SWP

Thinktanks können vieles – eine inklusive, vielstimmige und konstruk­tive gesellschaftliche Debatte organisieren können sie nicht. Hier sind andere gefragt, auch und gerade beim Thema Nahost.

Donald Trump hat eine neue Asymmetrie zwischen der Ukraine und Russland geschaffen

Authoritarian states are increasingly leveraging non-state cyber capabilities to expand their operational reach, thereby challenging conventional distinctions between state and non-state activity. This practice complicates attribution and presents obstacles for coordinated international responses. Moreover, as cyber threats become more complex and entangled, effective countermeasures necessitate enhanced information sharing, trusted partnerships and the development of response tools that function independently of political attribution.

In diesen unruhigen Zeiten muss Deutschland weg von reaktiver Krisenverwaltung hin zu strategischer Zukunftsgestaltung. Nötig ist eine systematische Ermittlung der Bedrohungen für unser Land.

Southeast Asia has long been a foreign policy priority for Japan, but Tokyo has intensified its engagement – both with the ASEAN Commu­nity as a whole and with individual member states – since 2012. Japan views China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia as a major foreign policy challenge and is seeking to prevent the emergence of a hierarchical order centred around China. It has economic as well as foreign and security policy interests in the region. Tokyo’s engagement in Southeast Asia aims to uphold the rules-based multi­lateral order in the region, underpinned by US involvement. Of par­ticular significance is Tokyo’s commitment to shared rules, principles and norms – for example, in the areas of free trade, infrastructure develop­ment and maritime security. Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia since 2012 has been characterised by both continuity and change. Unlike in the past, Japan is now seeking more comprehensive security cooperation with the region, including through dialogues, military exercises and capacity building programmes. ASEAN is important for Japan as the linchpin of regional cooperation. Tokyo supports the institutional development of the Community and helps reduce socio-economic differences between individual member states. Japan is intensifying its relations both with countries that are more criti­cal of China – such as the Philippines – and with those considered more aligned with China – such as Cambodia. This approach extends to security policy. By offering to cooperate, Japan provides Southeast Asian countries with alternatives to Chinese initiatives and thereby prevents China from monopolising the region. Japan and Europe are both interested in a stable, multilateral order in Southeast Asia. The two sides should therefore step up their engagement with the region and leverage their influence over regional geopolitical dynamics through complementary or joint initiatives.

In den vergangenen Monaten haben sich die Debatten darüber verschärft, ob Europa noch auf die erweiterte nukleare Abschreckung der USA vertrauen kann – oder ob es eigene Alternativen dazu erwägen muss. Ein bloßer Entweder-oder-Ansatz erhellt hier aber wenig. Es bedarf einer differenzierten Herangehensweise, um bei dieser Frage zentrale Herausforderungen und Handlungsoptionen zu erfassen. Zu diesem Zweck werden im Folgenden drei Szenarien entworfen, wie sich der europäische Blick auf die Verlässlichkeit des amerikanischen Atomschutzschirms entwickeln könnte. Der erste Fall wäre eine Vertrauenskrise, die moderate Anstrengungen erfordern würde, um den Status quo wiederherzustellen. Bei der zweiten Variante – einem Vertrauensbruch – bräuchte Europa nicht nur eine stärkere konventionelle Verteidigung, son­dern auch angemessene Eskalationsinstrumente, um Washington notfalls zum Han­deln zu bewegen. Im dritten Szenario würden die Europäer davon ausgehen, dass die USA sich vollständig von ihnen abgewandt haben – die Folgen wären schwer vorhersehbar, aber wohl deutlich gravierender als häufig angenommen.

Europe must take more responsibility for its defence, if necessary without the United States, given Washington’s volatility. In March 2025, the European Union (EU) launched a series of initiatives to strengthen defence industry and defence policy cooperation. With these new instruments also come the outlines of a new partnership strategy. Previous Brussels formats for defence industrial cooperation were only open to mem­bers of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). The Security Action For Europe (SAFE) Regulation – adopted by the EU in May 2025 – on the other hand, provides for a level of integration of Ukraine in this sector that comes close to that of an EU mem­ber. With the United Kingdom, the EU has created new opportunities for participation for the first time since Brexit via a security partnership agreement. The EU also wants to offer countries such as Canada, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Australia and even India points of contact via partnership agreements. In order for this strategy to be successful, the EU needs to make itself a more attractive partner.

Die USA haben iranische Atomanlagen angegriffen. Irans Nachbarländer fürchten nun, dass sich der Konflikt ausweiten könnte.

Strategische Ambivalenz: Die komplexe Rolle der Türkei in der Entwicklung der NATO

In the discussions being held at EU level about the 2040 mitigation target, the role of international credits has recently taken centre stage. The new momentum in those discussions is due in part to the German government having announced its support for a mitigation target of a net 90 per cent greenhouse gas emissions reduction is conditional on up to 3 per cent of the target being achieved through international credits. How the target is to be drawn up and what it means for EU climate policy instruments will inevitably give rise to conflicts during the forthcoming legislative processes. Despite open questions about the quality, additionality and availability of the credits, it makes sense to hold a timely debate about their possible functions so that, if necessary, policy instruments can be further developed and corrections made later. It would be expedient to ensure that the use of international credits is focused on durable carbon dioxide removal technologies that are scalable only to a limited extent within the EU itself. Not only could international removal credits make a contribution to overcoming the challenges on the path to greenhouse gas neutrality by counterbalancing residual emissions; the creation of institutionalised demand for high-quality removal methods would also lay the foundation for achieving net-negative emissions.

Georgia is at a turning point due to democratic backsliding in domestic policy and a reconfiguration of external relations influenced by regional and global geopolitical turbulence. In addressing this challenge, the EU should: consider carefully whether using communication channels will promote Georgia’s democracy and future in Europe; assess the implications of cooperation for the broader population; and strengthen the resilience of Georgian civil society. Progress in the accession processes of other EU candidate countries could weaken EU-skeptical voices in Georgia and help solidify public support for the country’s European aspirations.