The National Interest

Summary and Key Points: In the twilight of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force explored replacing the A-10 Thunderbolt II, known for its 30mm GAU-8 Avenger cannon, with a variant of the F-16, dubbed the A-16 and later the F/A-16.

-This concept involved fitting the nimble F-16 with a pod-based version of the A-10's cannon, aiming to create a more survivable close air support (CAS) platform.

-The A-16 underwent limited combat testing during Operation Desert Storm, but the idea was quickly abandoned after the cannon proved ineffective due to mounting issues and the F-16's high-speed flight profile, which hindered precise targeting.

-Despite efforts to replace the A-10, the Warthog proved irreplaceable in its CAS role, and it remains a legendary combat aircraft, beloved by troops and aviation enthusiasts alike.

The A-10 Thunderbolt II, better known as the Warthog, is renowned for its massive 30mm GAU-8 Avenger rotary cannon. But for a short time in the twilight of the Cold War, the Air Force wanted to know if it could replace the low-and-slow Warthog by strapping a variant of the same massive gun to the light-and-nimble F-16. 

This concept, known initially as the A-16 and later as the F/A-16, would see the broadly capable fighter absorb the A-10’s close air support (CAS) role by delivering a variety of air-to-ground munitions. Most prominent among its weapon systems would be gun pods carried beneath each wing and the aircraft’s center pod. These pods would house a pair of matching 7.62mm miniguns underwing, which were meant to support the primary gun system bolted to the F-16’s belly: a 30mm rotary cannon that fired Red Bull-can-sized depleted uranium projectiles at ground targets at 40 rounds per second. 

This combination of the F-16’s speed and agility and the A-10’s incredible firepower, the Air Force hoped, would result in a more survivable close air support platform – one that would be capable of offering the Warthog’s ground-pounding presence without its vulnerability to enemy air defenses. 

The idea seemed so promising that a small batch of F-16s were even modified and equipped with a new pod-based variant of the A-10’s mighty cannon and deployed to Iraq for Operation Desert Storm, where a group of pilots from the New York Air National Guard were tasked with determining once and for all whether or not this new F/A-16 concept had wings. 

However, within just about 48 hours worth of combat operations, the Air Force came to realize that despite their concerns about how survivable the Warthog may be in contested airspace, not even mounting a 30mm cannon on the F-16 would be enough to bring the A-10 down. 

The Warthog’s path to duty arguably began during the Vietnam War, when the United States came to recognize that high-speed, low-loiter time platforms like the F-4 Phantom were ill-suited to fly close air support missions for troops on the ground. As a result, the Air Force turned to its Korean War-era A-1 Skyraider for the job, but with a standard cruising speed of under 200 miles per hour and four 20mm cannons onboard with just 200 rounds per weapon, the aircraft not only lacked the necessary firepower but was also seriously vulnerable to small arms fire. 

Yet, while the need for the A-10 may have been first recognized in the Far East, the aircraft’s focus throughout development was decidedly further West – namely, in a lowland corridor on the border between East and West Germany known as the Fulda Gap. 

This area, some 60 miles northeast of Frankfurt, included several narrow open passes tucked away between rolling German hills making it uniquely suited to allow columns of Soviet armor to pour into Europe if the Cold War suddenly turned hot. With only around 250,000 American troops pre-positioned in Western Germany at the time, and roughly 1.2 million Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops staring them down from the opposing side of the Fulda Gap, NATO planners had no illusions about their chances at successfully stopping such an assault. 

“This is the frontier where it would happen,” Col. Thomas E. White, commander of the 4,500 troops in the 11th U.S. Armored Cavalry stationed at the mouth of the Fulda Gap, told the LA Times in 1987. 

The pressing need to find a way to curtail an armored Soviet advance in this region certainly informed the selection of the A-10’s primary weapon system – a massive hydraulically driven seven-barrel rotary cannon capable of slinging 30mm armor-piercing rounds with selectable speeds of 2,100 rounds per minute or a mind-blowing 4,200 rounds per minute. At full tilt, this 20-foot monster of a weapon could deposit 70 rounds on target per second, meaning the Warthog could empty its entire standard loadout in just over 16 seconds of sustained fire. 

While that might not seem like much, there aren’t many targets on the planet that could withstand a full second of sustained fire from this powerful weapon, making the 1,150-round standard loadout (and 1,174-round maximum loadout) more than enough to have the necessary impact. 

With a maximum effective range of 4,000 feet, this weapon came to dictate the A-10’s flight profile. That massive gun, dubbed the GAU-8 Avenger, was mounted along the aircraft’s center line and angled down only slightly, which meant Warthog pilots would need to fly just about directly at their targets on the ground in a shallow 30-degree dive and close to within 4,000 feet to engage them. With what was sure to be a symphony of Soviet air defense weapons firing from below, the A-10 would not be able to avoid being hit, so it was designed specifically to stay flying even after absorbing an immense amount of punishment. 

For this reason, the A-10 boasted double-redundant hydraulic flight control systems, as well as a mechanical backup in case both of those systems failed. The cockpit was encased in 1,200 pounds of titanium armor ranging in thickness from 0.5 inches to 1.5 inches – enough to withstand a direct hit from 23mm gunfire and indirect hits from weapons as large as 57mm. Its engines were positioned high atop the aircraft, limiting the chances of debris being sucked into them while operating from austere forward airstrips. Self-sealing fuel tanks with check valve-equipped fuel lines helped ensure any puncture of the fuel system wouldn’t result in the jet going down. 

The A-10 was over-engineered to be able to make it home while down an engine, or after losing half the tail or half of one of its wings. The Warthog was meant to be a flying tank, but even with all its baked-in survivability, the Air Force still recognized that the aircraft itself… just wasn’t all that survivable. 

According to a report published by Combat Aircraft magazine, the Air Force still predicted that a war in Europe would result in substantial A-10 losses, as the aircraft were tasked with engaging columns of Soviet armor amid an inverted hail storm of anti-aircraft fire. Estimates projected that in every 100 sorties, the branch could expect to lose roughly seven percent of its deployed A-10s, which was a big problem, seeing as the plan to stifle a Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap called for each pilot to fly roughly four sorties per day for a combined minimum of 250. 

As War Is Boring would later point out, a seven percent loss rate flying at that operational tempo would have meant that each of the six A-10 forward operating locations in Europe would lose at least 10 airframes per day. At that rate, America would lose every A-10 in its fleet – roughly 700 jets – in under two weeks. 

That is to say that the A-10 Thunderbolt II wasn’t designed to survive in contested airspace but was rather built to last just long enough to inflict heavy losses on invading Soviet forces before being all but inevitably shot down. This concept of operations might sound cynical to our modern ears, but it’s important to understand the stakes of such a conflict between nuclear powers. After all, Warthog pilots wouldn’t be the only ones going out in a blaze of glory if NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries started trading nuclear blows. 

Yet, while strapping highly-trained pilots into what could arguably be called heavily armed Kamikaze tank killers may have been seen as an operational necessity at the time, it was very clearly not an optimal solution, and the Air Force started looking for ways to retire its new flying tank almost as soon as it entered service. 

Several efforts at fielding more survivable close-air-support aircraft soon emerged, including a heavily modified iteration of the A-7 Corsair II that would have boasted the same F100 afterburning turbofan as the F-15 Eagle, but none managed to demonstrate the necessary combination of value versus survivability needed to step in and replace the still-new A-10. 

So, the Air Force opted for a different approach – looking to aircraft that were already in service and demonstrating the sort of high-speed survivability it was looking for, and then simply trying to strap the A-10’s massive 30mm cannon to them instead. 

To accomplish this, the Air Force kicked off a new program dubbed “Pave Claw,” which sought to reduce the size and weight of the Avenger rotary cannon and then stuff it into a gun pod that could be carried by other, more survivable, jets. 

The original GAU-8 was so massive that the A-10 had to be designed around it to accommodate all seven of its 7-foot-long barrels, a hearty firing mechanism and feed system, and the ammunition drum that, alone, was nearly six feet long and 34.5 inches in diameter. The gun system itself weighed only around 620 pounds, but when fully loaded with 1,350 rounds of 30×173 mm ammunition, its weight skyrocketed to a hefty 4,029 pounds. 

The first order of business, then, was to bring the weight down, so the Air Force started by reducing the number of barrels in its new pod-based 30mm cannon from seven to four. While the A-10’s GAU-8 was powered by a pair of hydraulic motors, each with independent redundant hydraulic systems, the pod-based cannon would use a single pneumatic drive system powered by a 3200psi composite bottle of compressed air. 

The biggest source of weight for the GAU-8 was its Coke-bottle-sized 30mm depleted uranian armor-piercing rounds, and there was no way a pod-based variant would be able to carry as much of this ammunition as the A-10. 

Nonetheless, a cleverly designed helical magazine that saw the rounds spiral around the gun inside the pod made it possible to carry 353 rounds onboard. With fewer barrels and a different drive system, this new 30mm gun pod could only manage a comparatively measly 2,400 rounds per minute – just over half of the GAU-8’s maximum – but could nonetheless put 40 rounds on target per second. When you account for the half-second it took for the barrels to get to speed, that meant a pilot could burn through every round onboard in under 10 seconds of sustained fire, but in those 10 seconds, this new gun pod could unleash some serious destruction. 

This new four-barrel 30mm cannon was dubbed the GAU-13/A. Once complete, it weighed in at just 333 pounds and stretched just over nine feet long, making it roughly half the weight of the GAU-8 at less than half the length. The pod that housed the weapon was entirely self-contained and designed to be mounted on just about any tactical aircraft with standard 30-inch lugs, including the F-15 Eagle (the Strike Eagle wouldn’t emerge until years later). However, the Air Force already had one very specific fighter in mind… the broadly capable and extremely agile F-16 Fighting Falcon. 

The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon entered service just one year after the A-10, but from a technological standpoint, it was practically from another era. Meant to serve as a low-cost supplement to the immensely expensive F-15 Eagle, the small and nimble F-16 was the first production fighter ever to incorporate fly-by-wire control, which brought with it a revolution in fighter design that coincided with the advent of John Boyd and Thomas Christie’s Energy–maneuverability theory model of aircraft performance. 

The F-16 was the first fighter designed for combat in the truly modern sense, embracing quantitative data over the pervasive belief at the time that air-to-air combat was more artform than science. 

Aircraft up until that point had been designed to have what’s commonly known as “positive static stability,” which means the aircraft is shaped in such a way that air flowing over its wings and control surfaces will make it stable by default, forcing the pilot to trade either kinetic energy (speed) or potential energy (altitude) to overcome that inherent stability and perform aerobatic maneuvers. The F-16, on the other hand, was inherently unstable, but used an onboard flight control system to make constant small adjustments to the positioning of its control surfaces to make it seem stable in level flight. 

As a result, this new fighter didn’t need to trade nearly as much energy to snap into aggressive aerobatic maneuvers, allowing it to retain as much speed and altitude (energy) as possible. The more energy the aircraft maintains, the more it has to trade for further maneuvers, and the bigger the advantage it has in a dogfight. 

