Diplomacy & Crisis News

Paysan en Chartreuse, Vincent Gilbert réagit à l'article « Éloge de la fermière » (août), extrait du dernier livre de Benoît Duteurtre.

Je rejoins l'auteur sur le constat de la menace de disparition de l'agriculture de montagne. Mais je pense que la principale menace qui pèse sur la ferme de Josette Antoine n'est autre que la mentalité totalement décalée des citadins apprentis campagnards.

Pêle-mêle, je note une confusion entre les termes « pasteurisation » et « stérilisation », entre « élevage hors-sol » (qui est effectivement absurde) et « création d'un bâtiment avec une dalle ».

La référence à cette magnifique agriculture montagnarde née au Moyen Âge semble oublier qu'à l'époque les agriculteurs étaient pour la plupart des serfs travaillant pour un seigneur peu concerné par les droits et la protection sociale de ses « larbins ».

Enfin, le paragraphe sur la possible reprise de l'exploitation par le fils de Josette néglige la réalité du travail quotidien dans une ferme. Certes, les vieux bâtiments sont bucoliques, adorables, poétiques... Mais ils sont inadaptés aux pratiques actuelles de l'agriculture, et ce même pour de petites exploitations agricoles de montagne. Et je ne parle pas là des normes qui semblent vous révulser. Je parle de fonctionnalité, de praticité, de gain de temps et d'économie... de sa santé !

Après la parution de l'enquête de Christelle Gérand « Aix-Marseille, laboratoire de la fusion des universités » (septembre), le président de cette université, M. Yvon Berland, a souhaité apporter son point de vue. En voici les principaux éléments.

Aix-Marseille Université (AMU) ne procède pas d'un pari de gigantisme, mais d'une démarche volontariste visant à décloisonner, constituer et coordonner une masse critique de compétences et d'excellence dans le secteur public. Il y avait des raisons intrinsèques à fusionner les trois anciennes universités, ne serait-ce que l'enjeu de cohérence et de lisibilité en matière de recherche et de formation.

Si AMU avait eu le classement de Shanghaï pour seul horizon, il lui eût fallu alors ne pas intégrer les lettres, langues et sciences humaines, pourtant essentielles aux savoirs, mais dont les publications des enseignants-chercheurs ne sont pas ou peu prises en compte dans ce classement, qui juge de la performance de l'établissement au regard du nombre total d'enseignants-chercheurs.

Vous soupçonnez le président de l'université de clientélisme. Compte tenu de la très large majorité qui soutient sa politique, s'il y avait clientélisme, presque tout le monde serait déjà servi ! Et comment expliquer que des opposants notoires (que vous citez à plaisir) aient également bénéficié de financements ? Le seul critère ayant régi le financement des projets dans le cadre des Initiatives d'excellence (Idex) a été l'expertise internationale indépendante.

Vous contestez des faits pourtant incontestables tels que l'augmentation du régime indemnitaire des personnels administratifs, la réfection des locaux (dont la vétusté ne dépend pas de la fusion) ou encore l'augmentation des dotations en sciences sociales.

Vous critiquez le fait que l'université se préoccupe de l'employabilité de ses étudiants et son dialogue avec le monde socio-économique dans lequel se trouve l'essentiel des emplois. Vous auriez pu souligner le travail d'AMU, qui, au travers de ses accords-cadres avec de grands industriels, mais aussi avec le tissu de PME-PMI locales, facilite l'insertion professionnelle de ses étudiants et contribue à la reconnaissance du diplôme de doctorat dans le monde socio-économique.

Il est triste de voir éreintée de la sorte une université qui travaille, a connu de premiers succès et est déterminée à poursuivre dans la voie qu'elle a choisie, car avoir l'ambition d'être une université de rang mondial n'est absolument pas incompatible avec celle d'être une grande université de service public. C'est le pari que fait chaque jour Aix-Marseille Université.

— L'article « Riposte culturelle au Cachemire » (septembre 2016) évoquait l'absence d'élu musulman ou chrétien. Il fallait comprendre « dans la majorité gouvernementale », et non dans l'ensemble du Parlement.

— La carte accompagnant l'article « Cette France en mal de médecins » (septembre) ne prenait en compte que le nombre de médecins exerçant en libéral. Une carte interactive, plus détaillée, est présentée sur ce site.

— Dans « La Corne de l'Afrique dans l'orbite de la guerre au Yémen » (septembre), une coupe malheureuse a conduit à écrire que des forces arabes pourraient menacer Assab, alors que nous voulions dire que cette base érythréenne pourrait être utilisée par l'aviation égyptienne.

— L'article « “Enchanter la vulgaire réalité” » (septembre) donnait une traduction approximative de la devise de Paris. Fluctuat nec mergitur signifie plutôt « Il est battu par les flots, mais ne coule pas ».

— Dans « Traduire Shakespeare » (septembre), l'auteur faisait référence au mot finlandais sisu, et non situ comme indiqué par erreur.

