Russland hat noch bis zum Mai 2023 den Vorsitz im Arktischen Rat. Aufgrund der russischen Kriegspolitik haben aber sieben der acht Arktisstaaten ihre Mitwirkung im Rat vorläufig eingestellt. Moskau ist davon in mehrfacher Hinsicht betroffen: Politisch wird damit ein Politikfeld beschädigt, in dem die internationale Bedeutung Russlands noch ungebrochen war. Wirtschaftlich steht die Zukunft wichtiger Industrieprojekte und Absatzmärkte Russlands auf dem Spiel. Außerdem tangiert die Unterbrechung der Ratsarbeit auch Interessen anderer Staaten wie China und wirkt sich nachteilig auf die russische Position in der Arktis aus. In Wissenschaft und Forschung haben alle westlichen Partner ihre Kooperation ausgesetzt. Zwar leidet Russland in besonderem Maße unter den Folgen des Klimawandels in der Arktis, doch schadet der zeitweilige Stopp klimarelevanter Forschung letztlich der ganzen Welt. Militärisch suchen Finnland und Schweden ihren Schutz in der Nato. Das konterkariert die ursprüngliche Absicht des Kremls, den Einflussbereich der transatlantischen Allianz zurückzudrängen. Zudem wäre Russlands Grenze mit Nato-Staaten dann doppelt so lang wie zuvor.
There are currently a significant number of protracted armed conflicts worldwide. Illicit economies and their links to violent actors are frequently cited as reasons for their persistence. Drug cultivation, production, and trafficking in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar have been garnering attention recently since they can undermine peace processes and contribute toward rising levels of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is particularly difficult to grasp the situation in conflict zones and understand the networks of internal and external actors linked to illicit economies due to the limited information base. This also holds true for the violent conflicts in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR) that have been going on for extended periods of time. However, since United Nations (UN) sanctions apply in all three contexts, there are extensive and regularly available sources of information provided by the reports of the UN Panels of Experts that monitor sanctions implementation. These investigative teams provide valuable insights into illicit economies in conflict zones and their links to peace and security. Looking at the reports for Mali, the DRC, and CAR from the last five years helps to identify some common patterns that defy simple solutions, but that can also show entry points for action.
On May 10, 2022, the International Peace Institute’s (IPI) Board of Directors elected several new members.
The Honorable Kevin Rudd, Chair of IPI’s Board Directors, said: “I’m delighted to announce the seven new members who have been elected to join IPI’s Board of Directors. Their collective experience, integrity, and knowledge of international affairs will help lead the organization forward as we innovate to face the ever-evolving global challenges of the day.”
New Members of IPI’s Board of Directors (Listed in alphabetical order by first name)
• Amy Towers: Former Chief Operating Officer of Glenview Capital Management; Founder of the Nduna Foundation; Co-founder (in partnership with UNICEF Zimbabwe) of CCORE, the Collaborating Centre for Operational Research and Evaluation in Harare, Zimbabwe; and Trustee for Women for Women International
• Badr Jafar: CEO of Crescent Enterprises and President of Crescent Petroleum; Founding Patron of the Centre for Strategic Philanthropy at the Cambridge Judge Business School; and Founder of the Pearl Initiative
• Ewout Steenbergen: Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, S&P Global; and Chair of the Board of Directors of UNICEF USA
• Mads Nipper: President and CEO of Ørsted
(Ørsted is the largest energy company in Denmark—globally producing 90% of their energy from renewable sources.)
• Michelle Yeoh: PSM, Actor; Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); and Road Safety Ambassador for the “Make Roads Safe” campaign and the FIA Foundation
• Owen Pell: President of the Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities; and Retired Partner of Counsel, White & Case LLP
• Suzy Wahba: Senior Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University; Former Anchor on Bloomberg Television; and Former Vice-Chair of Hands Along the Nile
An invitation has been extended to an eighth new board member and the matter is now pending.
IPI’s Board of Directors provides strategic leadership, oversight, and guidance for the organization on matters concerning governance and financial sustainability, working closely with the President and CEO.
On April 24 2022, Emmanuel Macron was elected for a second 5-year term as President of the French Republic. So, what does this mean for French (and European) international policy? According to the French Constitution, Macron cannot run again for the next election, thus he has free rein to run the diplomacy he truly wants. This second term is not dedicated to his re-election but rather to his historical legacy.
In Europe, and more broadly in the Western World, there was a strong sense of relief after Macron’s re-election. The reason is quite obvious: he was opposed to Marine Le Pen, the French far-right leader, whose hostility towards the European Union, and pro-Russian tendency, has been at the center of her political DNA. Even though she softened her policy on ditching the euro single currency, one of her major pledges 5 years ago, she still considers the European Union as detrimental to French sovereignty, leaving it incapable of protecting French people from the threats and perils of globalization. Le Pen also sought to reassess the Franco-German alliance (the bedrock of the European project since its inception), pull France out of NATO’s military command, and launch a strategic rapprochement between NATO and Russia, which could be considered somewhat bizarre given Russia’s ongoing military operation in Ukraine.