Yet, while the F-16 was envisioned as an all-business dogfighter by Boyd and his controversial group of colleagues known as the Fighter Mafia, it wasn’t long before the Air Force came to realize that this nimble new fighter could do a whole lot more than air-to-air combat. The F-16 entered service in 1978 but proved so well suited for ground-attack operations that by 1981, every F-16 to roll off the assembly line came standard with the built-in structural and wiring provisions required to leverage air-to-ground bombs and missiles. 

The very next year, production began on the GAU-13/A and its GBU-5 gun pod, which the Air Force believed could turn the air-to-air focused multi-role F-16 into an attack-specific 30mm CAS machine. Before long, the branch began setting F-16 airframes aside for this new role, which came to be known as the A-16, swapping out that F-for-fighter prefix in favor of a new A-for-attack designation. 

This new Block 60 A-16 would boast a great deal of onboard firepower, delivered primarily by its massive GAU-13 30mm cannon, but boosted by twin 7.62mm miniguns mounted in their own pods under each wing. Targeting for all this firepower would be bolstered by a new conformally mounted FLIR targeting system dubbed “Falcon Eye;” this was then integrated with the “Cat’s Eye” helmet-mounted targeting sight that was similar, in some respects, to the monocle sighting systems employed by Apache helicopter pilots. These changes, and a slew of others, however, saw the A-16 concept quickly balloon in both price and weight, effectively eliminating two of the F-16’s primary strengths in the Air Force’s eyes.

Two existing Block 15 F-16s were modified and converted into the A-16 trim at Shaw Air Force Base for testing, but the effort was curtailed by a lively debate about what kind of aircraft was truly suitable for the CAS mission. Some argued that the A-16, while certainly quick and agile, lacked the rugged toughness required to survive the hornet’s nest of small arms fire such an aircraft would have to contend with, while others made the now familiar claims that the A-10 was simply too slow to survive in modern battlespaces. 

Ultimately, however, the argument was made moot in 1990 when the U.S. Air Force was ordered to maintain two wings of A-10s for the CAS mission, effectively killing off the A-16 concept the branch had hoped could serve as a suitable replacement.

Congress forced the Air Force to keep its Warthogs, but the branch wasn’t happy with that and kicked off a sizable retrofit of some 400 F-16s with a slew of new CAS-focused systems, even if the GBU-5 gun pod was not among them.

Then as the Desert Storm air campaign kicked off in the early days of 1991, the Air Force saw its opportunity to demonstrate that the F-16 really could fly and fight using its podded 30mm rotary cannon. A group of 24 F-16As and F-16Bs out of the 174th Tactical Fighter Wing of the New York Air National Guard were equipped with the GBU-5 30mm gun pod and re-designated F/A-16s, combining both fighter and attack prefixes. 

These aircraft flew into the fight with the Air Force’s CAS hopes resting on their shoulders, but despite the best efforts of the pilots, the 30mm gun pods just didn’t live up to expectations. 

First and foremost, the centerline pylon mount for the nearly 2,000-pound (when fully loaded) gun pod quickly proved insufficient for the job, with the weapons knocking themselves off-center after just a second or two of sustained fire, eliminating the weapon’s zero and making it all but impossible to accurately lay down fire. While that could likely be addressed with just a bit more R&D, the other issues were inherent to the differences between how the F-16 and A-10 were designed to operate. 

Although the A-10 flies at a standard cruising speed of around 335 miles per hour while engaging ground targets, the F-16’s cruising speed is usually almost twice that, at just shy of 600 miles per hour. In theory, this added speed would make the F/A-16 a harder target for ground troops, but in practice, it meant the A-16’s pilot had significantly less time to line up a target during their shallow dive toward the earth on a gun run. And of course, when the weapon was firing, it created such immense vibrations within the aircraft that there were palpable concerns about potential damage to onboard electronics. 

Within only a day or so of combat operations, F/A-16 crews transitioned to using the 30mm gun pod as an area-effect weapon, effectively giving up on the idea of precise targeting in favor of using its massive rounds more like cluster munitions over a broader area. Within just two days of combat operations, the entire idea was scrapped, the gun pods were removed, and America’s only-ever F/A-16s transitioned back to their conventional bomb-dropping roles. 

And just like that, the A-10 was given its second of many stays of execution, proving once again that no other platform in the American arsenal could effectively employ the mighty GAU-8 Avenger rotary cannon, and as such absorb the CAS role as the Air Force knew it at the time. 

In the years since, the F-16, F-15E Strike Eagle, and even much larger platforms like the B-1B Lancer, have all proven to be CAS experts in their own right, thanks to the widespread adoption of precision-guided munitions that allow these aircraft to engage enemy troops effectively without having to adopt the Warthog’s daredevil flight profile. 

The A-10, which was a specialty aircraft built to fly and die in a world-ending conflict over Europe, would go on to become a troop (and fan) favorite throughout the two decades of the Global War on Terror, where American forces fought an asymmetric conflict against adversaries with no air defense capabilities to speak of. This proved once and for all, that if you build an aircraft tough enough, a viable use case will present itself – and on a few rare occasions, it might even be tough enough to secure its place in the pantheon of legendary combat aircraft – a pantheon the A-10 has already been circling at low altitude for years now. 

Today, the A-10 is once again staring down the seven-foot barrels of retirement, but thanks to the A-16 and F/A-16 efforts, the branch has no illusions about the need to strap its legendary gun to another jet when it does. 

But the GBU-5 gun pod is still around, and you never know what the future might bring. 

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article first appeared at Sandboxx News.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force’s decision to pause the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, which aims to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter, has raised concerns about the future of American air superiority.

-Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced the pause to reassess the program's cost, operational concept, and next steps, even as the Air Force had planned a significant $2.5 billion investment for next year.

-Critics argue that halting the NGAD would be a mistake, as it is crucial for maintaining air dominance, especially against technological peers like China. Manned platforms, despite the rise of unmanned drones, are still essential for complex missions that require real-time decision-making and advanced capabilities. The pause also risks falling behind international competitors and weakening the U.S. military aircraft industrial base.

Once upon a time – meaning just a few months ago – the U.S. Air Force was all-in on acquiring a sixth-generation stealth fighter. Now, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has announced he will “take a pause” on the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program to re-evaluate the cost, operational concept and next steps in the process.

Kendall said the service is still “going to do a crewed, sixth-generation platform” but this is a major moment considering the Air Force has been working on this program for years and planned to invest $2.5 billion next year in this new fighter. Suddenly, the Air Force appears to be backtracking on its commitment to NGAD and to the central role for advanced, manned fighters in general.

There is a meme running through defense circles that recent conflicts demonstrate that modern air defenses are too lethal for manned platforms and that drones can pursue the same missions alone. While NGAD is still in its formative stage, and there are trades to be made between different capabilities, it would be a mistake of colossal proportions for the Air Force to halt the program. Here are five reasons why the Air Force must continue to develop a sixth-generation, manned tactical platform.

First, the U.S. Air Force needs a new, specialized air superiority platform.

NGAD is intended to be a next-generation air superiority platform, replacing the F-22, and allowing the U.S. Air Force to dominate the air domain for decades. It is a system of systems with many pieces, including a key role for unmanned capabilities, particularly the highly capable, largely autonomously operating drones called Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

However, the centerpiece of NGAD is a manned platform. This new fighter would be equipped with highly advanced avionics, multiple sensor systems, unparalleled electronic warfare capabilities, and a host of weapons. It is expected to have a new power plant supporting both long-range, fuel-efficient cruising and a high-speed dash. Finally, the NGAD platform would have the computing and communications capabilities to act as the quarterback for a team of unmanned systems and other air-launched effects. NGAD is being designed, in particular, for the expected intense and lethal air environment in the Pacific theater and a future conflict with a technological and industrial peer, specifically China.             

Second, there remain unique roles for manned aerial platforms. The more complex the mission, the greater the need for a manned platform. Modern air warfare requires a mix of capabilities and the ability to shift from one type of engagement and one capability or weapon rapidly to another. Drones and CCAs are conceived of as single-mission platforms. Moreover, they must either be pre-programmed before launch or have secure communications with an operator. Only a manned platform will have access to the range of capabilities needed to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and the presence of a pilot who can make the necessary decisions in the moment despite an intense electronic warfare environment.

Third, drones may not be as effective as proponents assert. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to the potential of drones and other unmanned aerial systems to change or even dominate the future of warfare, the reality so far is less impressive. The great change has been the proliferation of relatively simple and, hence, cheap tactical drones. Yet the Iranian air assault on Israel saw more than three hundred drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles shot down. With most nations investing heavily in counter-unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) capabilities, it is unclear whether the future favors drones for every mission. Beyond this, the more capable the drone, the more sophisticated the CCA, the greater their cost and the smaller the number that can be procured. The Air Force is looking at a mix of expendable, attritable, and exquisite drones, with most being in the first two less expensive categories. The question is, where should the most sophisticated, high-end capabilities be deployed: in the drone or in the manned aircraft quarterback? Experience suggests that the most exquisite capabilities should reside in a manned platform.

Fourth, the U.S. is not the only nation working on sixth-generation tactical aircraft and unmanned adjuncts. The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a program involving the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), are being developed by France, Germany, and Spain. China is moving forward quickly on a sixth-generation platform; Russia claims to have flown such a platform, as well. Without NGAD and its Navy counterpart, the U.S. will be left behind in the race to deploy a sixth-generation fighter.

Fifth, pursuing NGAD is vital to maintaining a robust U.S. military aircraft industrial base. The range of technologies that will go into the NGAD is truly breathtaking. So, too, are the technical accomplishments required to build such an aircraft and its systems, including power plants, avionics, sensors, computers, and hardware. Some of these innovations will be migrated to the commercial aircraft world. Most of all, investing in NGAD will help ensure a robust U.S. aircraft design and production base for the future.

Dan Goure is a non-resident fellow with the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy research organization in Arlington, Virginia. He has held senior positions in both the private sector and the U.S. government, including as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense transition team. Follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute @LexNextDC. Read his full bio here.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: In the ongoing war in Ukraine, small commercial off-the-shelf drones and custom-built loitering munitions have revolutionized modern warfare, allowing Ukrainian forces to effectively target Russian tanks and positions.

-In response, Moscow has deployed its own drones, sparking a technological arms race as both sides develop advanced counter-drone measures.

-This includes enhanced camouflage, cope cages for vehicles, and jamming technology to disrupt drone communications and video feeds.

Small commercial off-the-shelf drones carrying modified ordnance and specialty-built loitering munitions have both proven to be game changers in modern warfare in the ongoing war in Ukraine. Since the early days of the fighting, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been employed by Ukrainian soldiers to target Russian tanks and forward positions to great effect. Moscow responded by deploying its own drones to target the Ukrainian platforms – and as a result, both sides are now working to develop counter-drone technology.

It has included better camouflage techniques, cope cages added to tanks and other vehicles, and even soldiers armed with shotguns as a last resort. Yet, increasingly, it has included jamming technology to disrupt communications over a wide area, as well as directed radio waves to cut a drone operator's video feed.