Fins connaisseurs de la loi de l'offre et de la demande, les économistes Pierre Cahuc et André Zylberberg ont trouvé une méthode pour écumer les plateaux télé et les antennes radio : provoquer la polémique de la rentrée en intitulant subtilement leur livre Le Négationnisme économique. Principale cible de leur brûlot : les économistes hétérodoxes, dont bon nombre figurent parmi les auteurs du Manuel d'économie critique du Monde diplomatique, actuellement en kiosques.

Que leur reprochent MM. Cahuc et Zylberberg ? De contester les résultats d'une discipline qui aurait opéré sa « révolution expérimentale » au point de devenir aussi indiscutable que « la physique, la biologie, la médecine ou la climatologie ». Désormais, les économistes, disent ces deux amoureux de la science, sont capables d'évaluer l'efficacité d'une mesure politique (par exemple, la hausse du smic) ou d'une prestation sociale exactement comme leurs collègues médecins testent les vertus d'un nouveau médicament : en comparant un premier groupe de patients, auquel la molécule est prescrite (dans ce cas, les bénéficiaires d'une mesure), à un second, auquel on administre un placebo (les autres).

Dans les années 1930, les économistes ont contracté un complexe d'infériorité vis-à-vis des sciences « dures », qui ne les a jamais quittés. Chez ces deux-là, la physics envy (1), ou jalousie envers les sciences physiques, confine au caprice de bambin. À ceux qui auraient l'idée saugrenue de reprocher aux économistes de ne pas avoir prévu la crise de 2007-2008, ils rétorquent : « En fait, la science économique n'est pas capable de prévoir un futur très complexe. De la même manière, la médecine est incapable d'anticiper la prochaine grande épidémie. Arrêtez-vous de voir votre médecin parce qu'il ne peut pas prédire si vous aurez un cancer l'année prochaine (2)  ? » Certes… Mais, si mon médecin m'a encouragé à fumer les trente dernières années, j'aurai de sérieuses raisons de vouloir changer de praticien. En préconisant énergiquement de déréguler la finance, les économistes dominants ont une grande responsabilité dans les tares du système actuel. Et, contrairement aux physiciens, qui ne peuvent guère modifier la loi de la gravité, les économistes influencent souvent leur objet d'étude…

Même le « Prix Nobel d'économie » 2015 Angus Deaton s'est agacé du scientisme naïf de ses collègues : « [Ce type de test empirique] n'est utile que s'il est combiné avec d'autres méthodes et d'autres disciplines pour découvrir non pas “ce qui marche”, mais pourquoi les choses marchent, à tel moment et à tel endroit (3).  » Car les phénomènes sociaux, contrairement aux expériences de laboratoire, ne sont pas reproductibles à l'identique. Ces subtilités donnent raison aux citoyens, de plus en plus nombreux, qui doutent des préconisations des économistes dominants. Faut-il vraiment s'en désoler ?

(1) Cf. Philip Mirowski, « Do economists suffer from physics envy ? », Finnish Economic Papers, vol. 5, no 1, Helsinki, printemps 1992.

(2) Challenges, Paris, 1er septembre 2016.

(3) Le Monde, 12 septembre 2016.

Kevin Lamarque (Associated Press)

There has been a lot of discussion of Hillary Clinton’s e-mails and her handling of classified material—a lot. Press coverage of Clinton has focused on the e-mail issue so much that it is the first thing people mention when pollsters ask about her. The topic is certainly worthy of discussion, but much of it has been misinformed, involving some combination of willful distortion and innocent misunderstanding about some fairly esoteric topics. I would like to take some time to examine some points about Clinton’s e-mails, the government classification system, and the reason why the State Department often does not follow its own rules when it comes to information security. This is not an exercise in excuse making but an effort to understand what has been happening at the State Department and why.

First, some people view FBI director James Comey’s public statement of July 5, 2016, explaining the FBI’s investigation and recommendation regarding Clinton’s handling of classified information, as an attack on Clinton. It is, I believe, more accurately understood as a preemptive defense of the FBI as an institution. So many exaggerated claims and assertions had been made about Clinton’s e-mails in terms of criminal liability that he would have opened his agency to attack if he had simply recommended against prosecution and left it at that.

Thus he went into an unusual degree of detail about the investigation and its thoroughness to prevent charges of bias. Comey said as much toward the end of his statement: “I know there will be intense public debate in the wake of this recommendation, as there was throughout this investigation. What I can assure the American people is that this investigation was done competently, honestly, and independently. No outside influence of any kind was brought to bear.” In a later memo to FBI employees, he stated: “The hard part was whether to offer unprecedented transparency about our thinking. . . . I struggled with that part, but decided the best way to protect the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the American people’s sense of justice was to announce it the way we did—with extraordinary transparency and without any kind of coordination.”

Despite what some people have suggested, Clinton’s use of a personal e-mail account, in and of itself, was not a violation of the law, nor was it necessarily unusual. Examining the period between 2001 and 2008, before Clinton came to the department, the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) “identified more than 90 Department employees who periodically used personal email accounts to conduct official business.” The OIG report—which addressed department-wide practices, not just Secretary Clinton—went on to quote a former department official as saying, “State’s technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively.”

