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What do Japanese and Chinese think about each other’s countries? Let’s look at the numbers.  

The sentence raises huge questions marks over the political future of one of South Africa's most controversial politicians.

BRICS appears to be more riddled with internal conflicts than most multilateral groups.

Amid turbulence in the international order, will international society remain capable of countering totalitarian heresies?

At the 61st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 30, 2026, South Korea reaffirmed its position on human rights in North Korea, joining 50 countries as a co-sponsor of the council’s annual resolution. The move marked Seoul’s first such participation since the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung, a former human rights lawyer. The resolution, adopted for the 24th consecutive year since 2003, passed again by consensus without a vote.

The measure condemns “in the strongest terms” what it calls “systematic, widespread and gross” violations in North Korea, citing crimes against humanity that include forced labor used to support nuclear and missile programs, the operation of political prison camps, torture, public executions and what it describes as a “pervasive culture of impunity.” It urges Pyongyang to take “immediately all steps” necessary to end such crimes, including the closure of prison camps, the release of detainees and sweeping legal and institutional reforms.

Compared with last year’s text, the 2026 resolution makes only modest adjustments but places clearer emphasis on dialogue. It highlights the “importance of dialogue and engagement to improve the human rights situation in North Korea, including inter-Korean dialogue,” signaling a subtle shift from earlier iterations that focused more heavily on the severity of abuses.

The resolution also offers limited acknowledgment of North Korea’s recent engagement with international mechanisms. It “welcomes” the country’s compliance with certain human rights obligations and its participation in the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review, including a United Nations review on disability rights in Geneva in August last year and its appearance in the U.P.R. process in November 2024.

As various assessments have noted, however, North Korea’s normalization in the international community is unlikely to be realized without parallel progress on both denuclearization and human rights. From this perspective, human rights should not be treated as a secondary or downstream issue, but rather as a form of leverage operating alongside CVID‑style denuclearization—jointly shaping the conditions under which meaningful engagement, and ultimately normalization, can occur.

Despite the strategic importance of such parallel progress, South Korea’s new Lee administration marks a departure from the previous government’s policy emphasis, weakening its leverage to nudge North Korea onto a path toward normalization. Under the previous Yoon administration, former Vice Foreign Minister Kang In‑sun explicitly linked human rights pressure with denuclearization objectives. At the 2025 high‑level segment of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, she called on North Korea to abandon all nuclear and missile programs in a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner,” directly invoking the CVID framework.

By contrast, at the 2026 session of the same forum, Jeong Yeon‑du—serving as a senior official overseeing strategic affairs and North Korea policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—outlined a phased approach centered on “halt, reduction, and dismantlement,” while emphasizing dialogue, coordination, and a return to negotiations. Notably, his remarks did not include any reference to CVID.

Taken together, the shift from an explicit CVID formulation to a phased, open‑ended sequence narrows the gap between pressure and process, but at the cost of blurring the intended end‑state of denuclearization.

On March 26th, 2026—the 16th spring since ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772), a Pohang-class corvette comparable to the US Navy’s Cyclone-class PC-1, sank after North Korean torpedoes struck in 2010—this waterside memorial gathering honors the 46 sailors whose sacrifice still weighs heavy on their families and the Republic of Korea Navy 2nd Fleet Command (Photo credit: RoK Navy).

China’s Gray Shadow Still Looms Over Defectors

On the issue of North Korean defectors, the resolution again addresses China indirectly by reaffirming the principle of non-refoulement, urging all states to ensure that no one is forcibly returned to North Korea. The wording closely mirrors that of resolutions adopted from 2023 through 2025, reflecting a continued effort to preserve consensus by avoiding explicit reference to Beijing — a choice that, critics say, comes at the cost of diminishing attention to the plight of defectors.