The drone wars continue to drone on.

Two years ago, drones began to reshape the modern battlefield, and some lamented it meant the end of the Main Battle Tank (MBT) – as the lumbering behemoths proved vulnerable to low-cost drones. But for every new weapon platform, there are efforts to counter it.

Now Electronic Warfare (EW) is once again reshaping the battlefield. A literal arms race is now underway as each side seems to counter the others' drones with jammers and scramblers, while in turn efforts are being made to overcome the latest anti-drone technology.

This week, Russian state media reported that experts at the Sky Warrior training center have also developed a new mobile EW platform that can interfere with the remote controls of first-person view (FPV) drones across a range of frequencies.

"We have developed an electronic warfare system. More than fifty products have been dispatched to the frontline. Our equipment has displayed its capabilities. It works well against FPV drones, including drones on offset frequencies. Our enemies are now flying on frequencies from 337 MHz to 1100 MHz. All of these frequencies are available and we can jam them easily," a Russian specialist identified as Pastor told Tass, and claimed that Kyiv's forces lacked the resources to overcome the Sky Warrior's radio-electronic warfare protection.

The report further suggested that Ukrainian drones were being "disabled and crash(ed) 300-400 meters away from the jamming equipment. They cannot get closer. The product comes in several configurations: a stationary unit for a motor vehicle and a man-portable kit for an infantryman - a box with straps weighing about 15 kg."

The jammer developed by Sky Warrior is reported to have three modes of operation, including being activated manually where it can "ward off" an approaching drone, triggered automatically should a drone come into range, or active all the time. Yet, it remains unclear if the jammers will impact Russian drones or other communications.

Kyiv has also been deploying jammers that according to recent reports can block about seventy-five percent of frequencies that Russia's drones currently employ to communicate with their operators. However, what has remained more challenging is countering the latest types of loitering munitions, notably the Kremlin's Lancet "kamikaze drones" that are entirely autonomous once a target has been marked.

At the same time, Ukraine's special forces have begun to introduce new drone technology that can fly and strike targets without GPS and with limited operator input, countering the Russian jammers.

The arms race of drones, jammers, and counter-jamming technology will continue, further reshaping the way modern conflicts may be fought.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The Battleship USS New Jersey, the most decorated warship in U.S. Navy history, is back and better than ever following a $10 million restoration.

-This summer, the Iowa-class battleship will host unique events, including the Philadelphia Ship Model Society’s sixth annual ModelCon on August 3, featuring over 100 historic ship models.

-Additionally, the ship will celebrate World War II Victory Day on August 10 with special guided tours, a flyover of U.S. warplanes, and opportunities for attendees to fire the ship’s Quad 40 and 5-inch guns.

-The recent restoration, completed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, addressed crucial repairs, including hull preservation and corrosion prevention. The ship, now back at its Camden, New Jersey, home, is expected to draw more visitors and host memorable events that highlight its storied past and continued significance as a floating museum.

The nation's oldest continuously active ship model clubs in the United States will hold its sixth annual ModelCon at what is arguably the most impressive location for such an event. The Philadelphia Ship Model Society, which was founded in 1931 and is devoted to the art of ship model building, will host its event on the United States Navy's Iowa-class battleship USS New Jersey (BB-62).

The one-day event on Saturday, August 3, promises to include more than 100 models of historic vessels, including warships that survive only in model form.

The Philadelphia Ship Model Society's ModelCon is just one of several planned events that the famed battlewagon – the most decorated U.S. Navy warship – is hosting this summer.

In addition to special guided tours of the engine room and turrets, BB-62 will offer a World War II victory day celebration on August 10. It will include a flyover of U.S. warplanes, displays of artifacts from the conflict, and a talk on the Japanese surrender 79 years ago by Battleship New Jersey's curator Ryan Syzmanski. There will also be an opportunity for attendees to pay to fire the ship's Quad 40 and 5-inch guns as a salute to the aircraft.

This summer's events are all the more special because the more than 80-year-old Iowa-class battleship looks better than ever following a $10 million makeover that restored the vessel to her former glory.

Though the restoration project, which began in March ran a little longer than expected – and meant the vessel wasn't back at her home on the Camden, New Jersey, waterfront for Memorial Day this year – it proved worth the wait. In late June, USS New Jersey completed her 12-week-long repairs at the Philadelphia Navy Yard's Dock #3, where the battleship was built and launched during the Second World War.

As New Jersey.com reported, "It was the first time it had left its dock in decades."

The original plan to preserve the 80-year-old, 887-foot-long, 45,000-ton vessel called for the repairs to be completed in time for Memorial Day, and the start of the peak tourist season. The warship is a major attraction for the Garden State, drawing 80,000 visitors annually.

The museum and memorial's newly-titled CEO Marshall Spevak told the Courier-Post newspaper that unexpected issues were discovered during the restoration, resulting in the delay. Additional work included the welding of a steel ring around the outward propeller shafts as part of an effort to prevent future leaks, while ultrasonic tests were conducted to determine the thickness of the steel hull. The biggest task was the application of around 18,000 linear feet of sealant to further stop corrosion and future leaks – and more importantly to ensure that the elements won't win and sink this battleship.

Fortunately, during the time at dry dock, the ship was opened to special tours, where visitors could literally walk under the historic vessel.

And now that USS New Jersey is back in Camden where she will continue to be preserved as a floating museum, we can only expect the battleship to play host to some truly special events.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Japan's Soryu-class submarines, introduced in 2009, are a key component of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) as tensions rise in the South China Sea.

-Equipped with advanced lithium-ion batteries for extended underwater endurance and quieter Kockums Stirling engines, these submarines are designed for stealth and efficiency.

-Each Soryu-class submarine features six torpedo tubes capable of launching Type 89 torpedoes and UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, making them formidable in potential conflicts with China or North Korea.

-Interest in the Soryu-class has extended internationally, with several countries considering procurement, although Japan remains the sole operator for now.

In order to push back at a hostile China and a nuclear North Korea, Japan is modernizing its naval capabilities. 

Tensions in the South China Sea are only growing, as outlined in Tokyo’s annual white paper released earlier this month. 

If a full-blown conflict were to erupt, Japan would likely lean on its advanced fleets of Soryu- and Taigei-class submarines.

The Taigei-class is the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s newest stealth submarine. With its weapons capacity, high-strength steel, and lithium-ion batteries designed for greater underwater endurance, these boats are widely considered some of the best in service today. 

However, the Taigei’s predecessor should not be overlooked. In fact, Japan’s Soryu-class boats share some impressive attributes with their Taigei counterparts.

Japan’s first air-independent propulsion submarine class was introduced to service in 2009. Compared to previous submarine classes with lead-acid batteries, the Soryu’s lithium-ion batteries provide greater power storage. 

Since submarines are most vulnerable to detection and enemy attack while surfaced, technologies that keep these boats underwater for longer stretches of time are vital. Lithium-ion batteries recharge more quickly than lead-acid batteries. The class’s eleventh submarine, Oryu, is the first to mount these batteries. 

Soryu submarines are equipped with Kockums Naval Solutions Stirling engines adapted from engines used in Sweden. As explained previously by Caleb Larson, “The unique engine uses bottled liquid oxygen so that the engine’s diesel fuel can combust. The advantage of this propulsion system is that it runs much quieter than a traditional diesel engine. Furthermore, its range is estimated to be around 6,100 miles or about 9,800 kilometers.”

The lead ship of the class, Soryu, commissioned in 2009, was followed by Unryu, Hakuryu, Kenryu, Zuiryu, Kokuryu, Jinryu, Sekiryu, Seriyu, Shoryu and Oryu. Each Soryu submarine measures 84 meters in length and can sail up to 20 knots when fully submerged. 

Each submarine features six HU-606 533 mm torpedo tubes for Type 89 torpedoes and UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, according to Naval Technology. The Soryu boats also field cutting-edge sensors, radars and countermeasures.

The Soryu subs are so impressive that several nations have approached Tokyo about possible procurements. Morocco, India, Norway, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and Australia have expressed interest in purchasing the submarine-class. While Japan remains the only country today to field these impressive boats, future deals could permit the Soryu ships to sail for other nations down the line. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-16s Ukraine is getting are likely to be used conservatively, primarily for air defense roles such as shooting down missiles, drones, and enemy aircraft rather than engaging directly with Russian ground forces.

-Due to the threat posed by advanced Russian air defense systems, Ukrainian pilots may avoid using these aircraft in the most dangerous combat zones.

While more F-16s are expected to arrive from NATO countries like Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, these deliveries will take years. Therefore, the impact of the F-16s on the -conflict may be limited in the short term, contrary to the high expectations set by Ukrainian officials.

After months of lobbying, Ukraine has finally received their first batch of F-16 fighters, which Zelensky’s government believes are crucial in pushing back against the Russian invasion.

“Ukraine has been pushing its Western allies for F-16s for Ukraine for months,” the AP reported, “saying they were critically needed to fight back against the onslaught of missiles Russia has fired against it.”

The US had been hesitant to supply F-16s to the Ukrainians for fear that gifting fourth-generation fighters would further escalate the war, which is now in year three. But Zelensky, who has proven an effective advocate for his country’s security, has continued to press NATO allies for all variety of weaponry.

Zelensky was in Washington earlier this month, urging lawmakers to “remove all limitations on how Western-provided weapons are used,” the AP reported, “specifically allowing Ukraine to fire Western-provided weapons against an expanded set of Russian targets.”

President Joe Biden relented, authorizing the delivery of the F-16s. Exactly how many F-16s were delivered to Ukraine, and from which NATO member the F-16 was delivered, is not clear; the Ukrainian government hasn’t even confirmed the receipt of the single-engine fighters.

But the F-16s have arrived and will soon see combat above the skies of Ukraine. Whether the F-16s will make a substantial difference in the conflict remains to be seen, but it seems unlikely that the Cold War fighter will offer an immediate panacea for Ukraine’s deficiencies.

Ukrainian officials have said that Ukraine needs at least 130 F-16 fighters to neutralize Russian air power. While the exact number of F-16s sent to Ukraine is unknown, we can assume its far fewer than 130. According to the Washington Post, Ukraine will have far too few F-16s, which will be quite susceptible to advanced Russian air defense systems, meaning the F-16s will probably be used in a conservative manner – “to shoot down aerial targets such as missiles, drones, and aircraft – rather than strike Russia’s invading ground forces and other military assets near the front.” So, the F-16 will be used to boost Ukraine’s air defense systems, which adds value to the war effort, of course – but the F-16 is not going to offer the paradigm shift in the conflict that Zelensky had advertised.

Ukraine can be expected to treat the gifted F-16s, and the pilots who have recently graduated from an intensive F-16 training program, to be treated preciously, preserved from the most dangerous action. “Official have said that the planes, at least initially, are unlikely to fly too close to the front-line fighting, meaning it is unclear they will even be able to deter attacking enemy aircraft from crossing into Ukraine from Russian airspace,” the Washington Post reported.   