According to the OIG report, it was a violation of department policy to use an unauthorized system without seeking official guidance or approval from the department’s Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) and Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which Clinton did not seek. (The report’s wording implies that the burden was on the secretary to initiate these actions, yet the IRM director was clearly aware of the situation.) Even there, however, the FBI report suggested some ambiguity: “While State policy during Clinton’s tenure required that ‘day-to-day operations [at State] be conducted on [an authorized information system]’ according to the Bureau of Information Security Management there was no restriction on the use of personal email accounts for official business. However, State employees were cautioned about security and records retention concerns regarding the use of personal e-mail. In 2011, a notice to all State employees was sent on Clinton’s behalf, which recommended employees avoid conducting State business from personal e-mail accounts due to information security concerns.” [Emphasis added; insertions and deletions made by FBI.] Was it required or recommended, or were there no restrictions? Apparently it is still hard to say.

The mishandling of classified material is a different matter. That can involve serious violations of the law, and that was the main focus of the FBI investigation. We shall return to that shortly, after reviewing a few intermediary points.

Why Would Clinton Use Her Own Server?

The State Department has two e-mail systems, a classified system for classified documents and an unclassified system (@state.gov) for other documents and messages. It is not permitted to transfer documents from the classified system to the unclassified system, and in any event they cannot be transferred without the direct assistance of system administrators.

Clinton regularly used the classified system for classified documents (or, more precisely, she assigned people to do it for her). The controversy arises from her use of a personal server in place of @state.gov and, more particularly, from the occasional use of that server—or any unclassified system—to communicate on classified topics. We will return to that topic below. First, why did she use a personal server?

My own initial assumption was that she wanted to control access to her communications. Clinton has been the target of political attacks for a quarter century, and some of those who attack her are not shy about taking information out of context or distorting it in the process. Thus one might expect her to want to limit access to her communications. Yet this does not seem to have been the case. Rather, just as she has said all along, she said to the FBI that she used the private server as a matter of convenience, and the FBI appears to have accepted this explanation.* The decision seems to be rooted in Clinton’s quite profound lack of expertise in, or curiosity about, information technology. She did not fully comprehend the possible consequences, and—probably because she was the secretary—no one forced her to confront them.

The decision to use a personal server, of course, raised two issues: possible exposure of her communications to hacking by hostile powers (or others) and complications concerning the proper archiving of what the State Department now calls “record emails.” Record e-mails are those that are to be marked for archiving. Not all e-mails are preserved. Department employees are instructed to delete personal e-mails and most “working emails,” which concern day-to-day administrative matters. Employees determine on their own which messages to delete and which to archive.

While Clinton was aware of these issues, they did not cause her concern. With regard to archiving, she simply believed that her e-mails could be found in the archives of the officials with whom she communicated (which undermines my initial theory that she used the private server to prevent access to her communications). This is really not a satisfactory means of record keeping, but then many people underestimate the difficulty of maintaining records, and even if frustrating, it is not designed to prevent record keeping. After all, the FBI did find many of Clinton’s deleted e-mails by looking in the archives of people with whom she corresponded, just as she said they would. (Many of the deleted e-mails that were deemed to be business-related have turned out to be earlier versions of e-mail chains that had already been turned over.) Incidentally, this was the exact opposite of Colin Powell’s practice. According to an e-mail he sent to Clinton in January 2009, he used a personal e-mail account precisely in order to prevent his messages from becoming “an official record and subject to the law” and for that reason advised Clinton to avoid “systems that captured the data.”

As for security, Clinton did not consider it a problem. According to her FBI interview, “CLINTON understood the email system used by her husband’s personal staff had an excellent track record with respect to security and had never been breached.” Although the FBI could not find evidence of any breach of her account, Comey stated that the nature of the technology might have allowed talented hackers to enter without leaving traces (although the FBI did find evidence that another e-mail account on the server had been hacked). On the other hand, David Sanger reported in the New York Times (after 10 paragraphs of how vulnerable Clinton’s private server was) that the Russians had access to the @state.gov e-mail system that she was supposed to be using for more than seven years, from at least 2007 through the end of 2014, so they probably have her e-mails and everyone else’s anyhow.

For the record, Clinton has stated that it was a mistake to have used her own server. Given the hullabaloo over the decision, it is safe to assume that she is not likely to do this again.

Not All Classified Documents Are Created Equal

The process of classifying and declassifying government documents is complex and highly arbitrary. The rules are vague enough to be open to interpretation, and the incentives generally favor “overclassification.” In other words, permitting the release of information that should have been classified has repercussions; classifying a document that did not require it does not. Thus there is a lot of material that is needlessly classified. Some analysts speak of a disconnect between the classification system and the actual needs of national security.

The arbitrariness of the system has been taken into account by people who deal with it regularly. For example, George Washington University’s National Security Archive, which frequently requests the declassification of old documents for historical purposes, routinely submits multiple requests for the same document in the hope that different officials will declassify different portions. On one occasion, the archive received the beginning and the end of a document from which the entire middle had been redacted. The very next day, in response to a separate request, it received a version of the same document with the middle intact but with the beginning and end removed. Thus within 24 hours the archive had received the entire document. The markings on the two copies indicated that both versions had been reviewed, redacted, and released by the same official.

The current Clinton case presents another example. The notes from Clinton’s FBI interview contain the sentence: “CLINTON believed information should be classified in the case of covert military action, the use of sensitive sources and where sensitive deliberations took place.” The FBI report, which was based in part on the interview and was released as part of the same package, contains virtually the same sentence except that the words “covert military action” have been redacted. Among the redactions from the interview notes, on the other hand, is Clinton’s date of birth.

That said, of course, not everything is overclassified, and the subject is not to be dismissed out of hand. Officially there are three levels of classification as defined by the National Security Act of 1947: Confidential (C), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS). Bureaucrats often treat Confidential and Secret information in a fairly cavalier manner. This is the sort of thing that you read in the newspaper every day, attributed to a government official who will not give his name because he’s violating the law by giving classified information to a reporter. (Although, to be sure, some unauthorized leaks to the press are actually authorized releases masquerading as unauthorized leaks. Bureaucracy works in strange ways.)

Top Secret information is treated much more seriously. Fred Kaplan has related that when he began a job on Capitol Hill years ago, he was granted access to Confidential and Secret information from the first day, while he was restricted from seeing Top Secret material until his security clearance actually came through. Perhaps because there is only one category that everyone treats so seriously, a number of “unofficial” gradations have been invented within it, degrees of Top Secret, if you will. These include: Special Access Programs (SAP), Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI), and the anatomically challenging EYES ONLY. Incidentally there are two grades of unclassified information as well, both of which may be sent on (authorized) unclassified systems: Unclassified (U) and Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU).**

Various categories of secretiveness can pile up. To take a random example, a 1991 assessment of the 1983 Able Archer war scare*** was marked: TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON, which roughly translates as: Release Would Cause Exceptionally Grave Damage to National Security; Highly Sensitive Communications Intelligence; Contains Intercepts of Soviet Communications; Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator. As of last year, the document is freely available, albeit in redacted form.

*The argument that Clinton must have lied about it being convenient because she was really using multiple devices is false. She used multiple devices over the course of four years, one at a time.

**SBU is a State Department designation. Other agencies, including the FBI, use For Official Use Only (FOUO).

***Yes, there was a war scare in 1983, when the Soviets began to suspect that President Reagan was preparing to launch a nuclear missile strike and went on alert. Don’t feel bad, U.S. intelligence was not aware of it at the time either.

The post Clinton and Why the State Department Doesn’t Follow Its Own Rules (Pt I) appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Dominik P. Jankowski and Maksymilian Czuperski

The transatlantic community faces threats on multiple fronts, rendering NATO as essential as it has ever been. Because of these changing regional security dynamics, the Alliance should consider some additional reforms to its internal structure and capacities, so that it can achieve necessary readiness. There is still much to ponder. On the road from the 2016 Warsaw Summit to the 2017 Brussels Summit, the Alliance should embrace six core approaches—a new strategic “six-pack”—in order to strengthen the process of NATO’s long-term strategic adaptation.

First, NATO should become a key platform for a new transatlantic grand bargain. The ongoing presidential race in the United States has once again revealed growing criticisms of NATO in some American political circles, especially among supporters of Donald Trump. A new transatlantic bargain should lead to more fair and balanced burden sharing, both in terms of devoting necessary financial resources as well as investing in the right capabilities. Following the decisions of the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance will, in fact, need additional heavier high-end capabilities. A NATO Defense Planning Pledge—which would not replace the NATO Defense Investment Pledge, but concentrate more on a desired military output—could become a starting point for a renewed transatlantic bond.

Second, NATO needs a clear political-military strategy to counter the Russian “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) systems. Even if A2/AD is by no means a new concept, it poses a formidable challenge to the political and military credibility of NATO, as it restricts the freedom to maneuver. Therefore, it should be considered an aggressive posture. In fact, Russia has harnessed an array of stand-off weapons—including air defense, coastal defense, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missile platforms, and naval and submarine forces, as well as electronic and cyber warfare—which can turn areas falling within their range into strategically and operationally isolated “bubbles”.

Third, in an A2/AD and hybrid environment the Alliance needs a renewed and more ambitious exercises policy. NATO drills should not only provide assurance to Allies, but also serve as an element of a deterrence policy. An updated approach to exercises should not only include visibility, high-end capabilities and large-scale formations, but also be employed in a non-permissive environment on the eastern, northern and southern flanks. In short, what NATO needs are regular drills of the Follow on Forces in A2/AD “bubbles”.

Fourth, NATO needs additional robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, which are a fundamental requirement for effective situational awareness, strategic foresight, and early warning. In response to the current threats and challenges, NATO should consider employing a Regional Intelligence Analysis Centre (RIAC) on its eastern flank, which would supplement the work done by the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). An additional ISR presence in the region, e.g. an AGS forward-operating location in Poland, would also support the planning and execution of current and future activities on the eastern flank.

Fifth, the Alliance needs a reviewed NATO Command Structure (NCS) that should be better suited to deliver on the collective defense tasks. Current regional security dynamics have challenged some assumptions on which the NCS was based, showing that its connectivity with the NATO Force Structure is not sufficient. Moreover, the Warsaw Summit decisions on strengthened deterrence and defense posture added new requirements for the existing NCS.

Sixth, NATO’s actions require a fully integrated approach to strategic communications (StratCom). The Russian pressure to redefine our values has now reached the stage of undermining the coherence of Euro-Atlantic communication. In the fog of misinformation NATO might be well prepared for classical cyber challenges, but the Russian-Ukrainian conflict shows that it also needs to be prepared for information war when the events are seamlessly melded with cyber, kinetic and electronic warfare operations. In fact, NATO’s activities should be enhanced by a creation of special StratCom departments throughout the Alliance member states to rapidly gather evidence, analyze and respond to disinformation campaigns.

As Europe confronts the prospect of future Russian aggression, terror, and domestic upheaval, NATO must remain a primary security guarantor on the continent. In fact, there is no viable alternative to NATO. But new security challenges cannot be borne by the Alliance of decades past. Indeed, NATO’s military adaption should be continued The Alliance must emphasize what is required of it, like intelligence, strategic communications and effective coordination and command, to confront these threats to transatlantic security. By developing a strategic “six-pack” NATO will stay on the right path and draw credible red lines that can keep Russian adventurism in check.

Dominik P. Jankowski is Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Maksymilian Czuperski is Strategic Communications Advisor Europe and Special Assistant to the President of the Atlantic Council.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the institutions they represent.

This article was originally published by The National Interest.

The post NATO’s Strategic ‘Six-Pack’ appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Depuis deux ans, la diffusion du Monde diplomatique s'est nettement redressée (1) ; le nombre de ses abonnés atteint un record historique ; la situation de ses finances n'inspire plus d'inquiétude. Un tel rétablissement détonne dans le paysage de la presse et dans le climat idéologique actuel. Il tranche en particulier avec le délabrement éditorial et économique de la plupart des périodiques, dont certains ne diffèrent leur trépas qu'en se transformant en prime numérique du géant des télécoms qui les possède (2).

Notre santé contraste également avec la situation politique et idéologique générale. Politique : le courant intellectuel — rationnel, démocratique, universaliste — qui inspire ce journal depuis sa naissance est provisoirement sur la défensive, affaibli par une absence de stratégie à long terme, des rivalités internes, le vrombissement ininterrompu des ego et des réseaux sociaux. Idéologique : les attentats djihadistes et la peur qu'ils inspirent relèguent au second plan les combats pour la justice sociale. Et encouragent à piétiner ce qui reste de libertés publiques, à accepter un état d'exception généralisé, à acclimater les esprits à l'idée d'une guerre civile.

Loin d'être l'apanage de l'extrême droite et de sites Internet paranoïaques, de tels desseins ont désormais table ouverte à la radio, à la télévision, dans les principaux titres de la presse. Ils concourent aux décisions d'un nombre croissant de responsables politiques. En juin dernier, l'éditorialiste du Point assimilait la Confédération générale du travail (CGT) à l'Organisation de l'État islamique. Avec le même souci de la comparaison intelligente et apaisée, l'ancien ministre Luc Ferry vient d'estimer, dans sa chronique hebdomadaire du Figaro, que le port du burkini vise à l'« islamisation de nos sociétés » et qu'il faut par conséquent « résister aux collabos de l'islamo-gauchisme », à leur « pacifisme munichois ».

Mobilisé à son tour par cette immense affaire estivale, l'éditorialiste socialiste Jacques Julliard ne décolère plus, tantôt dans Marianne, tantôt dans Le Figaro, contre « le parti collabo du “pas d'amalgame” à tous crins, du “vivre ensemble” à tout prix ». Et il vilipende le « parti de la France coupable » qui « lui tire dans le dos quand elle est attaquée de face ». En juin 1940, Winston Churchill avait alerté ses compatriotes du danger d'un débarquement des armées nazies sur les côtes britanniques (« We shall fight on the beaches ») ; d'aucuns n'hésitent plus à transposer ce morceau de bravoure historique dans le combat, prétendument féministe mais assurément moins risqué, contre des tenues de bain religieuses : « Eh bien, nous aussi, nous nous battrons sur les plages (3) »... Dans un tout autre domaine, celui de l'économie politique, même la critique argumentée des politiques néolibérales passe de nos jours pour une forme de « négationnisme ».

Contre ce nouveau maccarthysme, nous continuerons à privilégier engagement et raison. Nous ne demeurerons pas pour autant cantonnés dans des positions défensives. Au fil des mois, ce journal est redevenu le lieu de rassemblement d'un nombre croissant de lecteurs souvent actifs dans les mobilisations sociales. Notre souci de rendre compte des transformations rapides de l'ordre international, alors que l'attention est trop souvent happée par des événements sans portée, explique aussi ce regain d'influence. Joue également en notre faveur le fait que nous disposons d'une colonne vertébrale, de convictions anciennes et solides. Et que notre journalisme, loin de juxtaposer des commentaires indignés, s'adosse à des enquêtes exigeantes, ouvertes sur le monde. Chacun sait par ailleurs que nous n'appartenons à aucune chapelle, que les auteurs les plus divers collaborent à nos publications, qu'aucune banque, aucun industriel ne nous tient.