Le Pen’s admiration for Putin is motivated by ideological values – he claims to defend Christian civilization against Muslims and to share similar views with Le Pen on societal matters. However, there are also psychological and economic factors at play, such as the need to have a strongman leading the country and the millions of euros Le Penn borrowed from a Russian bank 5 years ago to fund her presidential campaign.[1] As Macron told her during a debate between the two: “When you speak to Putin, you are speaking to your banker.”[2]
It was crystal clear why Marine Le Pen’s candidacy, and possible election, was perceived as a major threat by France’s European and Western partners. She was little known beyond the Western world, but broadly considered as lacking experience on international issues. Putin was probably the only head of state (besides the far-right Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban) who had wished for Le Pen to enter the Elysée Palace. And if the French political system (two-round election) was considered a bulwark against extremist parties, there was a growing perception that Le Pen’s arrival at Elysée Palace was no longer impossible. She was Macron’s main opponent, and while disappointment with leaders is a general trend around the world, this sentiment was particularly strong in France. Macron, unlike in 2017, was no longer perceived, both in France and abroad, as a young and brilliant leader able to give a new dynamism to France, but rather was regarded as a president unable to understand the circumstances and problems of low-income citizens.
The duel between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen was a remake of the 2017 elections. Both these elections witnessed a confrontation between a pro-European, pro-globalization candidate, who saw opening to the world as an opportunity for France, and an anti-European, anti-globalization candidate, who considered the external world as a threat to national identity and social equity. Macron was considered as the president of the wealthy, those in favor of globalization, and Marine Le Pen as the champion of have-nots and underprivileged people.
If in 2017 Macron triggered a huge enthusiasm among European political leaders and the media (The Economist, at the time, had published on its front cover a picture of Macron walking on water, id est a man able to perform miracles[3]), this time his election was met with just a mere sense of relief. Macron’s election has not fulfilled a dream among European political leaders and commentators. It has, however, precluded the nightmare of Marine Le Pen as president.
Macron did not meet Europe’s expectations during his first term due to various difficulties. The protests of the “Yellow Vests” and the perception that he was the president of the wealthy[4] presented him with major challenges, as did international issues related to Trump’s policies, Brexit, and then the Covid-19 crisis. What can we expect from his second term? Clearly, the strategic landscape seems in no way to favor his ambitions. Most of the current international tendencies are not compatible with traditional French diplomatic ambitions and perspectives.
The Russian aggression in Ukraine, a clear violation of international law, rules out any possibility of a French-Russian partnership or cooperation in the coming years, at least not while Putin is in charge. And no one can bet on the possibility of a regime change in Moscow any time soon. Putin could still be in power at the end of Macron’s second term. Unfortunately, since De Gaulle and the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, playing with Moscow on the geopolitical field has been a main feature of French international policy. During the Second World War, De Gaulle was often at odds with Churchill and Roosevelt. Thus, Moscow served as a counterweight, enabling De Gaulle to enhance his capacity of action. According to De Gaulle, the future of Europe was contingent on the entente between Russia[5] and France. After De Gaulle, every French president, and first and foremost François Mitterrand, who was a fierce De Gaulle opponent, followed the same line, with their own personality.
France’s priority was independence, and US protection at times felt a bit oppressive. As a Western country not aligned with Washington, and as a non-communist country enjoying good relations with Moscow, France had a specific diplomacy with no equivalent, allowing her to punch above her weight. Due to its nuclear deterrence, France was less dependent on the US nuclear umbrella and less fearful of Moscow, and saw its relationship with Moscow as a way to reinforce its room of maneuver.
However, this is no longer the case. Relations between Russia and the West have been going downhill for the past 15 years. In 2007, Putin criticized the West’s strive for world domination. The war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, NATO’s military intervention in Libya in 2011 and the killing of Khadafi, a partner of Moscow, and Moscow’s support of the Bashar Al Assad regime during the Syrian civil war only added fuel to the fire. The overthrow of the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych and the annexation of Crimea further worsened the situation. But a dialogue was still possible between Paris and Moscow. Nowadays, it is impossible. Relations have been frozen for a while now and Paris has lost some freedom of movement.
In November 2019, Macron declared that NATO was brain-dead.[6] His goal, when elected for his first term, was to push for European strategic autonomy and make Europe less dependent on Washington. Thanks to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, NATO has never been so strong and united. Every European country is now certain that, as far as security is concerned, NATO is the only game in town and the only one that can deter a potential Russian aggression. US strategic credibility, which was at stake after the Kabul disaster, has never been so robust. US President Biden, by stating that Washington will not send US troops to protect Ukraine, has sparked interest in NATO membership – Finland and Sweden are considering departing from their neutrality to join the alliance. Therefore, pleading again for European autonomy would be considered a foolish idea for European partners. It is the French project of European strategic sovereignty which is brain-dead. It will take a very long time to resume normal relations with Moscow. Europe is once again divided.
It is quite ironic, actually. So far, Russia’s military performance has shown that its army is far from being an overwhelming threat. Unable to defeat the Ukrainian army, it is hard to imagine that the Russian army would be able to achieve victory against a NATO country. Nevertheless, European countries have increased their military defense spending since Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, while seeking protection by Washington.