While the resolution maintains general language on forced repatriation, it stops short of expanding or sharpening scrutiny on the issue, even as reports of ongoing detentions and returns persist. The relative lack of new emphasis has drawn criticism from experts, who warn it risks signaling reduced urgency at a time when conditions for North Korean escapees in China remain severe. Ahn Chang-ho, chairperson of South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission, said that “some core elements were reduced or deleted,” including protections related to North Korean defectors, expressing concern that attention to the issue had been weakened. 

Even so, criticism of China persists. Advocates argue that Beijing continues to fall short of its obligations under international law, including the Convention against Torture and the 1951 Refugee Convention, both of which prohibit returning individuals to countries where they face a risk of torture. This concern is underscored by a particularly telling latest case from March 2026 documented by Human Rights Watch: a North Korean woman in China who helped her son survive a border crossing is now facing forced repatriation. If returned, she is at high risk of torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and enforced disappearance—abuses that the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea identified as potentially amounting to aiding and abetting crimes against humanity when carried out in cooperation with another state. Human Rights Watch stresses that, even as a party to these core treaties, China’s ongoing pattern of forcibly returning North Koreans, exemplified by this recent case, continues to erode the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.

Estimates suggest that roughly 2,000 North Korean defectors are being held in China without access to asylum procedures, often in undisclosed facilities or border detention centers, prior to being repatriated. Those who are returned face a high risk of torture, enforced disappearance, or execution.

 

Jeudi soir, Donald Trump a annoncé un cessez-le-feu de 10 jours entre Israël et le Liban, deux jours à peine après l’ouverture de négociations directes à Washington. Une annonce qui intervient alors qu’Israël continue d’occuper le sud du pays.

Mais c’est un autre fait qui retient l’attention : Benjamin Netanyahou a exigé l’exclusion de la France de ces négociations, allié historique du Liban, alors qu’elles sont elles-mêmes conduites par les États-Unis, principal allié d’Israël.

Cette exigence israélienne pose une question de fond : que reste-t-il de la relation franco-israélienne ? Elle apparaît aujourd’hui profondément déséquilibrée et unilatérale ; Israël exige, la France cède, ou se contente de condamnations verbales qui n’ont jamais infléchi la moindre décision de Tel-Aviv.

Est-ce le signe d’une fin définitive de l’amitié franco-israélienne, ou simplement l’aboutissement d’un affaiblissement diplomatique français ?

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Liban : nouvel affront israélien à la France est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Pourquoi la France était-elle le seul autre pays au monde où Jeffrey Epstein possédait une propriété immobilière en dehors des États-Unis ? Était-ce par amour du pays… Ou parce qu'il y trouvait de quoi servir ses intérêts ? Dans les années 90, Paris est la capitale de la mode, et celle des agences de mannequins. Elles recrutent de très jeunes filles venues du monde entier, parfois mineures, souvent isolées… Des proies faciles pour le criminel sexuel américain.

A constitutional revision solves the wrong problem – and creates new complications.

Dans un précédent article, j'examinais comment le régime d'Aleksandar Vučić avait fait du droit pénal un instrument de pression politique, en visant l'avocat Čedomir Stojković. Ce cas constituait déjà un signal préoccupant pour les défenseurs des droits humains. Pourtant, les événements du printemps 2026 révèlent une évolution plus profonde — et, dans un sens presque kafkaïen, plus subtile — du dispositif répressif serbe.
Ce que les médias proches du pouvoir présentent comme une « mesure (…)

- Notes et racines. Le blog de Valentin Smoliak / Serbie, Blogs - Diaporama

India has turned the corner in its battle against Naxalism – and effectively governing its own margins is an essential step toward global power status.

Les 22 et 23 mars 2026, les électeurs italiens ont rejeté, par 54 % des voix pour le non contre 46 % pour le oui, le projet de réforme constitutionnelle de la magistrature porté par la présidente du Conseil, Giorgia Meloni. Avec une participation proche de 60 %, un taux exceptionnellement élevé (…) / Fascisme, Droit, Italie, Justice

Selon le chef de la défense de l'UE, un pacte de type Schengen pourrait être ouvert au Royaume-Uni, à la Norvège et à l'Ukraine

The post Kubilius propose un nouveau traité visant à créer une union européenne de la défense appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Despite being one of the oldest aircraft still flying in U.S. service, the U-2 remains relevant enough for Skunk Works to seek a qualified pilot in Palmdale.

