European Union

- This article was originally published with ‘E-International Relations (www.e-ir.info)  on     11 June 2015-

British politics has gone through turbulent times since the public referendum on Scottish independence took place in September 2014. A majority of Scottish voters narrowly backed remaining part of the United Kingdom after the opinion polls in the weeks before the referendum had indicated that the Scottish National Party (SNP) would succeed in its ambition to make Scotland independent from the rest of the UK (Nardelli, 2014). The 55 per cent no vote against Scottish independence was essentially achieved through a concerted effort made by the leaders of the three main Westminster parties. Conservative prime minister David Cameron, Labour leader Ed Miliband and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg signed a vow which was printed in the Scottish daily newspaper Daily Record on September 16th 2014, two days before the referendum took place. In the vow the three leaders publicly committed themselves to devolving ‘permanent and extensive new powers’ to Scotland (Clegg, 2014). Most significantly, the Labour Party in Scotland decided to throw their weight firmly behind the ‘no’ vote, with former prime minister Gordon Brown acting as an outspoken advocate of maintaining the Union in the final days of the campaign. In his firebrand speech for the pro-union ‘better together’ campaign Brown compared Scottish independence with an ‘economic trapdoor’ from which there would be no escape once the decision had been made (Watt, 2014).

Prime minister Cameron swiftly backtracked on the pledges made in the vow. Already in his first statement on the morning after the referendum he emphasised that the devolution of further powers to Scotland should only occur if voting rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons on English laws were restricted:

So, just as Scotland will vote separately in the Scottish Parliament on their issues of tax, spending and welfare, so too England, as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, should be able to vote on these issues and all this must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland. (Cameron, 2014)

This statement resulted in a surge of SNP support in Scotland which most of all damaged Cameron’s referendum allies, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. Both parties lost all their seats but one to the SNP in the UK general election on May 7th. The SNP landslide and the almost complete collapse of electoral support for pro-union parties in Scotland could indeed be an indication that, as long as Westminster fails to deliver further devolution of powers, public support for independence will grow. Alistair Crighton argues that the long-term goal of the SNP is to hold a second referendum which, in the post-general election absence of strong and credible pro-union voices North of the border, is almost certain to result in a resounding ‘yes’ for independence (Crighton 2015).

The re-election of David Cameron as prime minister with a narrow Conservative majority has made it certain that a referendum on Britain’s EU membership will be either held next year or by 2017. If the majority of voters in England opt for Brexit while a majority of Scots decide to stay in the EU, the SNP is almost certain to demand another independence referendum to be held in Scotland. SNP leader Nichola Sturgeon has warned the British government of a ‘groundswell of anger’ if Scotland was forced to leave the EU on the basis of a UK-wide overall majority. Sturgeon demands that the Brexit should only be possible if  in all four regions of the UK (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) a majority is in favour of leaving the EU (BBC News, 2015). Scotland has traditionally displayed a more pro-European attitude than many parts of England, which is reflected in opinion polls on EU membership. The latest major survey on attitudes towards EU membership in the UK, which was conducted by Populus in April this year, shows that 48 per cent of Scots would back staying in the EU. Support in English regions for staying in ranges between 34 and 44 per cent, with the Midlands showing a clear majority for Brexit (Populus, 2015). It is therefore quite possible that the EU referendum may result in a split between an overall majority support for Brexit in England and against in Scotland.

It is obvious why Scotland shows a stronger affiliation with the EU than most English regions. Britain’s reputation as an ‘awkward partner’ in the EU (George, 1998) emerged mainly from the sceptical attitude of the English political class towards the project of institutionalised European integration. For the English eurosceptics, who can be mostly found in the Conservative Party and the English nationalist party UKIP, engagement in the EU’s system of multi-level governance boils down to a constant and difficult battle to defend national sovereignty (Usherwood 2015). In the Westminster-focused and London-based media the perception that the EU’s policies and regulations undermine Britain’s national interest has been promoted for decades. At the same time no British government  has been bold enough to make a sustained and outspoken argument in favour of the economic and political benefits EU membership offers to the UK.­­­ In contrast to the predominantly negative English public debate, people in Scotland seem to be more aware of the political and economic benefits that being part of the EU Single Market has for their region. These range from the export market for the Scottish whisky industry, gas and oil production (Springford, 2015) towards benefits for Scotland’s business, society and the country’s infrastructure provided by the financial support under the EU’s Structural Fund Programmes. Scotland continues to receive substantial financial support under the EU’s Social Fund and Regional Development Programmes (Scottish Government 2014).