On the Sahel front, we could hesitate between ‘failure’ or ‘stalemate’ to describe the actual situation. But ‘success’ is far from the reality of the situation. The link between France and Mali is broken and victory against terrorism is not in sight. In 2013, just after the French intervention, which prevented jihadist groups from reaching Bamako, France and President Hollande were acclaimed in Mali.[7] However, they are now accused of being neocolonialists and are no longer welcome.[8]
In general, the situation is gloomy for France in Africa. Not only is Paris no longer Africa‘s cop, but its prestige has also deteriorated. The rise of the far right in France is part of the explanation, but so is France’s will to maintain relations with authoritarian French-speaking regimes (Togo, Chad, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon), most of them inefficient and unpopular, as well as its will to establish links with the civil society and the young generation of students – two contradictory goals. France is perceived by the youth as a protector of corrupted regimes, incapable of developing their country and society, and only interested in protecting their own interests.[9]
The situation in the Middle East is also problematic. Lebanon is in big trouble and Macron does not have a magic wand to fix the problem. He challenged the political elite of the country, blaming them for the disaster the country was facing. But this elite is still in charge. Internal difficulties in Algeria (the Hirak mass protest movement) too have had a negative impact on French-Algerian relations. Paris has also given up on its efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as has the whole international community. Thus, Paris has lost the prestige it once had as the proud advocate of noble causes. Fortunately for Macron, relations between France and the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent with Saudi Arabia, are at their peak, with intense cooperation on the economic, cultural and military fronts.
There could, however, be some hope for Macron if he can manage to make some positive contributions. So, what can he do? The first file would be the fight against climate change. France has strong arguments having hosted the COP21 summit in 2015, which successfully culminated in the signing of the Paris Agreement on climate change (for the first time in history, all countries were united under a common cause). Green issues are of particular importance, specifically among the younger populations, hence this would be a prime opportunity for Macron to take the lead in this mission.
The defense and promotion of multilateralism is another important area of focus for Macron. The crisis of multilateralism has been at the centre of some of the most critical strategic issues facing the world today. France is in a fortunate position to launch a campaign in an effort to create a united front in defense of multilateralism. Though France has sufficient power to exert influence in global affairs, it does not have enough to act unilaterally.
And last but not least, France could be a key player, along with other European actors such as Germany, in preventing a possible escalation between the Western world and Russia, thereby precluding a global confrontation between an authoritarian axis and a coalition of democracies. After more than 30 years since the end of the Cold war, between the US and China, France must strive to prevent a new division of the world and make this a strategic priority.
But the main challenge for Macron is to enhance, and even restore, France’s international soft power. His ability to reinforce France’s international influence, therefore, might lie on domestic issues. Due to the rise of the far-right movement, many internal political debates are focused on refugees and migrants, which are deemed as a threat. The same could be said about Islam and Muslims. Many political leaders and commentators seem to be obsessed by Islam. The proposal to ban the veil in universities, and even public spaces, is not only contrary to the true definition of the French concept of Laïcité[10] (which gives everyone the freedom to believe in what they want to believe in), but is also a subject that incites a great deal of consternation around the world.
France, which once portrayed the image of being active in the promotion of human rights, is now perceived as hostile to religious minorities, specifically the Muslim community. France, which at the beginning of this century was the most popular Western nation in the world, is now one of the most unpopular, not only in Muslim countries but also in Western ones that are more progressive on religious issues. In a globalized world, the national debates taking place within a country are monitored and scrutinized by the outside word.
Published by Trends.
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References
[1] Romain Geoffroy and Maxime Vaudano, “What Are Marine Le Pen’s Ties to Vladimir Putin’s Russia?” Le Monde, April 21, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2022/04/21/what-are-marine-le-pen-s-ties-to-vladimir-putin-s-russia_5981192_8.html.
[2] John Timsit, “Débat Macron-Le Pen : «Vous parlez à votre banquier quand vous parlez de la Russie», lance le président-candidat à sa concurrente” Le Figaro, April 20, 2022, https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/debat-macron-le-pen-vous-parlez-a-votre-banquier-quand-vous-parlez-de-la-russie-lance-le-president-candidat-a-sa-concurrente-20220420.
[3] “Electoral Victory Will Make France’s President a Potent Force,” The Economist, June 17, 2017, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/06/17/electoral-victory-will-make-frances-president-a-potent-force.
[4] He suppressed the symbolic wealth tax and made many comments perceived as scornful by low-income citizens.
[5] Most of the time, De Gaulle used the term Russia instead of Soviet Union or USSR, favoring the geographical definition over the political one and setting aside the fact that it was a communist regime.
[6] “Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO is Becoming Brain-Dead,” The Economist, November 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead.
[7] “French President Hollande Gets Warm Welcome in Bamako,” DW, February 2, 2013, https://www.dw.com/en/french-president-hollande-gets-warm-welcome-in-bamako/a-16572171.
[8] Paul Melly, “Why France Faces So Much Anger in West Africa,” BBC News, December 5, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59517501.
[9] Olivier Caslin, “En Afrique, un sentiment anti-français bien ancré,“ Jeune Afrique, December 18, 2020, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1092996/politique/en-afrique-un-sentiment-anti-francais-bien-ancre/.
[10] According to Laïcité, there is no official religion in France (though Catholicism used to be the official religion). The state is neutral regarding religion. Every citizen is free to choose one or none.
The war in Ukraine is set to increase the pressure on Turkey’s balancing policy, shed light on the role of anti-Westernism in Ankara-Moscow relations, and reshape Turkey’s relations with Russia and the West. The balancing policy will face a less permissive environment. However, a rupture in Turkey-Russia relations is not to be expected. Given the prohibitive cost of a breakdown, Ankara will strive to maintain functional bilateral relations with Moscow. More broadly, despite the changed context, Turkey will continue to seek autonomy in its foreign and security policy. This quest precedes the balancing policy and was not driven solely by discontent with the West. It was also informed by Turkey’s reading of the global order becoming more multipolar and less Western-centric. In spite of similarities in their narratives, the Turkish and Russian anti-Westernisms manifest themselves differently in policy terms. Finally, Russia’s geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey and the West relatively closer together in matters geopolitical and strategic, provided that Turkey’s current blockage of Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership bid is resolved in the not too distant future.
The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in June 2022. In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-hosted a virtual roundtable discussion on April 19, 2022. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN stakeholders, civil society representatives, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in Mali in a frank and collaborative environment. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MINUSMA’s mandate and the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.
Participants agreed that MINUSMA has an important role to play in Mali and that the mission’s mandated priorities still align with the areas where the UN can bring the most added value. But they also noted that MINUSMA alone cannot address all the critical challenges and that the mission is already spread thin across a dangerous operating environment. Given the rapidly changing dynamics in the country and throughout the Sahel region, some participants saw this as an opportunity for the UN Security Council to engage in strategic reflection about MINUSMA’s future.
Participants raised several points for consideration during the upcoming negotiations on MINUSMA’s mandate renewal:
Dans le cadre de la guerre en Ukraine, les Occidentaux, et notamment l’Europe, justifient leur soutien à l’Ukraine par la nécessaire défense de leurs valeurs. Si la dénonciation des crimes de guerre, la défense des droits de l’homme et d’une nation attaquée illégalement sont effectivement des valeurs défendues par les Européens, et qu’il existe une certaine proximité culturelle avec l’Ukraine qui justifie une mobilisation plus importante que dans le cadre d’autres conflits, il reste indéniable que ce soutien est également le fait d’intérêts qu’il est nécessaire d’assumer. Cela renforcerait la légitimité des Européens à soutenir l’Ukraine et rendrait certainement leurs positions plus audibles à l’égard du reste du monde.
L’analyse de Pascal Boniface.
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On the occasion of a visit to the United States of a delegation of Ukrainian women leaders, IPI and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) co-hosted an event on the gender dimensions of the war in Ukraine on May 19th. The delegation included members of the Ukrainian parliament, human rights advocates, anti-corruption experts, and influential civil society activists who shared information about the ongoing war in Ukraine and the external support needed to advance a peace process.
Women and girls always suffer from the atrocities of war, yet they are not just silent victims. From the first days of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian women have fought in the military and territorial defense forces, served on the diplomatic and informational front lines, and played a central role in decision making. They have saved dozens of lives as doctors, nurses, hospital workers, volunteers, activists, and train conductors. They have given birth in metro stations and basements used as bomb shelters. They continue to support the economy through their work in agriculture, manufacturing, information technology, and the service sector, as well as by running businesses. Those living overseas have organized mass protests in countries all over the world.
However, hundreds of women and girls in Ukraine have become victims of sexual assault and torture committed by the Russian army, and reports have documented the increasing use of rape as a weapon of war. At the same time, women and girls who have fled to Poland struggle to access abortions and are vulnerable to human trafficking and victimization by their hosts. As most men are prohibited from leaving Ukraine, many women refugees also bear multiple burdens as caretakers of children and the elderly and the sole breadwinners for their families.
Despite the critical role women are playing in Ukraine, the perspective of women has been noticeably absent from the dominant narratives about the war. To remedy this, this event provided a gender perspective on the war in Ukraine, focusing on the vital need for women’s involvement in both a potential peace process and the eventual process of national reconstruction.
Opening Remarks:
Dr. Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President and COO
Mr. Marcel Röthig, Director, Ukraine and Moldova Office, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Speakers:
Ms. Halyna Yanchenko, Member, Ukrainian Parliament
Ms. Olena Tregub, Secretary General, Independent Defence Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO)
Moderator:
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of the Women, Peace, and Security Program
En 2011, un rapport du Pew Research Center estimait qu’en 2020, les musulmans seraient 28 010 000 sur le territoire chinois. Si l’Islam est encore souvent associé aux pays arabes, aujourd’hui il se situe pourtant majoritairement en Asie, et notamment en Chine. Combien le pays compte-t-il de musulmans ? Et qui sont-ils ?
