L’attaque surprise lancée contre l’Iran par les États-Unis et Israël le 28 février 2026, a vu Téhéran intensifier ses activités militaires dans la région du golfe Persique et notamment à mettre en place un blocus « à péage » du détroit d’Ormuz. Cette initiative censée s’adresser aux bâtiments marchands appartenant à des nations « non hostiles » selon la terminologie employée par le gouvernement iranien a pour l’heure profité à peu de nations, dont la Chine et le trafic maritime est quasiment à l’arrêt. Ce blocus du détroit d’Ormuz tout comme les initiatives militaires des États-Unis pour l’en empêcher commencent à avoir d’importantes répercussions non seulement sur l’approvisionnement en pétrole brut des pays asiatiques, mais aussi sur la chaîne d’approvisionnement mondiale en pétrole.
À téléchargerL’article Les chaînes d’approvisionnement pétrolières asiatiques perturbées par le blocus du détroit d’Ormuz : perspectives pour l’Inde, le Japon et la Corée du Sud est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Chaque mardi, Pascal Boniface reçoit un membre de l’équipe de recherche de l’IRIS pour décrypter un fait d’actualité internationale. Aujourd’hui, échange avec Emmanuel Lincot, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS, co-responsable du programme Asie-Pacifique, sur la posture chinoise vis-à-vis de l’Iran, alors que Donald Trump entend influer sur Xi Jinping quant à sa position dans le conflit, lors de sa visite à Pékin cette semaine.
L’article La Chine et la guerre d’Iran est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Russlands sogenannte Schattenflotte dient in erster Linie der Sanktionsumgehung für den Ölexport und damit der Finanzierung seines Angriffskrieges gegen die Ukraine. Sie stellt jedoch vermehrt auch ein verteidigungsrelevantes Sicherheitsrisiko für Europa dar. Schiffe der Schattenflotte werden zunehmend mit Spionage- und Sabotageakten in Verbindung gebracht, sie bedrohen deutsche und europäische Sicherheit und die maritime Umwelt. Die Bundesregierung sollte gemeinsam mit ihren Partnern einen systematischen Ansatz verfolgen, um wirksam gegen die Schattenflotte vorzugehen. Ziel ist es, Sanktionsregime aufrechtzuerhalten, die maritime Sicherheit zu gewährleisten und verteidigungsrelevante Bedrohungen einzudämmen.
Standfirst para:
Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.
In a nutshell
Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.
Standfirst para:
Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.
In a nutshell
Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.
Standfirst para:
Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge of weak job creation and persistent informality. Drawing on survey evidence on business behaviour and labour market dynamics, this column explains why job creation is limited and informal work remains such an integral part of how firms organise production. The generation of more formal jobs requires a comprehensive policy approach, one that goes beyond enforcement of labour regulations to reshape the economic environment in which firms and workers make decisions.
In a nutshell
Informality in the labour market reflects incentives on both sides: firms benefit from lower costs and flexibility, while workers may prefer higher take-home pay or they may perceive limited benefits from formal employment.
Policies to create formal jobs that are focused solely on enforcement may backfire by raising hiring costs; effective reform requires reducing the cost of formality -including through simpler tax procedures and more proportionate labour costs - while increasing its benefits.
Addressing informality requires targeting informal employment within formal firms, aligning labour market and industrial policies, and adapting social protection and contribution systems to non-standard work arrangements.
Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.
Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.
Escalatory attacks on multilateral rules and institutions in this era of raw power politics have plunged international politics into uncharted territory. Traditional alliances have been fractured and new partnerships between unlikely bedfellows are emerging. No longer in transition, the post-World War II world order is in rupture. This paper examines international cooperation under these conditions and argues that a new ‘flexi-lateralism’ is taking shape as a pragmatic response to changing times. We define the new flexi-lateralism as international cooperation expressed through adaptable modular tools and selective coalitions, anchored in UN norms, that proceeds even when universal commitments are openly contested and attacked. Our paper considers a set of initiatives launched around the Financing for Development (FfD) conference in Sevilla (July 2025) on the issue of debt servicing. We illustrate how cooperation often depends on selective participation, informal venues and issue-specific coalitions, rather than comprehensive universal bargains. The paper uses ‘flexi-lateralism’ as a term for these flexible multilateral forms that sit between classic UN-style universality and narrow great-power deals. We conclude that international cooperation in this era is neither automatically collapsing nor simply fragmenting. It is adapting and reconfigured through overlapping clubs and coalitions with uneven implications for the Global South and the North.