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Fenêtre FIFA – Match amical Maroc-Mali : les Aigles Dames du Mali prêtes
Fenêtre FIFA — Les Aigles Dames du Mali ont lancé leur rassemblement en vue du match amical international Maroc–Mali. La sélection féminine a effectué, mardi…
Fenêtre FIFA – Match amical Maroc-Mali : les Aigles Dames du Mali prêtes
Mali Actu :
Fenêtre FIFA – Match amical Maroc-Mali : les Aigles Dames du Mali prêtes
Will the Board of Peace become another short‑lived episode, akin to the Summit for Democracy, or will it thrive as a sustainable, pragmatic international body for reconstruction and development that also advances the values of universalism/communitarianism with American characteristics?
On March 30, 2026, Kosovo’s government, led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, approved deployment of troops to Gaza as part of the Board of Peace –aligned International Stabilization Force (ISF), thereby aligning itself with a U.S.-backed and UN‑mandated mission. The initial Kosovo Security Force (KSF) operation element is expected to consist largely of specialized units—demining and unexploded ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, medical personnel, planning elements, and special operations support. Yet this move reflects the growing support of nation‑building and middle‑power–aspiring states across the broader Eurasian region, encompassing Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia, revealing to the world a deeper commitment to addressing post‑conflict instability, countering terrorism, and laying the foundations for long‑term security.
“We are ready to participate and help the people of Gaza, because we ourselves have been, and remain, beneficiaries of international forces since 1999,” Prime Minister Kurti emphasized the ethics behind Kosovo’s shift from a passive recipient of international security assistance to an active contributor to global peace operations when announcing the troop deployment. Yet the implications go beyond the realm of ethics. For Kosovo—a state still navigating the threshold of UN membership—the mission presents a critical opportunity to validate its nation‑building trajectory by evolving its role on the global stage.
In response to Kosovo’s courageous decision, the Board of Peace promptly endorsed the deployment, noting that it “welcomes the strong commitment of the Government of Kosovo to advance peace and reconstruction in Gaza.” By giving Kosovo the green light, the Board of Peace has paved the way for it to further consolidate the international legitimacy of its latest diplomatic and military initiative.
Kosovo’s Nation-Building Aspirations Impeded by EU Western Balkan Politics
In the aftermath of the European Union’s 2014 enlargement moratorium—effectively implemented under Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission during a period of Eurozone recovery and enlargement fatigue—Western Balkan integration trajectories diverged into two competing paradigms: pan-regional institutionalism and state-driven pragmatic regionalism.
The first, embodied in Germany’s Berlin Process and later institutionalized through the EU’s Common Regional Market (CRM), pursued a comprehensive, multilateral approach. Launched by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014, the Berlin Process brought together all six Western Balkan states (WB6)—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—into a coordinated framework designed to prepare the region for eventual EU accession. Across eleven annual summits, from Berlin in 2014 to Tirana in 2024, and supported by EU institutional mechanisms such as the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF), the initiative mobilized more than €10 billion in funding and achieved meaningful progress in regional infrastructure, including transport and energy connectivity projects. In 2020, the CRM further deepened integration by advancing the policy ideas of the four freedoms—the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor—while aligning with the EU’s main agendas, including digital market harmonization, SEPA payment integration, and the European Green Deal.
However, the EU’s integration efforts have gradually stalled, due in part to the behind‑the‑scenes politics and diplomacy of the region, as this consensus‑driven model required unanimous agreement among all WB6 participants and proved highly susceptible to political vetoes. In particular, Serbia’s persistent obstruction of Kosovo‑related measures—notably its repeated blockage of initiatives aimed at normalizing Belgrade–Pristina cooperation—has significantly slowed progress. Such obstructive behavior is especially noticeable in Serbia’s refusal to fully implement the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which integrates North Kosovo into Kosovo’s legal and institutional framework and effectively acknowledges Kosovo’s authority over the judiciary and police, while Serbia formally refrains from recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Instead of embracing Kosovo’s authority under this framework, Serbia has pushed for the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb‑Majority Municipalities (ASM/CSM) within Kosovo, thereby seeking to strengthen collective Serb autonomy inside the country rather than accepting the logic of Kosovo’s centralized institutional authority.
In contrast to the EU’s Berlin Process–centered Common Regional Market (CRM), the Open Balkan initiative, launched in 2021 by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in partnership with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and North Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev (later Dimitar Kovačevski), adopted a more flexible and pragmatic approach. Often described as a “Mini‑Schengen,” Open Balkan prioritized rapid, tangible outcomes through non‑binding agreements, bypassing the EU’s formal accession framework. By 2023, the initiative had delivered expedited border procedures, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and health certifications, pension portability, and a unified tourism framework. In sum, intra‑regional trade among the participating states increased significantly, alongside greater cross‑border labor mobility.
Despite the neighbouring countries’ growing interdependency, Kosovo again remained structurally excluded from Open Balkan from its inception. Political tensions with Serbia, particularly Belgrade’s refusal to engage with Kosovo on a state‑to‑state basis, effectively barred Pristina’s participation. A clear example is the 2021 Belgrade summit, where Serbia insisted that Kosovo be invited not as an equal state participant but as a technical observer, without formal signing rights, effectively limiting its role in shaping the initiative’s rules and benefiting from its core provisions. As a result, the initiative’s benefits were unevenly distributed, reinforcing Kosovo’s marginalization within regional economic and political frameworks.
Consequently, both paradigms of the Western Balkans’ integration into the EU produced unintended constraints on Kosovo’s nation‑building trajectory. The pan‑regional model, while inclusive in design, empowered rival actors’ veto power to block Kosovo’s progress, whereas the Open Balkan framework, though more efficient, effectively institutionalized Kosovo’s exclusion. These dynamics were in turn compounded by broader EU‑level stagnation, including limited accession momentum, shifting political priorities, and growing skepticism toward enlargement. As a result of these combined factors, by 2025–2026 Kosovo faced a convergence of structural challenges: prolonged political deadlock following snap elections—epitomized by the 2021 parliamentary early election, called after the legislature’s dissolution under constitutional and political strain—the suspension of key EU funding mechanisms, and stalled progress in accession‑related processes.
Within this context, Kosovo’s participation in the Board of Peace emerged not as an isolated foreign policy decision, but as an alternative strategic avenue. It reflects a broader strategic recalibration, enabling Pristina to circumvent regional and European constraints and position itself as a proactive contributor to international peace and security.
The Board of Peace’s New Corridor of the Willing Establishes a Comprehensive Developmental Architecture with American Characteristics
The Board of Peace marks the rise of a ‘New Corridor of the Willing,’ redefining multilateral integration through a distinctly American lens of strategic pragmatism. This framework replaces the passive, open-ended institutionalism of previous eras with the principle of functional sovereignty. By aligning approximately 31% of its membership as active stakeholders along the IMEC and Middle Corridor, the Board of Peace consolidates a comprehensive developmental architecture where stability and reconstruction are shared responsibilities. Within this system, a core axis of partners—most notably the UAE, Azerbaijan, and Albania—functions as the essential financial and infrastructure nodes that sustain these transnational networks.
In this strategic triad, the UAE serves as the primary capital hub for the IMEC zone, while Azerbaijan acts as the indispensable energy anchor for the Middle Corridor. Albania emerges as the regional gatekeeper at the strategic crossroads where these corridors converge into the European market via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). By prioritizing the selective integration of these pivotal nations, the US-led Board of Peace provides a robust mechanism to neutralize the monopolistic leverage of dominant regional actors.
This stewardship replaces traditional power asymmetries with a model of strategic interdependence, anchored in synchronized technological standards and permanent route diversification. Such structural redundancy effectively strips any single transit power of the ability to exercise a unilateral veto over global supply chains, ensuring the corridor remains insulated from local political volatility. Ultimately, this approach transforms the position of smaller states, such as Kosovo, from points of geographic vulnerability into indispensable, tech-integrated anchors for regional reconstruction, advancing a pragmatic form of universalism/communitarianism with American characteristics.
The question of who should be responsible for meeting the rapidly growing need and expenses for elderly care remains a contentious issue in many countries. Credit: Shutterstock.
By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Apr 15 2026 (IPS)
Who should be responsible for providing care and covering expenses for the elderly? Should it be governments, the elderly themselves, their families, a combination of the three, or a new societal arrangement?
As populations age and more elderly individuals live longer lives, there are relatively fewer workers and less tax revenue, causing governments to struggle with the challenge of providing care for the elderly. This struggle is particularly notable in the provision of nursing care and health services.
The challenge is mainly driven by the growing demand for care, workforce shortages, and rapidly rising costs. These issues are expected to become increasingly difficult to sustain in the upcoming years.
