Jeudi 16 avril 2026 à 16 heures à la bibliothèque Malesherbes (108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris).
- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienneJeudi 16 avril 2026 à 16 heures à la bibliothèque Malesherbes (108, boulevard Malesherbes 75017 Paris).
- Agenda / Monténégro, Région parisienneSur les étagères du bâtiment qui abritait les actualités yougoslaves à Belgrade, la cinéaste et artiste serbe Mila Turajlić découvre des centaines de bobines oubliées : celles, nombreuses, filmées pendant la présidence yougoslave de Tito, documentant notamment l'émergence du mouvement des non-alignés. Chaque soir, elle crée un montage et donne à voir le vertige que l'on peut ressentir devant ces images qui sortent de l'oubli le récit du Tiers-Monde en train de s'inventer.
Fondé en 1961, (…)
For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.
While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.
The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.
This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.
Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.
The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.
The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.
If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”
There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.
“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.
The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.