European Union

When the European Council – the institution that sets the European Union’s agenda on broad, strategic issues[1] – published its Declaration on the Environment on December 3, 1988, climate change was mentioned briefly and in passing.[2] In 2009, the year of the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen, the topic’s salience had risen dramatically. In that year, climate change made up more than 80% of the references to the environment in the European Council’s publicly-available Conclusions, and more than one-tenth of all references to policy issues.

This estimate of climate change’s increasingly important role is possible because of data compiled by the EU Policy Agendas Project. The project’s researchers have analyzed the European Council’s Conclusions sentence-by-sentence from 1975 to 2012 to identify which policy issues are discussed and when.[3] This information is available in a public dataset[4], which gave me an exciting opportunity to explore how much attention the Council has given to climate change in the last three decades. This post retraces how I mobilized the EU Policy Agendas Project data – and added to it – to explore patterns in the Council’s attention to climate change since 1988.

First, some context: in the EU Policy Agendas dataset, climate change is considered a subtopic of the broader “Environment” policy topic.  Between 1975 and 2012, the environment garnered an average of around 4% of the Council’s attention.[5] Overall, 32% of the references to the environment in the Council’s Conclusions are categorized as related to climate change. However, this average masks significant year-to-year changes. For example, in the six years from 1988 to 1993, climate change made up only 5% of the Council’s references to the environment. In contrast, from 2006 to 2011, climate change made up 74% of environmental references.

Figure 1. Council attention to the environment, by subtopic, 1975-2012 (1,679 total mentions). Source: Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Climate change: international negotiations and EU climate policy

Although the EU Policy Agendas dataset distinguishes between climate change and other environmental issues, it does not include analysis of the specific climate-related topics that the European Council discusses. Therefore, as a next step, I analyzed all mentions of climate change in the dataset and organized them into three overall categories: general statements about climate change, statements about the international climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and statements about European Union climate policy. Three examples of statements I placed in each category are given below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Examples of European Council climate change-related statements in three categories: general climate change, international climate negotiations, and EU climate policy.

So which of these three categories gained the most attention? Overall, the international negotiations under the UNFCC garner almost 60% of the Council’s climate-related attention. The EU’s climate policies attract a further 25%, with 15% related to generic climate statements. Figure 4 below gives a historical perspective on these estimates (from 1997 to 2011). The first mention of climate change was in 1988 (not shown), but it did not become prominent on the Council’s agenda until after the international agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This same pattern was repeated in relation to the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, explaining the large increase in references to the international negotiations during that year.

Figure 3. European Council attention to climate change topics by year. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Which EU climate policy?

Finally, I wanted to explore which specific climate policies the Council discusses. In its 132 references to internal EU policy over the period 1988-2011, the Council focused on general references to policy (39%), the EU’s targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (22%) and the EU Emissions Trading System (20%). Other policies received 5% or less of the Council’s attention.

Figure 4. European Council attention to EU climate change policies. Author’s analysis based on Alexandrova et al., 2014.

Conclusion

As I mentioned in the introduction, the data exploration presented above has a few limitations. I have looked at the basic share of attention to climate change, and have not attempted to explain why we see the patterns that we do. Although I did not have the time to do so, more detailed analysis could examine the reasons why these patterns of attention exist. I also limited the analysis to only the references that were coded as climate change-related in the EU Policy Agendas dataset. Some climate topics were categorized differently (for example, ‘the global carbon market’ was placed in the energy policy category[6]). A broader analysis could attempt to track Council attention to those climate-related issues that were categorized as a different policy topic.

What I have found is, however, quite interesting. Taken together, this analysis suggests that in the mid-2000s, climate change became the dominant environmental issue on the European Council agenda. Much of the Council’s attention focused on the international climate negotiations, but with increasing space for EU climate policies like the EU Emissions Trading System. Although the EU Agendas dataset stops in early 2012, climate change is still clearly on the Council’s agenda (as evidenced by the 23-24 October, 2014 Council Conclusions, where the EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework occupied more than half of the document). It remains to be seen whether climate change will continue to play this important role on the EU’s environmental policy agenda in the years to come.

[1] Peterson, John and Michael Shackleton. 2012. The institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See pages 43-67.

[2] European Council Conclusions, 2-3 December 1988, Annex I

[3] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, & Arco Timmermans. 2012. Policy punctuations and issue diversity on the European Council agenda. Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 69–88.

[4] Alexandrova, Petya, Marcello Carammia, Sebastiaan Princen, and Arco Timmermans. 2014. Measuring the European Council agenda: Introducing a new approach and dataset. European Union Politics, 15(1): 152-167.

[5] Alexandrova, Carammia, & Timmermans, 2012, pg. 75.

[6] “The strengthening and extension of global carbon markets” (March 9, 2007) was categorized under energy policy.

