European Union

Remember the spy novels of Cold War times? Where pretty much everybody was suspected of being a ‘mole’? The master storyteller of brilliant double agents was John Le Carré, and one of his very best novels was Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy,  published in the spring of 1974, incidentally one month after Willy Brandt had resigned because he had an East German spy among his closest collaborators.

The more the Brexit referendum debate unravels, the more it reminds me of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, the title of which refers to the code names given to some of the suspects and borrowed from an old nursery rhyme (not that this is of any importance for this post). The parallel between the Cold War spy novels and the Brexit referendum campaign is the haunting question whether there is a double agent, seemingly pursuing a publicly proclaimed preferred outcome, but secretly aiming at provoking the exact opposite.

If the Brexit referendum was a TV series like Borgen or Deutschland 83, the best possible cast for the double agent would undoubtedly be David Cameron. He would actually be too good to be true. The most brilliant and efficient ‘moles’ always have the appearance of bland people, underestimated by everybody. They are unspectacular, not really stupid but not particularly bright either, sometimes clumsy, but almost touching in their awkwardness. They have cover stories that have been built over years, so patiently that they have become entirely credible, so convincing, so obvious. If I had to write the scenario of this TV fiction I would therefore lay great emphasis on the perfect fake identity for my double agent.

The cover story would go like this:

Here is a rather average politician who has been put by circumstance in the position to lead the country. From the beginning it has been ‘evident’ that he was not madly in love with the European Union, but had come to the pragmatic conviction that EU membership was on the whole a better option for Britain than splendid isolation.

Then, the scenario would unfold like this:

Unfortunately, to his sincere regret, he has to put up with a bunch of obnoxious backbenchers and an aggressive, populist alliance of Eurosceptics and xenophobes that forces him – against his will! – to commit to holding a referendum about EU membership. There’s no danger, though, the polls predict a stable majority for remaining. Relief!

In the meantime he is bravely trying to limit the damage, by cleverly turning things into a win-win situation. He engages in a renegotiation of the terms of membership with his European partners, the positive outcome of which should strengthen his position and enable him not only to keep Britain in Europe but actually be perceived as an energetic reformer. Of course, he goes about it in somewhat clumsy manner, almost jeopardising his chances of success. And he also seems to handle all other details – the wording of the question, the fixing of the date, the issue of party discipline etc. – in his own hesitant, awkward way.

Some cliffhangers later the dénouement would be written in the future past, why not narrated in emotional flashbacks. He will have dauntlessly fought and argued in favour of membership, and once it’s all over and the leavers pop their (probably EU-produced) champagne, he remembers the day when he warned all stakeholders that his personal commitment and charisma may not be sufficient to counter-balance the momentum of nationalism spurred by a hateful press.

Looking back, the spectators will recognise that there will have been something inevitable about Brexit from the beginning; it’s just they were tricked by the scenario and the main protagonist into not noticing it. And with relations between the UK and Europe being what they are, the end of the story would be somewhat open, leaving the possibility to shoot a second season soon.

If this sounds all too silly, it’s probably just that I read too many Cold War spy novels in my Cold War youth. Apologies for letting my imagination run wild. At the same time, you will have to admit: if ever there was a soviet master spy like John le Carré’s mysteriously named ‘Karla’, driven by the long-term objective to dislocate the European Union, he could not possibly have recruited a better double agent than David Cameron, could he?

 Albrecht Sonntag, EU-Asia Institute
at ESSCA School of Management.
Follow us on Twitter: @Essca_Eu_Asia

The post Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, … Brexit! appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure
on the 2015 report on Serbia
(2015/2892(RSP))
David McAllister
on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Sunday 31 January 2016
London
18.30 Meeting with Prime Minister David Cameron

Tuesday 2 February 2016
17.00 Meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg (photo opportunity)

Thursday 4 February 2016
London - Supporting Syria and the Region conference

(local time)
11.00 Intervention at the Supporting Syria and the Region conference

11:25 Meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
12.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron
13.00 Meeting with President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz
14.30 Meeting with Prime Minister of Slovenia Miro Cerar
15.00 Meeting with Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu, German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras and Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann

Talk about the calm before the storm!  The silence is deafening as both Brussels and Washington DC holds its breath days before the February 1st deadline for an agreement on a new Safe Harbor framework.

At the moment both sides of the Atlantic continue to stare hard at each other waiting for the other side to blink. Senior level negotiations occurred behind closed doors during Davos but very little was revealed. The EU is standing firm as Commissioner Jourova said she is clear that ‘when a European’s personal data travels the equivalent protections also need to go with it’. While Penny Pritzker, U.S. Secretary of Commerce said they have a comprehensive offer being refined ‘…that creates what’s called ‘essential equivalents’ which is the standard that needs to be met in order for Safe Harbor to receive what’s called an adequacy determination’.

What we can assume by next Monday is that some sort of agreement will be announced notwithstanding a complete breakdown in negotiations. Which is a possibility.

What would such an agreement look like? Hard to say, but here are some areas that have been discussed. Clarity on the use of legal mechanisms recognized by the High Court in Europe to allow the transfer of data from the EU to the US. In particular, Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) and Binding Corporate Rules (BCR). There has even been discussion on potentially introducing new ‘creative’ mechanisms such as Codes of Conduct and Certification. However, some Data Protection Authorities in Germany have said they will challenge SCCs and BCRs and any new mechanisms would take several years to be develop, accept, and implement.

But what if the negotiations fail? Where does that leave companies that are directly impacted by the absence of Safe Harbor (of which many are European, by the way)?

We would hope that, in absence of an agreement, the European Commission and Data Protection Authorities will provide clarity and specific ways for companies to transfer data overseas. Unfortunately this does not exclude investigations being started by the Data Protection Authorities.  We can hope these authorities will recognize the good faith companies have shown to date. Companies have repeated throughout the process that they do not have the competency to change how US laws are applied but have offered to make unilateral commitments such as providing transparency reports, developing compliance processes, implementing specific technical or organizational measures.

The real test will be that whatever is announced will need to stand up to European Data Protection Authorities. But it will also need to survive another challenge most likely to come from the High Court and the ‘Schrems’ of the world. A perfect acceptable solution will mean a seismic change in US domestic policy to halt its intelligence services and provide assurances that will need to be entrenched somehow in law. This is not likely in the current US political climate which is very sensitive in the run up to the Presidential elections. The current administration will not want to give Republicans more ammunition with an agreement that may be seen to appease the EU in exchange to sacrificing some of its national security. In addition, the EU would need to provide a credible message to the US explaining why it is ok for Member States, like France and the UK, to introduce new mass surveillance laws. The US will be less enthused to hear Brussels’ response that it does not have the competency to issue orders to Member States, especially not to the likes of the UK with Brexit on the horizon.

Unfortunately the only conclusion is that 1 February will not be the end of the painful discussions that will still be needed to ensure data can flow across the Atlantic. We can only hope cooler heads will prevail and factor in the benefits the free flow of trans-Atlantic data can have in bringing prosperity, jobs and important innovation. Maybe wishful thinking on my part.

Ray Pinto 

Welcome to the Friday edition of our new Brussels Briefing. To receive it every morning in your email in-box, sign up here.

Mr Cameron and Mr Juncker at the prime minister's official country residence last year

David Cameron, the British prime minister, is due in Brussels today for a meeting with Jean-Claude Juncker – a session so important that he cancelled a trip to Denmark and Sweden in order to sit down with the European Commission president in person. The two men have a famously difficult relationship – Mr Cameron actively opposed Mr Juncker’s election as president, and was one of only two leaders to vote against him at a 2014 summit. But it’s less than three weeks before a high-stakes EU summit where Mr Cameron hopes to get a renegotiation deal that changes the UK’s relationship with Europe. So Mohammed must go to the mountain.

For months, the main sticking point in the British renegotiation talks – which have taken Mr Cameron on a grand European tour from Berlin to Bucharest – has been benefits for EU workers in the UK. Mr Cameron wants to prevent EU migrants from receiving in-work benefits for four years, something that would appear to run directly counter to EU treaties’ non-discrimination requirement.

The latest option under consideration is actually one that has been debated for several months – an “emergency brake”. The original idea would have allowed Britain (and other countries) to limit immigration from other EU members if it can prove government services like healthcare or schools were becoming overwhelmed by the strain. As our Brexit watcher Alex Barker reports, the new twist is that the “emergency break” would allow countries to limit work benefits, rather than immigration. In the past, Downing Street has been lukewarm to the “emergency brake” idea, especially since it would likely need vetting from Brussels before the brake can be pulled. But with time running out, and alternate “Plan B” options limited, Mr Cameron may be warming to the idea.

Read more

The 2007 European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia was reviewed for the fourth time in 2015. Over the last eight years, the EU has successfully established several institutionalised mechanisms for strengthening relations and working with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. Despite this, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been backsliding. The EU should not and cannot compete with Russia and China in the region. The EU would do best to focus on a few key areas where it can achieve concrete results. Besides broader economic and some security cooperation, the EU should focus on education in supporting the region’s development while further emphasizing human rights and strengthening political and financial support to civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Central Asia, located at the centre of the Eurasian continent and straddling the borders of some of the world’s most pressing hot spots, offers economic opportunities and natural resources but also remains insecure and troublesome. For the European Union, the region is not a priority. It is too distant and Brussels experiences difficulties in executing its democratic and value-based agenda on the ground. Regional dynamics have been significantly influenced by many players present in the region; Russia, China and the United States are the most significant. Russia’s position relies on a holistic approach, including military might and the more recent Eurasian narrative. China, pursuing its Silk Road ideas, has no equal in trade and energy. The US has partially retreated from Central Asia and is reviewing its security-centered strategy. Under these circumstances, what should the EU regional approach look like? What are the shared interests and divergent objectives of the actors present in Central Asia? With what actors could the EU cooperate and with whom should it abstain from regional rapprochement? Finally, what options does the EU have to strengthen its posture in the region from a regional and geopolitical perspective?
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

The 2007 European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia was reviewed for the fourth time in 2015. Over the last eight years, the EU has successfully established several institutionalised mechanisms for strengthening relations and working with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. Despite this, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been backsliding. The EU should not and cannot compete with Russia and China in the region. The EU would do best to focus on a few key areas where it can achieve concrete results. Besides broader economic and some security cooperation, the EU should focus on education in supporting the region’s development while further emphasizing human rights and strengthening political and financial support to civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP