Foreign Policy Blogs

ZHUHAI, CHINA NOVEMBER 18, 2019: Fishing vessels in the South China Sea. Artyom Ivanov/TASS (Photo by Artyom IvanovTASS via Getty Images)

      China rapidly grew into the world’s second largest economy after opening its doors in 1978. The emerging power’s economic success allows it to continually improve its conventional and nuclear capabilities. A rising China poses a threat to U.S. allies in East Asia, most notably Japan. Japan falls under the umbrella of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence – if China acts against Japan, the United States will be obligated to respond. Japan’s alliance with the United States remains its main defense. The Trump administration weakened the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan, both in the eyes of the Chinese and the Japanese. As such, the current U.S. administration must reconsider its policy options to negate a rising China. Biden should consider three policy options: encourage Japan to develop nuclear weapons, increase U.S. conventional forces in defense of Japan, or adopt a grand strategy of neo-isolationism. I ultimately recommend that Biden reinforces the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan, while emphasizing the defensive nature of that commitment.

        The development of a Japanese nuclear arsenal would create an effective deterrent against China. A nuclear threat must be credible in order for deterrence to work. The previous administration’s behavior towards U.S. allies weakened the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to Japan. Trump’s administration pulled out of multiple agreements, including the Paris Climate Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China may feel more empowered against Japan if it believes that the United States will not retaliate. By developing a nuclear arsenal, Japan would be less reliant on the United States. China would see the development of nuclear weapons as a credible threat and be less likely to act aggressively. The United States could continue supporting Japan without shouldering as much of the cost of defense. The development of Japanese nuclear weapons would also benefit U.S. relations with North Korea. In 2017, North Korea tested missiles able to reach mainland United States. Japan is situated approximately 700 miles from North Korea — if a nearby U.S. ally acquires nuclear weapons, it would deter North Korea from acting aggressively towards the United States.

         Encouraging nuclear development in East Asia comes at a great risk for both the United States and the international community. It could create a security dilemma domino effect – if Japan builds up its arsenal in response to insecurity created by China, China and North Korea will become increasingly insecure. These two nuclear states would in turn increase their own nuclear capabilities. Even current non-nuclear states could see the spread of nuclear weapons as a threat – South Korea may consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Encouraging nuclear development in Japan risks creating an arms race across Asia. The creation of more nuclear weapons, whether or not they are intended offensively, would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The more weapons that circulate in the region, the higher the possibility that someone will use them. 

         Alternatively, the United States could decide to increase the capability of conventional forces dedicated to protecting Japan. This policy route would act within the boundaries of international norms; it does not threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Since the focus will be solely on conventional capabilities, this policy will reinforce the United States’ military commitment to Japan without encouraging proliferation. Additionally, this option greatly reduces the risk of igniting a nuclear arms race. Nuclear states will not be faced with an immediate nuclear threat, and the security dilemma on nuclear level will be much less severe.

         Increasing conventional capabilities does risk creating a security dilemma on a conventional level. The reinforcement of the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan could provoke China, who may decide to respond with conventional warfare. Considering the strength of Chinese forces, a conventional strike could be debilitating for Japan. On top of the economic costs of reinforcing conventional forces, the United States may have to face the human cost of a war with China. Conventional wars have the potential to turn nuclear, especially when nuclear states are involved. Considering both China and the United States possess nuclear weapons, a conventional war involving between the two has an increased probability of escalating.

         The United States could adopt a grand strategy of neo-isolationism, which would prevent U.S. involvement in an East Asian war. Neo-isolationism infers that the United States would step back from its alliances in Europe and Asia. The United States would no longer bear the burden of protecting Japan. It cost the United States nearly $34 billion to keep military forces in Japan from 2016 to 2019, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. By ending alliances, the United States could reallocate billions of dollars to domestic issues. Because of the size and survivability of U.S. nuclear weapons, the United States would still maintain a sufficient nuclear deterrent against its adversaries.

         A shift to neo-isolationism would critically impact the United States’ reputation. The international community generally dislikes when states withdraw from prior commitments, as exemplified by Trump’s time in office. The United States would lose access to the various benefits of alliances – the economic benefits of trade, additional military aid, and support from the international community. The most significant cost of neo-isolationism is the loss of influence in the international community. Right now, the United States acts as a global hegemon. The respect and economic power held by the United States allows it to impose its influence globally. If the United States resigns from its commitments, it would have a harder time influencing other states to act within its interests. The United States would thus resort to military power to exert influence, which would be costly and inconvenient.

         The damage done to U.S. alliances by the Trump administration begs the question – how will the Biden administration address this issue? Will it continue down a treacherous road towards isolationism, or will it re-emphasize its commitments? In his first year of presidency, Biden has sent mixed messages. He rejoined the Paris Climate Accords and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but he withdrew forces from a 20-year commitment in Afghanistan.  Biden’s alliances in East Asia will deeply impact how China behaves throughout the rest of this administration. As such, Biden’s administration should consider the second policy option. Reinforcing the U.S. conventional commitment to Japan will emphasize the United States’ dedication to its alliances without risking nuclear proliferation. Biden should simultaneously emphasize the defensive nature of this commitment to avoid exacerbating the security dilemma in Asia.

Americans must never for Khojaly, Rwanda, Bosnia and other genocides and crimes against humanity.    

On February 26, Azerbaijanis around the world remember the 613 innocent Azerbaijani men, women and children who were slaughtered in Khojaly for the crime of being Azerbaijani.  Rabbi Israel Barouk wrote in Khojaly: A Crime against Humanity, “Of those who perished, 56 people were killed with particular cruelty: burning alive, scalping, beheading, gouging out of the eyes and the bayoneting of pregnant women in the abdomen.”  He noted that an additional 1,275 people were taken hostage.  Many of those who were held hostage were raped and tortured in the cruelest manner.

Many Americans may wonder, why should they care about what happened in Khojaly?  After all, Azerbaijan is very far away from America and it happened in the 1990’s.  However, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., one of the greatest leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement, once stated, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.   We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.   Whatever affects one directly affects us all indirectly.”  

This means that if there is no justice for the Azerbaijani victims, then there will be no justice for us either, as injustice knows no national borders.  For today, it could be innocent Azerbaijani civilians.  Tomorrow it could be another nation and then the following day, it could be my people. 

Then UN Secretary General Jan Eliason stated in 2015, “It is important that we examine why we continue to fail to prevent mass atrocities, despite lessons learned, despite knowledge of causes and drivers and despite our assurances of never again.  Genocide can only happen when we ignore the warning signs and are unwilling to take action.”  

As then Israeli President Reuven Rivlin stated at the UN General Assembly that same year, “On this day we must ask ourselves honestly, is our struggle, the struggle of this Assembly, against genocide, effective enough? Was it effective enough then in Bosnia? Was it effective in preventing the killing in Khojaly? Of Afghans by the Taliban? Is it effective enough today in Syria? Or in the face of the atrocities of Boko Haram in Nigeria? Are we shedding too many tears, and taking too little action?”

He concluded, “I am afraid that the United Nations “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” has remained a merely symbolic document. It did not succeed in realizing its commitment and fulfilling the objective that underpins the establishment of the United Nations Organization.”

Furthermore, if we continue to turn a blind eye to mass atrocities across the world, whether in Khojaly, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Syria, or some other place, then tomorrow a genocide could take place in America too, as ADL head Jonathan Greenblatt already warned it could happen in his recent book titled “It could happen here.”

According to Greenblatt, “None of us want to believe that America could end up like Germany in the 1930’s. As the American author Sincair Lewis ironically titled his 1935 novel—published before the full horror of Hitler became apparent—It can’t happen here. Even today, nobody wants to believe that illiberalism, fascism and violence could unfold on our shores. But I wrote this because we must confront that possibility.”

Greenblatt stressed that genocides become possible “when an underlying social context of hate arises and solidifies over time. From inside that context, hate seems normal and not especially dangerous. Someone shouts a slur at you or spits on you on the street or they refuse to serve you at a restaurant, or they break off a friendship with you. Life might be unpleasant, but it is not intolerable. And then, one day, the unthinkable happens.”

As Greenblatt wrote in his book, “America is a society saturated in hate. The ADL’s own data shows that the United States saw over eleven thousand incidents of extremism or antisemitism in 2019-2020, from coast to coast. Across society, hate is at an all-time high, with numerous groups emerging across the ideological spectrum. Hate groups are also more emboldened than they’ve been in recent memory.”    Thus, what began as ignoring Khojaly, Rwanda and other genocides abroad could lead to the unthinkable happening in America in the future, unless Americans start to care about crimes against humanity and to act against them.   Therefore, as Americans, we have a moral duty to remember what happened in Khojaly, as well as all other instances of genocide and crimes against humanity.  

In recent months, a popular idea to lower tensions between Russia and the West has, among some experts, become to ask Kyiv to seek compromise with Moscow. In the seeming absence of better options, Ukraine should succumb to permanent unofficial Kremlin control of the Donets Basin (Donbas) currently occupied by Russia. This would satisfy Moscow for now and be in the Ukrainians’ own best interest.

Indeed, Ukraine’s hopes for Western direct military assistance, NATO and EU membership, or a US mutual aid pact are unrealistic. Thus, reaching a compromise with Russia may be Ukraine’s currently “best bad” option, and might appear as useful to be pursued by the West. Yet, such a compromise is, for three reasons, only on the surface a suitable instrument to lower tensions in Eastern Europe.

First, compromising with post-Soviet Russia’s disregard for the sovereignty and integrity of other successor states of the USSR is neither a new nor a successful strategy. The most telling – because it’s the longest – story is that of Moldova. In 1992, Russia intervened militarily in an inner-Moldovan conflict. Ever since, a Moscow-supported pseudo-state in Transnistria, and Russian regular troop detachment, stationed without consent from Chisinau, have been undermining Moldovan sovereignty. A similar story has been ongoing in Georgia since 2008, if not before. Russia has not been sanctioned for its destructions of the Moldovan or Georgian states, and has thereby been encouraged to continue.

When Russia started its military aggression against Ukraine in late February 2014, the West initially also refrained from any substantial material action. It instead encouraged Kyiv to not deploy its troops in Southern Ukraine to defend Crimea. The minor Western sanctions imposed after the peninsula’s annexation were too little too late.

The result of the West’s restrained behaviour was neither a resolution of the Crimea issue nor an achievement of peace. In March 2014, Moscow launched a broad hybrid attack on mainland Ukraine involving various Russian state agencies, paramilitary groups, proxy organizations, and regular troops. Alongside thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, over 200 hundred EU citizens on flight MH17 became victims of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The looming new escalation between the two countries suggests a need to urgently ease tensions. Some think that this can be only achieved via Western pressure on Ukraine to agree to Russia’s interpretation of the Minsk Agreements on Donbas. The resulting concessions by Kyiv might temporarily satisfy Moscow, and buy some time for Ukraine. Yet, such an appeasement would have grave collateral effects, and may have repercussions.

An ad hoc Russian political triumph in the Donbas would be a merely partial, or even elusive success for the Kremlin. Obtaining permanent control over the Eastern Donets Basin has an only instrumental purpose. It does not play – like the annexation of Crimea – an essential role by itself for the Kremlin. Moscow does not need the Donbas as such but sees it as a mean to destabilize and influence Ukraine. A Western compromise on the Donbas would not satisfy Moscow’s original wish to turn Ukraine as a whole into something approximating the “people’s republics” in the eastern part of the country. 