Furthermore, this challenge is complicated by age discrimination towards elderly individuals. This discrimination is increasingly prevalent and has a negative impact on older people’s physical and mental well-being. It is associated with earlier death, poorer physical and mental health, and slower recovery from disability in older age.
The proportion of the world’s population aged 65 years or older has doubled from 5% in 1950 to 10% today and is expected to reach 16% by 2050. Most of the world’s elderly are below the age of 75, with 41% in the age group 65 to 69 and 29% in the age group 70 to 74 (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations.
The increase in the proportion of elderly individuals is significantly greater in many countries. For example, in Japan, the proportion of elderly has increased six-fold since 1950. Similarly in Italy and China, the proportion of elderly has tripled since 1950. By 2050, it is projected that approximately one-third of the populations of Japan, Italy, and China will be elderly (Figure 2).
Source: United Nations.
In addition to population ageing, life expectancy at birth for the world’s population has increased from 46 years in 1950 to 74 years in 2026. It is projected that by 2070, the global life expectancy at birth will nearly reach 80 years, with many countries, such as France, Japan, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, expected to reach life expectancies at birth of around 90 years.
Elderly individuals in need of care are more likely to be women, 80-years-old and older, and live in single households. Many of them experience social isolation while living at home, which negatively impacts their mental and physical health. Additionally, these individuals typically have lower incomes than the country’s average.
The cost of providing care for elderly individuals varies drastically across countries. Costs for care are mainly driven by labor costs, healthcare infrastructure, and government subsidies.
Governments, especially those leaning towards political conservatism, are hesitant to cover the increasing expenses associated with care for the growing numbers of elderly. In the United States, for example, the president recently announced that it’s not possible for the federal government to fund Medicare, Medicaid, and child care costs. Instead, he argued that the one thing the federal government must take care of is the country’s military spending
Many high-income countries rely on migrant workers with irregular work contracts, to fill labor gaps, often operating with limited legal protections and standardized training. The situation is further complicated by poor working conditions, comparatively low salaries, and a lack of recognition making recruiting and retaining care workers difficult.
High-income countries have relatively high annual costs for care, while low-to-middle-income countries typically rely on family members to provide assisted care for the elderly.
For example, in the United States, the average annual cost in an assisted living community is approximately $75,000. Care in Switzerland is also expensive, with nursing home costs averaging over 100,000 Swiss francs annually. Similarly in Germany, the average annual cost for nursing home care is roughly between 36,000 to over 48,000 Euros.
Among OECD countries, publicly funded elder care systems still leave nearly half of older people with care needs at risk of poverty, especially those with severe care needs and low income. Out-of-pocket costs represent, on average, 70% of an older person’s median income across OECD countries.
Governments, especially those leaning towards political conservatism, are hesitant to cover the increasing expenses associated with care for the growing numbers of elderly.
In the United States, for example, the president recently announced that it’s not possible for the federal government to fund Medicare, Medicaid, and child care costs. Instead, he argued that the one thing the federal government must take care of is the country’s military spending.
Conservative and authoritarian governments typically do not see much economic benefit from government spending on elderly care, as they perceive the elderly as a societal burden. They argue that health care costs for the elderly is negatively correlated with economic growth and tend to oppose publicly funded efforts for life extension, advocating for limited government spending in these areas.
Furthermore, these conservatives and government officials often stress the importance of individual responsibility and solutions from the private sector. They believe that the costs of caring for the elderly should be borne by the elderly and their families.
However, the total cost of care for the elderly is often unaffordable for most families. In many OECD countries, elderly individuals risk falling into poverty without substantial financial assistance from their governments.
Some countries, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands, have implemented mandatory enrolment in elder care insurance. These programs are typically funded through mandatory payroll contributions.
In many countries, however, informal care for the elderly is still provided by family members, with the majority being women. This informal care is facing increasing strain due to factors such as urbanization, declining fertility rates, dual-career families, workforce mobility, and rising financial costs, all of which are putting pressure on the capacity of families to care for elderly relatives.
Although the need for elder care is rapidly increasing worldwide, the ability of existing systems to respond to current and rising needs remains limited in many countries. Most individuals in need of care rely on families and informal caregivers for support, while care services remain expensive, unstable, and difficult to access. These circumstances place significant strains on families, caregivers, and health care systems.
Further complicating care systems is the fact that elderly individuals often suffer from chronic health conditions. Some common health issues experienced by the elderly include Alzheimer’s disease, arthritis, asthma, back and neck pain, cancer, cataracts, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), dementia, diabetes, frailty, falls and injuries, heart disease, hearing loss, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, osteoarthritis, stroke, and urinary incontinence. Furthermore, as individuals age, they are more likely to experience multiple health conditions simultaneously (Table 1).