Like in the case of the Irish Republic, Scotland seems to perceive EU membership as an indispensable tool to maintain economic and ultimately also political independence from England. For the Irish Republic joining the European Community in 1973 was an important symbolic political step to re-emphasise their political independence from the UK (Fitzgerald and Girvin, 2000, p. 273). Ultimately the significant financial support from the EU Ireland received since its accession in 1973 provided the platform for the development of its investment-friendly Celtic Tiger Economy in the 1990s. EU funds helped Irish governments to keep corporation tax on the lowest level in the whole of the EU and to invest in the infrastructure of business parks across the country (FitzGerald, 2004, p. 72). These attracted major North American high-tech companies in the computing sector as well as in the pharmaceutical industry. Major companies such as Dell, Google, Facebook, Bayer, Glaxo SmithKline and Roche positioned their European headquarters in the Irish Republic.

Former SNP leader Alex Salmond hence not only controversially compared Scotland’s pro-independence movement to the ‘Irish freedom struggle’ (Peterkin 2015). Salmond also argued that an independent Scotland in the EU could replicate the pre-financial crisis economic dynamism of the Celtic Tiger by creating a ‘Celtic Lion’. In his speech at Harvard University in 2008 Salmon argued that as a small nation Scotland, like the Irish Republic, could achieve economic success by offering investors a flexible environment that is built on a strong political consensus on the country’s national interest and overall economic strategy. The crucial factor for this success would however be membership of the EU:

Where this occurs within the framework of a European Union and single market place of 600 million people, it creates the ideal environment within which small nations can take the most of their comparative advantage. (Salmond, 2008)

Scotland can of course not assume that it would automatically remain in the EU if another independence referendum was held in the aftermath of a Brexit decision. Former EU Commission president Barroso warned the Scottish government in 2014 that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ for an independent Scotland to join the EU (BBC News 2014). Barroso’s intervention was nevertheless widely considered as an attempt to strengthen the pro-union camp in the September 2014 referendum rather than a statement of legal facts. In their assessment of the road to EU membership for an independent Scotland, constitutional experts Stephen Tierney and Katie Boyle from the Centre on Constitutional Change in Edinburgh point out that an independent Scotland would have to apply to join the EU. Accession of a independent Scottish state would ultimately depend on the unanimous agreement of all existing EU members (Centre on Constitutional Change 2014). The concerns raised in the report about potential hostility of the UK and other EU member state towards an the accession of an independent Scotland’s appeared in the context of the circumstances of the 2014 referendum. If Scotland held another independence referendum after the UK referendum had opted for Brexit, the situation would be entirely different. The departing rump United Kingdom, consisting of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, would certainly no longer have the ability to veto Scottish accession to the EU. Moreover, it can be expected that the remaining 27 EU member states will show a positive attitude towards gaining Scotland as the new 28th member state. Rejecting Scotland would not only be against the EU’s general spirit of national self-determination and devolution of power which it has been promoting under the subsidiary principle since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Most obviously the collective EU Council is unlikely to reject the application of a small country which has been part of the internal market since 1973 and could help to partly fill the economic gap that will be opened up by Brexit (Keating 2015, p.  204).