Ukrainian concessions on the Donbas would not meet the Kremlin’s larger demand to fundamentally renegotiate the European security order. Moscow’s plans for Ukraine are the most important, but not only expressions of the Kremlin’s desire that the West recognizes a Russian special sphere of interest. Worse, it would demonstrate to Moscow three older inferences. (A) Military posture or/and escalation works. (B) Ukraine’s independence remains incomplete. (C) The West can be made to function as an accomplice to Russian attempts to subvert the integrity of post-Soviet states.

A second defect in Western debates on how to deal best with Russia is an underestimation of the social impact of economic measures. This is a serious Western instrument to contain Russia without employing military means. Some, however, suppose that such sanctions will not be imposed, others that they may not help to sufficient degree. This assumption is fundamental to the conclusion that Western pressure on Kyiv is the only way out of the current quagmire.

One cannot know for certain, in advance, the effects of substantive individual and sectoral sanctions on the Russian political leadership and system. Yet, there are indications that restrictive economic measures may be more effective regarding Russia than in relation to, say, North Korea or Iran. The current Western sanctions imposed on Russia are, despite much European fanfare, limited. Many of the measures target individuals and a number of companies. Most sanctions do not directly hit the Russian economy as a whole. The somewhat more significant general restrictions imposed by the EU in the summer of 2014 are not properly sectoral, but rather sub-sectoral. They only concern the EU’s sale of certain narrowly defined high technologies and financial services to Russia.

Assuming a significant impact of serious Western sanctions on Russia’s economy and, in extension, its behaviour is plausible in view of what we already know today. It can be extrapolated from some well-researched consequences of the existing individual and sub-sectoral measures that have been in place since 2014. Two detailed studies published in 2021, by Erik Andermo and Martin Kragh in the journal Post-Soviet Affairs as well as by Anders Aslund and Maria Snegovaya in a report for the Atlantic Council, have demonstrated considerable negative indirect repercussions for Russian economic growth of the limited Western sanctions that have been in place during the last seven years. While these minor measures have not led to a Russian economic decline, they have prevented a likely higher economic growth since 2014. These studies indicate that Russians would have had billions of dollars more income without the rather modest sanctions adopted seven-and-a-half years ago.

The seemingly considerable potential of unused Western sanctions should be seen in connection to two other recent empirical studies by Maria Snegovaya, a Russian political economist living in Washington, DC. Snegovaya has demonstrated a correlation of Russian expansionist sentiments with the income from energy exports, as well as the country’s related general socio-economic situation. The aggressiveness of Russian presidents’ foreign policy rhetoric is positively related to the level of oil prices and export revenues. Moreover, Russia’s population’s mood is more enterprising in foreign affairs in times of good socioeconomic development. While these studies do not address the issue of sanctions, they indicate that economic performance and their social effects are important issues for the foreign political thinking of both, the elite and population of Russia.

A third miscalculation in many Western deliberations about Ukraine concerns the domestic repercussions of further Ukrainian compromises on its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. To be sure, a joint Western insistence that Kyiv consents to an implementation of the Minsk Agreements leaving the occupied Donbas territories under informal Moscow tutelage is possible. Yet, the larger challenge for Kyiv and the West would be how to make Ukrainian society and especially those parts of it that have been involved in the more than seven-year war effort settle with such a solution.

There are today numerous Ukrainians who have contributed and sacrificed a lot for the defence of the fatherland. Millions have invested their money, time, nerves, energy, and health while thousands have lost their beloved in the war. Many Ukrainians would thus hardly agree to a fishy peace deal with Russia. In fact, a significant part of Ukrainian society is already today unhappy about what they perceive as Kyiv’s not hawkish enough stance vis-à-vis Russia and the two so-called “people’s republics,” in the East.

Historical experience suggests that a dubious compromise between Kyiv and Moscow could not only lead to Ukrainian riots. In the worst case, protests against concessions towards Russia could turn into a, now, real and not, like hitherto, pseudo-civil war in Ukraine. In summer 2015, then President Petro Poroshenko, hardly a dove, started, under Western pressure, a process to change Ukraine’s Constitution allowing for a special status of the occupied East Ukrainian territories. This led to disturbances in front of Ukraine’s parliament leaving several people dead and dozens injured.

Since then, the aversion against any Ukrainian allowances in the war with Russia has grown rather than declined. One suspects, moreover, that the enormous domestic risks from a fundamental Ukrainian policy change regarding the Donbass war are fully understood in the Kremlin. Perhaps, an escalation of inner-Ukrainian tensions has been a major or even the major purpose of the entire Russian enterprise, in the first place.

The stark choice facing the Ukrainian leadership is even bleaker than many in the West might recognize. The alternative is not only and not so much between a self-sacrificing war, on the one side, and denigrating peace-deal with Russia, on the other. Instead, Kyiv’s possible partial satisfaction of Moscow’s appetite entails secondary domestic and foreign dangers that could turn out to be, in their sum, larger than the hazards of a new armed escalation today.

Why Compromise in the Donbas Is Unhelpful | Global Policy Journal

It was always interesting speaking with those who escaped tyranny when I began my studies. My intention was not to educate myself on the nature of those regimes nor even challenge those ideas in my youth, but to understand the effect on individuals who survived the physical and mental struggle of a failed society. I was told that in my country, everyone believed everything they were told by the Government, where as in her country of Czechoslovakia, no one trusted anything they Government ever said. This view of the world is meant to not only keep one’s life from becoming suspect to the tyranny of their Government, but also to maintain one’s own sanity in a place that was a physical and mental prison, designed to enshrine corruption above and beyond a person’s natural rights.

While literature classes in an English speaking atmosphere often encourages students to follow novels based on British traditions and society, it was more useful to me to study places similar to where my family originated from. With a diverse background also came a diversity of places that were subject to different types of tyranny. While these places differed greatly, tyranny often crushes one’s humanity in a similar fashion. The works of Czech author Milan Kundera was notable, as a person who wrote about life under Communism post the Prague Spring. As described by my colleague at the time, their society was one where people only communicated in whispers, and were weary of neighbours, friends and family as the secret police loomed over every action of every citizens. The beginning of tyranny was as interesting as its end, with Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago showing how the makers and helpers of society will always be turned into criminals by a One Party State, and with the Polish filmmakers Kieslowski’s film Blanc/White showing an emergence from a gray and dead Communist Poland at the end of the Cold War, with the spirit of Solidarnosc giving light to freedom of the country and the individual.

I found out once studying comparative policy between the EU and Latin America that Milan Kundera was popular as well in the South America. While not under Communism, many countries in Latin America also suffered from military dictatorships well into the late 80s and beyond. Despite there being little in common between Czech and Latin American culture on the surface, the isolation and torment of living under a dictatorship in Latin America in those years can be clearly understood by those living under Communism in places like Prague in 1968, Budapest in 1956, Warsaw and Gdansk in the early 80s and East Berlin in the late 80s.

Lessons from this era of tyranny is not lost in modern times. Some tenants of free thinkers are sacrosanct, and movements like Solidarnosc in Poland has proven that persistent, peaceful and coordinated protest movements can heal a society. Latin American academic Guillermo O’Donnell studied the transition of military dictatorships into democratic nations during his studies, and he showed that there are different aspects of democracies that need to all function in order to produce a healthy and free society. Institutions and grassroots movements need to be married to clear and unwavering property rights and an open society built on free speech. The basic rules of laws should never be suspended, as those with unchecked power will corrupt them without fail. A free media should in a manner be part of the checks and balances on a society, as when a media is controlled or works for the Government, they tend to decay the checks and balances instead of functioning to challenge those in power to ensure a free society.

Democracies work in order to create methods and guarantee rights so that citizens never have to live in silence. If a society is crumbling, a Government will promote individuals operating on a level of subsistence just to maintain their food, shelter and basic needs so opposing views remain powerless. The checks and balances function to relieve pressures in society so that citizens can be confident that a small, elite group cannot choose to extinguish their rights, their property and their lives. Without these values to release pressures and tensions in a democracy, a country will vacillate violently between oligopolies, kleptocracies, military dictatorships, and one party states. Democracy is not just about voting ever few years, its about being able to be a human and have a free voice in a multidimensional and institutionally healthy community.

Sports and politics have long been intertwined- historical figures like Jackie Robinson, Muhammad Ali, Arthur Ash, and Billie Jean King have played a huge role in advancing the cause of human rights both in the United States and around the world. Modern figures like Colin Kapernick, Megan Rapinoe, Enes Kanter Freedom, and many many others have continued to enhance the legacy of politically motivated athletes.

In past years, these efforts have continued at the Olympics. Athletes like Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, and Fumino Sugiyama have used the platform they earned through sport as an opportunity to push back against repression. To the extent that these demonstrations were controversial in their time, history has vindicated (and will continue to vindicate) the actions taken by these politically minded athletes.

However, as we approach the end of these 2022 Olympic games, examples of athlete activism have, unfortunately, been few and far between- there are a number of reasons for this. 

The most obvious of these is the direct repression that the non-democratic Chinese regime enforces on Chinese nationals and international visitors alike. Most of you taking the time to read this article will already know that the government in Beijing has a long legacy of violating human rights and weaponizing the state against racial and religious minorities living in China.This threat was made even more clearly by the very public crackdown on domestic dissent that took place in the weeks leading up to the games.

However, not all examples of repression come from expected sources…Perhaps the most surprising of these examples comes directly from the International Olympic Committee. The IOC continues to enforce the infamous Rule 50, which bars athletes from participating in political demonstrations while in Olympic venues or other areas. This rule was put in place in the aftermath of the courageous demonstration carried out by Tommie Smith and John Carlos in 1968, and it remains as chilling and regressive today as it was when it was implemented to curb those demonstrations against racism.

Additionally, representatives from the United States and other liberal democracies have advised athletes against making political statements. Perhaps the most shameful of these statements comes from Rep. Nancy Pelossi who suggested that athletes, “(should) not risk incurring the anger of the Chinese government”, citing concerns about, “what the Chinese government might do to (American Olympian’s) reputation and families.”Cowardly statements such as these give credibility to the fundamentally un-American idea that any government can restrict fundamental human rights like the freedom of speech and religion through the threat of force.

Even worse, some Olympians have had their own “liberal” governments bar them from making statements regarding the human rights abuses that the Chinese government inflicts on its people by, functionally, issuing handlers to monitor statements made by their athletes. This precise thing took place when skiers from New Zealand were prevented from responding to a potentially political question when they were interrupted by a handler assigned to them by New Zealand and the IOC.

While there have been broad diplomatic boycotts of the games, these efforts have done little to increase public awareness regarding China’s human rights abuses- much less apply the sort of pressure that might actually lead to change. Further opportunities to increase public awareness about the severity of China’s human rights abuses have been wasted as a consequence of NBC’s unwillingness to highlight China’s continued violations of human rights while broadcasting the Games.

With all of this being said- to the extent that hosting the Olympic games is a sign of international prestige, it should also come with the responsibility to uphold global norms surrounding respect for human rights and individual autonomy. Without coupling the opportunity to host the Games with increased public scrutiny, the Olympics risk becoming an opportunity for repressive regimes to flex their muscles without fear of being shamed for their illiberal policies.