More F-16s are likely on the way; NATO members including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway have vowed to supply Ukraine with 80 F-16s, but their donations will take years, meaning Ukraine will have to use their existing F-16s sparingly in the meantime.

In sum, don’t expect the much-touted F-16s to make a drastic difference in Ukraine’s resistance.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-16 Fighting Falcon, first developed in the 1970s as an air-superiority fighter, has become one of the most widely produced and versatile combat aircraft in history.

-Originally designed with the Energy-Maneuverability Theory to maximize agility, the F-16 has been continuously upgraded with advanced avionics, sensors, and more powerful engines, making it a formidable opponent in modern air combat. With its 11 external hardpoints and advanced radar systems, the F-16 remains highly relevant despite being a fourth-generation fighter.

-As Ukraine receives F-16s from Denmark and the Netherlands, these aircraft are expected to significantly enhance the Ukrainian Air Force's capabilities against Russian forces. 

First conceived in the 1970s as a day air-superiority fighter, the F-16 Fighting Falcon has gone on to become one of the most widely produced combat aircraft ever. The brainchild of Col. John Boyd and the “Fighter Mafia,” the F-16 was designed to maneuver with minimal energy loss. It was the first fighter to take advantage of the new Energy-Maneuverability Theory of dogfighting. 

From these beginnings, the F-16 has been progressively upgraded, gaining Beyond Visual Range capabilities, improved sensors and avionics, and more powerful engines. The jet can remain in the air longer than enemy near-peers due to its superior combat radius. 

Older F-16 variants feature nine hardpoints for weapon payloads and can carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder, Raytheon AMRAAM, Raytheon Sparrow, and other air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.

Many nations outside the U.S. recognize the value of the F-16 – there are over 30 current, former, and future operators. F-16s headed to Ukraine now are being supplied by Denmark and the Netherlands. 

Stealth aircraft are the future but there is still a place for non-stealthy, fourth-generation fighters. Modern stealth fighter aircraft are relatively limited in their payload, since they must carry weapons internally to maintain a small radar cross section. By contrast, modern F-16s have 11 external hardpoints. The inclusion of the AN/APG-80 AESA radar and IRST give upgraded F-16s sensors with capabilities similar to the most modern fighters. 

Currently, the Ukrainian Air Force fights Russia with Soviet-era Su-27s and Mig-29s, compared to Russia’s newer Su-30s and Su-35s. F-16s are at least on par with these aircraft. Opponents of providing F-16s to Ukraine have argued that Russia’s advanced S-400 SAM system would easily outclass these fighters.

But those who applaud the transfer of F-16s point to the platform's potential integration with Western weapons systems. If Western aid continues and provides more advanced weaponry to Ukraine such as the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, it is far easier to equip those weapons on F-16s which have already been approved for their use. Any weapons the U.S. or other supply must be jury-rigged onto Soviet aircraft that were not designed to carry them, which hinders their utility. 

Although F-16s are older, they are still highly capable combat aircraft and, with all their upgrades, very relevant on the modern battlefield. While it’s unlikely they will rapidly shift the tide in the air war over Ukraine, they represent a valuable asset that strengthens Ukraine’s overall position and gives them much room to grow. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The United States has provided over $56 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including $55.4 billion since Russia's large-scale invasion in February 2022. This support has focused heavily on artillery, with the U.S. sending more than 200 M-777 howitzers, 40 M142 HIMARS systems, and millions of shells, including precision-guided munitions. The U.S. has also supplied Ukraine with 400 million bullets and anti-tank weapons.

-While the U.S. leads in support, key allies have also played vital roles. The U.K. was the first to send main battle tanks and long-range cruise missiles, inspiring similar contributions from Germany and France.

-Germany has also provided critical air defense systems, while a coalition of European nations pushed for the delivery of F-16 fighter jets, which Ukraine recently received. The U.S., along with its allies, continues to provide essential military aid, bolstering Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression.

The United States has committed over $56 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the past four years, including $55.4 billion since the Kremlin launched its large-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. 

A few facts stand out about America’s support of the Ukrainian military. 

Artillery is the king of the battle. Most casualties in the war have been caused by artillery fire. As such, the U.S. has made sure to send guns and shells to Ukraine in bulk. 

Specifically, the Pentagon has sent or committed to sending to Kyiv more than 200 M-777 155 mm howitzers, 72 105 mm howitzers, 40 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and close to 4.5 million 203 mm, 155 mm, 152 mm, 130 mm, 122 mm, and 105 mm shells. 

Among these artillery rounds are some specialized munitions like the M982 155 mm Excalibur precision-guided shell, the 155 mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine system, and cluster munitions. The demands of the conflict are high, and the Ukrainian forces need more artillery still. 

When it comes to small arms and anti-tank weapons, the U.S. has provided over 400 million bullets, 40,000 grenade launchers, and approximately 140,000 anti-tank weapons, including FGM-148 Javelins, AT-4s, and Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided missiles. 

By the numbers, America is by far Ukraine’s biggest supporter, but several other countries have provided important security assistance. Sometimes, these countries provide new types of weapons and munitions even before the U.S. 

The United Kingdom was the first to commit main battle tanks to Ukraine. When it committed to sending Challenger 2 MBTs, London broke through a debate among NATO members and inspired Germany to send Leopard MBTs, while the U.S. sent the M1 Abrams. 

Moreover, London was the first to commit long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine (Storm Shadows), which finally allowed for precision strikes against Russian targets deep behind the frontlines. France followed soon thereafter by sending its own SCALP-EG cruise missiles to Ukraine.

In addition, Germany has provided important air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These help defend against countless missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure. Berlin has provided three MIM-104 Patriot and six IRIS-T air defense systems with the necessary munitions and sensors. 

Furthermore, a group of countries including the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway pushed hard for the delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets to the Ukrainian Air Force, despite reservations in the U.S. After many months of debate, Kyiv received its first F-16s this week, with more on the way. 

The U.S. has been leading the international effort to provide Ukraine with the necessary tools to fight Russia’s invasion, but it is lucky to have strong allies and partners in its efforts.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons or from Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Ford-class aircraft carriers, like the USS Gerald R. Ford, are the latest nuclear-powered carriers in the U.S. Navy, designed to replace the aging Nimitz-class. Despite advanced technologies like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), the Ford-class faces significant challenges.

-Reliability issues with these systems, coupled with untested weapons elevators and jet blast deflectors, raise concerns about their combat effectiveness and high costs.

-With increasing threats from enemy A2/AD capabilities, the Ford-class carriers may struggle to justify their investment.

America’s great love affair with the aircraft carrier continues unabated, with the creation of the Ford-class aircraft carrier. Its namesake, the USS Gerald R. Ford, named after America’s thirty-eighth president, is the latest class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in service to the United States Navy. These boats are intended to slowly replace the ten Nimitz-class carriers that have been in operation since the 1970s. The USS Gerald R. Ford was commissioned in 2017.

Ford-class carriers are equipped with two Bechtel A1B nuclear reactors, which provide the ship with an astonishing speed of over 35 miles per hour. This is comparable to the speed of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. For a warship of this size, that is an incredible feat. However, given that the Nimitz-class carriers can do the same—and they’re cheaper to build and maintain than the Ford-class—it begs the question as to why the Navy really needed the Ford-class carriers.

The Navy says that the Ford-class carriers are designed to be more efficient and have a higher sortie generation rate than their Nimitz-class predecessors. The ship’s design allows for a more efficient flow of aircraft, fuel, and ordnance, which helps to increase the number of aircraft that can be launched and recovered in a given time period. 

Yet, the real challenge to U.S. aircraft carriers today, regardless of their class, is enemy anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that are meant to blunt the power projection capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers by keeping them outside of the operational range of their air wings (meaning that they are rendered combat ineffective).

The Ford-class carriers are equipped with a bevy of new, advanced technologies meant to augment their operations, including things like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), which are designed to improve the efficiency and safety of aircraft launch and recovery operations. 

A single Ford-class carrier costs more than $13 billion to build. It will cost hundreds of millions of dollars more to maintain over the course of its service. The Navy insists that the maintenance costs for the Ford-class will be lower than those of the older Nimitz-class carriers. 

But that remains very much in doubt. 

Because of the inclusion of so many advanced, and frankly untested, systems supporting the new carrier’s operations, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) has already faced several issues since its commissioning in 2017. Such issues have increased the cost of the warship and even delayed its entry into service, creating significant strategic gaps in the Navy’s surface fleet disposition and capabilities. 

Some notable problems included reliability issues afflicting the aforementioned EMALS and AAG launch systems. The EMALS has had a failure rate that places it well below expectations and the AAG, designed to catch landing aircraft, has experienced similar reliability issues. This, of course, means that the safety of naval aviators—and their expensive aircraft—is put in significant jeopardy. 

Meanwhile, the Ford-class weapons elevators have malfunctioned more than they have performed as expected. There are eleven advanced weapons elevators (AWEs) meant to rapidly move bombs and missiles from the ship’s magazines to the flight deck. In a heavy firefight, in which the safety of the warship itself was in question—or in which the ship’s airwing was called upon to engage in massive deployments—failure of these AWEs could lead to the destruction of the warship in battle and the defeat of the United States Navy.

Jet Blast Deflectors (JBD) protect the flight deck from the intense heat generated by aircraft engines during takeoff. These systems have struggled with reliability problems, notably regarding their electromechanical actuator subsystems. Again, even without the threat of enemy A2/AD fire damaging the carrier’s critical flight deck, if the deck is not protected from the wear-and-tear of combat operations, it won’t last long in combat, making the carrier a wasting asset. 

Because of these issues, there have been significant cost overruns and delays, prompting many analysts to question whether the investment into the Ford class was even worth the price tag. It likely was not.

There are currently three Ford-class carriers being built, with two more planned for the future. Of those carriers, the USS Gerald R. Ford is actively serving in the fleet, even recently being deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in response to the horrific Hamas attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023. The USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), the USS Enterprise (CVN-8), and the USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) are all in the construction pipeline. 

Higher sortie rates, greater technology, and an impressive flanking speed make these carriers appealing to the U.S. Navy. It remains to be seen, however, whether these carriers will overcome the serious—and growing—A2/AD challenge posed by America’s rivals, notably China. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

The Biden administration and a bicameral, bipartisan majority of Congress are working to promote semiconductor production in the United States. This would be news to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which is opening an investigation into American chip darling Nvidia. Antitrust scrutiny of Nvidia detracts from American efforts to promote economic and national security regarding semiconductor production, undermining the administration’s priorities. Such a course should be abandoned.

The federal government has undertaken two significant efforts to foster investment and security in the American semiconductor industry. One is the CHIPS and Science Act, which allocated $52.7 billion to incentivize companies to produce semiconductors in the United States. Complementing CHIPS, the U.S. Department of Commerce has imposed export controls on advanced semiconductors to prevent foreign adversaries and their domestic firms from acquiring advanced chips. Even with the law’s shortcomings, semiconductor investment has boomed alongside investments in AI.