Sur les 55 minorités officiellement reconnues en Chine, 10 sont majoritairement de confession musulmane sunnite. Les deux principales de ces minorités sont les Huis et les Ouïghours. Divers groupes dissidents de musulmans chinois estiment à 132 millions le nombre de musulmans pour l’ensemble du pays, soit près de 10 % de la population nationale. Leur nombre exact n’est pas communiqué officiellement, ou est revu délibérément à la baisse. Les Ouïghours, au nombre de 12 millions [d’après le recensement de 2017], vivent majoritairement dans le Nord-Ouest du pays, dans la province du Xinjiang. Ils sont turcophones et soufis. Les Huis sont d’ethnie han, tôt ou tard convertis à l’islam. Ils constituent la majorité des musulmans de Chine. Le gouvernement chinois, à l’instar autrefois des Soviétiques, leur reconnaît un statut de « minorité » (minzu) à part entière. Les Huis ont été associés à l’histoire des routes de la soie en se situant traditionnellement dans des régions de passages et de commerce. Ainsi les trouve-t-on au Qinghai, au Gansu dans le Nord-Ouest du pays, ou au Yunnan, dans le Sud (dans les régions respectivement limitrophes de l’Asie centrale et du Tibet) en tant que restaurateurs ou jadis, comme peaussiers et commerçants de musc ou de thé. Leur rôle a été considérable en tant que passeurs entre le monde musulman et la Chine proprement dite. Aujourd’hui encore, ils se reconnaissent à leur hybridité culturelle. Enseignes de restaurant en lettres arabes et en idéogrammes ou signes de reconnaissance vestimentaire constituent les codes les plus visibles de ce sentiment d’appartenance. Bien que se disant citoyens chinois, et reconnus comme tels, les Huis ont en partage avec les Ouïghours le sentiment d’appartenir à une communauté universelle, l’Oumma. Elle dépasse et de loin les frontières chinoises et désigne avant tout la communauté des croyants. Lui est associée l’usage de l’arabe. Langue de la Révélation, langue du Coran, l’arabe structure car elle est la langue de la foi, mais elle place aussi tout croyant non arabe en une sorte d’exil chez soi, au plus proche. Être un étranger chez soi : un impossible séjour, pourtant bien réel. Cette situation dit aussi une condition de l’homme moderne. Car, que l’on soit ouïghour, pachtoune ou pendjabi, c’est-à-dire issu d’un islam asiatique aujourd’hui majoritaire, les mythologies politiques et auxquelles on adhère sont inspirées d’un creuset arabo-musulman qui s’est forgé pour le Prophète et ses compagnons dans l’épreuve : celle d’une exclusion. Et, pour les membres de la communauté comme pour les États musulmans s’y référant, cet acte fondateur reste un marqueur identitaire. Ces référents mythologiques sont étrangers à la Chine han. Et en dépit d’une acculturation certaine de la communauté hui, celle-ci, au moins depuis le XIXe siècle, a été associée d’une manière récurrente à des crises politiques graves, qui ont largement concouru à la chute de la dernière dynastie impériale Qing (1644-1911). Xi Jinping est avisé sur ce point, comme il sait aussi que le succès de son projet colossal des nouvelles routes de la soie dépend très largement de relations stables entre la Chine et les pays musulmans. N’oublions pas que c’est successivement au Kazakhstan puis en Indonésie — deux États musulmans asiatiques — que le président chinois a officiellement annoncé, en 2013, le lancement des nouvelles routes de la soie terrestre et maritime. Le fait, par ailleurs, que le chef de la diplomatie chinoise, Wang Yi, ait appelé son pays à établir des relations « amicales » avec le régime taliban, de nouveau au pouvoir en Afghanistan voisin, dès le mois d’août 2021, va également dans ce sens.
Quand l’islam est-il apparu en Chine et sous quelle forme ? Quelle a été la position du pouvoir chinois à l’égard de l’islam au cours de l’Histoire ?
Dès la première moitié du VIIe siècle, l’existence de communautés marchandes musulmanes dans les villes portuaires de Quanzhou ou Guangzhou (actuelle Canton) mais aussi dans la capitale impériale même, Chang’an (actuelle Xi’an), est attestée. Constituées d’arabophones et de persanophones, elles empruntent des routes terrestres et maritimes et sont d’une manière générale plutôt bien tolérées, jusqu’au moment où le pouvoir de la dynastie T’ang (618-907), se sentant menacé, organise de vastes conjurations contre le pouvoir des étrangers. Au même titre que les communautés bouddhistes alors persécutées, ces communautés subiront à plusieurs reprises des épreuves, marquées à la fois par la terreur et par la purge. En termes de gouvernance, il s’agit là de régulateurs politiques que le pouvoir chinois actuel n’a en rien abandonnés. Mais la grande période de l’islam en Chine correspond à deux autres phases bien plus déterminantes encore. C’est d’abord celle de la dynastie des Qarakhanides (XIIe siècle) se traduisant, et pour la première fois de leur histoire, par la conversion des populations turciques de l’actuel Xinjiang à la religion du Prophète. Leur capitale, Kachgar, en est un centre de rayonnement culturel et intellectuel.
L’acharnement des autorités chinoises depuis ces dernières années à vouloir détruire ce lieu de mémoire manifeste clairement leur volonté d’éradiquer toute trace de ce passé prestigieux auxquels peuvent s’identifier les Ouïghours. La seconde phase survient moins d’un siècle plus tard, avec l’instauration de la dynastie mongole des Yuan (1234-1368). Cette période est synonyme de brassages inédits pour des populations parfois originaires de l’Asie centrale. Au contact de la Chine, elles introduisent des spiritualités et une culture matérielle d’un genre nouveau. D’un pôle à l’autre de l’Eurasie, le conquérant mongol se fond alors dans les réalités culturelles et sociales préexistantes. Ainsi, dans l’espace persan, le pouvoir s’appuie sur la réalité locale, quitte à composer entre des traditions juridiques pourtant antinomiques (yasa mongole contre charia islamique) ou en faisant appel à des éléments étrangers pour se renforcer. Hommes de guerre, administrateurs et artistes de confession musulmane seront de ceux-là. L’empire mongol dispose d’une panoplie de moyens qu’il est le seul à mobiliser pour assurer la sécurité de ses intérêts.