Skunk Works, the legendary Lockheed Martin’s secretive advanced projects division, is hiring a U-2 pilot in Palmdale, California.

The job posting, that you can find here, calls for an onsite, full-time, first-shift position in Test Engineering for an experienced professional pilot, with a 4x10h schedule and possible relocation, and it is clearly framed as a test-oriented role rather than routine operational flying: according to the listing, the pilot would conduct engineering flight tests, production-acceptance flights, and flight-test support, help verify aircraft compliance and operational suitability, coordinate flight-operations efforts, approve cockpit configuration, and, if needed, perform demonstration flights for customers and government officials.

The ad, published on Apr. 6, 2026, says applicants must be no more than two years outside qualification on the U-2S Dragon Lady, hold a current FAA Class I or II medical, and possess either a suitable FAA Commercial Pilot certificate for multi-engine land and instrument airplane or an ATP (Airline Transport Pilot), while also being willing to travel, holding a valid U.S. passport, and arriving with an active Top Secret clearance.

Among the desired qualifications are 1,000 flight hours, graduation from a formal Test Pilot School, background in flight-test disciplines such as weapons, avionics and flight sciences, as well as instructor/training, communication, organizational and leadership or program-integration experience.

The posted compensation is a California salary range of $156,400 to $275,655 outside most major metro areas and $179,800 to $311,650 in most major metro areas, although the final offer depends on factors such as experience, training, skills, scope and business considerations; listed benefits include medical, dental, vision, life insurance, short- and long-term disability, flexible spending accounts, parental leave, paid time off, holidays, education assistance, and incentive-plan eligibility.

U-2 pilot. | Source: USAF

The emergence of the job posting is quite interesting, considering the iconic Dragon Lady was slated for retirement from U.S. Air Force service this year. However, while some U-2s have already been withdrawn from active service, the aircraft’s retirement date is far from settled, and the sundown of the type remains under intense congressional scrutiny.

In fact, U-2s are still flying active intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions on a daily basis from forward operating locations, and there is little sign of that activity slowing down at least for now. USAF U-2s are home based at the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale Air Force Base, California, but are rotated to operational detachments worldwide, including RAF Fairford, UK; Osan Air Base, South Korea, and RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus. The latter sustained damage from an Iranian kamikaze drone launched in retaliation for the U.S. and Israeli air strikes, last month.

In line with such continuous postponement of its retirement, in 2023 Lockheed Martin announced the first flight of the U-2 Avionics Tech Refresh (ATR), carried out by Skunk Works in partnership with the U.S. Air Force. The company said the flight tested an updated avionics suite, new cockpit displays and a mission computer designed to the Air Force’s open mission systems standard, with further testing planned to mature the software baseline before more mission systems were added. 

More recently, BAE Systems was awarded a contract to support and sustain the U-2’s AN/ALQ-221 Advanced Defensive System (ADS), another sign that the aircraft is still receiving updates and meaningful attention rather than simply being allowed to age out quietly. 

As for Palmdale, Plant 42 remains a hub for major activity involving the type, and the job posting seems to suggest Lockheed Martin expects the Dragon Lady to continue generating the kind of work that may require highly specialized pilot support for quite some time.

A U-2 Dragon Lady takes off for the first flight of the Avionics Tech Refresh program in Palmdale, California. | Source: Lockheed Martin

Eventually, it should not be forgotten that, beyond its operational role, the U-2 is still valued as a high-altitude testbed. Testing campaigns conducted over the last five years have leveraged the aircraft’s open architecture and its ability to integrate new technology quickly. The U-2 has been involved in containers and AI/ML experimentation, open-mission-systems integration, and gateway or data-sharing roles between different platforms. A Skunk Works pilot current on the U-2 would be useful if Lockheed is using the aircraft to trial payloads, communications systems, sensors, or battle-management concepts that may feed current and future programs.