Yet the DOJ is taking a different approach to the American semiconductor sector. Recent reporting revealed that the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will investigate several leading AI companies, including Nvidia. The DOJ has yet to release any information on what prompted the investigation, but there are some clues.

Earlier this year, the FTC’s Office of Technology’s Tech Summit devoted an entire panel to issues related to AI, chips, and cloud computing. U.S., EU, and UK competition enforcers recently signed a joint statement articulating their approach to issues concerning generative AI foundation models and AI products, including specialized chips for AI training, Nvidia’s specialty.

While the Biden administration has enabled a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement, particularly in nascent markets, legislative and regulatory action on technology has prioritized promoting domestic production or protecting national security, not expanding antitrust tools. The DOJ’s investigation would undermine its own administration’s priorities to the detriment of American firms, citizens, and sovereignty.

An antitrust investigation of Nvidia would impose costs in the short term and create long-term legal uncertainty. Nvidia is no pauper; it can afford a lawsuit. However, the opportunity cost of litigation should not be ignored. One of the largest beneficiaries of CHIPS funding is Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Nvidia is dependent on TSMC for manufacturing key chips. With CHIPS Act projects encountering difficulties, forcing Nvidia to reallocate capital away from designing chips and driving demand for TSMC’s services is counterproductive. Nvidia is already dealing with lost revenue after redesigning chips for the Chinese market to comply with export controls. An antitrust suit is unlikely to be resolved quickly, and while the cost may not be debilitating, the uncertainty and potential risk are detrimental to U.S. priorities.

Further, Nvidia’s strength comes from its market-leading product offerings, but it is not guaranteed that its dominance will continue. Nvidia was already dealt an antitrust blow when the FTC blocked the firm’s attempted acquisition of AMD, a competing semiconductor design firm. The FTC’s move proved prescient, as AMD is now gunning for Nvidia’s silicon crown. Big tech companies that are building custom chips to create alternatives to Nvidia present another challenge. One cannot ignore Intel; the legacy chipmaker was awarded nearly $20 billion through the CHIPS Act and now argues that Nvidia should watch the throne. 

Beyond hardware, Nvidia is also facing challenges to its integrated software stack. The open-sourcing of Pytorch 2.0, a software library that helps engineers avoid using Nvidia’s proprietary software language when working with its hardware, could lower barriers to entry and switching costs for AI developers and deployers. Another challenge comes from a group creating standards for interconnect in AI chips, the technology which links together multiple servers to power cutting-edge AI applications. Nvidia is absent from this group, which is spearheaded by the company’s competitors and some of its largest customers. Firms are responding to market realities by promoting interoperability and open standards to spur competition and innovation.

The Biden administration and Congress have enacted a plan to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity, flawed as it may be. A DOJ antitrust investigation into Nvidia undermines such efforts by targeting a critical component of America’s advanced semiconductor sector. The administration’s inability to order policy preferences and promote a predictable regulatory environment is a self-inflicted error. The DOJ should reconsider its investigation or at least refresh itself on the administration’s priorities next time. 

Joshua Levine is the Manager for Technology Policy at the Foundation for American Innovation.

Image: JamesonWu1972 / Shutterstock.com.

Detaining UN and NGO workers, intensifying attacks on global shipping, and earning the ire of regional and global powers. Are these the behaviors of a state acting out of desperation or the machinations of non-state actors consolidating power and flexing unchecked local military prowess? This is precisely the question being debated by analysts regarding the actions of the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen.

Over the past month, militias affiliated with the Houthis have increased attacks on Red Sea shipping, launched increasingly deadly drone attacks toward Israel, and detained more than fifty Yemenis working with foreign organizations. These were the immediate reactions to a recent financial crisis precipitated by the closure of the Central Bank in Sana’a, which has placed additional obstacles to currency transfers and civil servant salaries in Houthi-held territory in northern Yemen. The liquidity of the bifurcated Central Bank, with its other branch in Aden, had been maintained by Saudi financing since the onset of the conflict in 2015, affording the kingdom a degree of leverage over the Sana’a-based Houthi government. Irregular payments to public sector salaries in Sana’a, a consequence of periodic economic sanctions and continued restrictions, have long contributed to the decline of healthcare, sanitation, and other services across the country.

The decision to escalate the Red Sea crisis might be an act of revenge against the United States and Saudi Arabia for targeting Houthi military and financial capabilities. However, the Houthis might instead be perceiving the closure of the Sana’a Central Bank as Saudi Arabia abandoning the last form of leverage over the Houthi territory. After initially hedging their bets, the Houthis appear to have shifted almost entirely toward the Iranian camp, assuming that Iran and its allies can guarantee future state finances. Rather than pursue reconciliation with the internationally recognized government in Aden, the Houthi leadership has sought to isolate itself from the region further.

The Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the southern gate to the Red Sea, has historically been a source of global commerce and prosperity for states in South Arabia. Not only have the Houthis neglected this territorial treasure, but they have transformed it into Bab al-Mawt, or the gates of death, for shipping companies daring to cross the waters approximate to Yemeni territory. On June 12, the Houthis claimed their first successful drone boat attack against a Greek-owned carrier on the coast of Yemen. This has only encouraged a precipitous increase in the number of attacks, further threatening commercial shipping in the Red Sea region.

The proverbial gates were also closed to international organizations previously operating in Sana’a and its environs. Yemeni staff affiliated with the World Food Program, the National Democratic Institute, and others were spuriously charged with espionage and arrested, effectively closing one of the world’s last remaining windows into an increasingly isolated society. The innocuous gathering of population statistics and the coordination of foreign humanitarian aid were depicted by Houthi media as malicious intelligence gathering and as attempts to subvert government control.

These policy directions are typical of other Iranian proxies around the region, especially Hezbollah and Hamas, who have prioritized self-interested short-term destruction of society rather than focus on long-term development. In a country often dubbed as the greatest manmade humanitarian crisis, the Houthis have consolidated their political power at the expense of exacerbating the suffering of the country’s population. They have done so by drawing Yemen into a regional conflict with Israel and moving the country closer to Iran, making it difficult for Saudi Arabia and Yemeni opposition parties to reconvene the negotiations that appeared on the verge of ending the conflict as late as September 2023.

Rather than weaken the Houthi government, aerial bombing of Houthi military targets by American and British aircraft has only inflated the Houthi sense of self-prominence in regional affairs. What was once an empty slogan of “Death to American! Death to Israel!” has become an actionable policy. Furthermore, allied forces can’t hope to win a war from the air, especially against an enemy terrain well-known for its mountainous caverns that traverse the northern highlands of the country. 

This same terrain withstood centuries of Ottoman imperial wars, five years of intensive Egyptian bombing raids during the 1960s, and, most recently, a 2015 Saudi bombing campaign and blockade. The Houthi militias that fought the Saudis to a standstill and descended from the same tribes that clashed with the Ottomans and the Egyptians know well the futility of aerial campaigns. Accordingly, they are prepared to wait out the conflict in perpetuity. If the Biden administration is hoping to outlast the Houthis in a war of attrition, then they have already lost. While the Houthis have the luxury of time, the Biden administration is under pressure to “solve” the Yemen crisis before November.

After nearly a decade of civil war, a conflict that international interests have overrun is no closer to being solved than it was in 2014. If anything, the opposing sides have become even more entrenched, with the Houthis isolating themselves and their population from the outside world. The war in Yemen will not be solved by external actors forcing a particular model on the country but ultimately by Yemeni groups themselves. 

Unfortunately for the region and the Yemeni people, it looks as if the Houthis have garnered sufficient legitimacy and internal support to declare sole political control over the northern regions of the country. It remains, however, unlikely that Houthi governance could spread to the southern regions surrounding Aden or the eastern regions of Hadramawt. A potential outcome for Yemen remains a federalist state with at least three distinct regions, ultimately granting the Houthis a degree of autonomy in the north while dividing power up in the rest of the country. The international community must work to sever Iranian support for the group and force the Houthi leadership to assume responsibility for its own citizens and abandon extremist ideology in exchange for non-Iranian international support.

Asher Orkaby is a research fellow in Near Eastern Studies at Harvard University and the author of Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–68, published by Oxford University Press. Follow him on X: @AsherOrkaby.

Image: MhmdArt / Shutterstock.com.

Former President Donald Trump has said little about what he might do on nuclear weapons policy if he gets back into the White House. This is surprising for someone who spent so much time talking about the bomb when he was in office. But if we look at his past policies and what he and his allies are saying, we can get a pretty good idea about what he might do. And it is not a pretty picture.

While in office, Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea and then tried (and failed) to get a nuclear deal with its leader, Kim Jong Un. Trump walked away from a successful deal with Iran, only to see Tehran then accelerate its nuclear program. He withdrew from one arms control treaty with Russia and then refused to extend another. He considered resuming US nuclear testing, which would have violated yet another global pact. In short, Trump did on nuclear policy what he did on so much else: create chaos and undermine the rule of law.

With four more years, Trump could do even more damage, wreaking havoc on an already weakened network of treaties and agreements that have reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation and war.

In his speech at the GOP convention, Trump had just one clear proposal related to nuclear policy: “We will replenish our military and build an Iron Dome missile defense system to ensure that no enemy can strike our homeland.” Short on details, this looks like a throwback to former President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 proposal—called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and derided as “Star Wars”—to build a system of space- and ground-based interceptors to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” It made for great slogans, but after forty years and some $400 billion, the technology is still not up to the challenge. Israel’s Iron Dome system has had success because it has a limited mission: defend a small country (the size of New Jersey) from short-range missiles. But if you try to scale that up and cover a country the size of the United States against hundreds of Russian and Chinese long-range missiles, it just won’t work.

But it could set off a new nuclear arms race. If Moscow and Beijing take Trump’s plans seriously, their likely response would be to build hundreds of additional nuclear-armed missiles to overwhelm the new defense.

Trump might provoke a new arms competition even without his Iron Dome on steroids. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s last national security advisor (2019-2021), wrote a recent article in Foreign Affairs calling for the United States, “to maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.” The idea here, popular among conservatives at the Heritage Foundation and Project 2025, including Christopher Miller, Trump’s last defense secretary, is that Washington needs to have more nuclear weapons than Moscow and Beijing combined.

This is a terrible idea. Firstly, there is every reason to believe that Russia and China are already deterred from attacking the United States based on the current arsenal we have, which is about 3,748 nuclear weapons. Building more than we need is a waste of money. Second, guess what Moscow and Beijing will do if Washington suddenly builds more bombs? They will do the same, and we will be worse off since we will now be in the middle of a race for ever more deadly nuclear arms. Third, a US buildup would doom any chances of saving the US-Russian arms reduction process. The last remaining treaty, New START, expires in 2026 and unless we replace it there will be no legal limits on US and Russian warheads for the first time in fifty years.

