oversight a daily authority on topics that can be suggested by individual members and, specifically, adding oversight of the detention sector. A revised version of the draft procedure was presented during a conference in Kabul on 2–4 May 2015, to which all members of the 34 provincial councils were invited by the senate.

The current draft, which AAN has seen, has 13 articles and says that PCs can oversee the following fields: provision of services by the local governmental authorities, detention centres, budget expenditures, the implementation of development projects and project indicators. The procedure stresses that, because these responsibilities require technical knowledge that members of the provincial councils may not have, they will need to use the services of experts. (The procedure for hiring such experts remains open, again.)

The oversight mechanism is also clarified in the procedure and seems designed to prevent individual meddling. The PCs are instructed to exercise their oversight authority through permanent committees (in Dari: kamitaha-ye muwazaf) – somewhat similar to the parliament’s commissions – the structure of which they can decide themselves. In case of necessary investigations into wrongdoing in the province, they can become active on their own initiative, after confirmation by a two-thirds majority of all members, or based on complaints from residents on a particular issue. (In the second case, the procedure concerning how many PC members must agree to form such a committee is left open.) The committees are not allowed to send their recommendations directly to the involved local institutions; instead they should go through the provincial governor’s office. If the local institutions ignore their recommendations, the PCs can forward their recommendations to the president or the parliament through the IDLG.

The procedure would make local government authorities responsible to report regularly to the PCs. For example, provincial administrations are instructed to share their budgets within 20 days of the parliament’s approval of the national budget and to quarterly provide reports on the progress and challenges of the projects and expenditures of both the development and ordinary budget.

The procedure also lays down some limitations for PC members: they are not allowed to fire or appoint any employee; they cannot intervene illegally (ie outside the oversight process) to ask the provincial government to stop or implement any action; and they cannot sign contracts or support anyone to get a contract with the local administration. All these are currently widespread practices. Finally, the procedure gives the right to residents of a particular province to complain against PC members or the PC as a whole. This complaint is then addressed by the Code of Conduct Committee (Kumita-ye Usul-e Raftari) of the same PC or by the IDLG. If the complaint brings up legally culpable offences, the Code of Conduct Committee should send it to the Attorney General’s Office for prosecution.

There is only one problem. Despite the oversight right, in principleconfirmed by the president’s March 2015 decree, it has not yet been made law. And this needs to involve the Wolesi Jirga, which is sticking to its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight rights.

More opposition

In addition, PCs are still opposing the compromise that the president’s decree might have made possible. The discussion of the draft during the conference in early May was meant to result in its confirmation by PC members and to wrap up the whole debate. But this did not happen. PC members avoided publicly expressing either their support or opposition to the draft procedure. But at the margins of the conference, a number of them argued, when speaking to AAN, that the procedure was meaningless, because now the oversight authority is not backed up by a proper law, and because it unduly limits their authority. (AAN did not hear a single voice of support for the procedure.) They also raised further points that should be included in the procedure (for example, the right to oversee procurements on the provincial level) or dropped (for example, the provision that a two-thirds majority is required for setting up ad hoc committees).

Since the PCs failed to accept IDLG’s procedure on the oversight authorities at the early May conference, the issue of the PC law is, in essence, back at square one. The Wolesi Jirga has not given up its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight rights, while the PCs – in their dealings with the IDLG – are constantly upping the ante. They also reject the compromise laid out in the president’s decree and the procedures developed on its basis.

The protracted conflict over the PCs’ oversight authority is more than just a controversy over details of an administrative issue. It reflects how poor legislation inherited from the previous government (regardless of whether the shortcomings represent a lack of capacity and understanding or are the result of political intent) continues to affect the working of the current one. Another inheritance from the Karzai era is the strained relations between the executive and the legislative – the latter was often outmanoeuvred by the former and therefore is hitting back wherever opportunity arises. Provincial councils are caught in the middle.  However, they are not fully unselfish in this case; after all, Afghans know how elected and other positions are used to bargain for favours. With their resistance to the IDLG procedure, and their constant advancement of new preconditions, they try to defend ‘rights’ of influence that parliamentarians ‘traditionally’ had but which do not fit within the new constitutional framework.

Although this issue has not yet been raised by the PCs, how the PCs are subordinated to control by the executive is also problematic. Lines between the executive and the provincial-level element of the legislative, the PCs, are blurred by at least two factors: they report to the president (it would be more ‘natural’ for them to report within the legislative, to parliament) and the IDLG has budgetary control over the PCs. The IDLG both drafts the PCs’ budgets and is responsible for hiring their administrative staff.

All in all, the PC law controversy is a case study in how weak political institutions remain, and how easily vested interests can exploit holes in the law and, in this case, prevent necessary checks-and-balances from emerging on a subnational level.

What’s possible next?

Now, despite the mutual blockade between the Wolesi Jirga and the PCs, some PC members are still arguing for another attempt at overhauling the law. Some politicians support this, at least verbally. Muhammad Alam Izedyar, first deputy chairman of the senate, promised the PC members at the same conference that the lower house would start another amendment process, based on Articles 95 and 97 of the Constitution (7) that give such a right to both houses of the parliament. While a legal base for recognising the PCs’ oversight authority is an essential need, it is however unclear whether Izedyar will be able to muster the required support of ten senators for such an initiative, and then get a majority in the house. But even if this happens, the amended law also needs to go through the Wolesi Jirga again. Under the current circumstances, however, it is difficult to see why the Wolesi Jirga should give up its principled opposition to the PCs’ oversight authority this time.

 

(1) According to some there might be an issue with the date of the rejection, given that the draft of the Provincial Council Law was initially sent to the government on 16 November 2014. The Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, which is in charge of communication between the government and parliament, however sent the draft back for spelling and grammar corrections after which the parliament resent it on 16 December 2014. President Ghani then rejected the law on 29 December 2014. According to Article 94 of the constitution, if the president disagrees with an approved draft of law, he can reject and resend the draft to the lower house within 15 days of receiving the draft. If the president neither signs nor rejects the law within 15 days, it will be automatically applicable, without the signature of the president.

Tayeba Khawari, head of the Bamyan provincial council (Afghanistan’s first female provincial council chair), argued on her Facebook page, that because the president had rejected the draft of provincial council law too late, 42 days after it was sent, it would automatically become law (here). She said that none of the related laws and regulations say that the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs has the authority to resend drafts to the parliament; once the draft is issued by the parliament and sent to the government, only the president can sign or reject the draft. In practice however draft laws are regularly sent back to the parliament for corrections before being sent on to the president.

(2) Relevant article in the 2007 provincial council law on the provincial councils’ oversight authorities:

Article 4:

Para 2: [Provincial councils] give advice and do oversight on the efficiency of the expenditure of the provincial budget.

(3) Relevant article in the original 2014 provincial council draft law (which was not adopted):

Article 8:

Para 3: [Provincial councils] give advice to the provincial governor and the related governmental organisation and oversee the effective use of the financial resources and their [the provincial governor and other related governmental organizations] activities with the purpose of filling the gaps and boosting the quality of services.

Para 13: [Provincial councils] advise and oversee the development projects with the purpose of boosting the quality and quantity of governmental services.

(4) See Article 79 of the Constitution: During the recess of Parliament, the Government shall, in case of an immediate need, issue legislative decree except in matters related to budget and financial affairs. Legislative decrees, after endorsement by the President, shall acquire the force of law. Legislative decrees shall be presented to the Parliament within thirty days of convening its first session, and if rejected by the Parliament, they become void.

(5) Full text of the decree on oversight authority of the provincial councils:

Article 1: The provincial councils can use the oversight authority as stipulated in the provincial council law that was issued in official gazette 920 on 30 Hamal 1386 (20 April 2007).

Article 2: The Independent Directorate of Local Governance is in charge of providing facilities for the implementation of the first article of this decree.

Article 3: This decree is enforceable from the date issued.

(6) Presidential Decree, number 862

Date of issue: 11/5/2007

According to Article 139 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the Provincial Councils Law, the below points with purpose of making cooperation and better understating between the local governors and the members of the Provincial Councils and boosting the importance and role of the Provincial Councils in the society and strengthen of the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is approved.

1-  The Provincial Governors shall prepared the provincial development plans together with the Provincial Councils and submit it after verifying of the Provincial Council.

2-  The Provincial Governors shall provide a better space for all activities of the Provincial Councils that include oversight from the implementation of law, balanced development, reform and other important sections.

The authority of overseeing on implementation of this decree is given to Office of Administration Affairs, OAA (Edareh Omor).

Hamed Karzai

The President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

(7) Article 95: The proposal for drafting laws shall be made by the Government or members of the Parliament or, in the domain of regulating judiciary, by the Supreme Court, through the Government.

Article 97: . . . If the proposal for drafting a law is made by ten members of either of the two houses, it shall be after approval of one fifth of the House where it was initiated, included in the work agenda of the House.

 

This year, the renowned Integrated Air and Missile Defence conference is branching out towards a special Eastern Europe-focused summit to be held in Warsaw this July. Senior ministers and officers from Poland, as well as the likes of Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the

From Arlene Kushner
May 7, 2015

Could Be Worse
Before I begin to discuss how it could be worse, a couple of housekeeping matters.

First, dear readers, please know that I am working overtime on the Legal Grounds Campaign.  That’s a good thing, because it means we are developing a solid campaign to coincide with the formation of the new government.  But it also means that there is less time for me to write. And so, please understand if sometimes intervals of several days go by in which I do not post.  Nothing is wrong.

I’ll pick up again on my regular posting schedule as soon as possible.

Thank you.

As to the Legal Grounds Campaign, if you have not done so, please do take a look at our website: http://israelrights.com .  Please! join the campaign (no cost), and take the time to learn about the campaign and Israel’s legal rights by reading the material on the site.Thank you again.

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And then...Credit: CagleCartoons
This lovely man is Yaakov Kirschen, originator of the Dry Bones cartoons. When you visit our website you will see the cartoon he did to address our issues.

When I wrote about him recently, I referred to him as Yaakov Kirschner.  And I do not excuse myself for this silly mistake.  I sentence myself to 100 lashes with a wet noodle.

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Now let’s talk about how it could be worse. What I have in mind is the new coalition that was formed, literally, at the very last minute, by Prime Minister Netanyahu.Credit: presidentconference

Deadline was midnight, last night, and he completed negotiations with Bayit Yehudi at about 10:30 PM.

This has not been a happy time for the Israeli electorate. Since the election on March 17, there has been no clarity.

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Background:

President Rivlin, after meeting with all factions, had offered Netanyahu – whose Likud faction has 30 mandates - the first opportunity to form a governing coalition. A coalition requires sufficient factions coming together with agreements so that they collectively represent at least 61 seats in the Knesset (half plus one).  When Netanyahu could not accomplish this within the allotted time, he requested an extension of 14 days, as the law permits.

I had made reference in postings during this time to the fact that rumors were flying fast and furious.  In the main, I did not write about those rumors – as they were just that: rumors, sometimes planted for purposes of influencing one faction or another, without shedding any genuine light on the negotiating situations.

There was (still is) talk of a unity government with the Zionist Union (Herzog-Livni).  It was said, until very recently, that Netanyahu wanted Lieberman to continue in his role as Foreign Minister. There was a great deal of scuttlebutt regarding what positions former Likudnik Moshe Kahlon of Kulanu was insisting upon – Kulanu’s orientation is socio-economic. It was widely understood, and correctly so, that Lapid of Yesh Atid would remain on the outside.

And there was a lot of talk about discontent expressed by many of the senior individuals who had secured seats within the Likud party.

And on and on.

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This new coalition, once it was formed, was supposed to bring stability and a cohesiveness that would permit strong governance.  But in the end of the day, that is not what we have gotten, in several respects.

The first parties Netanyahu signed coalition agreements with were Kulanu and UTJ (United Torah Judaism – Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox), with 10 and six mandates respectively.  It does appear that Kahlon (pictured) will be Finance Minister, as had been promised, and have control of related agencies that will permit him to push forward certain reforms – which have undoubtedly been written into the coalition agreement.   
Credit: TimesofIsrael

But the UTJ agreement?  It reverses reforms that had been made in the conversion process, and reinstates funds to hareidi schools that do not teach a core curriculum.  These are very bad moves in my opinion.  That’s even before we discuss the complex matter of haredi draft (which I would like to return to at another time.)

Following this was the agreement with Shas (Sephardi ultra-Orthodox), with seven mandates.  I see this as much worse than the agreement with UTJ, because I do not believe that Shas party head Aryeh Deri is fit to be appointed dog catcher.

And what is this about?  Securing mandates for the coalition.  Not about forming a solid nationalist base, that is for sure.

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At about this point, Avigdor Lieberman, head of Yisrael Beitenu, with six mandates, announced that he was resigning forthwith from his position as Foreign Minister and would be in the opposition – refusing to take part in the new government.There was some head-scratching at this, because Lieberman had declared consistent intention of continuing in the Foreign Ministry.  And he is, generally, erratic in his statements.  But I believe the motivation for his action here became quite clear: He was disgusted with Netanyahu’s rush to bring the ultra-Orthodox parties, with their demands, into the coalition and considered it a betrayal of principles, including nationalist principles.

Lieberman’s withdrawal from the process made the numbers a lot tighter.

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The final party negotiating a coalition agreement was Bayit Yehudi, with eight mandates – headed by Naftali Bennett.  Credit: Jpost

It has been Netanyahu’s interaction with this party throughout that has been most troubling.

In the course of the elections, with Likud running neck and neck with the Zionist Union in the polls, and sometimes even falling behind Zionist Union – a call went out to nationalist voters to vote Likud rather than Bayit Yehudi in order to ensure a Likud victory.  That call was apparently successful, as Likud pulled ahead in the elections – way ahead of what polls had predicted, while Bayit Yehudi fell back a handful of mandates from what the polls had predicted.

I don’t think it is unfair to say that Naftali Bennett took a hit for Bibi Netanyahu’s sake. This is certainly the way I, and many others, saw it.  Netanyahu spoke frequently about how Bayit Yehudi and Likud were natural partners in the upcoming government.  The expectation, if this was the case, was that this would be the first coalition agreement signed.  But that is not what happened.

There are those who say that the problem was that Bennett’s demand’s were excessive: he sought either the defense or foreign ministry. And yes, Bennett is a politician among politicians. But there was more than this going on, perhaps a reflection of tensions between the two dating back for some time.  Whatever the case, there was the sense that Likud was distancing itself from Bayit Yehudi.

Was this a desire to appear more “centrist” (read, less nationalist) than Bayit Yehudi?

I am keenly aware of the enormous pressures being placed on Netanyahu from the outside – the expressed expectation that we must commit to negotiations again, etc.  But when a government is formed, if it cannot represent what we are supposed to be, than we are in trouble.

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In the end, Bennett relinquished demands for defense or foreign affairs and sought the education portfolio.  In addition, he sought he sought the Justice Ministry for Ayelet Shaked. Credit: Haaretz

At this point, Bennett was in a very strong bargaining position, because without his mandates, Netanyahu had no coalition.  He said he would walk, if his demands were not met.  After extensive negotiations, Likud agreed to accept Shaked as Justice Minister. Sort of. For there was an infuriating attempt to strip Shaked, who should be excellent in this post, of her authority in several respects.  The stipulations were:

That she not chair the Judicial Committee, the body that appoints judges for the law courts; that she not appoint religious judges; and that she not sit in the Security Cabinet – where Bennett will also be sitting.

What was so enraging about the attempt to limit Shaked’s power is that the last justice minister was Tzipi Livni, and apparently this was all right with Likud.  Livni was a fig leaf – giving the world the impression that they were seeing a government to the left. Shaked represents just the opposite.

~~~~~~~~~~

Bennett balked at these limitations, and they went back into those eleventh hour negotiations. In the end, the only restriction that remained was that a Likud minister would head the panel that would make the religious judge appointments, with Shaked and someone from Shas participating.

Shaked will also sit in the Security Cabinet – although it is likely that Netanyahu will enlarge the number of individuals sitting in it to dilute the Bayit Yehudi influence.

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My friends, this is huge, and can change the face of Israel in several major respects.

A Likud official was cited thus (emphasis added):

“...the justice minister will soon have to decide on who the next attorney general will be.  It’s a very sensitive position...The second problem is that Shaked is spearheading the battle to change the face of the Supreme Court. Netanyahu has so far avoided going head to head with the court, and he may well not want this headache.”
While Shelly Yachimovich, former head of Labor, said:

“Prepare to see a hard and bitter battle for the welfare and identity of the judicial system and law enforcement...She is capable, but her view of the courts, the judiciary, and the legislature, are the opposite of mine.”
http://www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-homes-ayelet-shaked-gets-justice-ministry-with-limitations/

Need we say more?

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Nor is Bennett as Education Minister a small matter.  The future of the nation rests with the understandings our young people have about Jewish identity, Jewish rights, and our place in the land.

Hear a discussion of these issues, on Voice of Israel, that clarifies their importance:

http://www.voiceofisrael.com/naftali-bennett-on-education-jewish-identity-and-israeli-sovereignty/

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And so, it could be a lot worse indeed.  In spite of Shas and all the rest, there may be some reforms ahead that can affect Israel in significant ways.  Let us pray so.

Let me add here that a third member of Bayit Yehudi (Tekuma faction), will be Minister of Agriculture.

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One of the major problems to be faced with this new coalition is that it has a razor-thin majority, and is thus vulnerable to extortion that can make moving ahead difficult.  (“You do that, and my party walks, bringing down the government.”) The likelihood that this government, as presently constituted, will be stable enough to last four years is small.

Netanyahu commented yesterday that “61 is good, 61 plus is better,” thereby stimulating speculation that he intends to enlarge the coalition.  Those rumors that he seeks Herzog for a unity government persist, but Herzog insists that he has no intention of bailing Netanyahu out. A political consultant I spoke with today believes that Herzog means it – that it would not serve him well to join Netanyahu now.

A second possibility is that Netanyahu still hopes to lure Lieberman, with his six mandates, back in. And there are other more obscure possibilities as well.  We shall see...

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In the meantime, there are more immediate issues confronting Netanyahu.  He still has to announce all ministry appointments. Will Yaalon retain his position as Defense Minister?  Seems a good bet but we do not know yet with certainty.  And Foreign Minister?  Netanyahu is reported to be reserving this for himself. But there is the feeling in certain quarters that he’s saving this for Lieberman, should he want to return, or Herzog, should he be lured in.

Additionally, there is discontent within Likud, as I had indicated above.  So many major posts have been given to other parties that Likud senior party members feel short-changed. Thus is there also talk about creating more ministries, which would require a change in the law.  From the opposition Yair Lapid says he will fight this tooth and nail because of the added expense to the country.

And so, we have a government. But there is yet a great deal to resolve.  Within a week, there should be answers, and I will track this to the best of my ability.

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Let me end with two good news pieces that show how special we are, no matter what the world thinks:

A team of five Israeli medical clowns has gone to Nepal to help reduce trauma and anxiety.Credit: Reuters

http://www.jpost.com/International/In-photos-Israeli-clowns-help-ease-trauma-in-quake-hit-Nepal-402253

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A medical team from IsraAID, an Israeli humanitarian response non-profit, has carried supplies in backpacks to reach remove villages in Nepal and provide care to the people.  Participating are ten doctors, nurses and midwives, who left their jobs in Israel to volunteer for two weeks in Nepal.  They first made their way to a group of mountain villages known as Thangpaldkap, in the district of Sidhulpalchowk, one of the hardest-hit regions of Nepal.

http://www.timesofisrael.com/clinic-in-a-backpack-brings-israeli-relief-to-remote-nepal-areas/

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© Arlene Kushner. This material is produced by Arlene Kushner, functioning as an independent journalist. Permission is granted for it to be reproduced only with proper attribution.If it is reproduced and emphasis is added, the fact that it has been added must be noted.

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It’s almost axiomatic by now that Chinese bureaucrats of all stripes should be careful what they wear on their wrist. On May 5, a sharp-eyed Web user spotted a host on state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) wearing an Apple Watch on her left wrist while giving a news report that day. After the user posted screen shots of CCTV host Wang Yinqi and her expensive timepiece, the photos spread quickly on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like microblogging platform, setting off a fervent debate about what counts as luxury and excess in contemporary China.

The photos initially attracted attention as an example of an ostentatious display; a spate of news articles and Weibo media posts on May 5 accused Wang of “showing off her wealth.” Some Weibo users chimed in to criticize Wang as well. “Official media should appear thrifty,” wrote one Weibo user, arguing that the image of official media and that of the government that controls it are closely related. More than one speculated without evidence that Wang, beautiful and in her mid-20s, might be mistress to a wealthy man.

Those claims are harsh (and unsubstantiated) – but the vitriol toward China’s reviled state broadcaster is more understandable. While CCTV has often served as an important mouthpiece for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s nationwide anti-corruption crackdown, now into its third year, the state broadcaster itself has been embroiled in several scandals during that time. In July 2014, authorities unexpectedly detained one of CCTV’s most outspoken hosts, Rui Chenggang. That same month, authorities held senior CCTV executive Guo Zhenxi for suspected bribery, and in August 2014 they detained Huang Haitao, a prominent CCTV deputy director, for alleged graft.

Expensive watches have become a symbol of corruption in China ever since August 2012, when netizens unearthed an image of provincial safety bureaucrat Yang Dacai smiling at the scene of a deadly traffic accident — and wearing a luxury timepiece likely beyond his modest means. Further images of Yang’s wrist-wear soon went viral on the Chinese web, sparking a grassroots campaign to oust him from office. It succeeded, and in September 2013, Yang was sentenced to 14 years in prison for corruption. Since then, party leaders have been careful either not to purchase luxury watches, or at least not to wear them in public.

Apple’s new watches are harder to categorize. The most expensive, retailing at up to $20,000 and called Apple Watch Edition, seems tailor-made for China’s still-massive luxe market; the priciest model sold out in China within two days of its offering. But lower-tier models can cost anywhere from $349 to $1,099, a similar price range as the iPhone 6, Apple’s newest smart phone model which after its Chinese release in October 2014 marked the first time more iPhones were sold in China than in the United States. In other words, while Apple watches aren’t cheap, neither are they out of reach for members of China’s giant urban middle class.

That may explain why most web users among the thousands of commenters refuted the notion that Wang’s timepiece was anything glamorous. “What’s wrong with wearing an Apple?” one Weibo user wrote. “It’s priced for the common people.” “A few hundred dollars for a watch, and they’re saying it’s ‘showing off wealth,’” wrote one user on May 6 in a popular comment. Yet another wrote in a popular comment, “When a couple hundred dollars is flaunting riches, it’s a beggar country indeed.”

There’s no question that, as a group, Weibo users, who mostly access the platform via smartphones, are more affluent than the country at large. But the online support for Wang (or at least, her timepiece) marks a turnabout from 2008, the year before Apple began selling its signature smart phone in China, when iPhones were the rare and much-coveted property of expats or overseas Chinese back for a stay in their homeland. Then again, according to World Bank statistics, in 2008, per-capita GDP in China was $3,414. In 2013, it was $6,807. That’s why Ms. Wang’s career is probably safe. As the ranks of China’s urban middle class and its elite continue to grow, the normalcy of even the newest and most expensive Apple products can be taken as a sign of the times.

Fair Use/Weibo