Another (even more speculative) possibility is that Lockheed could employ a U-2 pilot as part of work on or around future classified ISR aircraft, using the Dragon Lady as a surrogate, a risk-reduction platform, or a bridge capability. With the RQ-180 spy drone slowly beginning to emerge from the shadows of black programs, there is a chance Skunk Works is maturing new manned or unmanned ISR concepts. In that context, having a U-2 pilot with a test background could make sense for comparative flying, sensor work, or manned-ISR experimentation. 

Whatever, if you are interested and your profile fits the requirements, you’d better hurry: you have less than a month to apply, as the deadline is May 15, 2026.

Le procès en appel de l'affaire du financement libyen de la campagne présidentielle de Nicolas Sarkozy de 2007 se tient à Paris depuis le 16 mars. Condamné en première instance à 5 ans de prison, il avait été détenu 20 jours à l'automne. Résumé de la cinquième semaine d'audience, au cours de laquelle Claude Guéant, représenté par son avocat, a mis en difficulté la défense de l'ancien président.

The Indian Ocean has no shortage of distressed strategic assets: financially stressed yards, ports, and logistics infrastructure in small states that cannot sustain them independently.

With Viktor Orban’s election loss, Pedro Sanchez is now Beijing’s most useful European leader.

L’IA devient l’un des principaux terrains de rivalité stratégique entre grandes puissances. Les États Unis et la Chine cherchent à s’assurer une maîtrise complète de la chaîne de valeur, des semi conducteurs au développement des modèles de fondation, en passant par le contrôle des infrastructures de calcul. D’autres puissances cherchent également à se distinguer dans ce nouvel espace de compétition géopolitique à la croisée des enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de compétitivité.

Philippe Barbet, professeur émérite d’économie à l’Université Sorbonne Paris Nord et chercheur associé à l’IRIS, répond à nos questions :

• Les États-Unis et la Chine ont-ils définitivement distancé leurs concurrents en matière d’IA et de sa chaîne de valeur ?

• Quel est le rôle de l’UE sur ce marché de l’IA ? Quelle carte a-t-elle à jouer ?

• Certains parlent d’un futur éclatement de la bulle IA. Ce scénario vous semble-t-il plausible ? Cette fébrilité ne représente-t-elle pas une faiblesse pour les États-Unis par exemple dont l’économie est dopée à l’IA ?

Cette vidéo a été réalisée à l’occasion de la 3e édition des Rencontres géoéconomiques et géopolitiques organisées par l’IRIS et NEOMA Business School, en partenariat avec Diplomatie Magazine et Courrier international, le 2 avril 2026.

L’article Géopolitique de l’IA , quels nouveaux rapports de force mondiaux ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Des inquiétudes ont également été exprimées concernant les suspects européens de terrorisme passibles de la peine de mort en Irak

The post L’UE craint une nouvelle recrudescence du terrorisme lié à l’État islamique appeared first on Euractiv FR.

In an era defined by geopolitical fragmentation, the Australia-Japan partnership shows how middle powers can cooperate to mitigate risk and enhance resilience. 

« L'Espagne a abandonné le peuple sahraoui », a déclaré une députée sahraouie-espagnole à Euractiv

The post Les réfugiés apatrides exclus de l’amnistie migratoire espagnole appeared first on Euractiv FR.

La Commission européenne a appelé la Turquie à revenir sur sa décision « inacceptable » de ne pas inviter la République de Chypre à une réunion préparatoire en amont d’une conférence des Nations unies sur le climat. La Conférence des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques de 2026 (COP31) se tiendra en novembre à Antalya, […]

The post L’UE fulmine alors que la Turquie empêche Chypre de participer à une réunion de l’ONU sur le climat appeared first on Euractiv FR.