In the same article, former national security advisor O’Brien also writes that “Washington must test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety in the real world for the first time since 1992—not just by using computer models.” The United States ended nuclear testing three decades ago (under President George H.W. Bush) and then signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, banning all nuclear tests. Washington has conducted more nuclear tests (1,030) than all other nations combined. As long as the United States does not develop new types of nuclear weapons it has no need to test. But if we resume testing other nations would too, like Russia and China, and Beijing has only conducted forty-five tests. Imagine how much China could learn if Trump gives it an excuse to resume testing? The only state in the world today that is still conducting nuclear tests in North Korea (six tests); we should be pressuring Pyongyang to stop, not reopening this Pandora’s box.

Whoever wins in November, the next president will make decisions that could reshape US and global nuclear policy for decades to come. Under Trump, we could see billions spent on ineffective long-range missile defenses, the end of arms control the start of a new nuclear arms race, and new nuclear testing. All of this would make the world a more dangerous place and increase the risk of nuclear conflict. If Trump wins, get ready for a wild ride.

Tom Z. Collina is a national security expert and award-winning author. He is the former Director of Policy at Ploughshares Fund and an author, with former Defense Secretary William Perry, of “The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump.”

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

As a matter of practice, military contractors have overcharged the Pentagon for years—at the expense of both taxpayers and the military.

However, several members of Congress are working to end the practice. Last year, Senators Warren (D-MA), Braun (R-IN), and Grassley (R-IA) teamed up with Reps. Garamendi (D-CA) and Deluzio (D-PA) to introduce legislation that will address the legal loopholes that enable military price gouging.

Acquisition experts understand these loopholes well, but unfortunately, most lawmakers are still unaware of how common it is for contractors to overcharge the military. Without a better understanding of the true scale of military price gouging, Congress is unlikely to pass legislation to prevent it.

That’s why Congress should include in the final FY 2025 defense policy bill Rep. Doggett’s (D-TX) provision to investigate potential overcharging by sole-source suppliers of military products and services. Due to unchallenged market power, sole-source contractors are well positioned to profiteer. Doggett’s provision would establish a panel to review sole-source military contracts and “determine whether the Department of Defense paid fair and reasonable prices.” By focusing on sole-source contracts, the panel would shine much-needed light on the issue of military price gouging writ large, the scale of which is near impossible to discern because so much of it is legal.

Over the course of decades, military contractors have consolidated and harnessed market power to slowly obscure military price gouging. Industry consolidation began when the Cold War ended, and the Clinton administration slashed defense spending. However, as Richard Loeb—former Executive Secretary and Counsel of the Cost Accounting Standards Board in the Office of Management and Budget—has pointed out, the administration simultaneously catalyzed an era of “acquisition reform” to protect contractor profits even as defense spending plummeted and the number of prime military contractors shrank from over fifty to just five. Merger mania has continued, further concentrating market power among the few. Military contractors wield that power on Capitol Hill, lobbying Congress to gradually chip away at acquisition laws designed to protect the government from unfair pricing schemes on military contracts. In so doing, lawmakers have left the Pentagon in the dark about contract negotiations with the defense industry.

Acquisition reform and industry consolidation have helped contractors overbill the military in pursuit of excess profits. As a result, military contractors have overcharged the Pentagon to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars on a single program, generating nearly 40 percent in excess profits. Indeed, a CBS investigation last year revealed that the Pentagon saved $550 million on the Patriot PAC-3 missile after conducting a 2015 cost review of Lockheed Martin and Boeing’s previous work on the program. Both contractors are repeat offenders, and they have long been among the top five prime contractors dominating the defense industry. The Pentagon’s internal watchdog exposed Boeing for inflating prices on spare parts in 2013 and 2011. In one case, the company charged over 177,000 percent above the fair and reasonable price for a helicopter spare part—$71.01 for a tiny metal pin worth 4 cents at the time. The trend continues. Just last month, two Lockheed subsidiaries agreed to a $70 million settlement with the Navy for doing the same thing—inflating prices on spare parts.

The Pentagon can’t negotiate reasonable prices with military contractors because it doesn’t have sufficient bargaining power. Contractors are often exempt from providing the Pentagon with “certified cost or pricing data.” Without this information, the Pentagon has little idea what companies’ costs are and, thus, what their profit margins might look like. Contracts may be valued below the mandatory disclosure threshold. Contractors may also produce a product that’s considered commercial—and theoretically, price competitive. However, the statutory definition of “commercial” is overly broad, encompassing products that aren’t sold to the public and sometimes never have been. Lawmakers expanded the commercial definition and raised the mandatory disclosure threshold for certified data at the behest of industry and under the guise of cutting red tape.

Without legal requirements for certified data, the Pentagon may ask contractors for historic or uncertified cost and pricing data. Yet, the Pentagon has few tools to ensure that this data meets requisite standards; among them, that they include “the minimum information necessary to permit a determination that the proposed price is fair and reasonable.” According to the Pentagon, current statutory and regulatory requirements discourage officials from requesting uncertified data. Instead, contracting officers often rely on historical cost and pricing data. Still, according to the Pentagon Inspector General, the department cannot evaluate price reasonableness “based solely on historical price comparison.” This is particularly concerning given the watchdog’s extensive analysis of contract pricing in recent years, which shows that price analysis methods like historical cost comparison enable “sole source contractors to earn excess profits without detection by contracting officers.” Effectively, military contractors can provide the Pentagon with any cost figures without consequence—even if they give zero indication of how reasonable current prices are. In other words, contractors can price gouge the military legally, likely under the government’s radar.

Still, the defense industry appears to resist almost any attempt by the Pentagon to evaluate contract price reasonableness. “Sweeping” is a process through which contractors overwhelm the Pentagon with cost and pricing data that was “reasonably available at the time of price agreement” but submitted after the fact. According to Senator Warren, contractors often sweep the Pentagon after price agreements and before contract awards to absolve themselves of the liabilities associated with breaking acquisition law and potentially “to hide data that might give the [Pentagon] a better price.” In other cases, contractors outright refuse to provide the Pentagon cost and pricing data, claim they can’t share it, or delay the provision of such data to the extent that the Pentagon may blindly agree to a contract price due to time sensitivity. So, the Pentagon doesn’t just struggle to obtain certified cost and pricing data. It’s a challenge to get any cost and pricing data—even from sole-source contractors, which are relatively uninhibited by the forces driving price competition.

The Pentagon has admitted that data denials “may be more prevalent [than reported], particularly with respect to sole source commercial items.” This is especially nefarious in a market that looks like a monopsony but operates like a monopoly, where sole-source contractors reign as kings. They have a documented history of refusing to provide even uncertified cost and pricing information. Since 1998, the Pentagon’s Inspector General has published several reports detailing data denials by sole-source contractors. TransDigm, Inc. is the most recent example and perhaps the most notorious. According to the Pentagon, the company “accounted for all Defense Logistics Agency cost and pricing data denials” in FY 2022. The company failed to respond to 401 requests for cost and pricing data from the agency, and that was after the Pentagon Inspector General exposed TransDigm for twice price gouging the Pentagon. The contractor generated a total of nearly $40 million in excess profits.

Ultimately, withholding cost and pricing data bolsters a contractor’s ability to increase profits by charging the Pentagon unfair and unreasonable prices. However, the defense industry already significantly outperforms other industries financially, and this is not just because the United States spends over a trillion dollars annually on national security. In many cases, the Pentagon reimburses contractors for research and development costs. It will even cover some capital costs, including those associated with the depreciation of assets like machinery and equipment. As a result, military contractors enjoy returns on assets and invested capital that are difficult to achieve in other industries where companies make those investments themselves. Still, military contractors leverage special treatment from the government to increase executive compensation and cash paid to shareholders, even at the expense of capital investment and internal research and development.

If the defense industry continues to consolidate, it will only get harder for the Pentagon to negotiate fair prices with military contractors. The department will have to rely on more and more sole-source contractors, which not only increases the risk of overcharging but also presents national security risks,  like supply chain vulnerability and reduced availability of certain resources. The entire nuclear triad is already dependent on one company, Northrop Grumman. As far as U.S. contractors go, General Dynamics manufactures a significant portion of tracked combat vehicles. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman produce the military’s fixed-wing aircraft. The distillation of the defense industry to a handful of companies bodes poorly for both the military and taxpayer because it produces waste, not to mention a strong profit incentive for war.

As the defense industry’s primary customer and a steward of taxpayer dollars, the Pentagon needs to be a stronger buyer. However, never-ending acquisition reform continues to prevent that. Current laws are insufficient even to document price gouging by military contractors, much less prevent or remedy it. If retained in the final defense policy bill, Rep. Doggett’s provision would help the Pentagon better understand the scope of overcharging by sole source contractors—and ultimately, give lawmakers the information they need to hold industry accountable for overcharging the government at the expense of the taxpayer.

Julia Gledhill is a Research Associate for the National Security Reform Program at The Stimson Center. She focuses her research and writing on Pentagon spending, military contracting, and acquisition. In previous roles at the Project On Government Oversight and the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Julia worked on various national security issues related to Pentagon accountability, war powers, civilian protection, drone policy, the torture program, and U.S. lethal strikes.

Image: Mehmet Ali Poyraz / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The USS Florida (SSGN-78), an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine, recently completed a record-breaking 727-day deployment across the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet areas of operations, returning to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia.

-The submarine, one of four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines converted to carry conventional cruise missiles, operated with two alternating crews, maximizing its strategic availability.

-Over the deployment, the USS Florida conducted vital national security missions, traveling over 60,000 nautical miles and visiting ports in Greece, Guam, Diego Garcia, and the United Kingdom. Despite the SSGNs' proven capabilities, the U.S. Navy plans to retire these submarines between 2026 and 2028.

Life on a submarine is likely never easy, which is why the United States Navy's Ohio-class boats are assigned two crews that allow the subs to increase their deployments and average sixty-six percent of their time at sea. The Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN-78) recently completed a 727-day deployment to the 5th, 6th, and 7th fleet areas of operations, the United States Navy announced Wednesday.

The Ohio-Class SSGN returned to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, late last month.

SSGN-78, one of the four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) converted to an SSGN, was assigned to Commander, Submarine Group Ten, and began her deployment in August 2022. Over the past two years, the boat conducted five crew swaps. According to the U.S. Navy, employing two crews – each with its own captain – maximizes the "strategic availability, reduces the number of submarines required to meet strategic requirements, and allows for proper crew training, readiness, and morale."

"We have demonstrated the versatility of the SSGN platform to operate anywhere at any time," said Capt. Peter French, blue crew commanding officer. "We operated in several different oceans. It's very uncommon for East Coast submarines to deploy to the West Coast, but we managed to do an exceptional job completing the mission."

The Ohio-class SSBNs were developed to serve as a virtually undetectable undersea launch platform for the U.S. military's intercontinental missiles, and the boats became a key component of America's nuclear triad during President Ronald Reagan's time in office.

As the largest subs ever constructed for the U.S. Navy, and the third-largest submarine ever built, the boats were designed to carry the concurrently developed Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A total of eighteen of the Ohio-class submarines were constructed by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics between 1981 and 1997.

According to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which was agreed in June 1992, the number of U.S. Navy strategic missile submarines was limited to fourteen beginning in 2002. Rather than simply phasing out or decommissioning four of the boats, the U.S. Navy opted to convert them to conventionally armed nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

Electric Boat was awarded a contract in September 2002 to convert the four oldest of the class including USS Ohio (SSBN-726), Michigan (SSBN-727), Florida (SSBN-728), and Georgia (SSBN-729); and each of those boats were refitted with vertical launching systems, which allow the submarines to carry up to 154 Tomahawk TLAM (land attack) or Tactical Tomahawk (block IV) missiles. According to Naval Technology, the conversion also allowed the nuclear-powered SSGNs to deploy special operations forces via Northrop Grumman's Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), while the boats were also fitted with a mission control center. The modifications required converting two of the twenty-four vertical payload tubes into a lockout, which could be used by special operators such as the Navy SEALs.

The SSGN Program Office was able to refuel and convert the four ballistic missile subs (SSBN) to SSGNs in just over five years, and more importantly for U.S. taxpayers for considerably less cost and at less time than it would take to build a new platform. All four of the vessels had completed their conversion by December 2007.

Despite the proven capabilities of the SSGNs, the U.S. Navy has announced plans to retire the four converted Ohio-class boats between 2026 and 2028.

Exactly where SSGN spent her time at sea hasn't been disclosed, but the U.S. Navy only confirmed, "The crews conducted vital missions crucial to national security, enhancing operational capabilities and reinforcing deterrence effort, while traveling more than 60,000 nautical miles. The crews also had the opportunity to visit Greece, Guam, Diego Garcia, and the United Kingdom, as part of routine port calls."

At a media round table that included international military analyst firm Janes on July 25, Captain French praised the SSGN's "unprecedented strike capability," and acknowledged that "Missions change depending on what the combatant commander needs day to day."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The A-12 Oxcart, predecessor to the famed SR-71 Blackbird, was a groundbreaking reconnaissance aircraft developed by Lockheed's Skunk Works in the late 1950s.

-Designed to gather intelligence at speeds up to Mach 3.5 and altitudes of 90,000 feet, the A-12 was faster and flew higher than its successor.

-Despite its impressive capabilities, the A-12's operational history was brief. It primarily served in Vietnam and played a crucial role during the USS Pueblo incident.

-The A-12 was retired in 1968 after just a year of service, overshadowed by the SR-71, which went on to become the more well-known aircraft. Today, the remaining A-12s are displayed in museums across the United States.

Aviation enthusiasts know the SR-71 Blackbird, America’s lightning-fast reconnaissance plane. They are not as familiar with its predecessor, the A-12 Oxcart. Despite its plodding name, the Oxcart could fly faster and higher than the Blackbird.

The U.S. in the 1950s was locked in a military-technological race with the Soviet Union and wanted every scrap of information it could source from behind the Iron Curtain. The U-2 spy plane, capable of flight above 70,000 feet, offered the first real look deep inside Soviet territory. 

But the high-flying U-2 was vulnerable to technological developments in surface-to-air missiles. After failed attempts to reduce the radar cross section of the U-2, designers at Lockheed met with the CIA and agreed to produce another reconnaissance aircraft. 

Skunk Works, the secretive Lockheed division dedicated to highly classified equipment for government programs, got to work. Lockheed had to compete with Convair’s Kingfish design, which incorporated a number of stealthy features. But the success of the U-2 program contrasted with Convair’s struggles with the B-58 Hustler. This swayed the CIA to select Lockheed’s design, the A-12.

The A-12 is visually similar to its better-known successor, the SR-71. It has a long fuselage with hard chines and blended delta wings topped by two inward-canted vertical stabilizers. The Oxcart is smaller than the SR-71 and has only one crewmember. Reports differ, but Lockheed has said it was designed to fly at 90,000 feet and Mach 3.5 – higher and faster than the Blackbird. 

Development began in the late 1950s, but the Oxcart wasn’t operational until 1967. The process was so drawn out in part because new technologies and materials were needed to support this ambitious aircraft. The platform made heavy use of titanium, and few companies had experience working with that material. Other advances in radar absorbing materials were included in the A-12, making it more stealthy.

The Oxcart was designed to spy on the Soviet Union, but after the loss of Gary Powers’ U-2 in 1960, seven years before the A-12 entered service, leaders deemed these missions too risky. Instead, the A-12’s first missions were over Vietnam. 

The A-12 program was actually canceled in 1966, before its missions over Vietnam even began. The aircraft flew for about a year in that theater. Perhaps its most significant contributions came during the USS Pueblo incident, when a Navy intelligence ship was captured by North Korea. A-12s dispatched to the region were able to locate and identify where Pueblo was being held. 

In June of 1968, the A-12 was retired. At that point, the SR-71 was operational and would go on to steal the spotlight. The nine remaining A-12s were placed into storage and eventually loaned out to museums across the country, where they can be viewed today. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: Some Russian commentators, fueled by nationalist rhetoric, have continued to suggest that Alaska should be returned to Russia, despite the fact that the territory was legally purchased by the United States in 1867.

-This notion has resurfaced recently, with propagandist Olga Skabeyeva and Russian lawmakers like Oleg Matveychev calling for Alaska's return. However, these claims are entirely baseless, as Alaska was sold to the U.S. for $7.2 million in a legitimate transaction.

-The deal, initially criticized in the U.S. as "Seward's Folly," proved valuable after the discovery of gold and later, oil. American officials, including Alaska's Governor Mike Dunleavy, have dismissed these Russian claims with strong opposition.

There is a common misconception that the United States was largely "stolen" from indigenous people. It's actually quite complicated because while it is true that someone was there before the European and later American settlers arrived, the U.S. was largely purchased.

Much of the land west of the Mississippi River was acquired from France as the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, and while it didn't include parts of what was then Spanish-America, the United States did later pay Mexico for the territory obtained after the Mexican-American War (1846-48). Additional land in what is today Arizona and New Mexico was acquired via the Gadsden Purchase in 1853. The United States also bought the Danish West Indies in 1917, with the islands now today the U.S. Virgin Islands.

All this is important to note, because few (if anyone) in Paris or Copenhagen ever called for the land back – and while there have been calls from some Mexicans who have suggested the Treaty of Guadalupe be annulled, no one takes it the least bit seriously.

Yet, in Moscow, there remain critics who seriously believe Alaska should be returned to Russia, along with other territory that was once controlled by the Czars. The latest was propagandist Olga Skabeyeva, who on Sunday's broadcast of the Russia-1 news program 60 Minutes described the 49th American state as "our Alaska" while discussing the recent joint Russian-Chinese deployment of bombers with the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Skabeyeva must have missed the memo that Russian North America as it was known was sold to the United States in 1867. This wasn't the first time that Russian pundits on state TV have suggested that Alaska and other historic lands should be returned to Moscow's control.

It was two years ago that Oleg Matveychev, a member of the Russian Duma, called for reparations from the United States that included the return of Alaska as well as a historic settlement in California. Both Alaska and Fort Ross in California were once part of the Russian Empire in the late 18th and 19th centuries before being sold to the United States.

Matveychev's argument was clearly in line with that of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, who had attempted to justify Russia's domination over Ukraine by suggesting the land was once controlled by Moscow.

Of course, any suggestion of a return of Alaska to Russia is entirely without merit. The 49th State wasn't acquired by the United States via conquest or even annexation. It was sold by Russia to the United States for $7.2 million – roughly two cents per acre – in March 1867. It gave the United States 375 million more acres of land, and was the third-largest land deal in history, after the 1803 Louisiana Purchase from France – the second-largest land deal – provided an additional 512 million additional acres.

For the record, the largest "land deal" was really a treaty without money changing lands. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas essentially split the lands outside Europe between Spain and Portugal, then the world's largest superpowers. Spain seems to have gotten the better deal, gaining control of much of modern-day Latin America – but Portugal was granted lands in Africa and the Far East.

As for the sale of Alaska, the deal had taken some time to work out, and Russia could only be described at the time as an "eager seller."

Fearing another war with Great Britain, Russia first approached the United States about selling the territory during the administration of President James Buchanan, but negotiations were stalled by the outbreak of the Civil War. Russia feared if war came with Britain it would be unable to defend the distant territory, which bordered British Columbia, and it also sought to bolster its struggling finances.

The deal was closed after the American Civil War, but many Americans thought it was a wasteful investment.

Critics of the deal called it "Seward's Folly" or "Seward's Icebox" as the Treaty with Russia was negotiated and signed by Secretary of State William Seward and Russian Minister to the United States Edouard de Stoeckl.

Those opposed saw it as little more than a frozen tundra that offered few prospects for settlers. It should be remembered that at the time the "American frontier" was still ripe with opportunity, and few saw a need for land that most would never venture to.

That sentiment changed when gold was discovered in 1898, and today Alaska is a major provider of domestic oil. It is clear that Russia may have negotiated a bad deal (at least for them) in selling the territory, which could explain why they want it back. Yet, even the suggestion of Russian claims over Alaska has been met with strong words from U.S. lawmakers.

"Good luck with that! Not if we have something to say about it. We have hundreds of thousands of armed Alaskans and military members that will see it differently," tweeted Alaska's Republican Governor Mike Dunleavy (@GovDunleavy) in 2022 when Matveychev's claims were first made.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Seawolf-class submarines are among the most advanced and formidable in the U.S. Navy, designed during the Cold War to counter Soviet submarine threats.

-These submarines are equipped with pump-jet propulsors, allowing them to operate quietly at high speeds, with a flank speed of 25 knots (35 mph).

-The Seawolf class excels in stealth, making it nearly undetectable by enemy sonar, and it is armed with advanced weapons systems.

-However, only three of these submarines were ever built due to budget constraints. The recent accident involving the USS Connecticut has left the U.S. Navy with just two operational -Seawolf-class submarines, highlighting the limited availability of these critical assets.

America’s Seawolf-class submarines are some of the most advanced subs in the world. They were built to counter the advancing Soviet submarine threat during the last decade of the Cold War. 

While all submarines are meant for covert, undersea warfare, some are better at the covert part than others. The Seawolf class is the best of all. 

Not only can it stealthily deliver special forces operators to a distant target, but it can quietly tap into undersea communications cables.

These subs come equipped with a feature known as a pump-jet propulsor, which uses a ducted propeller to generate thrust. This design allows for quieter operation and higher speeds compared to traditional propeller systems on lesser classes of submarine.

Seawolf-class submarines can travel at 25 knots (around 35 miles per hour) using what is known as “flank speed.” This speed setting on the Seawolf-class submarine refers to the maximum power setting for the propulsion system. 

While at flank speed, the Seawolf class can quickly respond to threats, evade enemy vessels, and carry out missions including intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

In addition to their high speed, Seawolf-class submarines are designed to be extremely quiet, making them difficult to detect by enemy sonar systems. This combination of speed and stealth makes the Seawolf-class sub a unique and frightening foe in the underwater domain.

Seawolf-class submarines have a submerged displacement of 9,137 tons (12,139 tons for USS Jimmy Carter, which is a specialized variant of the Seawolf-class), and a length of approximately 353 feet. They are equipped with advanced sonar systems, such as the AN/BSY-2, which is considered one of the most advanced sonar systems in the world. 