Source: World Health Organization.
In conclusion, as a result of population ageing and increased longevity, countries are facing the challenge of providing care for their elderly citizens. The question of who should be responsible for meeting the rapidly growing need and expenses for elderly care remains a contentious issue in many countries.
The general public believes that the government should take on the responsibility of providing care for the elderly. In contrast, many governments, concerned about the escalating fiscal burden, prefer that the elderly and their families themselves provide the necessary care and be responsible for the expenses. Still, others believe that a new societal arrangement is needed to provide care for the elderly.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of many publications on population issues.
Jelenleg Ukrajna vészes hiányt tapasztal amerikai Patriot légvédelmi rakétákból, amelyek az ukrán légvédelem részét képezik – figyelmeztetett Volodimir Zelenszkij ukrán elnök a a ZDF német közszolgálati televíziónak adott interjújában, amelyet az UNIAN hírügynökség szemlézett szerdán.
„Most olyan hiányunk van, hogy annál rosszabb már nem is lehet” – mondta az államfő. Ezt a Közel-Keleten kialakult helyzettel hozta összefüggésbe, és hangsúlyozta, hogy az iráni háború negatívan hat Ukrajnára.
„Ha a háború tovább tart, kevesebb fegyver jut Ukrajnának. Ez mindenki számára kihívás. Ez az egész világ háborúja. Nem csak az Egyesült Államoké és Izraelé” – jelentette ki Zelenszkij. Emellett segítséget ajánlott fel a Hormuzi-szoros feloldásához, kiemelve, hogy Kijev a szoros megnyitása mellett áll. „Már van tapasztalatunk a Fekete-tenger blokádjával kapcsolatban, Amerika viszont még nem keresett meg ez ügyben minket”– tette hozzá.
Forrás: MTI
The post Zelenszkij: vészes hiány van Patriot rakétákból Ukrajnában appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.
Chaque mardi, Pascal Boniface reçoit un membre de l’équipe de recherche de l’IRIS pour décrypter un fait d’actualité internationale. Aujourd’hui, échange avec Thierry Coville, chercheur à l’IRIS, autour des enjeux des négociations entre l’Iran et les États-Unis après un premier cycle de discussions à Islamabad qui ont débouché sur un échec.
L’article Que veut négocier Téhéran ? | Les mardis de l’IRIS est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
En quoi le roman permet-il de proposer une lecture différente de la géopolitique et notamment des conflits ? Par le biais de la fiction, il propose une alternative à l’essai et conduit le lecteur à réfléchir aux relations internationales, en lui offrant un cadre immersif et des personnages auxquels il peut s’identifier, voire pour lesquels il peut éprouver de la compassion. Dans son dernier ouvrage « Le prieur de Bethléem » (Éditions Flammarion), Yasmina Khadra plonge le lecteur au cœur de la Palestine. Il l’invite à mieux comprendre la complexité du conflit israélo-palestinien et à prendre conscience de la violence qu’il engendre.
Dans quelle mesure la fiction permet-elle de dénoncer certaines réalités et de remettre en cause les récits dominants ? Comment le conflit israélo-palestinien est-il perçu dans le milieu romanesque et les médias français ? Quel rôle la France et de l’Union européenne pourraient-elles être amenées à jouer sur celui-ci ?
Dans ce podcast, Yasmina Khadra, écrivain, revient sur le rôle que joue la narration romanesque dans la compréhension du conflit israelo-palestinien et des enjeux géopolitiques.
L’article Comprendre le monde par le roman. Avec Yasmina Khadra est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Lancé comme une simple ambition il y a trois ans, le programme « Study in Algeria » (Étudier en Algérie) franchit aujourd’hui une étape historique. […]
L’article “Study in Algeria”: l’enseignement supérieur algérien séduit de plus en plus d’étudiants du monde entier est apparu en premier sur .
La partie sud de la province du Sud-Kivu est confrontée à une épidémie de choléra, principalement dans cinq zones de santé des territoires d’Uvira et de Fizi. Selon des sources sanitaires, les personnes déplacées ainsi que les militaires figurent parmi les plus touchés.
Intervenant sur Radio Okapi mercredi 15 avril 2026, le médecin chef de division provinciale de la santé du Sud-Kivu, basé à Uvira, Aimé Alengo Doudou, a précisé :