The post The rise of climate change on the European Union agenda: 1988-2011 appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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The projection ship ordered by Turkey will based on the Spain LHD ship Juan Carlos 1 (built by the Spanish shipyard Navantia) which also serve as the base of 2 futurs Australian Canberra-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide.

In 2004, French company Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) and Spanish company Navantia were invited to tender proposals, with DCN offering the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship and Navantia proposing the "Buque de Proyección Estratégica" design (later commissioned as Juan Carlos I). The Spanish design was selected in 2007, with Navantia responsible for construction of the ships from the keel to the flight deck, and BAE Systems Australia handling the fabrication of the superstructure and fitting out.
The construction of the first ship, HMAS Canberra, commenced in late 2008, with the hull launched in early 2011, and sea trials in early 2014. Canberra was commissioned in November 2014. Work on the second vessel, HMAS Adelaide, started in early 2010. Adelaide is predicted to enter service in 2016. They are the largest vessels ever operated by the RAN, with a displacement of 27,500 tonnes (27,100 long tons; 30,300 short tons).

The French Mistral class is an Amphibious general assault ship (LHA) that means an Amphibious general assault ship with flush deck and dock for amphibious craft. Tarawa Class ships (US Navy) are an other example. The Spanish Amphibious Assault-Ship, Multi-purpose (LHD) Juan Carlos 1 is identical to the LHA but with a capacity to lead maritime space control operations and force projection missions using ASW helicopters and V/STOL aircraft. Other examples of these type are the Wasp (US Navy).

This Turkish decision is a bad news for the French shipyard DCNS unable the deliver Sevastopol and Vladivostok Mistral class BPC ordered by Russia, due to political reason (EU embargo) and after the loss of the Australian tender France can lost the confidence of others futur potential customers.

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Group photo, distributed by the European Commission, of "sherpas" at last month's meeting

The agenda for next month’s EU summit has the potential to become very full very fast. European leaders are already facing a fraught decision over whether to extend economic sanctions against Russia, which expire in July.

Then there’s the ongoing Greek fiscal crisis, which could come to a head in June, when Athens’ current bailout ends. And now David Cameron, the rechristened UK prime minister, has signaled he will launch his renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with the EU at the same session.

Almost forgotten in this mix is eurozone leaders’ promise to revisit the future of their monetary union with a new “four presidents’ report” on how to fix the remaining shortcomings, due to be presented in June, too (the four presidents refer to the heads of the European Commission, European Council, European Central Bank and the eurogroup).

In preparation for that report, the so-called “sherpas” for all 28 EU leaders have been meeting periodically in Brussels under the chairmanship of Martin Selmayr, Jean-Claude Juncker’s influential chief of staff. Ahead of the last session on April 27, a summary of where the group stood was circulated to national capitals, and Brussels Blog obtained a copy.

As we reported in today’s dead-tree edition of the FT, the document contains no mention of changing EU treaties any time soon, which will disappoint Cameron, who has included treaty changes as a pillar of his renegotiation campaign. Indeed, the clearest thing to come out of the five-page “note for discussion by sherpas” is that there is not a huge amount of enthusiasm for doing much of anything.

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The 4th Eastern Partnership Summit takes place on 21 and 22 May 2015 in Riga. At this occasion, EU leaders will meet representatives of the EaP partner countries to reconfirm the importance the EU attaches to its Eastern Partnership (EaP).

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure
on the 2014 Commission Progress Report on Turkey
(2014/2953(RSP))
Kati Piri
on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Plenary session, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Europe faces new opportunities for cooperation with China. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, comprising the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, which envisages a comprehensive network of railways, roads, air and sea links, pipelines and transmission grids connecting China to Europe and the wider world. Before that, many in Europe were talking of building a free trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok so partners would not have to choose between Moscow and Brussels.

These developments would push forward intercontinental cooperation between China and Europe. Overland and maritime Silk Roads could link Central Europe with Eastern Africa and connect the Pacific and Indian oceans to the Mediterranean. This would not only drive the rise of China and India and consolidate Asia’s growth momentum, but also create a more inclusive globalisation, closing gaps between coastal and inland areas. By opening up to the West, One Belt One Road would encourage the development of China’s western regions as well as Central Asia and Mongolia. It would also create an opportunity for Europe to rediscover its ties with China and take East-West integration to new levels.

Global geopolitics may be reshaped through OBOR, returning Eurasia to its historic place at the centre of human civilisation. The two great civilisations of East and West were linked until the rise of the Ottoman Empire cut off the ancient Silk Road. That forced Europe to move seaward, leading to globalisation through colonisation and a further decline of the Silk Road. Eastern civilisations turned conservative, and the world became centred on the West. With the rise of the United States, Europe entered into a decline which recent attempts at integration have been unable to be reverse. Europe is now faced with a historic opportunity to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia.

China’s One Belt One Road offers the EU opportunities spanning from Europe itself to the Pacific and beyond, beginning with fulfilling European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s plan to inject €315bn into the EU economy over the next three years. European economic growth would be stimulated through the two-way connections extending the EU single market into Eurasia. The number of middle class consumers in OBOR regions is estimated to reach 3bn by 2050, while over the coming decade OBOR will create $2.5 trillion in trade among 65 countries.

“For a long time, the EU has been unable to prioritise between its Eastern and Mediterranean partnerships”

The initiative could also spur an upgrade the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership. The European interconnection plan, linked with OBOR, will enable “five-way” connection in policy, trade, transportation, currency and people to mesh with China and Europe’s “four great partnerships” of peace, growth, reform and civilisation. Poland and Greece will become new gateways for China’s access to Europe under the 16+1 framework of dialogue between China and countries in central and eastern Europe. China and Europe can discover new sectoral dialogues in maritime and cyber issues.

For a long time, the EU has been unable to prioritise between its Eastern and Mediterranean partnerships which both have problems in implementation. With the Ukraine crisis tearing Europe apart, it seems that in order to strengthen European integration, actions cannot be confined to the present Union. One Belt One Road would turn central and eastern Europe into China’s new European portal, and vice versa.  In addition, the inclusive development advocated under OBOR should be seen as an opportunity for integration, helping a dozen Chinese provinces to establish close economic partnerships and investment ties with European regions.

Through such increased connectivity, OBOR may even lead to EU-Russia reconciliation. Since the end of World War II and the establishment of NATO, “keeping Russia out” has been a clear strategic goal for the West. The current Ukraine crisis is a consequence of that strategy. EU-Russian reconciliation could be the cornerstone of stability in Europe. One Belt One Road aims to “keep Russia in” by working with Russia’s development projects in the Far East and organisations like the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Organisation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has realised that, since we are unable to choose our neighbours, Europeans must interact with the Eurasian Economic Union. This could help resolve the Ukraine crisis and forge long-term peace and stability.

Further East still, OBOR is an entry point for the EU into Asia-Pacific affairs. Since the United States put forward its “return to Asia” strategy, the EU has been concerned it will be marginalised. EU efforts to accelerate the promotion of free trade agreements with Asian countries have made less-than-satisfactory progress. OBOR would make it much easier for Europe to participate in Asia-Pacific affairs.

OBOR would enhance the EU’s global influence, promoting green, sustainable and inclusive development, and the high labour and environmental standards long promoted by the EU. Many of the countries along the route are Europe’s former colonies who need to draw from European experience in global and local governance. There will be a greater opportunity for China and the EU to cooperate in markets like West Africa, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. Europe’s experience, standards and historical and cultural influence are valued by China, and One Belt One Road will uphold the spirit of the Silk Road, namely solidarity, trust, equality, tolerance and mutual benefits to produce win-win cooperation.

Europe will also find the opportunity to balance its transatlantic relationship. Since World War II, Europe has relied heavily on transatlantic relations but found it hard to get out of an asymmetric position with the United States. The hope of “speaking with one voice” has remained elusive. OBOR, on the other hand, emphasises openness and inclusiveness. It transcends the bi-lateral exclusivity of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and does not seek to exclude any country, to create spheres of influence nor to engage in military expansion. Engaging with OBOR will make the EU both a Eurasian power and an Atlantic power more equal to the U.S. By promoting China-EU cooperation on Silk Road security, it may also contribute to bolstering Europe’s position in NATO.

“There will be a greater opportunity for China and the EU to cooperate in markets like West Africa, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia”

China-EU cooperation brings benefits for both sides. It enhances the potential for bi-lateral cooperation and world influence through the joint development of third-party markets, ultimately bringing regional integration and inclusive growth. Such are the shared expectations of both China and the EU. Europe should grasp the opportunities of One Belt One Road to realise its dream, which is complementary to the Chinese dream.

The New Silk Road Initiative could help redirect the centre of geopolitical gravity away from the U.S. and back to Eurasia. Europe is faced with an historic opportunity to return to the centre of the world through the revival of Eurasia. From this perspective, Europe should support new infrastructure and other development projects. The recent decision by France, Germany, Italy and the UK to join the China-led  Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) goes in this direction, and represents a major shift in European attitudes towards Asia, and China in particular, that clearly departs from the U.S. position.

 

IMAGE CREDITS: CC / FLICKR – President of the European Council

The post One Belt One Road: Opportunities for Europe-China cooperation appeared first on Europe’s World.

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Award of the 50th Theodor Heuss prize to the Court of Justice of the European Union

General : Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, will on Thursday 14 May receive the International Charlemagne Prize. The prize is awarded every year to recognise work in the service of European unification. The ceremony in Aachen will be attended by eight heads of states as well as many former laureates such as Pat Cox and Jean-Claude Juncker. French president François Hollande and King Abdullah II of Jordan will pay tribute to Schulz with a speech.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP