Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

La commissaire aux droits de l'Homme du Conseil de l'Europe, Dunja Mijatovic, a demandé aux autorités espagnoles, le 22 mars, de réviser le Code pénal afin de renforcer les garanties existantes du droit à la liberté d'expression. Cette révision devrait aussi permettre aux tribunaux espagnols de rendre des décisions conformes à l'article 10 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme. La commissaire s'inquiète de l'absence de définition claire de la notion d'apologie du terrorisme et de la multiplication des condamnations prononcées à l'encontre d'artistes pour des paroles de chansons controversées.

La Commissaire aux droits de l'Homme du Conseil de l'Europe, Dunja Mijatovic, a exprimé le 24 mars sa préoccupation concernant le racisme et la discrimination présente au Portugal. Elle a appelé les autorités portugaises à mettre en oeuvre un plan d'action contre la haine raciale, notamment contre les Roms et les personnes d'ascendance africaine. La Commissaire rappelle aux responsables politiques, qu'ils ne doivent pas contribuer à la propagation de ce discours haineux, que ce soit en y participant ou en le tolérant. Enfin, la Commissaire appelle le pays à combattre plus efficacement la violence à l'égard des femmes et la violence domestique.

La Commission de Venise du Conseil de l'Europe a publié le 23 mars, 13 avis adoptés lors de sa session plénière, portant sur la Biélorussie, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, l'Espagne, la Géorgie, le Kazakhstan, le Kirghizistan, la Moldavie, le Monténégro, la Russie et l'Ukraine. Elle recommande au Monténégro de ne pas "politiser" les réformes du ministère public en cours, à l'Espagne de réviser la loi sur la sécurité des citoyens, et se félicite de certaines améliorations apportées en Ukraine par la réforme de la Cour constitutionnelle. Par ailleurs, les experts ont aussi adopté un avis sur les amendements constitutionnels en Russie, ainsi que sur le projet de loi modifiant la loi relative au Conseil supérieur des juges et des procureurs en Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN se sont réunis les 23 et 24 mars pour examiner le programme de l'Alliance avec l'initiative OTAN 2030, qui va s'adapter aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires. Ils ont souligné leur volonté de renforcer les partenariats pour assurer la sécurité en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient et ont discuté de la situation en Afghanistan. Rejoints par leurs homologues finlandais et suédois, dont les pays sont partenaires mais non-membres de l'OTAN, et par le Haut représentant de l'Union, ils ont aussi discuté des activités de déstabilisation menées par la Russie.

Ancien jurisconsulte du Conseil européen et du Conseil des Ministres de l'Union européenne, directeur général du service juridique du Conseil, Jean Claude Piris, membre du comité scientifique de la Fondation vient de publier une étude sur les aspects juridiques des négociations 2016-2020 liées à la décision du Royaume-Uni de quitter l'Union européenne (Brexit).

La Commission a publié le 22 mars le premier rapport sur l'efficacité de l'instrument SURE pour protéger les emplois et les revenus touchés par la pandémie. Selon le rapport, SURE a aidé de 25 à 30 millions de personnes et 2,5 millions d'entreprises touchées par la pandémie. Plus de 90% du budget total de 100 milliards € a déjà été alloué.

Le musée du Prado à Madrid propose jusqu'au 4 juillet l'exposition "Passions mythologiques: Titien, Véronèse, Allori, Rubens, Ribera, Poussin, Van Dyck, Velazquez". Elle propose de découvrir une sélection de 29 peintures mythologiques réalisées en Europe aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles.

Le musée Albertina de Vienne propose jusqu'au 5 avril de découvrir, par l'intermédiaire d'une visite en ligne planifiée ou d'une visite virtuelle autonome en 3D, la collection Jablonka. Rassemblée par le marchand d'art allemand Rafael Jablonka, il s'agit de l'une des collections d'art américain et allemand les plus prestigieuses des années 1980. Environ 110 peintures, sculptures et œuvres sur papier ont été sélectionnées permettant ainsi de découvrir la grande diversité de la collection.