L’aménagement d’un réseau de communication en est un. Le projet des nouvelles routes de la soie en est le lointain héritier. Bien avant la mise en place de ce projet, le pouvoir maoïste a saisi que l’utilisation des communautés musulmanes de Chine et de leurs représentants faciliterait la mise en contact du régime communiste chinois avec des pays musulmans étrangers, comme l’avait fait avant lui le gouvernement de Chiang Kaï-Shek, voire celui du Japon dans l’espoir de se concilier certaines populations centrasiatiques comme les Tatars contre les Russes. C’est par l’intermédiaire de ces missi dominici que Pékin établira ses premières relations avec l’Égypte de Nasser ou la Palestine de Yasser Arafat.
Quel est l’héritage de la religion musulmane dans la Chine actuelle ?
Culture et religion musulmanes sont indissociables. Et de ce point de vue, l’héritage est considérable. Sur le plan artistique et patrimonial tout d’abord, avec le plan même de la capitale, Pékin, que la tradition attribue à un architecte de confession musulmane, sans compter le « bleu blanc » de Chine, porcelaine des Ming, qui est la synthèse entre des techniques de cuisson proprement chinoises, la terre de kaolin et le bleu perse de cobalt. Son exportation dès le Moyen Âge à des dizaines de millions d’exemplaires inondera les contrées du Moyen-Orient et, plus tardivement, les pays d’une Europe qui connaîtra à son tour et au XVIIIe siècle une véritable sinophilie. Le régime communiste rappelle aussi avec fierté que Zheng He, amiral de confession musulmane, a, au XVe siècle, découvert la Corne de l’Afrique. Sa découverte confère à cette figure historique la valeur d’un mythe politique, mis en avant par l’État-Parti afin de montrer que la Chine impériale a su établir, bien avant les Européens, des relations avec des peuples de l’Asie et de l’Afrique, musulmans ou non. L’Islam a véhiculé aussi sur les marges de l’espace chinois une rationalité empruntée à la culture hellénistique et suscité d’un point de vue métaphysique des interrogations que se posera de nouveau l’élite chinoise au contact des premiers missionnaires jésuites. Que peut signifier la croyance en un Dieu unique ? Qu’est-ce que l’Être ? Qu’est-ce que la question du sens ? Qu’est-ce que la liberté ?… « Le Ciel lui-même parle-t-il jamais ? » s’interrogeait, déjà en son temps, Confucius. La Chine est sans doute de toutes les civilisations celle qui se situe le plus aux antipodes de nos traditions monothéistes. Même si des tentatives d’accommodements continuent d’avoir lieu, elles n’en sont pas moins très difficiles. La Chine est en cela un champ de forces et le combat des Ouïghours pour la défense de leur identité interroge sur le choix des valeurs. Quelle société voulons-nous ? Une société matérialiste, axée sur des impératifs de croissance, comme le prône Pékin, ou autre chose, en termes d’épanouissement spirituel par exemple ? Ce questionnement n’est pas vain. La Chine est l’un des pays au monde où le nombre de convertis à l’islam ou au christianisme connaît une accélération sans précédent (1). C’est un véritable défi pour l’État-Parti, tant sur le plan moral que politique.
Dans votre ouvrage, vous citez John Lagerwey (2) en comparant le fonctionnement de l’État chinois à celui d’une Église. Pourquoi ?
C’est que l’État-Parti a socialement reproduit une oligarchie, de plus de quatre-vingt-dix millions de membres aujourd’hui, avec ses prébendes et ses grand-messes. Excommunications, hérésies et réhabilitations en rythment l’histoire. Son accélération est synonyme de crises, de purges. Souvent très graves, elles mettent en péril l’équilibre de l’appareil. Son fonctionnement est incompatible avec une trop grande hétérogénéité de vues. Le Parti reste extrêmement vigilant pour contrôler l’opinion, ses relais et institutions. Autant de contre-pouvoirs considérés comme dangereux au monopole de son autorité. Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Bo Xilai ou Zhou Yongkang, caciques historiques du régime, en furent les plus illustres victimes. Sans compter les millions d’anonymes et parmi eux, de croyants. Jamais ces derniers n’ont été admis à critiquer l’État, son discours, ses fondements qui sont aussi ceux du Parti. Ce dernier fonctionne en soi comme une véritable église, en effet. Se comprennent d’autant mieux ses très grandes réticences à établir des relations avec des pouvoirs religieux, lesquels — durant le long et douloureux XIXe siècle — ont souvent été tout particulièrement associés au pouvoir des étrangers.
Existe-t-il des tensions ou une solidarité entre les ethnies hui et ouïghoure ?
Ethniquement, comme nous l’avons dit, les premiers sont des Hans — donc de culture chinoise —, tandis que les seconds sont turcophones. Toutefois, historiquement, des alliances ont pu avoir lieu entre différentes obédiences, du temps des Seigneurs de la guerre notamment, moins par solidarité entre musulmans, d’ailleurs, que par un commun rejet de l’État. On retrouve par ailleurs des clivages traversant dès la fin du XVIIIe siècle l’ensemble du monde musulman entre djadidistes (réformateurs) et conservateurs dans le choix des langues interprétatives des textes sacrés, certains étant favorables à l’usage du persan, tandis que d’autres s’emploient au recours exclusif de l’arabe. L’islam confrérique est par ailleurs beaucoup plus vivace chez les Ouïghours et permet à cette communauté persécutée de développer des connexions étendues bien au-delà du Xinjiang, en Asie centrale postsoviétique notamment. La Révolution culturelle (1966-76), son cortège d’atrocités et d’humiliations, a provoqué une prise de conscience de la difficulté à pratiquer sa foi en régime communiste. Des vexations discriminatoires (obligation de célébrer l’année du porc, destruction de mosquées au nom de normes architecturales proprement chinoises, refus d’une mise en circulation de biens de consommation hallal, interdiction du port du voile dans les lieux publics depuis 2001…) ont créé des crispations identitaires, et même si les persécutions sont sans commune mesure côté ouïghour, elles provoquent un mécontentement certain et des frustrations identitaires au sein de la communauté hui. Des choix de radicalisation avérés sont observables tant chez les Ouïghours que chez les Huis, et même si aucun État musulman n’a manifesté la moindre solidarité à leur égard, il n’est pas impossible que les choses changent. On note au Pakistan un nombre croissant d’attentats contre des ressortissants chinois, et des maquisards ouïghours ont rejoint des groupuscules terroristes en Afghanistan.
Alors que la communauté internationale, en particulier occidentale, s’insurge contre les exactions commises à l’encontre des Ouïghours — certains parlant de « génocide » —, pour quelles raisons le monde musulman ne se mobilise-t-il pas davantage pour soutenir cette minorité ?
Les Ouïghours apparaissent davantage comme un problème que comme une solution. Que pèsent 12 millions de personnes (autant au sein de la diaspora) face aux milliards de dollars d’investissements qui sont en jeu dans les échanges économiques entre la Chine et le reste du monde ? Pas grand-chose. Seuls les Turcs pourraient se montrer plus solidaires avec les Ouïghours, avec lesquels les affinités de langue, de culture et de religion sont grandes. Mais en tout cas pas les Arabes, encore moins les Iraniens qui, étant chiites, n’y voient aucun intérêt — et encore moins d’un point de vue de leur politique énergétique. Que l’administration américaine, avec Trump, puis les Européens, aient condamné les répressions s’inscrit dans le choix d’une radicalité tous azimuts à l’encontre de la Chine. Pour louable qu’elle soit, cette politique en matière de droits de l’homme manque toutefois et singulièrement de cohérence. Les Occidentaux continuent en toute impunité de bombarder des populations musulmanes au Moyen-Orient et ne disent mot sur les persécutions des chrétiens en Chine. Et le relatif silence des capitales occidentales concernant les exactions commises par Narendra Modi à l’encontre des musulmans en Inde en dit long aussi sur des partis pris qui sont en l’espèce avant tout instrumentalisés et de nature idéologique.
Avant même la chute de Kaboul le 15 août dernier et le retour au pouvoir des talibans, les diplomates chinois avaient pris soin d’accueillir certains de ces dignitaires islamistes. Quelle sera l’approche de Pékin vis-à-vis des talibans ? Quels sont les enjeux pour la Chine ?
Il s’agit avant tout pour Pékin de sécuriser son étranger proche et de pérenniser son projet des nouvelles routes de la soie. C’est le prolongement vers l’Afpak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] et l’ouverture sur l’Iran que convoite Pékin, pour ainsi, dans une alliance de revers, s’appuyer sur son allié pakistanais contre l’Inde. La connaissance par les diplomates chinois des talibans est ancienne. De 1996 à 2001, Pékin était la seule puissance avec Islamabad à avoir établi des relations diplomatiques avec le régime taliban. Avant même l’instauration de ce régime, la Chine avait, dans le contexte de la guerre froide, soutenu les moudjahidines aux côtés de la CIA contre les Soviétiques. Pragmatique, la diplomatie chinoise ne s’embarrasse pas d’idéologie. Mais son erreur est de concevoir le nouvel État afghan comme dépositaire de la seule légitimité politique. En réalité, l’Afghanistan est de facto régi par des principes anarchiques, où la vendetta, le code de l’honneur et la loi du talion constituent la règle. Elle s’impose entre grands féodaux, et Kaboul n’a jamais exercé qu’une autorité aussi relative que limitée dans le reste du pays, profondément marqué par ses structures claniques. Pékin semble avoir emporté la première manche en privilégiant les interlocuteurs talibans. Au reste, ce ne sont pas les seuls. Les Russes ont engagé des démarches similaires. Mais il y a fort à parier que ce qui s’apparente pour l’heure à une débandade américaine est un choix de retraite stratégique et que Washington va renforcer sa présence dans des pays riverains, livrant ainsi les Chinois à la béance afghane. Pékin fait le choix du développement économique pour acheter la paix sociale. Les opportunités dans l’exploitation des mines de cuivre ou des terres rares ne manquent pas. Seulement, les aspirations afghanes ne sont certainement pas celles des Chinois, et les pierres d’achoppement vont être nombreuses entre Pékin et les populations musulmanes dans cette partie du monde.
Propos recueillis par Léa Robert le 4 septembre 2021 pour Areion24news.
The crypto rollercoaster has consequences beyond the realm of mass speculation. It shapes key discussions on the future of money and the Internet, which revolve around notions of decentralization and economic power.
Web3: The Quest of Decentralization, and the Market Hype
The idea of Web3, with blockchain at its core, is meant as a promise of decentralization, a return to the spirit of web1 (whose early protocols still underpin the Internet). It aims to supersede Web2, marked by the rise of social media giants. They filled the void left by the absence of an identification protocol in the original Internet, in order to expand their control over personal data, for advertising purposes. Giving users back control of their data, through the blockchain, and ensuring interoperability across services is the key rationale behind web3. The idea that artists could use NFTs – usually defined as digital property certificates – to directly market their creations and cut the middleman is undeniably appealing. Similarly, programmable blockchains like Ethereum, with decentralized apps (dApps), could offer a prospect to overcome the exorbitant privilege wielded by app stores.
However, the main promise of web3 clashes with the reality of blockchains, caught up in the centralization of large exchanges and key venture capital firms. Besides, the massive crypto bubbles – fueled by herd behavior, shaky digital constructs and (central) monetary policy – do not quite fit with the common vision of financial and digital decentralization… A bubble is generally defined as a mismatch between the trend of an asset price and some underlying value. In the crypto bubble, the very idea of an underlying asset – or reality – has been derided. Some NFTs have pushed that logic with undeniable humor, like those based on drawings of adorable monkeys and their ApeCoin…
The global financial landscape – with inflation-driven monetary tightening – is throwing many asset classes into trouble, drying up the liquidity flows that have fueled the rally. Extreme volatility has been a hallmark of cryptos since their inception, but the last few years have seen a considerable drift, based on authentic Ponzi schemes, with concepts as far-fetched as that of virtual land. The most recent projects rarely show the kind of monetary thinking that underpinned the (very experimental) creation of bitcoin in 2008, using the cryptographic concept of Merkle tree, developed as early as the 1970s.
Most of the confusion this time came from stablecoins, which aspired to be the poster child of cryptos by offering a fixed exchange rate with a currency, like the dollar. Some, however, operate without collateral… This is the case with TerraUSD, which relies on a highly vulnerable system of rebalancing, using a floating crypto named Luna. TerraUSD has seen its peg to the dollar collapse as result of massive outflows. Collateral-based, centralized stablecoins like Tether already show more resilience. Beyond reports of destabilizing movements by large investment funds betting on the downside, the rout has, in any case, occurred against a background of severe fragility.
Blockchain Is Still an Experiment, However Fascinating
The concept of monetary decentralization, using cryptography, remains exciting. It is a substantial contribution to the discussion on the nature of our monetary and banking system, and its reform. This system is said to be centralized in the sense that it relies on central banks, but also on the privilege of massive money creation by commercial banks (through loan issuance out of thin air) – centralized institutions indeed. On the other hand, the concept of decentralization is also relevant in the face of Big Tech’s concentration in the digital sector and its control over user data. This control is likely to increase exponentially with the level of immersion, as will be the case with the metaverse.
Overall, the crypto world needs to further question the purpose, stability and legal status of its constructs. The crypto-currencies and assets that have only capitalized on the bubble of the past few years are unlikely to thrive. The (few) true pioneers of blockchain keep insisting on its experimental nature. For example, a crucial discussion centers on overcoming proof of work (a mining mechanism based on a cryptographic contest between blockchain nodes), which comes at an exorbitant energy cost. Considerable effort is being made in this direction in the case of Ethereum, to move towards the more reasonable concept of proof of stake – which accredits the nodes on the basis of their proven involvement, like a substantial holding of the cryptocurrency. It is hard to see how bitcoin could reform in this direction. If web3 is to bear fruit in favor of any kind of decentralization, the crypto ecosystem will first have to refocus.
Regulation and Central Bank Digital Currencies Will Redefine the Landscape
Emerging and updated regulations – like MiCA and TFR in the European Union – focus mainly on the issue of anonymity and trafficking. This type of rules may indeed disrupt the model of crypto platforms and can be expected to spread worldwide. At the same time, other important pieces of regulation target Big Tech, like the twin Digital Services and Digital Markets acts, which the EU is in the process of ratifying. Competition policy is waking up to the challenges of the digital age. However, governments will have to find a balance between tackling Big Tech monopolies and regulating decentralized players, which present major risks but also opportunities to restore a healthier level of competition.
Public digital projects, especially on the monetary stage, are also crucial to seize the opportunity for reform. Central bank digital currencies are not crypto currencies as such but official currencies in their own right. They will be backed by their respective central bank (rather than a cryptographic creation mechanism) and enjoy full equivalence with other forms – digital or physical – of the currency. The development of CBDCs must be pursued in a more ambitious way to give more meaning and stability to money, with a more direct link between monetary authorities and economic players. This brings us back to discussions that have endured underground since the Great Depression (on the fractional reserve system). Admittedly, the emergence of crypto-currencies helped to revive the interest in these ideas, after the great recession. The crypto rout could undermine the interest in digital currencies as a whole. On the contrary, we should engage in a broad political reflection on the use of digital innovation to stabilize our monetary system.