Seawolf-class submarines have eight 26.5-inch torpedo tubes, which can be used to launch a variety of weapons including Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Mk 48 guided torpedoes. 

Sadly, there are only three submarines in the Seawolf class. 

Originally, the Navy envisioned a fleet of 29. Budgetary constraints, technical complications, and the lack of a near-peer rival at the time of their development kept the numbers low and left the submarines overworked. 

One of these submarines, USS Connecticut, crashed into an undersea mountain while on a mission off the coast of Hainan Island in the South China Sea. 

The submarine tore up its front and had to go limping back to port, where it will remain under repair until at least next September. Given the state of American shipyards, it could well be out of commission even longer.

Thus, the U.S. Navy now has only two of these essential subs at its disposal, all as the world system spins wildly out-of-control. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has long been a source of disappointment for Russian naval strategists, plagued by a series of mechanical issues, most notably its inefficient and environmentally harmful mazut-fueled propulsion system.

-The carrier, often seen belching thick black smoke and leaving oil slicks in its wake, has been undergoing a refit since 2018, with efforts focused on upgrading its outdated engines. Despite these efforts, the carrier remains docked in Murmansk, with experts doubting it will ever return to active service.

-The Admiral Kuznetsov symbolizes the struggles of a post-Soviet Russia trying to maintain a legacy warship amid dwindling resources and strategic miscalculations.

Russia’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, continues to disappoint Russian naval strategists. It was last seen at sea in 2018, being towed by a tugboat. Since that time, it has been at the shipyards for a refit. But most experts think the refit will fail to make the carrier worthwhile. 

The Russian Navy knows Admiral Kuznetsov is a wasting asset. Yet Moscow continues to throw money at it. 

One of the key changes during the refit reportedly involves the ship’s propulsion system. 

Kuznetsov uses gas turbines rather than nuclear power. A gas turbine usually runs on lighter, cleaner fuels. Instead, the Russians purposely designed Admiral Kuznetsov to utilize a dirty, cheap fuel source known as mazut. 

Mazut has a high sulfur content that is known for billowing black smoke emissions. This is one of the dirtiest fuels in the world. It is a significant pollutant and causes grave harm to the respiratory systems of people who breathe it, including the sailors aboard Admiral Kuznetsov.

Particulates spewed from Admiral Kuznetsov’s mazut-fueled gas turbine propulsion system include sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and other, lesser-known pollutants. 

Admiral Kuznetsov’s mazut-fueled engines also pollute the surrounding sea. The carrier was known for leaving large oil slicks in its wake that would linger and poison the surrounding aquatic environment for months after its transit. 

The Barents Observer noted in 2020 that Admiral Kuznetsov’s “engines were old, and the black smoke was caused by incomplete combustion of [mazut] and engine lubricant.”

Having a large, billowing, easily identifiable smoke plume trailing your warship and leaving oil slicks in its wake is probably not the most strategically sound thing to do. With Moscow being so obviously committed to maintaining Admiral Kuznetsov against all reason, the Russians understand they need to address this obvious vulnerability. 

That is why, according to TASS, Russia included “replacements of the main boilers, turbo-gear units, gas turbine, diesel generators, and the propeller auxiliary systems.” 

Whether these changes will work or not remains to be seen. The propulsion system upgrades were supposed to be completed in 2020, with Moscow intending to test the warship by 2022. 

Obviously, this never happened. Admiral Kuznetsov remains ensconced at the Naval Yard No. 35 slip in Murmansk. 

Because the warship was a product of the late-stage Soviet Union, it sat incomplete for many years after the USSR collapsed. By the time it was finally completed, it was a hodgepodge of barely compatible systems. 

The quality of the craftsmanship for the different phases of development also varied, since some of the ship was built when the Soviets had money and resources, and other parts of the carrier were finished under the auspices of budget-limited post-Soviet Russia.

It's no surprise, then, that the ship’s engine ran on such a cheap, inefficient, and dirty fuel as mazut. What’s more surprising is that the Russians waited decades to address the propulsion system woes. 

The Russians seem to have waited too long. The integrity of the entire warship had been so badly compromised that it is highly unlikely she will hit the high seas ever again. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Air Force continues to rely on its aging B-1B Lancer bombers, even pulling retired airframes from the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base for active service.

-Recently, the Air Force reactivated a B-1B, nicknamed Lancelot, to replace a damaged bomber, demonstrating the ongoing importance of the platform despite its age.

-The B-1B is being upgraded with new capabilities, such as the ability to carry the 5,000-pound GBU-72/B bunker-buster bomb, which will enhance its lethality.

As the Air Force faces delays in the B-21 Raider program, reactivating and modernizing B-1Bs helps bridge the gap in the service’s bomber fleet.

The U.S. Air Force’s B-1B bomber first flew several decades ago. Considering its age, it seems strange that the service continues to pull some of these airframes from the boneyard for operation. 

This spring, the service revealed that one of these Lancer bombers, nicknamed Lancelot, would replace another B-1 whose engine exploded during routine maintenance in 2022. Instead of spending to refurbish the wrecked bomber, the Air Force decided it would make more sense to activate one of its retired counterparts from the 309th Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Group at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. 

The B-1B may be an aging platform, but the service continues to upgrade it. Lancelot will probably be modernized soon.

Just last month, images of a B-1B bomber carrying a new bunker-buster bomb circulated on social media. According to The Aviationist, the bomber was spotted flying over the Mojave desert with a 5,000-pound GBU-72/B. Photographer Ian Recchio was photographing aircraft and reptiles in the area when he was made aware of a B-1 approaching the area. 

“On this day, although I could not confirm definitively it was the Edwards B-1, it appeared while refueling on a KC-135 which is not so common to see, so of course I fired off a few frames,” Recchio said. “Both aircraft continued to circle the area for about 2 hours, and I took a few more opportunities to capture images.”

The GBU-72 will certainly elevate the B-1 bomber’s lethality if made operational. This modification, along with several others that have been introduced to the platform over the years, helps the aircraft keep pace with emerging threats. 

Considering the Air Force’s dwindling bomber fleet, the more B-1s snatched up from the boneyard and put back in the air, the better.

In the years immediately after the Second World War, U.S. officials recognized the need for a new, modern bomber able to match the payload of the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress and the top speed of the B-58 Hustler. 

The resulting Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft program, later renamed the B-1A, would blossom into the legendary aircraft still revered today. North American Rockwell’s bomber prototype was selected as the new B-1A. The model featured large variable sweep-wings to increase lift during takeoff and landing – similar to the North American XB-70 and General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark.

The B-1B bomber variant was approved by the Reagan administration in the early 1980s to counter the Soviet Union’s advancing aerial fleet. The upgraded bomber was equipped with an increased payload, as well as advanced sensors and radars. Over the years, the Lancer underwent several more upgrades. Last year, the B-1B received a modernized Identification Friend or Foe system, updated mass data storage, a new defensive avionics system, and Link 16 tactical data communications capability.

While the Air Force does field newer bombers, the service’s total fleet numbers are dangerously low. Even the upcoming B-21 stealth bomber program is expected to face some delays, a concerning prospect considering the uptick in geopolitical instability around the globe. For now, resurrecting B-1 bombers from the boneyard could help alleviate the service’s bomber gap until the Raider is ready.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Iowa-class battleships were the pinnacle of U.S. naval power during World War II, designed for speed, firepower, and durability.

-Despite the shift from battleships to aircraft carriers following the Pearl Harbor attack, these vessels remained vital to the U.S. Navy through the end of the 20th century.

-Equipped with powerful 16-inch guns, advanced radar, and capable of reaching flank speeds of up to 35.2 knots, the Iowa-class battleships were unmatched in their time.

-Though rearming these historic ships is unlikely, their legacy endures as a testament to American naval engineering and the pivotal role they played in maritime warfare.

America’s legendary Iowa-class battleships were the premier capital ships of the United States Navy throughout the Second World War. It is likely that had so many battleships not been taken out of commission by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, these worthy vessels might have remained the central power projection platform for the US Navy. 

But Japan’s decimation of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor meant that the days when the battleship was the dominant player in the Navy were over.

Still, the Iowa-class battleship was a remarkable piece of technology for its era. 

The Iowa-class battleships would, in many cases, serve the United States until the end of the twentieth century. There is even occasional talk about rearming and modernizing the few battleships that remain on display as museums today and reforming them into floating missile trucks. 

While these ruminations are on the fringe, they are still brought forth into the public eye. This scenario is highly unlikely, but it’s easy to see why one might look back to the battleships of old and see some credence to bring them out of retirement.  They still may be useful in today’s age of highly contested areas of operation for the US Navy, notably to the advent of enemy anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD systems.

The Iowa-class battleships were equipped with four General Electric steam turbines, each driving a single, massive propeller for the battlewagon. These turbines were powered by eight Babcock & Wilcox boilers, which produced steam at a pressure of 600 psi (4,137 kPa) and a temperature of 850 degrees Fahrenheit. This power plant provided a total of 212,000 shaft horsepower (158 MW), driving the battleships to their maximum speed of thirty-three knots (or 37 miles per hour).

Iowa-class battleships were designed to be fast and maneuverable, with a length of 887 feet and a beam of 108 feet. They had a displacement of 45,000 tons and a crew of 1,515 officers and enlisted men. 

These battlewagons were equipped with a variety of weapons—notably potent cannons meant to break through enemy defensive perimeters and obliterate the armor of enemy warships from a distance. These battleships came equipped with 16-inch guns in three, tripe turrets, twenty 5-inch guns in ten twin turrets, and numerous anti-aircraft guns. An Iowa-class battleship came equipped with (for its time) advanced radar and fire control systems, which allowed for the battleships to engage enemy ships and aircraft more effectively than many other, older platforms that served in the WWII-era fleet.

One feature, though, stands out for a warship as massive as the Iowa-class. And that is the “flank speed” feature on this boat. Flank speed on an Iowa-class battleship refers to the maximum speed at which a ship can travel. The Iowa-class battleships, being speedy and maneuverable, could get moving at a clip of just shy of forty miles per hour—a real feat for such a large and heavy ship. 

During a shakedown cruise of the Iowa-class battleship, the USS New Jersey, the warship attained an astonishing speed of 35.2 knots—which she maintained for a staggering six continuous hours of operation! 

It was a key asset when under fire or at risk from aerial attack, as zig-zagging was a common technique US surface warships employed when trying to evade air attack from Japanese warplanes while at sea. 

What’s more, being able to travel at this top speed in battle allowed the Iowa-class to keep up with the fast carrier task forces of the US Navy, as they often provided cover for the carriers, and engaged enemy warships effectively.

Although it is an old system from a bygone era, the Iowa-class is an admirable old boat. Not only does it pack an unbelievable punch. This battlewagon can go petal to the metal when the situation demands. There’s a reason the surviving members of the Greatest Generation still speak of the legendary glories of the Iowa-class battleships. They truly were second to none. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)