Le grand Théâtre-Opéra de Varsovie propose jusqu'au 30 juin une exposition sur le peintre polonais Jan Cybis, figure éminente du groupe de coloristes polonais partis à Paris dans les années 1930, et surnommés les Kapistes. En attendant la réouverture au public, l'exposition est proposée en ligne et en réalité virtuelle.

Rendre l'art contemporain accessible à tous, depuis la rue... C'est ce que propose la Collection Lambert d'Avignon. Toujours fermé au public pour cause de pandémie, ce lieu culturel a créé La Loggia, espace d'exposition temporaire situé dans une vitrine donnant rue Violette. Chaque semaine, des oeuvres de la collection sont ainsi présentées aux badauds qui peuvent les admirer depuis la rue. Chacune de ces expositions-capsules permet de regarder sous un nouveau jour les artistes de la Collection ou de découvrir des œuvres jamais montrées dans les salles du musée

Le musée Städel de Francfort présente les 3, 5 et 10 avril, une visite guidée en ligne des grandes œuvres de femmes artistes, telles que Lotte Laserstein, Ottilie W. Roederstein et Cindy Sherman. La visite propose de découvrir pourquoi les positions féminines dans l'art sont restées relativement inexplorées pendant des siècles.

Le musée Salvatore Ferragamo de Florence présente l'exposition "Soie", disponible en ligne, qui rend hommage à Fulvia Ferragamo, qui a lancé dans les années 1970 la production continue d'accessoires en soie avec des motifs personnalisés caractérisés par des impressions faites à Côme avec des objets décoratifs exclusifs, en particulier des fleurs et des animaux exotiques formés par un patchwork de fleurs.

Dans Napoléon et Jésus, Marie-Paule Raffaelli-Pasquini démontre l'importance dans l'imaginaire napoléonien de la figure du Christ et de son ambition d'unir l'humanité autour d'un idéal commun. Napoléon et les cultes, de Jacques-Olivier Boudon, explore les rapports ambigus qu'entretenait Bonaparte avec l'Église catholique. L'intérêt d'étudier la politique religieuse de Napoléon Bonaparte, tient à ce qu'elle a servi de modèle à une grande partie des États passés sous la domination française entre 1800 et 1815.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?

Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costs

In August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.

Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.

First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.

Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.

Political conditionality as a necessary European reaction

While increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.

This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a decree in the early hours of March 20 withdrawing Turkey from the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention – dubbed the Istanbul Convention – on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. The treaty sets comprehensive standards for protecting women against all forms of violence. The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media criticising that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides: Just in 2020, at least 300 women were murdered. Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly responded that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws, and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the claim that the Convention was »hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality«, and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values. Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?

Erdoğan’s political rationale: To remain in power at all costs

In August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signalled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives and various Muslim orders began an intense lobbying effort against the Convention, lambasting it for damaging »traditional Turkish family values«. Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdoğan’s own family, with two of his children becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia, the debate was postponed.

Although recent opinion polls had shown that 84 per cent of the Turkish public opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a great majority of conservative women are in favour of it, President Erdoğan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution but also the legislative power of the parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding support for President Erdoğan and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the Convention gives Erdoğan three political advantages that will help him retain power.

First, Erdoğan and his AKP aim to re-energize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn – a reality that has only been exacerbated by the corona pandemic. The AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the Convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.

Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdoğan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January 2021 to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist, and conservative parties. With its 2.5 per cent of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. In his meeting with the SP, Erdoğan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Third, to bolster his image as a wilful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organisations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who are constantly criticising the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.

Political conditionality as a necessary European reaction

While increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Ankara intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision but revise its EU-Turkey agenda by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the Convention. This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, Brussels can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights, and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the CoE. Considering the latest attempts by the Polish government to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative »family-based« treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.

2021 is shaping up to be a year of elections for the Palestinians, both in the Palestinian Territories and across the world. Three ballots are scheduled for the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is still unclear whether they will all take place as planned. The PA elections certainly have an important role to play in integrating the younger generations in the Terri­tories, restoring political accountability and reinstating democratic checks and bal­ances. The elections to the Palestinian National Council – the PLO’s parliament in exile – would be even more significant and a crucial step towards creating a repre­sentative organ and establishing the basis for an inclusive discussion about the lib­eration movement’s future strategy and the role of the PA. The EU and its member states have been calling for years for the Palestinian leadership to revive the democratic process and overcome the Fatah/Hamas split. They should therefore not only support the elections with observers but also contribute actively to their being as free, fair and competitive as possible under the difficult circumstances.

2021 is shaping up to be a year of elections for the Palestinians, both in the Palestinian Territories and across the world. Three ballots are scheduled for the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It is still unclear whether they will all take place as planned. The PA elections certainly have an important role to play in integrating the younger generations in the Terri­tories, restoring political accountability and reinstating democratic checks and bal­ances. The elections to the Palestinian National Council – the PLO’s parliament in exile – would be even more significant and a crucial step towards creating a repre­sentative organ and establishing the basis for an inclusive discussion about the lib­eration movement’s future strategy and the role of the PA. The EU and its member states have been calling for years for the Palestinian leadership to revive the democratic process and overcome the Fatah/Hamas split. They should therefore not only support the elections with observers but also contribute actively to their being as free, fair and competitive as possible under the difficult circumstances.

Although things have been quiet in recent months and there has been no active dialogue between North Korea and the United States (US), developments in recent days suggest that Pyongyang is back on the agenda of the international community. First, it became known that the US has been reaching out to North Korea through several channels, starting in mid-February, but it has not heard back. North Korea then published two statements within as many days by two high-ranking officials. On March 16, Kim Yo Jong criticized the joint US–South Korea military exercise, warning that if Seoul dares “more provocative acts,” North Korea may abrogate the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018. She also cautioned the US that if “[i]t wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step.” Two days later, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was quoted saying that North Korea sees no reason to return to nuclear talks with Washington, calling its outreach a “cheap trick.” These statements coincided with a warning issued by the head of the US military’s Northern Command that North Korea might begin flight testing an improved design of its intercontinental ballistic missiles “in the near future.” On March 23, Pyongyang tested two cruise missiles before qualitatively upping the ante with a short-range ballistic missile test on March 25, constituting a breach of UN Security Council Resolutions.

Although these developments may suggest that a further escalation on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, North Korea has thus far been following its traditional playbook by signaling a message that leaves all options on the table, ensures maximum room for maneuver, and – at least from Pyongyang’s view – places the ball in the US’ court. North Korea is raising the stakes ahead of the conclusions of the policy review process in the US while simultaneously conveying the message that the door is open for re-engagement at some point. “In order for a dialogue to be made,” Choe states, “an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”

Biden’s North Korea policy review

Further developments in US–North Korea relations will, to a significant extent, depend on the outcomes of the policy review process. Although this process is not yet completed, it is apparent that the policies of the Biden administration will differ significantly from those of the Trump administration.

First, we should not expect Donald Trump’s personalized diplomacy to continue under Joe Biden. Rather, Washington is trying to restore a consultative process by involving the regional actors in northeast Asia more directly in the North Korea question – and possibly trying to (once again) multilateralize the nuclear issue in the longer run. During the visits of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Japan and South Korea, Blinken stated that the Biden administration was consulting closely with the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other allied nations while also acknowledging that Beijing “has a critical role to play” in any diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. Whether more consultation leads to actual consensus remains to be seen.

Second, the US will most likely propose a processual solution to the nuclear issue. In an op-ed in the New York Times in 2018, Blinken himself argued that the best deal the US could reach with North Korea “more than likely will look like what Barack Obama achieved with Iran.” He wrote that an interim agreement “would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map that will require sustained diplomacy.”

Third, the new administration seems to place a greater focus on the human rights issue in its policies on North Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Blinken made clear that the US would not only address security concerns, but also the North Korean government’s “widespread, systematic abuses” of its people.

Three lessons from the past

Act, not react: As past experiences with North Korea have shown, it is now critical for the United States to act quickly and clearly communicate its new North Korea strategy to both its allies and Pyongyang. If official communication channels are blocked, the facilitation activities of individual European Union (EU) member states and/or Track 1.5 intermediaries could be helpful. Until then, it is crucial not to get sucked into rhetorical tugs-of-war with North Korea. If the international community fails to act quickly on North Korea, Pyongyang will likely once again resort to a crisis-inducing policy, thus forcing the international community to react to its expected provocations, rather than preventing further escalation in the first place.

Separate the issues: The North Korean nuclear issue is complex. Solving the military and security components of this issue will inevitably require addressing a range of related political, diplomatic, economic, and even historical issues. As the case of the Six-Party Talks has shown, however, one individual negotiation process can quickly become overwhelmed by the multitude of challenges and issues associated with the nuclear issue. As such, it is essential to establish adequate formats with the right participants to address the respective issues and challenges.

There is a role for Europe: Although there is no doubt that the EU is only a peripheral player in Korean Peninsula security issues, the current debate on a new Indo-Pacific strategy provides an important opportunity for Brussels to critically reflect on its own approach to North Korea, as it has failed to achieve its stated goals, i.e., denuclearizing the peninsula, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and improving the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be front and center of this new strategy, the EU needs to show greater political will to contribute toward solving the pending security issues in the region if it wants to strengthen its profile as a security actor in the region.

This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.

Although things have been quiet in recent months and there has been no active dialogue between North Korea and the United States (US), developments in recent days suggest that Pyongyang is back on the agenda of the international community. First, it became known that the US has been reaching out to North Korea through several channels, starting in mid-February, but it has not heard back. North Korea then published two statements within as many days by two high-ranking officials. On March 16, Kim Yo Jong criticized the joint US–South Korea military exercise, warning that if Seoul dares “more provocative acts,” North Korea may abrogate the Inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018. She also cautioned the US that if “[i]t wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step.” Two days later, First Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was quoted saying that North Korea sees no reason to return to nuclear talks with Washington, calling its outreach a “cheap trick.” These statements coincided with a warning issued by the head of the US military’s Northern Command that North Korea might begin flight testing an improved design of its intercontinental ballistic missiles “in the near future.” On March 23, Pyongyang tested two cruise missiles before qualitatively upping the ante with a short-range ballistic missile test on March 25, constituting a breach of UN Security Council Resolutions.

Although these developments may suggest that a further escalation on the Korean Peninsula is inevitable, North Korea has thus far been following its traditional playbook by signaling a message that leaves all options on the table, ensures maximum room for maneuver, and – at least from Pyongyang’s view – places the ball in the US’ court. North Korea is raising the stakes ahead of the conclusions of the policy review process in the US while simultaneously conveying the message that the door is open for re-engagement at some point. “In order for a dialogue to be made,” Choe states, “an atmosphere for both parties to exchange words on an equal basis must be created.”

Biden’s North Korea policy review

Further developments in US–North Korea relations will, to a significant extent, depend on the outcomes of the policy review process. Although this process is not yet completed, it is apparent that the policies of the Biden administration will differ significantly from those of the Trump administration.

First, we should not expect Donald Trump’s personalized diplomacy to continue under Joe Biden. Rather, Washington is trying to restore a consultative process by involving the regional actors in northeast Asia more directly in the North Korea question – and possibly trying to (once again) multilateralize the nuclear issue in the longer run. During the visits of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Japan and South Korea, Blinken stated that the Biden administration was consulting closely with the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other allied nations while also acknowledging that Beijing “has a critical role to play” in any diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. Whether more consultation leads to actual consensus remains to be seen.

Second, the US will most likely propose a processual solution to the nuclear issue. In an op-ed in the New York Times in 2018, Blinken himself argued that the best deal the US could reach with North Korea “more than likely will look like what Barack Obama achieved with Iran.” He wrote that an interim agreement “would buy time to negotiate a more comprehensive deal, including a minutely sequenced road map that will require sustained diplomacy.”

Third, the new administration seems to place a greater focus on the human rights issue in its policies on North Korea. During his visit to Seoul, Blinken made clear that the US would not only address security concerns, but also the North Korean government’s “widespread, systematic abuses” of its people.

Three lessons from the past

Act, not react: As past experiences with North Korea have shown, it is now critical for the United States to act quickly and clearly communicate its new North Korea strategy to both its allies and Pyongyang. If official communication channels are blocked, the facilitation activities of individual European Union (EU) member states and/or Track 1.5 intermediaries could be helpful. Until then, it is crucial not to get sucked into rhetorical tugs-of-war with North Korea. If the international community fails to act quickly on North Korea, Pyongyang will likely once again resort to a crisis-inducing policy, thus forcing the international community to react to its expected provocations, rather than preventing further escalation in the first place.

Separate the issues: The North Korean nuclear issue is complex. Solving the military and security components of this issue will inevitably require addressing a range of related political, diplomatic, economic, and even historical issues. As the case of the Six-Party Talks has shown, however, one individual negotiation process can quickly become overwhelmed by the multitude of challenges and issues associated with the nuclear issue. As such, it is essential to establish adequate formats with the right participants to address the respective issues and challenges.

There is a role for Europe: Although there is no doubt that the EU is only a peripheral player in Korean Peninsula security issues, the current debate on a new Indo-Pacific strategy provides an important opportunity for Brussels to critically reflect on its own approach to North Korea, as it has failed to achieve its stated goals, i.e., denuclearizing the peninsula, strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and improving the human rights situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not be front and center of this new strategy, the EU needs to show greater political will to contribute toward solving the pending security issues in the region if it wants to strengthen its profile as a security actor in the region.

This text was also published at fairoberserver.com.

 

Joe Biden entend parvenir à des consensus avec les républicains sur plusieurs grandes réformes législatives. Parviendra-t-il à surmonter des clivages idéologiques anciens, mais que les années Trump ont cristallisés ?

Joe Biden l’a dit plusieurs fois lors de sa conférence de presse du 25 mars, sa première en tant que président : l’un de ses objectifs est de mettre un terme à la politique de division à Washington. Il souhaite ardemment que les républicains le rejoignent sur ses grandes réformes à venir. Immigration, infrastructures, emploi, environnement… L’agenda de l’exécutif est chargé, sans compter les réformes dictées par l’actualité chaude : limitation des armes à feu, défense de l’accès au vote pour les minorités. Le dilemme du président et des démocrates est dès lors celui-ci : est-il préférable, politiquement, de voter de grandes lois bipartisanes ou bien de passer les réformes à tout prix, sans l’appui des républicains, puisque la base électorale démocrate les attend ? Devant les journalistes, Biden a renvoyé la balle dans le camp conservateur, qu’il a mis au défi du travail commun.

Le pari du président, c’est notamment de mettre un terme à l’obstruction partisane au Sénat. Ce n’est rien de dire que ce sera extrêmement difficile. Le récent Plan de relance de 1 900 milliards a bénéficié d’une procédure de simplification du vote (une règle nommée « budget reconciliation process ») en raison de l’urgence. Mais cela peut difficilement être le cas pour les prochains projets de loi, notamment celui relatif au projet dit « Bring Back Better » qui rassemblera des articles sur la rénovation des infrastructures (routes, ponts, aéroports, écoles, réseaux d’électricité, etc.), la sauvegarde du climat et la création de dizaines de milliers de nouveaux emplois, en partie financés par de l’argent public, qui y seront directement affectés.

Le poison du « filibuster »

Il existe en effet un dispositif imposant au Sénat de disposer de 60 voix (les trois cinquièmes), et non de 51 (sur 100), pour adopter une loi, lorsqu’au moins un sénateur ou une sénatrice refuse qu’on l’on mette fin au débat parlementaire pour procéder au vote. Peut alors se mettre en place une tentative d’obstruction de la minorité, tentative appelée « filibuster », qui se caractérise par le fait, pour un ou une élu.e, de parler pendant des heures sans qu’il soit possible de l’interrompre, jusqu’à parvenir à un accord ou bien, s’il est impossible d’obtenir les 60 voix nécessaires, la majorité jette l’éponge et abandonne le texte. Le problème est que la règle des 60 votes est de moins en moins utilisée pour négocier entre les deux camps, et de plus en plus pour bloquer purement et simplement toute réforme voulue par adversaire. Ce que Biden a volontiers reconnu lors de sa conférence de presse du 25 mars, ajoutant que le filibuster était une relique de l’époque, raciste, de Jim Crow, et qu’il prendrait au besoin les mesures qui s’imposent. Mais pour l’heure, il veut croire à des consensus possibles avec le Grand Old Party.

Ce principe de la majorité de 60 pourrait, du reste, être assoupli (il l’a beaucoup été ces dernières années déjà, notamment pour faciliter les confirmations de juges et de ministres), voire supprimé par les démocrates, aujourd’hui majoritaires d’une voix, la cinquante-et-unième, celle de la présidente du Sénat qui n’est autre que Kamala Harris. Et l’on pourrait légitimement penser que c’est dans leur intérêt. Mais ils et elles perdraient alors, si le Sénat rebasculait à droite aux Midterms de novembre 2022, une possibilité de contrer des réformes des républicains (et pourraient moins faire valoir, le cas échéant, des intérêts électoralistes pour leur circonscription auprès du parti démocrate). L’unanimité n’est donc pas de mise pour y mettre un terme, la voix des « contre » étant emmenée par Joe Manchin, le sénateur poil-à-gratté de Virginie-Occidentale, dont on n’a pas fini d’entendre parler.

La politique est désormais extrêmement partisane aux États-Unis, et en particulier au Congrès fédéral, et cela ne date pas de Trump (même si cela s’est aggravé sous sa présidence). Mais alors la conséquence est que beaucoup de réformes risquent d’être bloquées et d’occasionner la colère des électrices et des électeurs (de chaque camp).

Immigration, port d’armes, accès au vote… des divisions partisanes insurmontables

Trois sujets, en particulier, seront scrutés de près. Sur l’immigration, Biden est taxé de laxisme par les républicains qui, cependant, lorsque leur parti avait la majorité au Sénat comme à la Chambre (les deux premières années du mandat de Trump) n’ont pas réussi à se mettre d’accord sur une loi. En cause : leurs propres divisions entre les chrétien.ne.s humanistes, les libertarien.ne.s, les pragmatiques qui savent que nombre de secteurs économiques comme l’agriculture, le high-tech ou les services à la personne ne fonctionnent pas sans les immigré.e.s (y compris clandestin.e.s), et les tenant.e.s d’une ligne identitaro-sécuritaire. Or il faudra bien, un jour, combler le vide juridique concernant les onze ou douze millions de clandestin.e.s qui vivent et souvent travaillent aux États-Unis, et notamment les 700 000 « Dreamers », qui sont arrivé.e.s mineur.e.s avec leurs parents sur le sol américain, y ont fait des études pour certain.e.s et y occupent parfois un emploi. Autant de gens sans véritable statut.

Autre sujet chaud : le libre port d’armes. Même après les massacres, ces derniers jours, d’Atlanta et de Boulder (Colorado), et alors que l’opinion publique est majoritairement en faveur d’une régulation fédérale (contrôle des antécédents psychiatriques et/ou judiciaires, interdiction des fusils d’assaut) que souhaitent Biden et Harris, les élu.e.s républicain.e.s du Congrès ne voteront probablement jamais avec les démocrates en ce sens.

Et, last but not least, le projet de loi voulu par Biden pour garantir l’accès au vote de tous et de toutes, alors que dans plus de quarante États fédérés, les républicains veulent réduire, par de nouvelles législations, le vote anticipé, le vote par correspondance ou encore contraindre l’électorat à disposer de papiers d’identité avec photo – tout cela, afin de limiter le vote des minorités ethniques. « From Jim Crow to Jim Eagle », pour paraphraser le président, furieux de telles initiatives (qu’il a qualifiées de « malades » et d’« anti-américaines » le 25 mars).

Pour l’heure, Joe Biden mise sur son expérience passée de négociateur en chef quand il était sénateur et sur le savoir-faire de ses collaborateurs et collaboratrices. Mais il y a longtemps que les couloirs du Capitole ne craignent plus le pouvoir d’un Josh Lyman.