Brexit within the next two years, followed by another Scottish independence referendum is not an inevitability. The British public may overall turn out to be pragmatic about EU membership and decide to vote in support of continuing membership. This outcome is of course more likely if David Cameron manages to achieve the substantial renegotiation of British membership terms and possibly even wider institutional reform through the revision of the Lisbon Treaty. The latter is, however, unlikely to be achievable within the short timeframe of the next two years. It is therefore more realistic to assume that Cameron will return from Brussels with a half-baked compromise deal on the freedom of movement and further safeguards for the UK to be sucked into the deepening of political integration in the eurozone. The hard-line eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, UKIP and in large parts of the UK’s foreign owned tabloid press are unlikely to be satisfied with such a deal. Cameron will therefore encounter great difficulties to sell a weak negotiation result to both his party and the British public, even more so because he will be a lone voice amongst what has become a rather deserted pro-European camp. In the absence of charismatic pro-European voices, such as Robin Cook, Mo Mowlam, Charlie Kennedy but also David Miliband, who continues to remain in the political exile in the US, the pro-EU camp will struggle to make its voice heard against a barrack of eurosceptic voices. If British pro-Europeans fail on this historic occasion to make the convincing case for staying inside the EU the days of the United Kingdom as we know it may indeed be over for good.

References

BBC News (2014) ‘Scottish independence: Barroso says joining EU would be “difficult”‘, 16 February.

BBC News (2015) ‘Nicola Sturgeon warns of EU exit “backlash”’, 2 June.

Cameron, D. (2014) Scottish Independence Referendum: statement by the Prime Minister, 19 September.

Centre on Constitutional Change (2014) ‘An Independent Scotland: The Road to Membership of the European Union’, 20 August.

Clegg, D. (2014) ‘David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg sign joint historic promise which guarantees more devolved powers for Scotland and protection of NHS if we vote no’, Daily Record, 15 September.

Crighton, A. (2015) ‘The UK is now a failed state: Why the SNP’s unprecedented landslide victory means an end to Union’, Aljazeera, 11 May.

Fitzgerald, R. and Girvin, B. (2000). ‘Political Culture, Growth and the Condition for sucess in the Irish Economy’, in Nolan, B., O’Connell, P.J. and Whelan, C.T. (eds), Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Dublin, Institute of Public Administration: 268-285.

Fitzgerald, G. (2004), ‘The Economics of EU Membership’, in Hourihane, J. (ed), Ireland and the European Union: The First Thirty Years, 1973-2002, Dublin: Liliput Press: 67-80.

George, S. (1998) An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford, University Press.

Keating, M. (2015) ‘The European Dimension to Scottish Constitutional Change’, The Political Quarterly, 86 (2), April-June: 201-208.

Nardelli, A. (2014) ‘Were Scottish independence opinion polls misleading?’, The Guardian, 19 September.

Peterkin, T. (2015) ‘Scottish independence referendum: Salmond claims links to Irish freedom struggle‘,The Scotsman, 4 June.

Populus (2015) ‘EU Exit, Party Leaders, and the Budget Deficit’, April.

Salmond, A. (2008) Free to Prosper: Creating Celtic Lion economy, Speech at Harvard University, 31 March.

Scottish Government (2014) European Structural Funds: Approved Operational Programmes 2014-2020.

Springford, J. (2015). ‘Disunited Kingdom. Why “Brexit” endangers Britain’s poorer regions’. London, Centre for European Reform, April.

Usherwood, S. (2015), ‘Britain and Europe: A Model of Permanent Crisis’, in: Demetriou, K.N. (ed), The European Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitimacy, Heidelberg, Springer: 3-14.

Watt, N. (2014). ‘Gordon Brown makes passionate appeal to Labour voters in final no rally’.

The post The UK after the 2015 General Election: Doomed to Be a ‘Failed State’? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Welcome to the Brexit Blog. This blog is not simply about British debates over the UK’s future in the EU. It is more about what Britain’s debate, attempted renegotiation, referendum and the outcome of that referendum could mean for the rest of Europe. As a start I’ve compiled below an overview of the literature that exists on what the ‘British question’ could mean for the rest of Europe.