Depuis 2009, nous avons fait appel à vous pour mener ce combat éditorial et politique. Le résultat est là, puisque notre vigueur découle de votre appui. La période qui s'annonce réclamera plus que jamais que notre voix porte. Votre contribution aura donc également pour avantage de prévenir tous les dynamiteurs du bien commun que leur offensive nous trouvera sur leur chemin.

(1) Depuis 2014, notre diffusion moyenne est passée de 137 000 à 156 000 exemplaires. Nous détaillerons notre situation et nos comptes d'ici à la fin de l'année.

(2) Lire Serge Halimi et Pierre Rimbert, « Information sous contrôle », Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2016, et Marie Bénilde, « Quand les tuyaux avalent les journaux », Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 2016.

(3) Élisabeth Lévy, Le Figaro.fr, 11 septembre 2016.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’automne de Politique étrangère (n°3/2016). Tristan Aureau propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Ian Bremmer, Superpower – Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (Londres, Penguin Press, 2015, 240 pages).

Alors qu’approchent les prochaines élections présidentielles américaines, nombreux sont les ouvrages qui entendent dresser un bilan de la politique étrangère américaine de ces dernières années et dégager quelques orientations d’avenir. L’originalité du livre de Ian Bremmer, essayiste influent et président de l’Eurasia Group, tient non pas tant à une thèse singulière qu’à la volonté de l’auteur de faire prendre parti au lecteur.

Dès l’introduction, le lecteur est ainsi invité à répondre à un questionnaire portant sur les options fondamentales de la politique étrangère américaine. S’ensuit une présentation synthétique du contexte international ; sans surprise, l’accent est mis par Bremmer sur les incertitudes entourant l’émergence de la Chine, le regain d’agressivité de la Russie, la faiblesse stratégique de l’Union européenne et les violentes secousses qui traversent le Moyen-Orient. Puis vient une critique sans concession de la politique étrangère menée depuis la fin de la guerre froide, particulièrement par Barack Obama dont Bremmer ne cesse de déplorer ce qu’il qualifie d’absence de stratégie.

S’ouvre alors le cœur de l’ouvrage, avec trois chapitres correspondant, pour Bremmer, à autant de cours possibles pour la future politique américaine. Le premier – Indispensable America – repose sur la conviction que les États-Unis demeurent une nation exceptionnelle appelée à imposer son leadership sur la scène internationale et à promouvoir ses valeurs, le cas échéant en recourant à la force armée. Le deuxième – Moneyball America – serait une politique étrangère calculatrice, fondée sur la poursuite des intérêts américains et débarrassée de toute prétention à exporter des valeurs telles que la démocratie ou les droits de l’homme. Le troisième – Independent America – renvoie à l’idée que les États-Unis ne pourront restaurer un quelconque leadership sur la scène internationale sans redevenir un exemple, ce qui suppose de reconstruire la puissance américaine de l’intérieur avant s’aventurer à nouveau au-dehors.

Le principal mérite de l’ouvrage tient à ce que Bremmer défend vivement chacun de ces trois points de vue, avant de dire sa préférence pour l’option Independent America, au terme d’une analyse sans concession, notamment à propos de la politique de Barack Obama face aux crises syrienne et ukrainienne. La présentation des options a enfin le mérite de structurer le débat de politique étrangère qui pourrait prendre de l’ampleur à l’approche des élections de novembre prochain.

Le lecteur peut toutefois regretter que le propos soit, en définitive, convenu, et reprenne des thèses défendues par d’autres auteurs ces dernières années. L’option Independent America rappelle la thèse défendue par R. Haas dans Foreign Policy Begins at Home (Basic Books, 2014), tandis que l’analyse de la moindre puissance relative des États-Unis fait directement écho aux analyses de J. Nye, notamment dans son dernier essai (Is the American Century Over?, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015). Quant à la critique de la politique d’Obama, elle peine à convaincre tant elle écarte d’un revers de main des orientations fondamentales qui, à défaut d’une stratégie formalisée, ne manquent pas de cohérence : « pivot » vers l’Asie, recours accru à des modes d’intervention discrets, retrait des principaux théâtres d’opérations sur lesquels s’était engagé son prédécesseur.

Tristan Aureau

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and other senior UN officials have paid tribute to Shimon Peres, former Israeli President and the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize winner, who passed away early Wednesday at the age of 93.

Officials at the United Nations today urged human and animal health authorities around the world to step up and more effectively address rabies &#8211 a preventable but fatal disease that still claims the lives of an estimated 60,000 people each year &#8211 as the international community marks World Rabies Day.

At interactive dialogues on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya Ukraine, and Burundi, senior UN human rights officials and independent experts today urged the governments to take immediate steps to ensure protection of human rights in their respective countries.

Noting the obstacles that persons with disabilities or those with other access requirements face in taking advantage of fundamental aspects of travel, senior United Nations officials today urged policy-makers, travel planners and companies that work with persons with disabilities to work together to make travel more accessible.

Four United Nations human rights experts today urged authorities in Pakistan to halt the execution of Imdad Ali, a man with a psychosocial disability, and to re-try him in compliance with international standards.

Warning that unsafe abortions kill nearly 50,000 women each year, United Nations human rights experts today called on States across the world to repeal restrictive abortion laws and policies, and all punitive measures and discriminatory barriers to access safe reproductive health services.

A new delay in Somalia’s elections is a matter of “immediate concern,” raising fears that the process is being politically manipulated and that the latest postponement may only be one of yet further rolling delays, the top United Nations official in the long-troubled East African country warned today.

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) today cautioned that unless it receives $3 million in urgent funding, it will have to suspend its school meals programme in Mali, affecting nearly 180,000 children in about 1,000 schools.

Having survived through the Greek saga with the Euro still intact, the banks, for now, still standing, and a new capital markets union in the offing, it could be argued that Europe’s economic union has withstood the slings and arrows of misfortune that have come its way in the last few years. The same, however, cannot be said of its political union.

In his State of the Union address delivered to the European Parliament, Commission President, Jean Claude Juncker, went so far as to call it an “existential crisis”. The day before making this statement, two headlines came out that supported his diagnosis. The first concerned the revelation that the EU admitted Romania and Bulgaria despite warnings from The European Court of Auditors (ECA) that they were not yet ready. The second involved comments made by Juncker’s compatriot, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn who said that Hungary should be excluded “temporarily or if need be forever” from the EU on account of the government’s authoritarian lurch and rough handling of the refugee crisis.

Looking more deeply at these interconnected issues we cannot help but agree with Juncker’s gloomy assessment about Europe being in a state of crisis. Since 2008, the main criticism of the EU has been that as a monetary, but not fiscal, union it has been incapable of correcting the imbalances that resulted from the differing economic needs of core and periphery members. Much has been made of this policy mismatch and the deleterious effect it can have, especially on the periphery.

The attention given to this divergence in economic priorities is understandable given that it cuts to the core of the Euro crises; however, while all eyes have been trained on the economic situation, insufficient attention has been paid to a divergence of another, possibly more threatening, kind that has been opening up among member states on the political level.

While the founding members, having set a course for “ever closer union” went into autopilot, expecting to arrive at a state of near perfect union sometime in the medium term, they never imagined that the idea of a perfect union in Berlin might be very different from that in Sofia, Prague or Budapest. That status quo lasted until the onset of the refugee crisis, which revealed the extent of the ideological parting of ways between old and new Europe.

Bulgaria was hard hit by the waves of refugees making their way into Europe, a crisis that translated into violence against asylum seekers committed with impunity by border guards. The country erected a 230-kilometer fence on its border with Turkey and has deployed the army to patrol it, which was accompanied by a spike in the number of reports of excessive force. This happens in a country whose European values are under scrutiny for other reasons, such as its shaky commitment to the rule of law and the nefarious influence the Mafia has over the state.

Across the border, Romania shows the same signs of hostility to refugees despite barely having any asylum seekers crossing its borders. Nevertheless, Bucharest loudly rejected the European Union’s quotas mandatory quotas, arguing that taking in 6,000 would be too much to handle. And indeed, Romania seems to have troubles even keeping its current population within its borders. Millions of Romanians have already left the country over the past decade for economic reasons. The current caretaker government of Dacian Ciolos has been accused of standing idly by as the health care system (understaffed by at least 30,000 physicians) crumbled, and has proved incapable of handling massive strikes and walk-outs. To top it off, Ciolos is accused of leading a witch-hunt against political opponents as part of a wide anti-corruption drive with the help of the Romanian Intelligence Service.

Romania’s case is however typical of the political climate prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. The  Visegrad group (composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has emerged as a stalwart bastion countering western values of liberalism, tolerance and open borders with its own set of values: Christian, nativist, authoritarian.

The most headline grabbing of these countries’ leaders is perhaps Viktor Orbán whose opposition to the EU quota system for distributing refugees throughout the block has become a rallying cry with which to drown out the criticism of corruption and cronyism that plague his administration. Claiming that the admission of Muslim refugees into Europe would undermine its Christian identity, Orbán has successfully fanned the flames of xenophobia in Hungary to a level grossly disproportionate to the vanishingly small number who would actually be settled in the country under the proposed quota system. A forthcoming referendum on migration is expected to swing largely in favor of the government and be used by Orban as a stick against further pressure from Brussels.

Poland, equally concerned with the preservation of its Christian identity, if not its democratic institutions, has come under fire from Brussels for undermining the ability of the supreme court to review legislation, leading to accusations of a power grab on behalf of the government and a roll back towards soviet style centralization. A clash between protesters and the government over the introduction of highly restrictive abortion laws and the influence of the Catholic Church on policy speaks to the growing rift between the country’s urban youth and the staunchly conservative Law and Justice Party.

It is strange how the newest members of the European Union, who have benefited both financially and politically from being members of a powerful political bloc, have been the first to jump ship at the first sign of trouble. Since its creation the EU has been driven by a set of common principles that it was thought would always define the Union. The refugee crisis has woken “old” Europe up to the realization that in a union of 28 countries those principles may not be so common anymore.

The post Central and Eastern Europe at odds with Brussels appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A B-2 in formation flight with eight U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornets and Super Hornets

Recently, the case has been made for “preserving” U.S. primacy using primarily military means. With respect to de Gaulle’s “The sword is the axis of the world” thinking, this stance fails to recognize that economic power is the foundation of a state’s influence in the 21st century.  Even more fundamentally, it fails to take into account both great and minor powers’ pursuit of self-interest, both historically and in today’s multi-polar world.

Militaristic Romanticism Will Continue to Bankrupt the U.S.

Conventional wisdom has it that the U.S. assumed primacy in the post-modern world after defeating the Former Soviet Union. Yes, the U.S. was able to weaken the Former Soviet Union militarily through supporting proxy fighters in Afghanistan, and economically through having it overspend on defense in a futile effort to overcome SDI (“Star Wars”). However, what is not in dispute is that there was no direct military conflict between the two powers. Had that happened, the odds are great that not only would I not be here typing this article, but you also wouldn’t be here reading it.

The conclusion reached during the Cold War that a direct military conflict between the superpowers would have been detrimental to all of humanity seems to have been forgotten by some when discussing current U.S-China hostilities. War with China is just as equally untenable nowadays as military conflict with the Former Soviet Union was during the Cold War. Actually, it’s even more untenable as China is not only a nuclear power, but is increasingly the epicenter of today’s interconnected global economy.  The economic fallout from any shooting war with China would not leave any nation on Earth, including, but especially the U.S., unscathed.

Because of all of this, it is critical for the U.S. to draw several conclusions. First, it’s going to need to effectively separate economics from politics in its dealing with states, especially China. While the phrase “Hot Economics, Cold Politics” may have once referred to Sino-Japanese relations, it can be broadened to refer to relations between all states in the 21st century, even if hot is a misnomer in the wake of the global economic crisis.

Pursuit of Self-interest is Man’s Natural State

Even more importantly, the U.S. needs to recognize that the world has returned to the era of great power politics, if it ever truly left it at all. To survive in this world, it will be increasingly critical to recognize, and not deny, the role of self-interest in all nations’ foreign policies, large and small. A first step in this process would be to go even further back in time before the Cold War and revisit certain WWII-era terminology, notably “ally”, “axis”, and “accommodation/appeasement”.

The word “ally” does not mean supplicant. Historically, allies have served one another’s foreign policy objectives because they understood how an alliance served their own self-interest and because they were ready to seal the agreement in blood if necessary, not because they necessarily liked one another. Only through combined U.S. and Soviet power was Nazi Germany eventually defeated. Even on the verge of imminent collapse, the Former Soviet Union contributed to the U.S.’ coalition in the Gulf War. Despite initial hiccups, is Russian cooperation in Syria today any less vital?

The term “axis” has been used rather carelessly recently as well. In the wake of Turkish overtures to Russia, a “Moscow-Ankara axis” has been mentioned. Following Russia’s warmer ties with Beijing and post-sanctions Iran, a “Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis” has been voiced. Lastly, in the wake of Russian power assertion in Syria and intelligence-sharing efforts with other powers in the region, a possible “Moscow-Tehran-Baghdad(-Damascus?) axis” has been written on. It’s quite moronic to continue to label other countries’ foreign policy goals with lexicon dating back almost three generations, as if a foreign policy that doesn’t clearly support the “rules-based order” is inherently evil.

Related to this are the term’s “accommodation” and “appeasement”. It is equally idiotic to use these terms when describing, for example, German and Japanese outreach efforts to Russia in the wake of U.S.-Russian hostilities. First, a state (ally or not) is always going to follow its own interests, especially where economics is concerned. Secondly,  the use of these terms to describe policies of former actual Axis powers reeks of historical amnesia.

Following this logic, is the U.K. an “ally”, part of an “axis”, or “appeasing” other powers? The U.K. recently withdrew from the EU and became a founding member of the AIIB, both despite U.S. protestations. The point is that if the U.S.’ strongest ally in its historically most-important geographic area of interest does this, it’s realistic to assume that this is a harbinger of a larger trend, and not just an outlier.

The issue is not whether it was actually in the U.K.’s interest to make these moves. Rather, the point is that the U.K. perceived that these actions were in its own self-interest and that it, along with all other states, will continue to make decisions based on this criteria, not dictation from other powers. This is also reflected in recent moves by both the Philippines and Vietnam to improve economic relations with China. These maneuvers, combined with global economic interdependency, are simultaneously a harbinger of the future and a reminder of the past and will continue to undermine any attempts to “preserve” U.S. primacy.

The post “Preserving” Primacy is Both Delusional and Self-destructive appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Short on details but long on criticism, Trump is put on the defensive in a test of his preparedness to be commander in chief.

World leaders gathered in New York City to give speeches and discuss the world’s most pressing foreign-policy issues, but they neglected two of its biggest problems.