Sadly, it goes without saying that the current regime in China is no champion of either human rights or individual autonomy. Despite this, the authorities that promote, broadcast, and organize the Games have largely remained silent- this lack of active criticism is tantamount to a tacit endorsement of Beijing’s countless human rights violations.

The goal here is not to criticize the athletes who have not spoken out- it is reasonable that those individuals may not want to risk the wrath of a fundamentally illiberal regime. More than that, it is reasonable that these athletes may choose to dedicate their full attention to their crafts without concerning themselves with politics.

Insted, we should look critically at the public statements (or lack thereof as the case may be) made by the Olympic committee, mainstream media, leaders in the United States and in other democracies that have suggested that athletes would be better off staying quiet than they would be speaking out. Bestowing prestige on a bad actor by giving them the Olympic platform and then participating in the coverup is shameful and violates the most basic mission of the Olympic Games- “to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association.

Sergei Supinsky / AFP / Getty

What is intriguing about the latest military conflict between Russia and Ukraine is how similar both countries are culturally and politically. While many ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and a fair number of Ukrainians live and work in Russia, their cultural, historical, linguistic and family ties are quite deep. As one of the largest and most influential members of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine made up a good portion of the population and territory of the European part of the former Soviet Union. Beyond having mainstay Russian military capabilities like Antonov being based in the Ukraine and until recently, the Soviet/Russian Fleet in Sevastopol as part of the territory of Ukraine SSR, many mixed families are fairly common. Discussions around the dinner table is likely very intriguing on the current political situation in the past few weeks.

There are many military focused websites putting out their predictions on the result of a possible hot war between Russia and Ukraine. The motivation for theories on these scenarios is likely spurned on by Western media promoting the idea that war is inevitable between the two countries. While I disagree with the inevitability of many of their conclusions, the tactical analysis given is likely true, that the Russian Armed Forces would defeat Ukraine’s Armed Forces in battle.

My impression of the capabilities of each force is that while countries like China in 2008, and Russia have invested more recently in many new weapons systems, Ukraine and the rest of the world have mostly relied on updating late Cold War technologies for conflicts that will never match a Cold War scenario. With the exception of US stealth technology and mostly Russian technological antidotes to stealth and drones via anti-aircraft systems, Ukraine is fielding some of the best late Cold War equipment against Russia’s post-2014 weapons systems. The late Soviet Army was likely the most effective it had ever been in the late 1980s, a concern for any invading army going against a force designed as the best defense force in the world, at least when Billy Joel was at the top of the charts.

Ukraine’s 1980s era tank divisions can more or less be described as the technological parents of Russia’s current systems. The T-64 tank that makes up much of Ukraine’s tank divisions was a model that was considered more expensive and more capable than the T-72 tanks, and were reserved for service within the Soviet Union almost exclusively. While the T-80s that came from the T-64 is possessed by both sides, Russia has more of them as well as the more modern T-72 variant, the T-90, with more modern defensive systems along the T-14 Armata modern battle tank. New technology may prove to keep Russian Forces protected, if it works as it should on the field of battle. NATO
Javelin missiles and Ukrainian Forces will certainly cause notable damage.

While stealth technology is possessed by Russia, much of the makeup of the military structure of the former Soviet Union was to defend against attacks from the West. Trauma from the Second World War created a ethos of integrated missile defence during the Cold War, and while the Soviets were not talented in making Bluejeans, they did and still lead the world on the creation of anti-aircraft radar systems and missiles. Ukraine, while likely being in a weaker position, is still one of the most capable armies in the world and do have possession of many advanced missile systems ranging from the TOR, BUK and S-300 missiles that are a major threat to many modern Russian aircraft. With NATO assistance, Ukraine may have been given some radar technology that can burn through stealth technology in close proximity to ground radars based on the battlefield in Ukraine. Computer systems that can manage a larger number of targets in the event Russia swarms them with drones and cruise missiles may also been distributed to them by NATO allies.

The conflict in Ukraine is really one of posturing against weak opposition to place Russia in a better defensive position physically and politically against the West after the disastrous pullout of Afghanistan and what is likely seen as a weak US and EU. Exporting fuel from North America would likely cause the most distress for Russia, reengage Germany and France in the defense of Ukraine, and put Russia into a more modest position while sorting out some inflationary issues at home. Unfortunately, Western leaders would prefer to choose short term strategies to win small victories in their local elections and play Olympics in places that disrespect human rights instead of uniting their people against real threats of war. It is likely not wise to increase inflationary pressures on food and fuel, while alienating those who feed and heat the local population while asking them to possibly donate their sons and daughters to a future war on the frozen plains of Ukraine. It will be no surprise that the adult youth in your town would rather be working to reduce inflationary pressures with much needed, community inspiring employment. What Ukrainians and Russians do know is that propaganda does not put food on the table, and that Western leaders have not figured that out yet. Plus ca change, unfortunately…

There have been some welcomed comparisons published over the last few weeks focusing on elections and the possible political future of countries and regions as a whole. While some regions can be considered too diverse to compare properly to each other, Europe and Latin America share some political, cultural and structural similarities, albeit applied in very different ways over time. Despite this, various countries and their citizens make political calculations based on their own experiences, ones that differ greatly between regions and countries in those blocs.

It is difficult to compare different Latin American countries on why they vote for a left/right President, as it is to compare Europe to all of Latin America. While many of the political campaigns in Europe focus on their refugee policies, there is a notable refugee crisis in Latin America. Millions of Venezuelans escaping left wing Chavista policies have been accepted into other countries in the region and the United States. It is very apparent in the region, and blunts a lot of support for the more extreme policies of the left.

In Mexico this is apparent, as while they have a left wing President, he still works to support economic measures for his nation for the benefit of all of Mexico’s industrial sectors. Policy conflicts with the new USMCA agreement shows that Mexico has been more assertive than Canada in defending their national interests, and was pragmatic in getting a trade deal even though Canada wanted them to gamble some economic sectors to demonstrate a united front against the US. While Mexico has been assertive in defending their rights under the USMCA, Canada who is now getting locked out of many traditional economic areas that were sacrosanct since the 1960s era Auto Pact. In many cases, Canada often enters the disputes after Mexico commits to a strong response. Coming from the nation that on occasion still prides itself on the policies of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, Mexico is rightly focused on helping diverse sectors of its economy.

As France goes, so does much of Europe. With elections coming soon for French voters, the world is certainly watching. Polling is currently showing France giving a lot of support to the right of Macron, but as in the last election this likely will not give Macron a loss unless he agitates his citizens and destroys his centrist position. Centrists must not give way to more extreme policies from either wing of the electorate, the ending result is that citizens will vote for perceived stability, as occurred in Brazil.

Also approaching an election, Brazil’s electorate may not have forgotten the corruption that personally affected most citizens surrounding international sporting events before the last election. With the current inflationary pressures and an electoral response to past political corruption against all establishment parties, the result will be of great interest. Noting that traditional parties seem to only have ex-President Lula da Silva of the early 2000s era as an option, recent memories of corruption may unbalance the view of Lula’s Presidency from the earlier era. While his past stance of campaigning from the left and governing from the centre may help, it might backfire unless he can be seen as repairing the complex problems that came from the pre-Car Wash Scandal era.

The reality is that stability eventually becomes the issue of the day, and citizens often pull away from establishment candidates by electing other establishment politicians that will likely get counterbalanced by interests in their countries. Separate from corruption and economic tragedies, most functional systems are naturally pushed to the policy centre by the electorate. For the most part this has been the case in Mexico. The healthier alternative is often to run a country from the centre left or centre right with some varied policies to ensure resulting stability. Corruption and economic collapse in Latin America may have the army try and act as a power broker, or in the case of Europe, have the Russian Army perform a similar task. Corrupt governments end up in a spiral of loss and chaos as they switch between corruption of the left, then corruption of the right, then back again, never truly addressing poverty or injustice.

What can be certain is that no one will benefit from extreme policies by any Government. The reality is that extremists feed off each other to the detriment of noble citizens. In Latin America, no one wants a left wing Venezuela situation as now everyone has neighbours telling them in person what they experienced in one of the most naturally wealthy countries in the world. Extreme type policies in Europe would ensure a far right/left victory. Extremist policies always illicit a reaction and produces totalitarianism. An “other” is always needed, is intentional and is the method of governing by selective oppression. Extremists feed off each other, and it is not unique to Europe, Latin America or any other nation.

They Really Don’t Know What We Want.  Do We?

At the outset of 2022, Russia has troops massed on the Ukraine border and China has heightened aerial testing of Taiwan’s defenses. While Russia and China may be coordinating their challenges, each has its own interest in reducing U.S. influence. China claims Taiwan and Russia aims to exclude the West from Ukraine. America, or its rules-based order, impede the interests and threaten the legitimacy of both. U.S. policy engages them in “great power competition,” but with too little thinking about what are we competing over.  As one for instance, do we value Taiwan as a free country or as a cog “in the defence of vital US interests”? If we do not give a coherent answer we let others interpret our goals for their purposes. If we ourselves do not know, we will keep “moving the goalposts” of our objectives as we did in Afghanistan. We will name incoherent priorities and pursue none fully, in a dissipation we cannot afford. No one will have reason to believe any intentions, much less values, we profess. Adversaries will use that mistrust to weaken our partnerships, rules-based order, and democracy.

America has a clear story to tell. Our nation conceived itself in a creed of rights, equal and unalienable to all persons, and of government to secure them by consent of the governed. In this self-conception, the creed defines our nationality. Betrayal, even by inattention, threatens this base of national legitimacy. Many U.S. interests are at stake in relations with China, Russia, and anyone else. Any nation must secure its tangible needs. But America must keep faith with our creed. Today our mounting self-doubts call us to reaffirm that existential base. Crises like Ukraine and Taiwan challenge our geopolitical position, but also offer a chance for reaffirmation. To conduct ourselves coherently across diverse and confusing issues, to answer the question of what we compete for, we need clarity in why we do what we do. With clarity, specific policies will fit together better than in serial reactions to today’s smorgasbord of challenges. If we orient policy by our founding tenets, we display consistent motives globally, set our international relations on our terms, and exhibit our core convictions to the world – and ourselves.

Parsing the Taiwan and Ukraine crises in light of our creed will illustrate how it could guide policy. Two step thinking is needed, one to stabilize the crises, the next to re-cast our relationships by the new theme. Actual dialogue will mix and mingle the two steps. Events, like an actual attack on Taiwan or Ukraine, could disrupt step two. Regardless of any outcomes, America can reaffirm our core purposes amid the crisis. If that potential fades, this speculation for a long term policy approach offers an image of opportunity for future reference.

Starting with Taiwan, Americans should understand that Taiwan is a free country as we understand the term, not some authoritarian regime with an electoral veneer. Like only a few dozen other countries it has repeatedly transferred power freely and without disruption, between parties of very different outlooks. In its entrenched democratic governance it supports not only elections and prosperity, but a society where individuals have great choice in how to live their lives. It grapples with the same issues, from food adulteration to language and gender diversity, as other advanced democracies. Taiwan displays as full a picture of freedom as any country in the world.  

Formally, U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy cites an old agreement with the PRC. Even we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, and though the agreement with the PRC remains in place, the idea of sovereignty gives China a claim to dominion. Also, our commitment to Taiwan originally supported a dictatorship, and we could squelch a PRC attack easily. Today, that geopolitical stance is outmoded and the PRC has developed a major military capacity. But Taiwan has developed in freedom, so America’s commitment to freedom is now on the line alongside Taiwanese autonomy.

Some policy discourse points this way. A Brookings paper of November 2021 rejects PRC faulting of the U.S. for “’creating Issues around’ China’s policies toward Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.” The rejection reflects America’s creedal core: “these issues touch American values at the heart of its national identity …” Defense Secretary Austin has also echoed strategist Michael O’Hanlon’s concept of “integrated deterrence,” targeting other PRC interests to discourage attack. This effectively elevates Taiwan as a U.S. priority, as China would respond by targeting wider U.S. interests. And even if we cannot win a war, the U.S. should make clear, as O’Hanlon suggested in an autumn panel discussion, that an attack will mean that U.S. – PRC relations “would never be the same.” We should assume the costs, including to our shared interests with China – and in our stretching of the sovereignty principle. Fidelity to our founding tenets demands this full, first, commitment to Taiwan’s freedom.

AEI’s Giselle Donnelly notes an ideological flavor to Sino-American relations, which a creed-based commitment to Taiwan will evoke. But the Cold War’s ideological conflict does not apply, at least not yet. Containment was waged against “an ’irreconcilable’ competitor presenting a ‘mortal’ challenge.” A zero-sum confrontation can spur one of the rivals’ demise, as happened to the USSR. Adopting that stance before explicitly finding China’s ideology irreconcilable and its challenge mortal will co-opt our core interest to the goal of defeating China.

How do we avoid weaponizing our soul on one hand, or appeasing a mortal threat on the other? The Brookings paper offers a start for a next step in relations with the PRC, calling for “calibrated, monitored collaboration” on our shared interests. If the U.S. names our creed as core national interest, we can calibrate relationships to that standard. Assuming a well-designed rubric, America might assess PRC compatibility with our core interest at (say) “2 out of 10;” and “3 out of 10” before their clampdown in Hong Kong, repression in Xinjiang, and increased social surveillance. The two “points” acknowledge the Chinese people’s rising welfare and the CCP’s public-institutional, rather than clan-based, rule. (North Korea would stand at zero.) Calibrated assessments carry our founding tenets yet respect China’s discretion to choose closer or cooler relations. Assessment should not be used as a rhetorical weapon – we could rate our own conduct on this scale too. Rather, the mechanism would set our long term stance in terms of our creed. If the CCP wishes to reduce tensions, it has clear markers of America’s priorities. If it chooses further divergence, free nations stand alerted. The idea that relations would ‘never be the same’ if China attacks Taiwan becomes more explicit.

Thus we can imagine ways, building on serious thinking, to orient policy by our creed.   But invoking our core national interest only over Taiwan would co-opt America’s identity to the purpose of opposing China. U.S. policies must carry our tenets globally. How should we address the Ukraine crisis?

Ukraine is an independent nation, recognized by Russia despite Russian-installed rule over their territory. Ukraine is also freer than Russia, and freedom doesn’t grow when sovereignty is threatened. That said, the U.S. did not contest Soviet invasions of Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Further, while Ukraine is growing in its democracy it does not exemplify our creedal values as Taiwan does. Freedom House rates Ukraine at 60 out of 100 in overall freedom and rights, where Taiwan rates a 94. Russia is rated at 20, well below Ukraine, but still retains electoral forms and Vladimir Putin enjoys some popular support, while Ukraine still suffers from corruption. It is more to the point that Russia’s aggressiveness poses a wider danger to European security, including that of deeply rooted democracies and others developing toward greater freedom. We must oppose Russian threats to Ukraine but our deepest reason is to protect freedom where it holds sway and support its growth in places like Ukraine. Rules of sovereignty and non-aggression serve this end, and we defend those as much as we defend Ukraine itself.

Russia also cites international rules, for its own reasons. As it took over Crimea and eastern Donbas Putin claimed that Ukraine posed a threat. This claim, however contrived, cites NATO expansion, against the historical backdrop of European invasions of Russia. The West can, easily, assure non-aggression against Russia. If we recast anti-Russian sanctions and arms sales to Ukraine as measures to protect international rules, we open a possibility, after Russia drops its threats, of common ground. We could rebase relations on a concept that Russia shares, however our interests in rules. On that new base we could engage Russia for the long term in pragmatic discussion of security, and still protect and nurture freedom. In that engagement we offer – with our allies – what Richard Haass calls “a diplomatic path (including) … a willingness to discuss with Russia the architecture of European security.” On a shared interest in rules, we would trade that voice to Russia for European democracies’ security and Ukraine’s, and others’, space to grow in freedom.

Before any new engagement, though, Putin  “should first put down his gun.” Our first step, underway as of January, must face him down. The second step aims for workable long term relations with Russia – not Putin’s forbearance. The prospect of that second step might nudge him to adopt a new strategy, but no change will be meaningful if negotiated at gunpoint.

Addressing each crisis for its specific impact on our core interest, we value Taiwan for its freedom rather than as a check on China, and open a possibility for clearer relations with China. We oppose Russian designs on Ukraine not over claims for Ukrainian democracy but by rules of non-aggression – which Russia espouses but which also support freedom. These approaches are illustrative speculations. But America’s purpose demands policy orientation around our core interest, keeping freedom’s ethos safe and vibrant, and leaving doors open even for rivals to evolve toward freedom. Full orientation to our creed names the purpose under any pragmatic dealings and gives substance to our abstract founding tenets. Crises, even as ominous as those over Ukraine and Taiwan, offer a reason to examine our policies, and a chance to realize our premises.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and U.S President Joe Biden shake hands during their meeting at the ‘Villa la Grange’ in Geneva, Switzerland in Geneva, Switzerland, Wednesday, June 16, 2021. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, Pool)

The threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine has been building for some time, and if recent reporting is any indication, the conflict appears to be coming to a head. If there is any way to avert fighting- now is the moment to bring ideas to the table.

If we are going to consider potential off-ramps, the first thing we need to consider is what each of the parties involved would need to see realized in order to walk away from the table satisfied. 

As the target of a potential invasion, it is simplest to identify the core Ukrainian interest. Ukrainian President Zelensky should be able to walk away from this potential conflict with his head held high if he can protect Ukrainian territorial integrity while keeping the long term prospect of Ukraine joining NATO on the table. The United States, coupled with partners in NATO, have a similar set of interests- prevent Russia from asserting itself as an imperial power in Eastern Europe and maintain the integrity of NATO in order to rebuff the threat of Russian expansion in the future.

Russia’s interest, especially if we are looking to identify potential off-ramps, is by far the most complicated to identify. Putin has demanded a promise that Ukraine will not be admitted into NATO now, or in the future. More than that, the Russian “President” has threatened that if this guarantee is not made, Russia may move to place nuclear weapons in Cuba or Venezuela- comfortably within striking distance of the United States and in clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The stakes are very high, for the United States, for Ukraine, and for the world as a whole.

The United States is likely to rebuff these demands, and beyond these measures, Putin has not identified other viable alternatives. However, there is one thing we can say with a high degree of confidence- given the very public nature of this armed escalation, Putin cannot afford to walk away from the table empty handed. Without some concession in the direction of Russia’s perceived security, it will be very difficult to avoid a conflict in Ukraine.

Despite these troubling signs, there is still an opportunity to avoid the worst case scenario. More than that, it very well might be in Putin’s interest to find an off-ramp. Given the slow and public build up of tension over the last few months, the Ukrainian military has had ample opportunity to prepare for an invasion. Coupled with direct military aid from the United States and other members of the international community, Putin knows that a conflict in Ukraine would be far from a painless endeavor. 

More than that, there is no avoiding the fact that, regardless of what happens over the next few days or weeks, NATO membership has become more attractive to other nations in Eastern and Northern Europe. Putin should be wary of this fact unless he envisions Russia as totally incapable of winning allies in the region through diplomacy. In a similar way, there are real questions about how willing individual Russians are to participate in a potential conflict, Putin’s preferences put to the side.

When these factors are coupled with the longer-term economic and political consequences that would come in the form of both sanctions and diplomatic distrust, Putin’s attempt to restore Russia to its historical greatness is at odds with alienating itself from the international community through a potential invasion of Ukraine. Personally, I find it unlikely that Russia finds itself better off in the year 2050 if Putin prioritizes small territorial gains over economic development and diplomatic integration. Perhaps Putin sees that truth as well.

Still, the question remains- what might a potential off ramp actually look like? I suggest that we use the Cuban missile crisis and the example set by President Kennedy as a guide. In order to prevent the potential threat of a Soviet backed Cuba possessing nuclear weapons, the administration employed two key tactics. First, similar to President Kennedy’s symbolic show of force by enforcing an embargo around Cuba, it could be argued that the United States has taken similar measures over the last two administrations by providing direct military aid to Ukraine. 

The second tactic, however, is what truly allowed the Kennedy administration to avoid the threat of a nuclear Cuba- namely, the removal of missiles from Turkey. Even though this agreement was carried out in secret, and despite the fact that the missiles based in Turkey were known to be outdated (in fact, the Kennedy administration was rumored to already be considering removing them), Khrushchev was able to save face in front of key domestic power-holders and protect his nation’s security interest.

I believe that a similar measure should be taken today. The United States should work with Russian negotiators to identify existing American or NATO military installations which, in exchange for a promise not to invade Ukraine, could be shut down or de-militarized. Given the strategic flexibility offered by America’s commitment to a nuclear triad, and in light of the gradual end of America’s wars in the Middle East, I am confident that there are a number of NATO military installations that could be shut down without meaningfully diminishing America’s (or NATO’s) ability to act in the region.

Frankly, these efforts may coincide with the closing of some of the NATO bases that were primarily tasked with serving as launch points for NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would mirror the approach used by the Kennedy administration even more closely- removing military equipment that is past its peak usefulness in order to achieve an important diplomatic objective.

Perhaps in order to accommodate Putin’s ego and need to save face domestically, the Biden administration will be asked to make these concessions publicly as opposed to privately. In my opinion, so be it. The American people should be tolerant of that. Given the massive reach of the American military, the United States has an opportunity to present Putin with a functionally “free option” in exchange for sustained peace in Eastern Europe. If the Biden administration can take advantage of this potential off-ramp, or another like it, it would be a huge win both for the administration, for Ukraine, and for the freedom loving world at large.

–

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

There is widespread fear of an escalation of the current Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict into a large and prolonged inter-state war in Europe. This could lead West European governments to agree to Putin’s key demand of reneging on NATO’s future inclusion pledge for Ukraine and Georgia. Should this happen, the West needs to compensate the two countries for the de facto broken 2008 Bucharest NATO summit promise. Ukraine and Georgia as well as Moldova can be provided with official EU membership perspectives and an assurance that Brussels will start accession negotiations once the three republics’ Association Agreements have been implemented.

In his yearly large press conference on 23 December 2021, Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes of Russia’s current confrontation with the West. In barely coded language, the Russian President has announced that Moscow will increase its military posture in Europe, and extend its current covert military invasion of Ukraine: “We must think about the prospects of our own security. We have to keep an eye on what is happening in Ukraine, and on when they might attack.” Putin is threatening Europe with a major war in its east, if Moscow’s demand for “security guarantees” from the West is not met.

This request is as ridiculous as Russia’s alleged worries about a Ukrainian offensive. Russia controls the world’s largest territory, is one of the two supreme nuclear-weapons states, and has one of the three biggest conventional armies. It is thus one of the militarily most secure countries in the world. The Kremlin recently extended Russia’s territory and has the capacity to erase the whole of humanity several times. Yet, Putin and his assistants represent Russia as a beleaguered underdog in fear of deadly assault from outside.

Playing Mad

Russian government officials and propaganda outlets are, on a daily basis, hammering into national and world public opinion the message that the Russian state is under an existential threat. Allegedly, NATO’s current cooperation programs and possible further enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus are posing fundamental risks to the future of the Russian nation. They are nothing less than “a matter of life and death for us,” in the words of the Kremlin’s official spokesman Dmitriy Peskov.

To be sure, few people outside Russia are buying into the Kremlin’s paranoid narratives. It is not the tale about NATO, however, but its deep resentment that the Russian leadership is communicating. Putin is purposefully signaling that he may be losing his mind, could snap, and might press the button if provoked. In 2018, the Russian president said: “An aggressor should know that vengeance is inevitable, that he will be annihilated, and we would be the victims of the aggression. We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will just drop dead.”

Having had to deal with Russian imperialism for centuries, most East Europeans will see through the calculation behind the Kremlin’s warmongering. The US and UK too may not be impressed by Putin’s arguments. They might instead note the risks emanating from Russia’s continued undermining of the worldwide regime to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is an official nuclear-weapons state, legal successor of the USSR, and, as such, together with the US and UK, a founder of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite far-reaching obligations emerging from this status, Moscow has, since 2014, put the purpose of the NPT on its head. Rather than providing security for non-nuclear weapons states, such as Ukraine, the NPT’s provisions have been transmuted into an advantage of an official nuclear-weapons state. The NPT guarantor Russia has increased its territory at the expense of a country forbidden to acquire atomic arms, under this ratified treaty. Moreover, Ukraine had, in the early 1990s, the world’s third larges nuclear warheads arsenal, but chose to give it not only partially, but fully up, in exchange for US, UK, and Russian security assurances, in the now infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, attached to the NPT.   

The fundamental incoherence and blatant contradictions in Russia’s current stand may not impede its psychological effectiveness in Western Europe, however. Among continental European political and intellectual elites, geopolitical naivety about the functioning of international affairs and simplistic pacifism oblivious of the reasons for war and peace are widespread. It is thus likely that various West European publics, above all the German, will eventually succumb to Russia’s shrill demands.

The German Predisposition

Germany is neither a nuclear-weapons state, nor a member of the UN Security Council, nor a signatory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, nor an exporter of any weapons to Ukraine. The German government has thus little contributed in the past and little to offer in the future to increase Ukrainian hard security. Instead, Berlin has, during NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 prevented, the start of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s accession to the North-Atlantic alliance.

The opening of the first Russian-German Nord Stream pipeline in 2011-2012 lowered Russian dependence on Ukraine’s gas transportation system. Nord Stream as well as Turk Stream, a new pipeline through the Black Sea that started operation in 2020, have deprived Kyiv of one of its key instruments of leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The Nord Stream-2 pipeline scheduled to become operational in 2022-2023 would end any Russian future need for Ukrainian gas transportation capacity and fully free Putin’s hands regarding the recalcitrant “brother nation.”

Despite its ambivalent role in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken in the past and may also in the future assume a lead in the EU’s relations with Russia. Traditionally conciliatory German and other continental West European approaches to Russian imperialism could thus again trump more consistent and principled Western approaches towards Moscow. We might soon see a replay of the scandalous Germany- and France-promoted re-admission of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). This controversial 2019 decision was an embarrassing reversal of the initial position that PACE had taken after the start of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. The Russian PACE delegation had been banned from the Assembly in 2014, and none of the conditions for Russia’s readmission had been met five years later. Yet the delegation again became a full part of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in summer 2019.

A similarly awkward West European backtracking could now be in the wings concerning the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit declaration, in which the North-Atlantic alliance had announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become” its members. NATO’s enlargement decisions are taken by full consensus meaning that each member country has the possibility to veto the accession of a new state to the alliance. Against the background of their 2019 behavior in the Council of Europe, it is possible that countries like Germany and France will, regarding NATO’s position toward Kyiv and Tbilisi, show now inconsistency similar to that about Russia’s membership in PACE.

Berlin, Paris, Rome, or/and other West European capitals may start sending public signals that Ukraine’s and Georgia’s future accession to NATO is conditional upon Russia’s agreement, or that the Alliance’s 2008 promise to them was not meant seriously, or even that the crucial message of the Bucharest declaration is null and void. Such a signal would cause disappointment throughout Eastern Europe and constitute a blow to the credibility of NATO. Still, such a course of events seems entirely plausible in view of Putin’s manifest determination to keep Ukraine in Russia’s orbit, and against the backdrop of earlier West European dovishness vis-à-vis the Kremlin.

The EU as an Alternative to NATO

If it indeed comes to a new self-denigration of the West and its fundamental values, it would be important that Western Europe does, at least, some reputation repair in Europe’s East. Regarding an im- or even explicit reversal of the North-Atlantic alliance’s 2008 entry promise to Ukraine and Georgia, various forms of bi- or multilateral damage control could be imagined. One can consist of a replacement of a serious NATO accession prospect with an official and written EU membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia. The offer could be extended to Moldova which is also part of these three countries’ so-called Association Trio within the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, and has, like the other two, undesired Russian troops on its territory. An explicit EU membership perspective could especially smoothen Ukraine’s already third betrayal by the West, in the form of the devaluation of the 1994 NPT founders’ Budapest Memorandum, 2008 NATO members’ Bucharest Declaration, and 2014 demonstrative exclusion of Russia from PACE.

The announcement of an official EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova would not be a big step, in fact. The three countries already possess fully ratified and especially far-reaching EU Association Agreements (AAs). The complicated multi-year implementation of the three AAs de facto constitutes a veiled preparation of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for accession to the Union. A principal inconsistency of the three Agreements signed in 2014 has always been their lack of a membership prospect. The exceptional depth of the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, via the AAs, into the EU’s economic and legal space, is in contradiction to the absence of a statement on the eventual aim of the vast approximation program that these three Agreements are meant to bring about.

Moreover, the EU’s unofficial constitution, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, already states, in its Article 49: “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 [respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.” There can be no doubt that Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are European countries. Georgia, for instance, has one of the oldest Christian churches in Europe.

An official announcement that the three associated countries have the opportunity to become full members of the EU would thus be little more than explicating an already promulgated general provision. In substance, it would change little in the Union’s future relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Sooner or later, the three countries would have – in case they implement their AAs successfully – received official EU membership perspectives, in any way.

Symbolically, however, an official and written confirmation by Brussels of the EU accession prospect for the Association Trio already today would be important. It will constitute an especially appropriate gesture to Ukraine and Georgia once various West European countries start to soften, subvert, or sneak away from, NATO’s 2008 membership promise. A public commitment by the EU could function not only as a psychological compensation, as well as a demonstrative re-affirmation of Western values and solidarity concerning democracy in Europe.

It could also represent an alternative security-political framework for Ukraine and Georgia, as the EU has recently also become an official defense Union. The 2007 EU Treaty’s new Article 42.7 says: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.”

The EU’s mutual aid guarantee is still a weaker security instrument than Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for NATO, to be sure. The EU does not primarily constitute a military alliance and excludes the US as, since 2016, also the UK as nuclear powers. Brussels prefers to use soft rather than hard power in its foreign affairs. Still, the Union’s considerable economic leverage and conventional military strength as well as France’s nuclear capability mean that the EU is, by no means, a mere paper tiger. Against this background, accession of the Association Trio to the EU would lift the three countries out of the geopolitical grey zone they are currently in.

Taking the Wind out of Putin’s Sail

Such a course of events would force Putin into a domestic and international oath of disclosure. The EU is perceived as far less threatening around the world, including in Russia’s population, than NATO (whose alleged aggressiveness is a misperception too). The Union’s enlargement cannot easily be portrayed as an existential military security risk to Russia. This makes the Union’s enlargement less geopolitically significant than NATO’s. It would be more easily justifiable vis-à-vis Russia whose various political and other representatives, before and under Putin, have made numerous and even today make occasionally pro-European statements.

Geopolitical dovishness and fundamentalist pacifism are widespread in Western Europe, including Germany. It is to be expected that the coming months will see a softening, in one way or another, of NATO’s 2008 membership commitment to Ukraine and Georgia. The consistency and coherence of NATO’s and its member states’ public communication have already suffered in the past. While the Bucharest Declaration may remain formally in place, the alliance’s credibility could decline even further in 2022. An EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova can save the West’s and especially Western Europe’s face.

Such an announcement would pose a complicated conceptual challenge, to the neo-imperialist Russian elite. The Kremlin’s appetite for inclusion of post-Soviet states and especially of Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence would, to be sure, remain in place. In fact, an EU membership perspective for Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine may be seen as more threatening to the powerholders in the Kremlin than NATO’s accession promise. In view of the high popularity of Europe in Russia, it would suggest to ordinary Russians that the future of post-Soviet states is not predetermined by their common past as parts of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The Kremlin would thus be as opposed to accession of Ukraine to the EU as to NATO.

Yet, the so-far dominant apology for Russian neo-imperialism – namely, its alleged defensiveness – would become implausible in the case of EU expansion. Conjuring up the image of an allegedly existential security threat to the Russian nation would not easily work regarding a possible new enlargement of the EU to the east. A public offer by Brussels to Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau of the possibility of a future accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to the EU would create an ultimately unsolvable ideological conundrum for Moscow. It would revitalize the all-European integration process, bolster the international reputation of such countries as Germany and France, as well as energize domestic reform processes in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

Andreas Umland is an Analyst in the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and the general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” published by ibidem Press in Stuttgart. This article was first published by the French website Desk-Russie.EU.

Expected Coverage of Russian S-500 Missile Systems From Kaliningrad, Central Province and Crimea – Militarywatchmagazine.com

Lemberg, known today as Lviv under Ukrainian rule and Lvov/Lwow under former Polish administrations, was the principal city of the region of Galicia that is now split between Ukraine and Poland. The city of Lemberg was the historical name when that region was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After being part of the front during First World War, Galicia switched hands between several different nations with many of the same residents often experiencing the horrific changeovers, ethnic conflicts, war and genocide. With the end of the Second World War, the region was officially ceded to Stalin’s Soviet Government and many of the residents expelled from their home region. Ethnic tensions were often the catalyst for the various bouts of violence, and were used as a cause de la guerre for regional power politics.

A foreshadowing of further military conflict in the region has been the focus on news reports regarding Russian relations with Ukraine. Russia looks to be seeking a reset of its boundaries in an effort to boost local support for its Government and play on national concerns of historic threats to Russia coming from Western powers. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, nations that were once controlled from Moscow and acted as a physical barrier to Germany and NATO were now becoming part of NATO. This placed NATO weapons and radar systems closer to Russia’s borders. The Ukraine, as one of the largest countries in Central/Eastern Europe, was always a large barrier between Russia and the West. Ukraine was always the focus of Moscow’s leadership in negotiations with NATO, placing Ukraine at a distance when NATO had no reservations accepting Poland, the Czechs or Hungarians into their fold.

Modern Russian expansion policy often takes place for tactical reasons, but is shrouded in claims of ethnic divisions in border regions between local people and local citizens of Russian descent living in the disputed territories. Conflicts between Russia and Georgia were based in this policy and lead to a short conflict. Russia assaulting and occupying Crimea also came from a similar catalyst, but it was well regarded as a strategic move as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was always stationed at Sebastopol; even when under Ukraine’s Government, and is considered a key historic battle ground for Russia’s Government and people.

With Russian influence waning in Ukraine’s Government after the 2014 elections, Russian support for separatist forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine started to mirror Russian moves on Crimea a few months earlier. While political tactics lead to a takeover without much violent conflict in Crimea, heavy fighting took place between Russian supported forces and Ukrainian Defence Forces in the Donbas region. The conflict spilled outside the region and garnered international attention when Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was shot down by a SA-11 BUK missile over the disputed territory, killing all abroad while the flight was peacefully making its journey from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.

News of the larger conflict was reduced when the shooting down of MH17 occurred. In the past, international condemnation of the Soviet Union when its SU-15 fighter plane shot down a Korean Airlines 747 with two missiles lead to a permanent scar on Soviet relations with the rest of the world in the 1980s. This is said to have contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union, and President Putin likely was aware of this effect. Blame for the act was mixed with hidden information and spin, and created a blueprint for hiding the blame for these types of murders by military equipment when it occurred again over Iran in January of 2020.

The focus on relations with Russia changed drastically as Russia gave direct military support to Syria in combatting what they likely saw as fascist elements trying to overthrow the Assad Regime after months of gains by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The US and other allies rhetorically opposed Russia’s increased influence in the Middle East, but did little to counter it, and coordinated with Russian Forces to avoid conflict and perhaps target their mutual enemy. Power politics in the Middle East shifted with Russian Armed Forces participating in the conflict, and showed that the US and Europeans were no longer to be depended on for full support. The long term effect was not only to legitimise Russian Foreign Policy actions in the region, but also took the focus off the Donbas and made US Foreign Policy appear as it was entering a phase of decline.

With a weak United States after the Afghanistan pullout, Russia is likely taking the opportunity to rearm and renegotiate the terms of its historical deal post Soviet Union in Europe. Russian fuel to Western Europe, combined with their influence in the Middle East and modernising military with S-500 missiles has been countered by US military aid to Poland and Ukraine, but has received little attention by media in the United States over the last few years. The Donbas has almost become a forgotten issue outside of Eastern Europe, and current posturing by President Putin may be successful as Americans would never support sending troops to fight in a muddy field in Ukraine when they have daily local political drama to contend with, to Russia’s benefit. While the value of the Donbas region may be limited to a large country like Russia, the current state of global affairs may the the biggest catalyst for the conflict, and Russia is likely using it to expand its distance from NATO to gain local support. Its a situation that will not be resolved by foreshadowing a hot war, insults, nor lost lives of soldiers or locals, but through appropriate and measured foreign policy measures.

Though much has changed in the years since the end of the Second World War, much of the thinking in America’s mainline foreign policy has remained the same. Many Americans look out into the world as if the United States was the lone nation capable of taking on the world’s most daunting challenges, and, as a consequence, many expect the U.S to address major problems independent of cooperation from other nations. The reality, however, is that times have changed- while the United States remains the world’s greatest power, the rise of China, India, and Brazil, and the consolidation of Europe has given rise to a slowly growing list of nations or blocs that are capable of playing a significant role in true global governance. 

Faced with the prospect of rising powers, including some potential rivals, the United States has two meaningful options. First, the U.S. could choose to face this new reality head on and work collaboratively with emerging nations. Or, second, The United States could ignore the development of these nations and potential partners, instead attempting to carry the same amount of global responsibility with relatively less capacity.

Despite important questions about China’s continued rise, the world is slowly returning to a bipolar, or even multipolar order. Put more directly, the gap in “power” (defined as economic, military and even soft power) between the United States is smaller today than it was at the end of the Second World War, or even at the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that today’s America is somehow weaker than the United States was in the 1950’s or 80’s- instead, it is meant to highlight the fact that other nations have grown more quickly between now and those historical moments.

In light of this, it is more important now than it has been at any time in recent memory for the United States to double down on its diplomatic efforts. India and Brazil have both seen astonishing growth since the 1980’s, and both nations have strong, if sometimes flawed, democracies. It is already important to have cooperation from these nations on global issues like climate change and halting the withdrawal of democracy globally. As these nations continue to develop both economically and politically, it will prove even more important for the United States to have a positive relationship with both countries. 

A similar thing should be said about America’s partnerships with the nations in Europe. The troubling situation along the Ukrainian border proves the value of NATO membership, and it comes at a vital moment for Europe following a changing of the guard in Germany and the recency of Brexit.The United States would be wise to resolidify its commitment to NATO and work to promote a politically unified, democratic Europe. Through close relations and thoughtful negotiations, European partners may continue to increase their contributions to NATO.

While these developments have presented new opportunities, they also present a new set of challenges. China has emerged as a global power with undeniable influence and a global vision that is at odds with the Liberal free-market tendencies of the United States. Russia, though certainly not a rising power, has interfered in American elections and continues to disrupt international norms. Other nations like Iran and North Korea, present threats to international stability in a more acute way. Non-state actors like ISIS present a new sort of threat entirely.

Perhaps it is possible that continued economic development in China creates a middle class that actively desires democracy, as some predicted in the early 2000’s. Maybe China’s economy will stall out, and the famed “Grand Bargain” between the CCP and the Chinese people will collapse. It is also entirely possible that China will continue its economic development in the face of the harsh civic and political repression suffered by many Chinese people. In any event, a strong web of partnerships and alliances for the US could serve to both entice China into better behavior or, at a minimum, deter the worst imaginings of China’s global ambitions. A similar list of potential outcomes could be suggested for each of the other problem areas mentioned above, and in every circumstance, the United States will be more effective having strong and consistent partners. 

I have been careful to focus on the upsides of what could take place if the United States walks face first into the emerging bipolar world, but the downsides of failing to do so can be summarized pretty simply. If the United States attempts to take on the full weight of international leadership without cooperation from a long list of committed partners, it will result in overextension, which could bring about the sort of decline that presents a real threat not only to America’s international interests, but to democracy more broadly.

This is why it is important for individual Americans to participate in elections, and remain informed about important issues in both domestic and foreign policy. The next few decades represent a turning point in so many important ways, as climate change, the retreat of democracy, and the rise of China, India, and Brazil all come to a head. Faced with so much uncertainty and so many opportunities, the United States would be wise to make as many friends as it can.

—
Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

There are a few tricks to surviving an epidemic of Hyper-Inflation that some have learned in those countries that have suffered from it over the last few decades. Unfortunately, much of it involved being so wealthy that you are able to shift your assets overseas using professional services that are only available to few people, and there being a asset or country where your investments would be safe from the inflationary pressures. The rest of us do not have this kind of access, and are dependent on effective policies to sustain our affordability of food, shelter and heat.

Three policy approaches that are likely to transform the inflationary situation into a harsh reality are already being applied. As you read this, in whatever country you currently reside, you are likely noticing it daily.

When a government begins focusing on a new crisis post Covid, even when Covid is still an effective burden on most countries, there is likely the motivation to change from a formally stable economic and political situation to one that benefits a few individuals. While these late 2021 crises are a surprise to many in the community, they always seem to be characterised by a sensational and immediate problem often not realised during Covid or to any great degree before Covid. They almost always tend to try and bypass any regulatory measures and oversight in the rapid application of these virtual emergency policies. While some of these quick applications may benefit the community, any policy that seeks to work around established policies and laws that were formed over time in a democratic and measured process will almost always fail to a degree, and likely will benefit few in a society.

An appropriate Government measure during a time of uncontrolled and severe inflation is to try and reduce the costs of living for average people. Policies by law should not add pressure to families and individuals that may drive them further into poverty, as it will likely keep them there for many years to follow. They effectively have no consideration for the basic needs of their citizens. Any country that has planned tax increases for any reason at this time of worldwide inflation are likely not going to recovery from it quickly and will enshrine a lost generation. A balanced budget is always important, and a measured response to economic pressures is the principal job of community leaders. If a government doesn’t care about you basic costs of living, they don’t care about your family, your shelter, and in cold countries, your heat in winter. Those who offer policies such as these should not be in charge of taking care of anyone. A policy producing added economic pressures on top of inflation is more often than not a corruption tax.

In the past, most countries that suffered from endemic inflation also suffered from systemic corruption. While inflation is not a direct cause of corruption, the measures to control the regulatory and legal structures of a society can be manipulated during these economic struggles to permanently harm a democratic and fair political, economic and legal system. Everyone worldwide is either in an early recovery phase of Covid or are presently dealing with great challenges due to Covid, and are at a weak point in their personal lives. If a government seeks to change society in any major way while its population is distracted and approaching an impoverished state, they are more often than not doing it for their own political and economic benefit. There should be a moratorium on drastic measures to change a society until we have had a few years to return to normalcy.

The post-Covid era is not much different than other eras where we have struggled, and we strived and reconstructed societies back to stability. There are no individuals who will miraculously better a society when it has had hundreds of years of successful and established democracy and diminished poverty by applying a grand policy at the weakest point held by a society. A country spending more in the last two years, than it has in the last century and through two World Wars is not a country that appreciates it own evolution of freedom and democratic stability. Keep your focus on your leaders, and do not allow them to turn your community into their new projects in the coming years.

If one seeks peace in the Caucuses, then there should be cultural and educational exchanges between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, not boycotts of Azerbaijan.  

Since they declared independence from the Soviet Union in the 1990’s, Azerbaijan has been a strategic partner of the United States.  Although too many Americans may not realize it, Azerbaijan is perhaps the one remaining friendly country that America has in the Caspian basin.  

As a secular multicultural majority Muslim nation that prides itself on its pluralism and religious tolerance, Azerbaijan sent soldiers to help the United States fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has also been a full ally of the United States in the struggle against Islamist extremism, serving as a major transit point for American military supplies to Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

Azerbaijan has also been a strategic partner against Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, as their recent war against Armenia fundamentally weakened Iran as Armenia’s main road to the Islamic Republic was cut off, which adversely affected the mullah’s economy, forcing the Iranians to contemplate creating alternative trade routes.    It is critical to note that only an economically weakened Iran can be convinced to end its nuclear program that threatens the entire world.  Thus, the results of the Second Karabakh War where Iran got weakened in the Caspian Sea worked to America’s advantage.   

Yet following the recent border tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, American Senator Bob Menendez, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called on the US to cut military aid to Azerbaijan despite all of these important facts.  However, to take such a measure would be detrimental to the United States.  

According to the Armenian lobbyist group ANCA, “The amendment (#4177) is one of three amendments to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that moves all references to presidential waiver authority of Section 907, a provision first put in place in 2001, and utilized by successive U.S. presidents – including President Biden.  Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act is an Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) -backed measure that would effectively block U.S. military aid to Azerbaijan.” 

However, much of America’s aid to Azerbaijan very much serves American interests.  In recent days in an interview with Jam News, American Ambassador to Azerbaijan Lee Litzenberger stated that a number of American companies have expressed interest in helping Azerbaijan to demine the Karabakh region and he hinted that this is important for America’s national security as well: “They are ready to invest where there are appropriate conditions, and above all, open tenders.” 

According to him, American aid has been instrumental in helping Azerbaijan to not only demine but to engage in other defensive actions: “Azerbaijan has been provided with appropriate scanners, X-ray machines and other equipment. They are used not only on land borders, but also in the Caspian to protect marine infrastructure and oil platforms. This equipment allows Azerbaijan to protect its coast and its sea borders.”  The ambassador noted that this these defensive measures are important, as they help Azerbaijan to block the flow of drugs into Europe and other areas of the world, and defend the vital oil industry in the region: “We are interested in maintaining stability on Azerbaijan’s borders.”  

Thus, if US military assistance is cut off to Azerbaijan, then this would adversely affect not only demining efforts, but also Europe’s struggle against the drug trade, jeopardize energy security in the region and would weaken the recently signed peace agreement, which would adversely affect regional security as a whole.  It should be emphasized that one cannot build a stable peaceful secure society if any child who strays from the road to play soccer can get killed in a landmine.  One cannot build up a stable oil industry in the region that imports to America and Europe if there are landmines throughout vast areas of the country.  And most importantly, no peace agreement can last if one side is encouraging boycotts against the other side.

If America truly wants to encourage peace and stability in the Caspian region, then they should ignore Armenian calls for boycotts of Azerbaijan’s military and instead call upon both Armenians and Azerbaijanis to build up academic exchanges between both countries, so that Armenian and Azerbaijani students can study each other’s culture and language.  Only via the existence of cross-cultural exchanges like this can the peace last between both sides.  Encouraging boycotts just undermines peace, demining efforts and the security of Azerbaijan and the region, as it struggles against radical extremism.   Thus, I call upon America to continue to support one of its few allies in the Caspian Sea and to ignore the ANCA initiatives. 

A Yazidi Refugee in 2016 in Northern Iraq.

It is not the first time someone like Nadia Murad was ignored by those in an institution, a city or a country when they wanted to make them aware of their experiences. Societies did not develop in an instant, and rights for individuals and within a community took generations to develop. Constitutions and modern states were born after others failed, and even then, people moved forward to improve basic rights and educate others on what being human means. In that process, we learned how to value others.

During those generations, the people that are the ancestors of Nadia Murad endured hardship just trying to survive in what we now refer to as Northern Iraq. In 2021, those who call themselves educators want to make sure that her culture, one of the oldest in the world, disappears from the world by silencing her in a country that claims to be a benefactor of those generations of rights.

Nadia Murad is the United Nations representative of the women and girls of the Yazidi people. Nadia, and those like her are the most brutalised women in modern history. Speaking up about the atrocities endured by her and her people won her a Nobel Prize, but a school board in Canada’s largest city does not want to hear anything from her. It appears that they never understood why Never Again matters. They are the most uneducated group of individuals in modern history it seems, and while this story has gone international in order to shame them into a moral position, in their own country it is not considered that newsworthy.

Should we be disturbed that a Western democracy that was built on the ideas of human rights can treat the victims of Genocide in such a fashion? Perhaps looking at their recent track record of ignoring another Yazidi refugee that was silenced by those who should help her when she ran into her torturer in a Canadian city should surprise us, but it was not a major story. A plan to create a Covid vaccine with China’s military was approved by the Government while knowledge of human rights atrocities against the Uyghurs was evident, but Concentration Camps in 2020 wasn’t newsworthy either it seems. A day that was created to recognise their own county’s past acts of human rights abuses against Indigenous children was ignored by their own leader while he went on a vacation of privilege, even though his own father may had a role in those acts. Could it be possible that these attitudes permeated into the Toronto’s District School Board when they wanted to silence Nadia Murad as well? Sadly, there are many more examples that makes those who are tied to refugees in that country feel unwelcome and unsafe.

The Holocaust Museum in Washington DC was established to not only educate others on how the Holocaust came to be, but also to acknowledge and promote education on other atrocities that have taken place in modern history. The purpose of it is clear:

Never Again applies to all victims of Genocide.

This education is important because it acts as a barrier to future Genocides. Responding by silencing victims further entrenches the act itself, as Genocide is committed to silence and exterminate a people, their culture and their lives. Its purpose is to erase history, and the educators in Toronto responsible for silencing Nadia Murad are re-victimizing all of the Nadias in every community that have ever experienced acts of discrimination and extermination. Ignoring brutality are why Human Rights Atrocities become a reality. The reason why the Armenian Genocide did not stop further crimes against humanity only a few years later is because even in 2021, some nations deny it ever took place.

This concept is so crucial that Germany decided to enshrine Holocaust Denial into their legal system as a criminal act. The German people did not all believe in the tenets of Fascism, but assuming that an education on those facts would be offensive to Germans is to assume all individuals had an interested role in the application of that Fascism. The real offense is to presume their acceptance of falsehoods. Unfortunately, some educators in Canada still do not grasp this concept.

The creator of Mosul Eye, Professor Omar Mohammed lived in Mosul, Iraq when ISIS took over his beloved city. A professor that was ejected from his university under ISIS, he secretly lead a video protest and online campaign to bring hope to the people of his city living under the fascism experienced after the takeover of Northern Iraq. He and most people in Mosul did not accept a life under fascism. Iraqis who experienced what he did are not ever going to silence Nadia Murad or anyone like her. This is true because he is a real educator and a survivor.

The border crisis between Poland and Belarus is more complex than a dispute between two sovereign nations. The extension of the EU border into the former Warsaw Pack area and towards the former border of the Soviet Union was always a source of tension as Poland was seen as a barrier to large armies coming from Western Europe. The trauma of the Second World War on Soviet citizens is notable in foreign policy arrangements since that time, and mirrors much of the history of Central Europe as a bulk-ward against the Wehrmacht, The Grand Armee of Napoleon, and many other historical disputes that placed the Polish people in the middle of wider conflicts.

The resulting Realpolitik that motivated the West and East of Europe to be weary of sharing a direct border with each other placed the Polish people into a revolving wheel of suffering and of erased identity. While the Polish people and culture survived and thrived in the areas known as historic Poland, the maintenance of a nation state was often determined by outside forces, making the Polish people strangers without a nation of their own in their historical homelands. The Poland once ruled by Medieval kings was not the same one that Napoleon stepped foot in, and was still drastically different than the Poland that came out of the Second World War. The end result is that Poland was a nation that often remained nameless despite having a rich culture and history. Poland is one of the oldest nations in European history, but remained absent as a state within Europe for much of the last 800 years.

The irony of citizens from Iraq, Syria and Yemen being trapped between the Belorussians and European Union at the Polish border mirrors much of European history as well as their own. As Poland was always the target of power politics in its region, the people of Iraq, Syria and Yemen are now often seen to be citizens of countries in a power vacuum, victims of political agents at home and now abroad that are used as a part of a larger conflict. When negotiations are taking place between Western Powers and those in the region, a missile launched at Iraq that murders its citizens is not mentioned or considered by any negotiators. Despite being indigenous peoples in their own lands, their nations are always at risk of disappearing due to external factors and foreign interests.

In reality, the conflict on the border is not between the Polish people and those from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This latest clash has mostly been orchestrated by outside forces, wishing to keep their treatment of nameless nations maintained and who deem inequality as the norm. This is an experience Polish, Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni people have always shared, and negotiations between these nations should reflect their own culture and experiences, not those of the real outsiders.

Haiti has a long history of natural, political, and human catastrophes. What do Haitians do now?

The Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Bel Air. Photo credit: Marcello Casal, Jr., Agencia Brazil, CC BY 2.0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EscombrosBelAir7.jpg

A State Department warning to Americans to avoid travel to Haiti follows the kidnapping of 17 foreign aid workers and family members in a long line of tragic stories from Haiti in 2021. Beginning decades ago but accelerating this year with political unrest, natural disasters, and economic and social problems, any prospects for progress in Haiti seem to be demolished by the next catastrophe.

The political earthquake of the year was the July 7 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Moïse replaced an interim president in 2017, who had replaced a president who stepped down for constitutional reasons, who himself came to power after 2010 earthquake that killed hundreds of thousands of Haitians and left more than a million homeless. The fallout from this summer’s assassination of Moïse continues, with the arrests of Columbians and former Haitian police officers, questions about former Ministry of Justice official Joseph Badio, and the current interim prime minister’s connections to Badio.

In August, Haiti suffered an actual earthquake, a 7.2 magnitude quake that killed more than 2,000 people and left more than 650,000 people in need of humanitarian aid.

This natural disaster built on years of similar ones. A partial list includes historic storms in 1935, 1954, and 1963, a series of devastating storms in the 1990s, four major storms in 2008, and Hurricane Matthew that destroyed 200,000 homes in 2016. Weeks after this summer’s assassination of Moise and two days after the earthquake, Haiti was hit by Hurricane Grace. Damaging flooding and landslides also hampered relief efforts for earthquake victims.

These political and natural disasters amplified the ongoing economic and social problems in Haiti. USAID assessed that more than one-third of Haitians live with “severe acute food insecurity.” Even before 2021’s troubles, the World Bank called Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world, with a negative growth in 2019 and 2020. Sixty percent of the country live in poverty and nearly a quarter in extreme poverty.

Together, these conditions have facilitated the rapid growth of violent gangs in Haiti. Gangs are not new to Haiti, but they are alleged to act with unofficial “governing powers” in some regions and with extrajudicial violence with the cooperation of government officials.

Drack Bonhomme is founding director of Haiti’s international relations think tank and graduate school, L’Ouverture Institute for Diplomacy & Global Affairs (LIDGA). Bonhomme spoke about these natural, political, and social crises at The Catholic University of America’s Institute for Policy Research (IPR).

“The kinematics of Haiti are catastrophic, the picture is really disastrous,” Bonhomme began. The indigenous people called the island Haiti, meaning mountainous land, and now “the problems are like mountains.”

Bonhomme described natural disasters – especially Hurricane Hazel in 1954 – as devastating the economy. Hazel damaged sugar and coffee production as well as tourism. In subsequent decades, disease and natural disaster, including HIV/AIDS and the 2010 earthquake, have had a continuing series of negative impacts.

Haiti’s political troubles also have deep roots, including the family dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier. Haiti today faces an “unprecedented constitutional crisis,” said Bonhomme, where “the three branches of government are non-existent.”

Bonhomme believes the limited international responses to Haiti’s current problems are worsened by the all-consuming nature of the Covid-19 pandemic. The international community is too busy with the pandemic, Bonhomme said, to focus on more traditional questions like natural disasters and political crises.

But he believes there is more that Haiti can do to help itself. First is working with donors and aid agencies to help Haitians figure out a way forward themselves – as the Marshall Plan offered reconstruction aid in postwar Europe based on what each country’s own plans were. Second is to draw more from the successful diaspora. The Haitian constitution limits the ways diaspora can contribute, other than remittances, to the re-development of the country.

But Bonhomme is optimistic. “The Haitian people are very resilient, a religiously spiritual people,” he concluded. There is a “hope within the soul of the Haitian people, they keep looking for the light…and that sense of hope is still shining inside of them.”

Watch Drack Bonhomme’s full presentation

There is no planet B

When Congress makes a mistake in determining important economic policy like setting the tax rate or implementing a new trade policy, the results can be pretty awful. Unexpected inflation might take place, jobs might be lost, and personal savings might crumble. In the most severe cases, these disruptions might result in economic recession, or worse, a more sustained depression. It goes without saying, this can be devastating- on a personal, national, and even global level.

However, in the aftermath of even the most severe of these crises, individual people have proven resilient. We “Keep Calm and Carry On”, as the saying goes. Even when the most sensitive economic policy goes awry, the consequences are usually constrained to economic matters. A mistake in tax policy can certainly cause suffering, but it cannot result in the end of the world.

This principle applies for many of the most important matters in the American political landscape. Immigration, education, healthcare, and of course economic policy are critically important, but our collective resilience allows for politicians to gradually tweak policy to match the nation’s needs and mood. The American political system is designed to process these sorts of changes incrementally at the national level while giving local decision makers the ability to implement policy in a way that suits their constituencies. Put another way- for most things in American political life, policy makers have the opportunity to “muddle through” policy making decisions, honing and (hopefully) improving policy over time.

However, there are some policy matters where tinkering around the edges or “finding the middle ground” simply will not do. Climate change is perhaps the most obvious and most pressing of these. There is a strong scientific consensus, backed by the United Nations IPCC report, that in order to avoid reaching the point where climate change becomes self-reinforcing, the global community must become carbon neutral by the year 2050. This is only twenty-eight years away.

To the extent that the world’s governments and the individuals that they represent ignore these warnings, we are gambling with the fate of the whole of humanity. The idea that we can be protected from the worst consequences of climate change by making only incremental adjustments does not fit with intellectually honest political discourse.

Of course, there is still plenty of room for debate regarding the best course of action to address climate change. It is entirely reasonable to debate if the bulk of the responsibility for addressing climate change falls on nations that have emitted larger total sums of greenhouse gases over time but have already begun to reduce their harmful emissions, or if it lies with nations that are currently the world’s chief greenhouse gas emitters. In either case, it is appropriate to shame Russia and China for failing to attend the COP26 climate conference, and it is reasonable to question the follow-through of leaders like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he pledges that India will be carbon neutral by 2070 despite currently working to expanding coal mining operations.

More than that, it can be wise to weigh the virtues of a carbon tax against those of a cap and trade system in our own country. Local decision makers will know far better than distant bureaucrats if subsidies for solar panels or a heightened focus on local agriculture suits your local community’s needs better.

These questions, however, ask which actions and policies are best suited to address climate change- they are elevated beyond the basic question of whether or not drastic action is necessary in the first place.

This is what separates climate change from the other important issues in American life. A failure to address growing inflation is bad, while a failure to appropriately address climate represents a potentially existential threat. More than that, the action that appears necessary to avert the worst of the harm done by climate change remains fully outside of the Overton Window. Forget actually curbing emissions, the United States gives something to the effect of $14.5 billion in subsidies and tax breaks to oil and gas companies- those subsidies outnumber investments in the renewable sector by 7 to 1.

Democrats and Republicans alike need to make dramatic progress in their willingness to take on climate change if they are serious about the current administration’s stated goal of achieving carbon neutrality by the year 2030. Additionally, American political discourse needs to commit itself to curbing climate change regardless of other important policy making, and regardless of our confidence in the follow through of other nations that are sometimes untrustworthy. Without the United States on board, there is little hope for avoiding the worst consequences of climate change. This is true for the United States even as it is true for Russia, India, and China- however, a failure by any of those nations to fulfill their responsibility does not excuse failure by the United States.

The time is now for us to fully shift the conversation from “do we need to address climate change” or “under what conditions should we make a full commitment to addressing climate change” to “what is the most effective way to address climate change”. Despite this somewhat liberal sounding call to action, this sentiment finds roots on both sides of the aisle. Former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, “the [global warming] debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat, and we know the time for action is now.”

The time for action is now.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

The Economist recently published an article on the overarching power of the European Council, a government body of the European Union that was designed to facilitate the discussion and application of policies throughout the EU. The problem that has always persisted in the European Union is how you can get consensus between so many differing ideas, cultures and interest groups that can be applied fairly and transparently throughout all 27 Member States. Part of the solution has been to reduce the number of voices in the process as not to make it so incredibly cumbersome, but many see this as a move towards systemically reducing democratic values in the process.

My experience studying the framework of the EU at a time when Accession was a major topic of the day was characterised by the expansion of the EU into Central Europe along with the addition of new cultures and former Warsaw Pact nations. These countries accepted entrance into the EU at the cost of what many see as an unfair burden on their agricultural sector and shared economic values. Many of those countries who over the last two generations overthrew the tyranny of fascism and the long slow decline of their societies under the Iron Curtain are naturally weary of outside pressures being put on their societies, and the top down structure of the European Council has the very real power of being able to tread on grassroots movements in Member States.

Countries like the United Kingdom always sat uncomfortably within the EU. This was always the case despite being at the top of its power structure and possessing parts of the UK that were happy to have the support of other regional Governments in the application of policies within the UK and EU. While The Economist article humourously compares the power of the European Council to that of a neo-Monarchic power structure, it was always the case that many English people saw themselves apart from Continental Europe, and were proud of their unique British cultural and democratic institutions and in some fashion had longed mourned their lost Empire. While the irony of the British Government having a Queen Monarch as Head of State would be lost on no one, the British Parliamentary system’s culturally based Constitution, assumed Customary Laws and invisible Constitutional etiquette would be hard to codify outside of British Society, and the grumbles against EU power within the UK was ever-present. One of the major factors that lead to Brexit that is often not spoken on is the feeling that democracy could not survive the whims of those not directly elected representing British citizens in a city with no connection to Britain’s culturally based democratic system. The Queen herself, while having the ability to technically apply Absolute power, culturally is at the sidelines and is well aware that interference in party politics may sour the public to the idea of having a Monarch altogether. This wise balance was not possible with UK representatives in Brussels, and it degraded the idea of Britain being in the EU for generations.

To see what the end result could be from those at the top ignoring grassroots politics and using their power to quell democratic traditions, you only need to look at how Canada’s Federated Government took to announcing policies that would greatly affect specific regions of its own country, in an international forum, and not within the region being affected or even Canada itself. The recent announcement of a cap on energy sales at a time where inflation hit record highs and cost of living is placing many in risk of losing their homes in winter is seen as needlessly aggressive policy. With a closed Parliament and no manner to answer to policy, the British Parliamentary system cannot function when Parliament is closed at a time of major policy development. In addition, ignoring the Customary laws of that traditional system means that people may feel their voices are muted, at a time when life is difficult and leadership is required. As the European Council slowly alienated British voters, no region of the world would tolerate a foreign power limiting their ability to produce an income, afford social programs and have an open voice in their own democracy. To keep a union of states or even a nation united, it should not be able to harm to itself as part of its own democratic system. As history has noted, then it is not really a full democracy.

The “Free Tibet” shoes worn by Enes Kanter

Enes Kanter has reemerged on the political stage.

The eleven year NBA veteran made waves after wearing a pair of speakers expressing support for Tibetan independence. The game between Kanter’s Boston Celtics and the New York Knicks was being broadcast around the world, until the feed was abruptly cut off for Chinese consumers by Tencent, the Chinese media conglomerate that is licensed to show NBA games in the Chinese market. On that same day, Kanter posted a three minute video to his twitter feed in which he condemns China’s repression of Tibet, and wore a shirt featuring the Dalai Lama- something that is considered a crime in China.

Despite backlash from Chinese state media, two days after this first public demonstration, Kanter made another post to his twitter in which he highlighted the horrific treatment of the Uyghurs population in China and damned Xi Jinping as a brutal dictator. In the following days, he has continued to make posts directly challenging Xi and condemning the slave labor that he believes takes place in Chinese reeducation camps. 

I highly encourage each of you to listen to Kanter’s statements yourself.

This is far from Kanter’s first serious venture into politics. He has long been a vocal critic of the Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who Kanter considers a dictator, and wears his arrest warrant as a badge of honor. As a consequence of his political activities, Kanter has suffered a tragic personal cost- his father was sent to prison in 2018. 

Additionally, Kanter has been outspoken regarding his views on American politics. Alongside athletes like Colin Kaepernick and LeBron James, Kanter has participated in protests against racist policing in the United States. Earlier this year, Kanter expressed his support for the Covid-19 vaccine, saying that players have a responsibility to be role models and work to promote public health. 

In order to understand what makes Kanter’s public statements on China so interesting, it is important that we understand the tremendous popularity of the NBA in China. Over 500 million Chinese watched an NBA game last year, and the sport has seen tremendous growth following the popularity of stars like Kobe Bryant, Steph Curry, and Yao Ming in China’s domestic market.

Despite the nationalistic rubmilings that appeared on social media in the wake of Kanter’s comments on Xi’s regime, there is reason to believe that the Chinese people continue to love the NBA and its biggest stars. Some 40 million Chinese fans play the NBA 2k basketball video game, and video recordings from NBA games held in Chinese arenas suggest major fan support.

Given the huge support (through both fans and finances) for the NBA in China, and given the wide-reaching censorship employed by the Chinese government, Kanter’s public position could present a problem for both the CCP and the National Basketball Association. China’s dedicated NBA fans will surely notice that all Boston Celtics games have been removed from their servers, and even in the face of Chinese misinformation many fans will become aware of the censorship. More than that, the NBA stands to lose some $1.5 billion in broadcast rights alone over the next five years if China were to completely ban the showing of NBA games. Kanter’s tweets and sneakers have certainly put a lot of very important people on their toes- this is the benefit of speaking truth to power.

Given Kanter’s consistent support for other types of social justice issues, the NBA, Nike, and other groups that do business with China will have a difficult time ignoring his criticism of their behavior. Dismissing Kanter as a consequence of this particular set of political activities -condemning China- would highlight the inconsistency that groups may have regarding their commitment to human rights- like support for Black Lives Matter.

All of this takes place in the foreground to the 2022 Winter Olympics which will be held in China. There are real questions about how the repressive elements of the CCP will respond to athletes who have become increasingly outspoken about social justice and human dignity. Should China respond in traditional “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy fashion to Kanter’s comments, other athletes will surely take notice, and hopefully work to resist the attempt at censorship. 

Politics and sports have long been interconnected. Jackie Robbinson, Jesse Owens, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, Muhammad Ali, Colin Kaepernick and now Enes Kanter, there is tremendous power when public figures use their platforms to fight against injustice and repression. Kanter’s ongoing activism protesting the cruelty of Xi’s government in China is the next leg in this proud legacy.

—

Please join the Foreign Policy Association today, October 28th, in welcoming Mr. Carl Gershman, who was President of the National Endowment for Democracy from its foundation in 1984 until 2021. Mr. Gershman will be delivering the annual John B. Hurford Memorial Lecturetitled, “Reflections on NED’s Past and Democracy’s Future”.  If you are interested, please register for the event here. 

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association