The Conservative party’s victory in the May 2015 UK general election leaves the EU facing its British question sooner than many were expecting. It also means the EU faces an issue that only a few have given much in-depth thought about. This is not to say the idea of a British renegotiation, referendum and exit have not been hot topics of discussion for some time. They have been much discussed over dinners in Brussels or coffees in Berlin, Paris and elsewhere. There has also been a range of short pieces in the media, blogs and comments by politicians, sometimes at a series of events in the UK and elsewhere held to discuss the subject. The governments of some other EU member states, along with allies such as the USA, have undertaken private discussions and analysis.

Detailed publicly available analysis, on the other hand, has been more limited. This is especially so when compared to the plethora of research about what a Brexit or renegotiation might mean for the UK (the House of Commons Library has produced a short bibliography of the literature and its own review of the potential policy implications of a Brexit). Talk about what a Brexit might mean for the EU and people soon shift discussion to what it might mean for the UK. Undoubtedly the consequences for the UK would be far greater. But the question of what it might mean for the EU still stands.

This does not mean there has been no detailed analysis on which to prepare for the forthcoming negotiations and referendum. There exists a range of English language reports and papers that specifically analyse the EU’s position vis-à-vis the UK. There also exist a range of sources (often shorter than full reports, but more focused on specific issues) that provide broader insights. Further reports will emerge over the course of the renegotiation and referendum. Taking into account the EU’s perspective will also be of direct interest to the UK. Deadlock and failure will come from the UK failing to appreciate what is and is not in the interests of the EU and therefore what is a plausible relationship for Britain either as a member of the EU or for UK-EU relations if the UK leaves.

• A good overview of what a Brexit could mean for the EU is the September 2013 30-page report by the SWP entitled ‘Europe without Britain: assessing the impact on the European Union of a British withdrawal’. It covers everything from what the UK contributes to the EU to what a Brexit might mean for Europe’s geopolitics.

• In February 2014 Nicolai von Ondarza of the SWP published a 31-page report (in German) entitled, ‘Großbritannien und die EU-Reform: Empfehlungen für den Umgang mit den britischen Forderungen an die Europäische Union’ (Britain and EU reform: recommendations for dealing with British demands for EU reform). It examines in detail how to approach any UK attempt to renegotiate its relationship.

• The DGAP’s September 2014 report – ‘The UK and the EU: what would a Brexit mean for the EU and other states around the world’ – which I edited with Almut Möller, is made up of 26 views of a Brexit written by people from research institutions and universities from sixteen EU member states (France, Germany, Poland, Ireland, Slovenia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands) nine non-EU countries (Canada, USA, China, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and Brazil), and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. It provides the most wide-ranging overview of how a variety of EU and non-EU countries might respond to the UK’s demands for reform or exit from the EU.

• Mark Leonard of the ECFR published a 2015 report ‘The British problem and what it means for Europe’ which examines what is driving demands for reform or exit, what a Brexit could mean for the EU, and how the EU might respond.

• In December 2013, Open Europe ran the first ever simulation – a war-game – of a UK-EU renegotiation followed by a negotiation over a UK exit. The online archive contains videos and a final report of the day’s proceedings. Open Europe have also written extensively on what the impact of a Brexit might be for the UK, with some of this analysis touching on possible implications for the rest of the EU.

• In September 2014, Deutsche Bank published a 20 page report analyzing the possible implications of a Brexit, especially economic ones, for the EU. A similar but shorter 8 page report was published by the Bertlesmann Foundation in April 2015.

• In 2013 the RUSI Journal published several short pieces on the possible defence and security implications for Europe of a Brexit. A January 2013 report from the International Security Information Service and NATO Watch also considered the defence implications. Europeangeostrategy.org has produced a series of posts (here, here and here) about the possible geopolitical implications of a Brexit.

• The legal side of a Brexit has been covered by a range of authors writing on how a member state might withdraw from the EU. See here for a report by Phoebus Athanassiou for the ECB examining the legal side to a withdrawal with attention in particular on Greece. Adam Lazowski of Westminster University has written in academic journals on the legal side of the UK exiting the EU, and has a forthcoming book on the topic. The UK and Article 50 is also examined in a blog piece by Steve Peers. Phedon Nicolaides 2013 article for the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law also considers the effects of Article 50 on a withdrawing state. In April 2014 Clifford Chance undertook a legal review of the implications of a Brexit for the UK and EU financial sectors.

• In July 2013 the House of Commons Library produced a lengthy research paper examining how the UK might leave the EU, examining issues such as procedures and some passing analysis of possible implications for the EU, although the report’s focus is largely on the UK.

• The potential consequences for the EU have also been covered in some of the UK’s pro-withdrawal literature. Admittedly a great deal of the literature gives scant thought to the issue. They are more interested in what end Britain should seek in leaving the EU, meaning they can overlook analysing the ways and means by which to secure this, something only possible if the EU’s likely positions are also taken into account. Nevertheless they do offer some interesting insights. The IEA’s 2014 €100,000 Brexit prize produced a series of proposals. The winner by Iain Mansfield can be found here with a wider-ranging report by the IEA here. There also exist other proposals – to name but a few – such as Richard North’s proposal for a ‘Flexit’, David Campbell-Bannerman MEP’s ‘Time to Jump’, Dan Hannan MEP’s proposals (for the Centre for Policy Studies), proposals from Fresh Start, the Mayor of London, and Civitas, (click here for a second 2015 Civitas report and here for a report by them on the potential impact on the UK and EU car industries).

• The UK has also been the source of numerous proposals for how to reform the EU. Especially notable here is the work of the CER with its many reports. Its director, Charles Grant has written extensively on how the UK-EU relationship could develop in ways beneficial to all.

• One reason for there being so little analysis of what UK positions could mean is because there is a lack of clarity over what the UK itself is seeking. The UK’s Balance of Competences Review provides not only some insights into what may be up for renegotiation, but also one of the most detailed analyses ever undertaken of the EU’s powers. The best overview of the review is by Michal Emerson (ed.) for the Centre for European Policy Studies.

• In the academic literature the idea of European disintegration remains largely under-researched, the assumption being integration is a forward moving process. Douglas Webber’s January 2013 article in the European Journal of International Relations, ‘How like is it that the EU will disintegrate? A critical analysis of competing theoretical perspectives’ provides an excellent overview of what different theories of European integration can tell us. My own attempt, written for an academic conference, to apply a Brexit to Webber’s approach to the theories can be found here. There is also Hans Vollaard’s ‘Explaining European disintegration’ for the JCMS, and the Journal of Democracy October 2012 special issue on European disintegration. Later this month the Global Society will be publishing my article ‘Europe’s British Question: the UK-EU Relationship in a Changing Europe and Multipolar World’. The work in this area has built on some discussions at several academic conferences.

• Analysis of differentiated integration and opt-outs has been covered by a range of authors, for example Rebecca Adler-Nissen’s 2015 book ‘Opting out of the EU: diplomacy, sovereignty and European integration’.

• Some books and reports discussing the UK’s European debate include brief discussion of the possible implications for the EU. The book by Roger Liddle, Tony Blair’s former special adviser on Europe, ‘The Risk of Brexit’ (for Policy Network) provides some insights into how the rest of the EU may respond to British demands. Some other national perspectives can be found in the Foreign Policy Centre’s 2014 report ‘Renegotiation, reform and referendum: does Britain have an EU future?’, edited by Adam Hug. In May 2015, The Guardian asked five journalists from other European countries to give their thoughts on what a Brexit might mean for their states and the rest of Europe. The Guardian’s report on what might happen if the UK leaves the EU touches on some of the possible implications for the EU. As the UK and the EU move through a renegotiation and referendum we can expect more pieces such as that by The Telegraph examining how other EU member states are responding to British overtures.

It is not clear how much more time there will be to prepare further research on what a Brexit or renegotiated relationship might mean for the EU. Cameron is moving quickly to get a referendum bill through Parliament.  A referendum in 2016 instead of 2017 looks difficult, but is a possibility.

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Informal meeting of Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs alongside the 104th International Labour Conference agreed on renewed efforts to improve working conditions in small and micro enterprises.

On Thursday, June 11, the Minister for Transport Anrijs Matīss chaired the meeting of the EU Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council.

Good afternoon. We have just concluded our second EU-CELAC summit. Let me first thank all the heads of state and government who attended. The high rate of participation from both sides of the Atlantic is a sign of the importance we attach to our partnership. And I also want to thank President Correa, who has co-chaired with me. I think it is a great sign of the vitality of this relationship that this summit was also accompanied by a number of parallel events, organised and promoted by civil society, academics, businesspeople, trade unions, youth and parliamentarians. This partnership is not just a political one: it is much more than that.

The European Union and CELAC jointly account for one third of the world's countries. Together we can have a decisive impact on - just to bring a few examples - the global climate talks, the post-2015 development agenda and the fight against drugs. That is why we need to keep talking, keep getting closer together on the issues and aligning our approaches. That is why the European Union and the CELAC countries intend to take forward our political dialogue from here. From now on, we have decided that our foreign ministers will meet between summits to ensure swift follow up of decisions made by leaders. And they will bring forward recommendations for how we deepen the relationship and how we can work together more substantively.

To give you one example: climate change matters to us both: Latin American and Caribbean countries are very vulnerable to this threat. That's one reason that the Paris talks later this year have to succeed and why the EU will continue providing support to the region through its EUROCLIMA programme.

We also discussed international and regional security. Chile and Colombia have already signed agreements with the EU to participate in crisis management operations and we welcome other interested countries in the region to talk to us about this as well. The European Union supports the peace negotiations in Colombia and will back a future peace deal through the creation of an EU trust fund to support peace implementation. We are also supporting the process of modernisation in Cuba, which we hope will be reinforced when we finish talks on our Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. I warmly welcome the steps towards full normalisation of the relations between Cuba and the United States.

The visa waiver agreements recently signed with five Caribbean States and just initialed with Colombia and Peru show our eagerness to bring our peoples closer together. After the entry into force of these agreements, more than 80 per cent of citizens in the CELAC region will be able to enter the Schengen area without a visa. These openings are possible thanks to the good cooperation we have on security of documents and immigration. We will continue developing this in the weeks and months ahead.

The CELAC region is very large and very diverse. For our partnership to be fully effective, we need to pay attention to sub-regional issues too. Today, we will hold two high-level meetings, one with the Heads of state and government of Central America and the other with the Heads of state and government of the Caribbean countries.

Finally, and importantly,  just before the summit, we initialed an agreement that will transform the EU-LAC Foundation into an international body, so that it can expand its work in promoting our partnership to our citizens. The EU will also continue its financial support to the Foundation, with €3 million over the next two years. Latin America and the Caribbean have become more prosperous and more confident and CELAC embodies the region's ambition to achieve closer integration - this is something we have strongly supported from the very beginning.

We can now confidently say - I am sure that President Correa agrees - that we are building a partnership of equals, based on mutual benefit and mutual respect. The direct fibre-optic cable that we agreed to build between our two continents is perhaps a simple but nonetheless strong symbol of our ever closer connection.

On 11 June 2015, the Latvian Presidency deposited, on behalf of the European Union, the instrument of approval of the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements.

“Progress in human rights in Azerbaijan can be best achieved through dialogue and engagement. Isolation and turning away will not help solve human rights issues in Azerbaijan,” said the Foreign Ministry’s Parliamentary State Secretary for EU Affairs, Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica, expressing the position of the Council of the European Union at the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 10 June.

We, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union (EU) and of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, met in Brussels, on 10 and 11 June 2015, for the II EU-CELAC Summit, our eighth bi-regional meeting, under the theme "Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens".

As an expression of our shared determination to further strengthen our relationship, deepen our dialogue and given the importance we attach to the bi-regional strategic association, we have adopted a Declaration on a 'Partnership for the next generation'.

On 11 June 2015, the Latvian Presidency deposited, on behalf of the European Union, the instrument of approval of the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements.

At the same time, the Latvian Presidency made, on behalf of the European Union, the declaration allowed under Article 21 excluding from the scope of the Convention insurance contracts in general, subject to certain well-defined exceptions, and a unilateral declaration stating that the European Union may, at a later stage in light of the experience acquired in the application of the Convention, reassess the need to maintain its declaration under Article 21.  

The Convention will enter into force on 1 October 2015. All Member States (except Denmark) will then be bound by the Convention.

The Convention makes a valuable contribution to promoting party autonomy in international commercial transactions and to increasing the predictability of judicial solutions in such transactions. In particular, the Convention ensures the necessary legal certainty for the parties that their choice of court agreement will be respected and that a judgment given by the chosen court will be capable of recognition and enforcement in international cases.

Today in Brussels, Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma addressed the meeting of the Heads of State of the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Within the framework of the Summit, topical issues relating to cooperation between the two regions were discussed, and the Brussels Declaration was adopted.

The Council of the European Union has been paying close attention to the corruption scandal in the International Association of Football Federations (Fédération Internationale de Football Association, FIFA) with great concern, and this issue has come to the attention of officials at the EU Council, the Foreign Ministry’s Parliamentary State Secretary for EU Affairs, Zanda Kalniņa-Lukaševica pointed out at the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 10 June.    

The Heads of State and Government of Member States of the Central American Integration System (SICA) met with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the purpose of reviewing the close cooperation between the two regions and adopted the following joint communique.

Indicative programme - Transport, Telecomunications and Energy Council meeting (telecommunications issues) - Luxembourg, 12 June 2015

Place:        KIRCHBERG building (KCC), Luxembourg
Chair(s):    Anrijs Matīss, Minister for Transport of Latvia 

All times are approximate and subject to change 

+/- 08.00     Doorstep by Minister Matīss

10.00          Beginning of Telecommunications Council meeting            

+/- 10.05     Digital Single Market Strategy
+/- 11.35     Interoperability programme ISA 2 (in public session)
+/- 11.55     AOB (in public session)
                    Telecommunications single market (TSM)
                    Network and information security (NIS)
+/- 13.25     Web Accessibility (in public session)
+/- 13.40     Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Council Conclusions
+/- 13.50     AOB
                     Work programme of the incoming Presidency

+/- 14.00     Press conference

Within the First Innovative Enterprise Week “Access to Finance for Research, Innovation and SMEs 2015” programme in Riga, Latvia, the European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) will announce new financial instruments for the European Union science and research programme “Horizon 2020”.

Plenary sessions : The European Parliament regrets that recent corruption allegations against the international football federation FIFA have seriously damaged the credibility and the integrity of global football. In a resolution voted on Thursday, MEPs call for a zero-tolerance policy on corruption in football, underlining that in-depth structural reforms within the organisation are now urgently needed.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Plenary sessions : The EU must critically re-assess its relations with Russia, which are profoundly damaged by Russia's deliberate violation of democratic principles, fundamental values and international law with its violent action and destabilisation of its neighbours , MEPs said on Wednesday. The EU must now devise a soft-power contingency plan to counter Russia’s aggressive and divisive policies, they said.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

In Riga, a high-level seminar in statistics of Eastern European, Caucasian and Central Asian (EECCA) countries discussed the draft Generic Statistical Law. The law will strengthen the institutional independence of statistical offices of the EECCA countries, impartiality of official statistics, and conformity with the UN Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics and the European Statistics Code of Practice. Representatives from the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the European Free Trade Association and the national statistical institutions of EECCAA countries took part in the drafting of the Law.

Plenary sessions : MEPs state their concern at the high number of child pregnancies in Paraguay, calling for "access to safe and legal abortion" when the health and life of women or girls are in danger, "where there is severe foetal impairment and in cases of rape and incest". In separate resolutions they also call for the protection of the Palmyra site and draw attention to the situation of children in Nepal.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP