European Union

Explainer: why everyone is giving Poland a hard time

Kamil Zwolski, University of Southampton

Since coming into power at the end of October 2015, Poland’s new, right-wing government has caused a stir at home and drawn international criticism.

Hardly a day passes at the moment without EU officials or European leaders questioning decisions made by the government.

In its analysis, Der Spiegel warns against Poland’s “creeping autocracy”. Some observers have even compared the situation in Poland to Putin’s Russia. While such comparisons are exaggerated, there are serious questions to ask about the Polish government’s commitment to the principles of liberal democracy.

Poland has been praised for years for its successful transition from communist state to liberal democracy. Now, it is the subject of criticism, worry and disappointment. What happened?

After eight years in power, the centre-right, pro-EU and relatively moderate Civic Platform government lost the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. In its place came the nationalistic, conservative and EU-sceptic Law and Justice (PiS) party, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, the twin brother of former president Lech Kaczyński, who died in a plane crash in 2010.

Changing the rules overnight

Things quickly changed after the election. Kaczyński appointed Beata Szydło as prime minister but it is clear that he pulls all the strings. For his part, president Andrzej Duda appears to be limited in his role to formally approving whatever the parliament (i.e. Kaczyński) throws his way.

Under the auspices of this peculiar administrative set up, the parliament has set about making drastic reforms at breakneck speed. Laws are changed overnight and without consultation. Critical voices are summarily ignored.

Szydlo and Kaczynski. One of them is Prime Minister, but no one can remember which.
Reuters/Kacper Pempel

So far, the parliament has significantly curtailed the powers of the national constitutional tribunal, which is supposed to impose judicial checks on the government. Another law seeks to curtail the freedom of the press by allowing the government to appoint the heads of media organisations.

Next on the list is foreign policy. The government is still in the process of developing plans on this front but it is already facing a predicament. On one side, the new government dislikes Russia, and on the other, it is increasingly fed up with the EU. The two positions are not particularly compatible.

The bear or the overbearing?

Poland has traditionally been sceptical of Russian foreign policy. While Western European countries, notably Germany, have been forging political and economic links with post-Soviet Russia, Poland has been working hard to join NATO, the EU, and to nurse the independence of the post-Soviet republics.

The wars in Georgia and Ukraine have proved to Poland’s elites that their concern was justified. Under Putin, Russia’s neighbours would have to watch their borders.

However, Poland is strongest as part of a team. It relies on its more powerful EU partners on the international stage and would struggle alone. When introducing the proposal for the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, Poland worked together with Sweden. In the Ukrainian conflict, Poland accepted the leadership role of Germany.

It is unclear whether the new government appreciates this. On one hand, the anti-Russian sentiment seems to run deeper than ever. This government seems to be more emotional and less pragmatic about the relationship than its predecessors. This is fuelled by the widespread belief among PiS politicians and supporters that the 2010 crash that killed president Kaczyński was Russian sabotage, rather than a tragic accident.

On the other hand, Poland’s new government is deeply eurosceptic. It is particularly suspicious of Brussels and Berlin. The liberal EU arguably presents a threat to Catholic, conservative, Polish values.

There are longstanding tensions between Poland and Germany stemming from their difficult history but there is now resentment over Germany’s desire for Poland to remain a pro-EU, liberal democracy.

And grumbles about Brussels’ alleged interfering on issues such as gay rights have grown to alarm as the migration crisis has worsened. Pressure to take in refugees from Syria has not gone down well and Kaczyński is more often to be found siding up with Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s notoriously anti-immigrant prime minister, than Poland’s western EU partners.

While EU sanctions against Poland are unlikely, there are informal ways in which Brussels and EU leaders can seek to influence Poland. They might, for example, apply pressure to the EU funding channelled to Poland. And of course, they could remind Poland of its desire for European solidarity in support of Ukraine.

This is the dilemma for the Polish government. How can it be anti-Russian and anti-EU at the same time? Where will it seek allies? Kaczyński has always been fond of Orbán and the sympathy seems mutual, confirmed by their recent meeting.

But Orbán is famous for his pro-Putin policy. PIS is uncomfortable when confronted with this fact. Washington is only interested in supporting Poland as a pinnacle of liberal democracy in the region and a committed EU member. What are the options then? Either way, the current policy is bound to crash.

Kamil Zwolski, Lecturer in Global Politics and Policy, University of Southampton

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The post Poland’s inevitable foreign policy crash appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/uploads/council-images/thumbs/uploads/council-images/remote/http_7e18a1c646f5450b9d6d-a75424f262e53e74f9539145894f4378.r8.cf3.rackcdn.com/Flag_of_Lebanon.svg_(1)_thumb_169_1444815990_1444815989_129_97shar_c1.png

EU-Lebanon relation is laid down in the Association Agreement which was adopted in 2002, entered into force on 1 April 2006 and open the way to fully incorporate Lebanon into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Download this video here.

AMENDMENTS 1 - 270 - Draft motion for a resolution on the 2015 Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Today I met with Prime Minister of Lebanon Tammam Salam to prepare for the upcoming London Conference, "Supporting Syria and the region", on 4 February. We discussed topics of common concern, such as the impact of the refugee crisis, the  joint fight against terrorism, and the Syria crisis.

The European Union is committed to support Lebanon to sustainably address the consequences of the Syrian crisis. Ahead of London, we agreed with Prime Minister Salam to do more to address the needs of refugees and host communities. This includes by creating job opportunities and providing education, offering greater hope for the future.

The European Union also appreciates Lebanon's efforts in countering violent extremism and fighting terrorism, particularly in the light of the brutal terrorist attacks in Beirut of 12 November. I hope that the EU and Lebanon will be able to further strengthen our cooperation. The upcoming counter-terrorism Dialogue in Beirut is an important opportunity to do so.

I expressed to the Prime Minister our appreciation for his commitment and efforts to govern in such challenging times. I also renewed our call on all political forces to elect a new President and foster reforms to strengthen democracy, justice and the rule of law.

The European Union is committed to working with Lebanon, especially during challenging times. We will continue our joint efforts to make the EU-Lebanon partnership stronger.

Commission v Cyprus
Freedom of movement for persons
Cypriot legislation on pension entitlement which places migrant workers at a disadvantage in relation to those who do not leave Cyprus is contrary to EU law

Here’s Thursday’s Brussels Briefing, our new daily insight into Europe. To receive it every morning in your email in-box, sign up here.

Austria's Faymann, left, with Merkel and Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu in November

Germany has received the most attention and Hungary the most denunciation, but in many ways it has been the country in between that has served as the bellwether of Europe’s ongoing refugee crisis. Back in September, Austria became one of the first countries along the “Western Balkan route” to find itself awash in migrants after Germany unexpectedly announced it was re-imposing checks on its southern border. A month later, it became the first country inside the EU’s passport-free Schengen zone to reconstruct fences at the border with another Schengen member, neighbouring Slovenia. Then last week it started turning away asylum seekers – though only those who admitted they were trying to get to Scandinavia.

But yesterday, the Austrian government may have taken its most significant step yet by announcing it would cap the number of asylum claims it will accept. Werner Faymann, the Austrian chancellor, said the country would only allow 37,500 to be admitted this year, down from 90,000 who applied for asylum status in 2015. Over the next four years, the limit will be 127,500. “We cannot in Austria take in all asylum seekers,” Mr Faymann said in Vienna. Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung has this excellent analysis piece that points out Mr Faymann long resisted such a cap, but was forced into the announcement by mounting pressure from within his own government.

The move raises serious legal questions, since the Geneva Convention on refugees – of which Austria is a founding signatory – prevents countries from expelling asylum seekers without a hearing, unless they can find a reason on national security grounds. Asked if the European Commission had come to a legal opinion on such quotas, a spokeswoman said it hadn’t – though only because up to now no country had sought such caps. But she hinted Geneva, which is incorporated into EU law, could present a roadblock. “We don’t practice pushbacks, we do not turn away people without first assessing their asylum applications on an individual basis, and this is the process that’s carried out across the EU,” said Natasha Bertaud, the commission’s spokeswoman on refugee issues.

Read more

Most of the current discussions on the possible ‘Brexit’ — the United Kingdom leaving the European Union — are concerned with issues of the Eurozone and its economic implications, the ongoing migration and refugee crisis, and the potential economic, political and social consequences for the UK in case of leaving the EU. What has been missing from the heated debates though, is the question about the implications of the Brexit for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). During the Cold War, European states relied on the security community in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. With the fall of the iron curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and thus the downfall of the biggest threat to Western states, the EU slowly developed its own security and defence structures. In 2003, the Union declared its full operability and launched two of its exemplary military operations, Operation Concordia in the FYRO Macedonia and Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina. So far, the EU has launched 22 civilian missions and 9 military operations. In several of these operations, the United Kingdom played a significant role in terms of operational planning and contributing military capabilities. What would therefore happen to the EU’s security and defence structures as well as its military capabilities if the UK were to exit? How will it cope without the contributions of the UK in future operations?

 

The UK’s Position in the EU’s Security and Defence Structures

In most of the EU’s military operations, the UK has played a key role. The Union’s operational headquarters are situated in Northwood, just north of London. The UK maintains a great share of the overall defence budget of the 28 member states. Even though it has often hampered the process of developing the EU’s security and defence structures further, it remains as one of the most important contributors to operations under CSDP. The EU’s overall military expenditure amounts to €192.5 million and with €43.7million, UK’s military expenditure represents more than a fifth (22.7%) of the EU’s expenditure. Also, it possesses the second biggest troop contingent and has currently deployed a great quantity of its personnel in current military operations as well as civilian missions, such as in Bosnia Herzegovina under Operation Althea which was taken over from NATO under British command. And in the case of Operation Concordia, the UK was even among the key actors in brokering the peace deal between the conflicting groups. By signing the Franco-British Joint Declaration in St. Malo in 1998, the UK has committed itself for a defence policy on the EU level and thus paved the way for further developments. This demonstrates the country’s importance to the Union’s operability and effectiveness as a military actor.

 

Brexit’s Implications for CSDP

Without the United Kingdom, the European Union might not be able to make such contributions to future military operations. Numerous questions concerning the relationship between the UK and the EU would need to be raised especially in security terms. What would happen to operational planning of future CSDP operations? How would the EU deal with a decreased military budget and less military personnel? And since the UK is the most important linkage between Europe and North America, what implications would a European Union without the UK have for future EU-NATO relations?

Regarding all of these questions, the EU and especially its security and defence policy would not make such a good image. This would then have negative effects on Europe’s role on the global stage. The EU would lack a great amount of important personnel, strategic planning capabilities as well as potentially loose its operational headquarters. Unless the UK would become a strategic partner of the EU and would still participate in operations under CSDP, the Union would not be able to develop its security and defence structures any further and the desire to become a global player would once again be at stake. As far as EU-NATO relations are concerned, the gap might become even wider. This special relationship already suffers from deeply rooted issues between its member states. Having another European member state without EU membership would complicate relations, especially in terms of collecting and exchanging intelligence as well as sharing military capabilities and assets.

Brexit would thus have severe implications for the EU as a security and defence actor not only in Europe but also beyond its borders. It is therefore essential, from the European security perspective, for the United Kingdom to remain in the European Union.

The post Why the EU needs the UK – A Security Perspective, by Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

After weeks of waiting, Gunther Oettinger has replied to a letter from the Polish justice minister that compared the German commissioner’s criticism of Poland’s media reforms with. . . the Nazi’s crimes of the second world war.

The letter, which we’ve posted here, is surprisingly polite, with a perky hand-written “Dear Colleague!” to start. This marked a shift in tone from the original missive from Zbigniew Ziobro, who tartly complained last week:

You [Oettinger] demanded that Poland be placed under ‘supervision’. Such words, spoken by a German politician, have the worst possible connotations for Poles. For me, too. I am the grandson of a Polish officer who, during World War II, fought in [Poland’s] underground Home Army against ‘German supervision’.

But Brussels is determined not to get into a war of words with Warsaw. This tactic was tried and failed with Viktor Orban, the populist leader of Hungary, who was happy to spar in public with the commission over his reforms while becoming increasingly popular at home.

Read more

How better to start a year full of transport policy initiatives than with some Dutch pragmatism? Transport is a practical sector itself as it inevitably links to one of the most basic needs of the economy: moving goods and people. 2016 looks to be an important year for transport and we have two keywords: competitiveness and sustainability.

In certain people’s eyes, the focus on these two main driving forces, competitiveness and sustainability, risks creating a significant dilemma: Should the EU try to boost competitiveness through a modern, innovative transport system or push for sustainability through unprecedented environmental policies and ambitious targets?

The Commission has to a large extent addressed the dilemma by betting on the leadership of Europe in the fight against climate change and the fact that the rest of the World will eventually follow, ultimately providing a competitive advantage for Europe. While this has not always proven to be true in the past, the agreement reached at the last UN Conference of Parties on Climate Change (COP21) may mean a step towards Europe’s ambitions with countries like the U.S. and China, which have insofar played the ‘competitiveness first’ card, committing to global environmental objectives.

What can we expect in the next months to reconcile these contradictory forces?

Competitiveness

The Netherlands EU Presidency kicks-off with a high-level conference at Schiphol airport today on the just-released EU Aviation Strategy. Coincidentally, Schiphol airport is celebrating its 100th anniversary this year …

Discussions on aviation have so far focused on alleged unfair competition from the non-EU airlines Beyond this populist debate, which seems to ignore what’s really needed in the European aviation sector, a serious rethink of the management of Europe’s strategic airports, a final solution for the capacity crunch and the completion of the Single European Sky are all long overdue.

The Commission is also looking at the competitiveness of the road transport sector and, despite the fact that the three initiatives on the social dimensions of transport, cabotage and road charging will not be grouped into a single legislative package, the Commission is addressing them simultaneously.

Several other initiatives are expected in the first half of the year including the mid-term review of the White Paper on transport, which touches on the competitiveness and also sustainability of the EU transport system. No major changes are expected in terms of long term objectives, but more emphasis will be put on the means to achieve them. The review will also probably sound the death knell of the modal shift approach, adopted in the 2009 White Paper, in favour of the more comprehensive concept of co-modality, which recognizes the need to use all the means of transport and for each one to achieve its best and most sustainable performances.

Sustainability

Talking about sustainability, another Presidency meeting will follow in April, to discuss smart and green mobility. No surprise, this meeting will touch on cycling as well as other types of active mobility. The Dutch aim to adopt the ‘Amsterdam Chapter’ on green and smart mobility, as mentioned by the Minister during the last Environmental Council of 2015. The Informal Transport Council will then follow in June, at the end of the Presidency.

Decarbonising transport is an important part of the Energy Union strategy, and a Communication is expected in the second half of the year. The Communication should be preceded by a new proposal for the continuation of the Effort Sharing Decision post-2020, which currently sets binding national targets for GHG emissions coming from agriculture, building, waste and indeed transport (excluding aviation and international maritime shipping).

More will come our way on CO2 emissions targets for both Heavy-Duty Vehicles (HDVs) and Light-Duty Vehicles (LDVs), such as cars and vans. The Commission started tackling HDVs emissions for the first time two years ago and is working on a new instrument which will help the monitoring process and hopefully lead to more informed choices from operators. On the LDVs side, post-2020 CO2 targets will have to be discussed after the modalities to achieve the current ones where agreed only in 2014. This debate has started prematurely due to the ‘dieselgate’ scandal which opened a Pandora’s box for emissions measurements performed by carmakers and authorised by national authorities. Some countries are undertaking initiatives to move away from diesel but will the scandal be the trigger for revamping the debate on energy taxation and the removal of the taxation advantage towards diesel in Europe?

Whilst everyone in Brussels is busy trying to minimize the negative spill-over effects of ‘dieselgate’ and to re-establish consumers’ trust in the automotive sector, DG CLIMA has gone through a major internal reorganisation with the ‘Transport and Ozone’ unit, which to-date dealt with transport emissions, being split into three units to reflect the non-ETS sectors (buildings, agriculture and transport). This means that all those affected by legislation on transport emissions may wish to get acquainted with the new “Mr Transport Emissions” in DG CLIMA.

By Laura Rozzo

 

 

The Wednesday edition of our new Brussels Briefing. To receive it every morning in your email in-box, sign up here.

Davos chief Klaus Schwab

At the height of the eurozone crisis, EU leaders would frequently express annoyance that they were the focus of almost every major international conclave, from Group of 20 summits to annual International Monetary Fund meetings. Resentment would become particularly piqued when leaders from the developing world – like Brazil or Mexico – lectured their European counterparts on getting their economies in order.

That crisis may be in remission, but another European one – of refugees – is due to be among the main topics of conversation at the annual talkfest for global elites at the World Economic Forum in Davos, which starts today. According to the forum’s formal schedule, there are no fewer than five officially-sanctioned events on the topic, including a one-on-one session between host Klaus Schwab and Joachim Gauck, the German president; a panel discussion featuring Germany’s vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel and Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven; and a press conference with the head of the International Organisation for Migration.

In a pre-Davos interview with the Associated Press, Mr Schwab said Europe was at a “crossing point”, and it needed to find a balance between the humanitarian instinct to help struggling refugees with the reality of limited capabilities to do so. “My concern is that Europe, at the moment, is in a phase of disintegration,” Mr Schwab told the AP. “Europe would be completely marginalized if we break up into different nation-states again.”

Read more

DHL Express (Italy) and DHL Global Forwarding (Italy)
Competition
In the field of competition law, the leniency programmes of the EU and of the Member States coexist autonomously