The National Interest

The starboard side of the former Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk moored in Shenzhen, China, as seen from a motorboat. (Wikimedia Commons / BrokenSphere)

Topic: Naval Warfare Blog Brand: The Buzz Region: Europe Tags: Aircraft Carriers, China, Kiev-class, Minsk, Russia, and Russian Navy How a Mighty Russian Aircraft Carrier Became a Burned-Out Husk in China February 11, 2026 By: TNI Staff Share

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The Soviet-era Minsk aircraft carrier, a hybrid warship designed for the Cold War, is now rotting away in a closed theme park in Nantong, China.

To describe Soviet-era Kiev-class vessels as “aircraft carriers” has always been a stretch. Unlike the hefty, flat-decked warships that function as floating airbases, the class more closely resembles a cruiser-carrier hybrid. They were built to fulfill the Soviets’ need for a sea-based missile platform during the Cold War. Despite the carrier’s armament-lugging capabilities, its overall effectiveness was sorely limited.

Today, the Kiev class warship is rotting away in a China-based theme park that is now closed.

Introducing the Kiev-Class Aircraft Carrier A starboard bow view of the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev (CVHG 051) underway. (US Navy / Wikimedia Commons)

• Year Introduced: 1975
• Number Built: 4
• Length: 273 m (895 ft 8 in)
• Beam (Width): 53 m (173 ft 11 in)
• Displacement: ~45,000 tons full load
• Propulsion: 8 turbopressurized boilers, 4 steam turbines (200,000 shp), 4 shafts
• Top Speed: 32 knots (59 km/h, 37 mph)
• Armaments:
  • 80–200 surface-to-air missiles
  • 2 dual-purpose guns
  • 8 CIWS
  • 10 torpedo tubes
  • Air wing: ~30 aircraft, including fixed-wing and helicopters
• Crew: 1,200–1,600

Designed to rival American-made counterparts like the Kitty Hawk-class carriers, the Kiev-class vessels were specifically designated as “heavy aviation cruisers” when first introduced. Their layout was in part derived from the Orel full-deck carrier, a previous proposal that was ultimately scrapped during the draft phase.

Each ship in the Kiev class was constructed at the Ukraine-based Nikolayev South Shipyards, the primary Soviet manufacturer of large surface warships.

An angled flight-deck took up roughly two-thirds the length of the ships’ total deck, while the rest was dedicated to surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. Each was equipped with eight SS-N-12 “Sandbox” anti-ship missiles that could carry a 2,000 pound high-explosive warhead or a 250 kiloton nuclear warhead. In terms of aircraft, the Kiev ships had launchers for about a dozen Yak-38 “Forger” jump jets and Kamov Ka-25/27/29 helicopters.

In total, the Soviet Union built four Kiev-class carriers prior to its collapse in 1991. None remain in service today. The first two ships in the class, Kiev and Minsk, were each laid up during Russia’s dire financial straits in the 1990s and sold to China as museums. The third in the class, the Novorossiysk, was ultimately scrapped. Only the final Kiev-class vessel, known at the time as the Admiral Gorshkov, remains in active service—but it is now serving with the Indian Navy, rechristened the INS Vikramaditya. 

The Sad Journey of the Minsk An illustration of the Minsk under construction. (Creative Commons)

The second carrier in the Kiev class—dubbed the Minsk after the capital of the Byelorussian SSR (today Belarus)—was commissioned into the Soviet Navy in 1978. The aircraft carrier enjoyed an unremarkable service life through the 1980s, and survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, entering service in the Russian Navy. However, following a mysterious accident in 1993, Minsk was retired and mothballed at the Chernomorskiy shipyard in Mykolayiv, Ukraine.

From there, the ship’s fate grew progressively more depressing. In 1995, she was sold to a South Korean company for scrap, but her planned scrapping was cancelled following environmental protests inside South Korea. The ship was resold to a Chinese entertainment company for a meager $4.3 million, intended to be used as the centerpiece of a military-themed amusement park in China’s southern city of Shenzhen.

The park—dubbed “Minsk World”—opened in 2000, and was for a time successful. (Minsk‘s sister ship, Kiev, became the centerpiece of a similar park in China’s northeastern city of Tianjin; it now operates as a luxury hotel.) At Minsk World, the carrier was displayed alongside Chinese Q-5 Fantan combat jets and Soviet-era MiG-27 and MiG-23 swing-wing jets. According to The War Zone, “Inert weapons, or mock-ups thereof, including missiles, bombs, and torpedoes, as well as other Soviet militaria were also displayed. Exhibits covering the Chinese military were also added.” The park even held song-and-dance numbers on an outdoor stage located atop the carrier’s aircraft deck.

But the Minsk‘s fate was far less fortunate; the park closed in 2006, was reopened under new management, then closed permanently in 2016.

The beleaguered aircraft carrier was towed to Zhoushan for repairs, before being moved to Nantong in China’s central Jiangsu province, in preparation for the opening of another theme park. But that theme park, originally scheduled to open in 2017, never materialized. In the years since, the Soviet-era cruiser has continued to rot away in a man-made lagoon near the Sutong Yangtze River Bridge in Nantong, China.

The latest, and perhaps final, disaster for the Minsk took place in August 2024, when the ship caught fire during new renovations. Although no injuries were reported in the blaze, footage showed enormous waves of fire sweeping the deck, gutting the ship. An official told China National Radio after the fire that it had “made the prospects of this project full of too many uncertainties”—meaning that the Minsk is likely never to open again.

This article originally appeared in July 2024 and has been updated to include more recent information. It was originally written by Maya Carlin.

All images are Creative Commons. 

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Topic: Foreign Leaders Blog Brand: Middle East Watch Region: Middle East Tags: Ali Khamenei, Iran, Iraq, ISIS, Kurds, Nuri al-Maliki, Shia, and United States What Nuri al-Maliki’s Iraqi Comeback Means for the US February 4, 2026 By: Charbel Antoun Share

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The revival of Iraq’s most polarizing Shia leader signals Iran’s intent to set the terms of engagement with the Donald Trump administration.

Iraq’s dominant Shia bloc has reached into the past to choose a face for the future: former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. His nomination is being marketed as the return of an “experienced” strongman capable of restoring order and finally bringing Iran-aligned militias under state control. But this narrative is political theater. Maliki’s comeback is not a technocratic reset—it is a strategic message from Tehran to Washington that Iran intends to defend its primacy in Iraq through its most loyal and battle-tested operator.

Maliki’s record is not one of restraining armed groups. His tenure between 2006 and 2014 saw Iraq descend into its worst sectarian bloodshed since 2003, the loss of three provinces to ISIS, and the deepening entrenchment of Shia militias inside the state. Yet the same Iran-aligned coalition dominating parliament is reviving him now—precisely as Washington pressures Baghdad to curb militia influence and as the US facilitates the transfer of up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syria into Iraqi custody. There is more choreography to this decision than coincidence.

The Myth of Nuri al-Maliki the “Fixer”

A new narrative is taking shape: Maliki as the only figure strong enough to centralize power and impose order. Former US diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad has echoed this framing, and some regional commentators have embraced it as well. Saudi anchor Malek Alrougui argued that Maliki could “put the militias back in the bottle,” though even he conceded that the task is to “limit their power, not eliminate them.” He also noted that Iraq’s political elite seeks to construct an “Iraq under Maliki” to counterbalance a “Syria under al-Shara.” But this reading ignores the historical record. Maliki did not put the militias in the bottle; he shattered the bottle and built a political system that depended on them.

The idea that Maliki will dismantle or meaningfully weaken the militias is a structural fantasy. These groups are Iran’s primary lever of influence in Iraq. Tehran does not empower a loyalist to dismantle its own leverage.

Maliki’s likely role is to rebrand and centralize militia influence by integrating them deeper into state institutions; shield them from international scrutiny under the guise of “state control”; manage sensitive issues—including the transfer of thousands of ISIS detainees—within a security ecosystem aligned with Iran. This is not a plan to tame the militias. It is a plan to cement their position and present the arrangement to Washington as a fait accompli.

Iraqi political life often moves in circles rather than forward. As Iraqi academic Ayad Anbar notes, the system “reproduces itself without any circular or spiral development.” Maliki’s nomination fits this pattern.

Lebanese analyst Mustapha Fahs argues that the move reflects a new phase in which the Shia right and the Shia mainstream face an unprecedented challenge in maintaining their power amid regional realignment and rising domestic pressure. He also highlights the significance of Masoud Barzani’s support for Maliki—an alignment between the Shia right and the Kurdish right that exposes the depth of political bargaining required to manage Iraq’s next chapter.

Why Ali Khamenei Chose Nuri al-Maliki

Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has clearly blessed Maliki’s return over more consensus-oriented Shia figures. By elevating a polarizing veteran, Tehran signals that it values ideological loyalty over domestic legitimacy or Western approval. As Omar Abdulsattar Mahmoud—a leader in the Iraqi National Opposition Council and former member of parliament—put it, Iran is “dealing a painful blow to Trump and seizing complete control of all aspects of the Iraqi state and government.”

This sort of messaging indicates that Maliki’s return is not about governing Iraq. It is about shaping the terms of engagement with the Donald Trump administration. If Washington intends to revive elements of “maximum pressure,” Tehran is preparing to answer with “maximum resistance” through a Baghdad leadership fully aligned with its strategic worldview.

US Options: Punish Nuri al-Maliki, Don’t Just Protest

The timing of Maliki’s nomination was not lost on Washington. Just hours after the news broke, the State Department released a readout of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s call with Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani, warning that “a government controlled by Iran cannot successfully put Iraq’s own interests first, keep Iraq out of regional conflicts, or advance the mutually beneficial partnership between the United States and Iraq.” The United States evidently views Iraq’s government formation process as a strategic red line, not an internal matter, and is prepared to recalibrate its approach if Baghdad tilts decisively toward Tehran.

Then came a direct and unusually blunt intervention from President Donald Trump on Truth Social, delivering a political body blow to Maliki’s bid. ​Trump warned: “Last time Maliki was in power, the Country descended into poverty and total chaos. That should not be allowed to happen again.” He added that “because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq and, if we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of Success, Prosperity, or Freedom.” Together, these statements transform Washington’s discomfort with Maliki into a clear threat of consequences for any Iraqi faction backing his return.

In 2014, the Obama administration helped push Maliki aside to prevent total state collapse. Today, the United States faces a far more entrenched reality. Washington cannot veto Iraqi internal politics, but it can shape the cost of political choices. The question is not whether the United States can stop Maliki’s appointment; it cannot. The question is how much it will make Maliki and his backers pay for it. Realistic means to impose costs on Maliki include targeted sanctions, financial pressure, conditional security cooperation, tighter oversight of US assistance, and diplomatic isolation of militia-aligned ministries. These are the levers that remain.

The West risks comforting itself with the illusion that a “strongman” can solve Iraq’s militia problem. Maliki’s return does the opposite: it entrenches the very forces that hollowed out the Iraqi state and paved the way for ISIS’ rise. If policymakers accept the myth of the “experienced fixer,” they are simply waiting for the next collapse.

About the Author: Charbel Antoun

Charbel A. Antoun is a Washington-based journalist and writer specializing in US foreign policy, with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa. He is passionate about global affairs, conflict resolution, human rights, and democratic governance, and explores the world’s complexities through in-depth reporting and analysis.

Image: 360b / Shutterstock.com.

The post What Nuri al-Maliki’s Iraqi Comeback Means for the US appeared first on The National Interest.