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China estimates the number of people of Chinese origin outside the People’s Republic to be 60 million. Beijing considers them all to be nationals of China, regardless of their citizenship. Xi Jinping views overseas Chinese as playing an “irreplaceable role” in China’s rise as a world power. Beijing is working hard to harness overseas Chinese resources for its own goals in the fields of economics, science and technology, as well as diplomacy and soft power. Beijing also expects people of Chinese origin in Germany to deepen rela­tions between China and Germany. But not only that: As “unofficial ambassadors”, they are also expected to spread China’s narratives to the German public, defend China’s “core interests”, and help with the trans­fer of knowledge and technology to China. Nevertheless, there are limits to China’s diaspora policy: Chinese migrants’ reactions to China’s ambitions are heterogeneous. They range from wil­lingness to cooperate to disinterest or open rejection. German actors should develop a comprehensive understanding of Chinese diaspora policy and the goals and practices associated with it. Just as in Beijing, diaspora policy should be perceived as an important component of Chinese foreign policy. Only on this basis can answers to China’s ambitions be found wherever German interests, legal principles, or social values are affected – without at the same time exposing people of Chinese origin to general suspicion. German actors should also expand their engagement in communities of people with a Chinese migration background instead of leaving this field to Chinese authorities.

Die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen fanden in den letzten Jahren wenig Auf­merksamkeit, standen sie doch im Schatten der großen europäischen und interna­tionalen Krisen. Nachdem es 2021 in Berlin und Prag zu Regierungswechseln gekommen ist, hat sich das bilaterale Verhältnis spürbar intensiviert, auch weil der Krieg in der Ukraine eine verstärkte Abstimmung erforderlich machte. Deutschland und die Tschechische Republik weichen zwar bei einer Vielzahl europäischer Fragen voneinander ab, etwa in der Debatte über Zukunft, Erweiterung und Reform der EU oder bei der militärischen Unterstützung für die Ukraine. Gleichzeitig aber bestehen zahlreiche Schnittmengen, so dass die Unterschiede keineswegs unüberwindbar sind, zumal beide Länder in der Europapolitik nach wie vor einem pragmatischen Ansatz folgen. Im Gegenteil: Die Spannbreite der Positionen und ein konstruktiver Dialog können die deutsch-tschechischen Beziehungen zu einem der wenigen funktionieren­den Bilateralismen mit europäischem Mehrwert machen.

Following the Western Balkans Summit with EU leaders in Berlin on 3 November, the leaders of the six Western Balkan states signed three agreements for closer economic cooperation. The meeting took place within the framework of the Berlin Process, which since 2014 has aimed to promote regional integration. The “Open Balkan” initiative was also launched with a similar objective, namely closer regional cooperation.

With the aim of enabling the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital among its members, Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia signed agreements in 2019, initially under the name “Mini-Schengen” and since 2021 under the “Open Balkan” initiative (OBI). It focuses on economic issues that should noticeably improve the everyday lives of citizens in these countries. For example, declared goals include the mutual recognition of degrees and work permits as well as cooperation in disaster prevention and food security.

So far, the initiative, which is strongly supported by the United States, has been limited to intergovernmental formats and does not include an institutional framework, as is the case, for example, with the Regional Cooperation Council of the Western Balkan states in Sarajevo. Moreover, no treaty exists, which makes it difficult to define a clear goal and thus set expectations. Instead, there is an open invitation to all countries in the Western Balkans to participate in all or selected projects. For example, starting in January 2023, many restrictions on customs duties and capital transfers will be eliminated for the three OBI member states. The World Bank estimates that these measures will save 30 million hours of waiting time at the borders and 3.2 billion euros.

 

Internal and external criticism

Despite this positive momentum, so far only three of the six Western Balkan states are members of the OBI. Kosovo wants to avoid any impression of settling for a “waiting room” rather than full EU membership. Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, categorically rejected the initiative co-founded by Serbia, thereby allowing him to demonstrate domestic political strength. Moreover, calls for cooperation have so far been directed at “the provisional Pristina institutions” to underscore Serbia’s failure to recognise Kosovo, so this important formality alone is grounds for rejection.

The governments of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, are divided. In Sarajevo, the Serbian entity in government supports the OBI, which is rejected by the Bosnian and Croatian entities. Thus, the initiative has become a political tool for obstructionist politics and is not necessarily evaluated in terms of its content. Members of the government in Podgorica are also ambivalent. With the argument that the country is furthest along the path to EU membership, no new initiative should jeopardise this trajectory. However, Montenegro recently signalled interest and participated in the “Open Balkan” meeting in Ohrid as an observer.

The OBI receives little active support from the EU. With reference to the Berlin Process, which aims to guide the region towards EU membership, there are fears of duplication, which indeed cannot be ruled out. For example, in October 2022, agreements between all six Western Balkan states were finally negotiated within the framework of a Western Balkans conference, the content of which was also decided by the three countries of the OBI in June 2022. In both cases, the issue was the recognition of personal documents and the mutual recognition of degrees and professional qualifications.

However, this duplication can also be interpreted as intentional. After all, negotiations for these agreements began as early as 2021 within the framework of the Berlin Process. However, due to disagreements between Serbia and Kosovo, no compromise could be found for a long time. Then, in June 2022, the three OBI countries decided to move forward with the suggested agreements, but this became moot when a compromise between Serbia and Kosovo was finally reached in August 2022, and the agreements between all six Balkan States were signed in Berlin on 3 November. Such a sequence of events presumably led Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama to the somewhat inflated assessment that the OBI was an “implementation tool” of the Berlin Process.

 

Positive momentum

Overall, the OBI should be seen as complementary to the Berlin Process. After all, in addition to deeper regional cooperation arranged by the Western Balkan states themselves, it remains important for the countries of the Western Balkans to be closely involved in the EU’s decision-making process, be it in the joint purchase of gas, migration via the so-called Balkan route, the implementation of the green agenda, or the fight against cybercrime.

Moreover, it is of high symbolic importance that after more than 40 regional initiatives in the past 25 years, this one comes from the region itself and is thus associated with the often invoked “local ownership”. The fact that Albania and Serbia, which are by no means natural allies politically, have jointly launched this initiative is remarkable in itself. Beyond its symbolic value, the OBI holds other possibilities. Increased regional economic integration can spur foreign investment and strengthen the countries economically. This in turn can better prepare the countries of the Western Balkans for their integration into the EU single market and, among other things, counteract the “brain drain” from the region.

Seit dem gewaltsamen Tod von Präsident Idris Déby im April 2021 versucht die herr­schende Elite im Tschad, ihre Macht durch die dynastische Nachfolge seines Sohnes Mahamat zu sichern. Mit dem Beschluss von Oktober 2022, den Übergangsprozess um zwei Jahre zu verlängern und Mahamat Déby einstweilen zum Präsidenten zu ernen­nen, werden die Risiken dieser Bestrebungen deutlicher. Die Taktik, oppositionelle Eliten durch selektive Kooptation zu spalten, stößt mit dem Aufkommen populistischer Kräfte an ihre Grenzen. Sowohl in der Provinz als auch in der Hauptstadt heizen Macht- und Verteilungskämpfe eine Dynamik identitätspolitischer Konflikte an. Die Repression der zivilen Opposition durch das Regime spielt den Befürwortern eines bewaffneten Umsturzes in die Hände. Als Garant für Débys Überlegenheit gegenüber den Rebellen kommt Frankreich eine zunehmend unpopuläre Rolle zu.

President Vladimir Putin escalated Russia’s war on Ukraine in September 2022, announcing a partial mobilisation and repeating his threat to use nuclear weapons. But what really ended efforts to bring about peace – which had continued since the 24 February invasion – was the proclaimed annexation of the Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Cherson. Since his election in 2019, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on Putin to agree to a personal meeting, even in the first weeks of this year’s Russian invasion. But on 4 October 2022, in response to the actions of the Russian side, he signed a decree rejecting direct talks. Ever since the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, and all the more so since 24 February 2022, the course of Ukrainian-Russian negotiations has been highly dependent on the situation in the battlefield and the broader political context.

How the War in Ukraine and Big Power Tensions Could Derail the Bali G20 Summit

Die Entscheidung Wladimir Putins, die Ukraine anzugreifen, traf die 83 Föderationssubjekte Russlands unvorbereitet. Nach acht Kriegsmonaten zeigen sich in den Regio­nen die unmittelbaren Rückwirkungen des Krieges und die Folgen westlicher Wirt­schaftssanktionen. Der Kreml versucht, die Regionen insbesondere für die Mobilisierung von Soldaten, die Herrschaftssicherung in den besetzten ukrainischen Gebieten und die Eindämmung der wirtschaftlichen Rezession in die Pflicht zu nehmen. Dabei verteilt sich die Last des Krieges ungleich auf die Verwaltungseinheiten. Trotz Kriegs­zensur, Staatspropaganda und Massenemigration entlädt sich auf lokaler Ebene Un­mut über die Folgen des Krieges und den Umgang mit den gefallenen Soldaten.

Over the past few years, a growing barrage of disinformation has targeted UN peacekeeping operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk.

This paper provides an overview of the recent rise in disinformation against MINUSCA, MINUSMA, and MONUSCO. It also examines how these three peacekeeping operations have been addressing disinformation and the challenges they have faced. While these initial efforts have tended to focus on strategic communications, disinformation is not only a strategic communications issue; it affects all mission components, and effectively tackling it requires situating it in the broader political context and understanding its drivers.

This paper offers the following questions the UN Department of Peace Operations and individual missions could consider as they develop policies, guidelines, structures, and activities to address disinformation:

• How can missions develop a cross-cutting, strategic approach to disinformation? Disinformation is more than a technical or tactical issue; it is a political and strategic issue that requires the proactive attention of mission leaders.
• How can missions better monitor and analyze disinformation both online and offline? Monitoring disinformation is critical not only so missions can address it; tracking rumors also has intrinsic value by helping missions better listen to and understand the sentiments of local populations.
• How can missions respond to disinformation more quickly? For many UN personnel, the slowness of the UN response is one of the biggest challenges inhibiting their efforts to address disinformation.
• How can missions reshape anti-UN narratives? Anti-UN disinformation is woven into a broader anti-UN (and anticolonial) narrative that is grounded in both great-power politics and legitimate public grievances. In countering individual falsehoods, missions should consider whether and how they could also respond to this broader narrative.
• How can missions contribute to a healthier information environment? From the perspective of civil society, the most important shift the UN can make would be to focus more on supporting local journalists.
• Does the scale of the problem call for a more decisive shift in approach? Any shift in approach should be premised on the principle that under no circumstances should missions respond to disinformation with disinformation of their own.

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The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in November 2022. The upcoming negotiations among council members will unfold against the backdrop of renewed momentum for implementation of the country’s peace agreement. And while security dynamics in the Central African Republic (CAR) are somewhat more stable compared to the period leading up to last year’s mandate renewal, human rights and protection threats to civilians persist alongside underlying challenges of limited service provision, poor socioeconomic development, and significant humanitarian needs.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center co-hosted a roundtable discussion on October 11, 2022. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in CAR in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MINUSCA’s mandate and the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.

Participants agreed that MINUSCA’s strategic vision and priority tasks are still relevant to the UN’s overall engagement in the country. Participants also emphasized that the current mandate provides the mission with appropriate guidance to pursue the strategic direction provided by the Security Council while also giving the mission enough flexibility to pivot as new priorities or crises emerge. The mission will likely need to balance the following issues over the next mandate cycle:

• Supporting the government’s implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (the APPR) and the Luanda Joint Roadmap;
• Encouraging widespread civic engagement with and promoting the inclusivity of the formal political process;
• Continuing to coordinate political support from CAR’s regional and international partners;
• Strengthening its capabilities to conduct proactive, robust, and mobile protection efforts across the country;
• Safeguarding its human rights monitoring and investigation responsibilities;
• Maintaining a constructive dialogue with Central African authorities to ensure the mission’s freedom of movement and the effectiveness of its operations; and
• Laying the groundwork for accelerated delivery of humanitarian aid and long-term, locally driven development programming.

Participants emphasized that these points should all feature in the upcoming mandate and should be reinforced with unified political support from the Security Council and the country’s bilateral and regional partners.

Turnusgemäß hätte die 10. Überprüfungskonferenz des Nukle­aren Nichtverbreitungs­vertrags (Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT) 2020 stattfinden sollen. Nachdem sie viermal verschoben worden war, trafen sich die 191 NPT-Staaten im August 2022. Dass sie sich dabei nicht auf ein Schlussdokument einigen konnten, war spätestens seit der russischen Invasion der Ukraine erwartet worden. Indes spielte die Streitfrage der atomaren Abrüstung überraschenderweise keine Rolle für das Schei­tern der Konferenz – obwohl die Polarisierung hierüber seit Inkrafttreten des »Nuclear Ban Treaty« (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW) Anfang 2021 noch gewachsen war. Die nichtnuklearen NPT-Parteien machten größte Zugeständnisse, um die Konferenz keinesfalls scheitern zu lassen. Erst Russland torpedierte den Kon­sens. Dieser Verlauf zeigt, dass in einer angespannten Weltlage atomare Abrüstung als An­liegen für die Nichtkernwaffenstaaten weniger wichtig ist, als sie suggerieren. Dass die Stabilität des NPT nicht von Abrüstungsfortschritten abhängt, ist eine gute Nachricht. Für Deutsch­lands Natio­nale Sicherheitsstrategie (NSS) bedeutet dies, dass aus Gründen des NPT größere Rück­sichtnahme auf TPNW-Verfechter nicht nötig ist.

Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen befinden sich in einem Zustand von Dauerkonflikt und wechselseitiger Entfremdung. Eine Trias von Problemfeldern belastet der­zeit das Verhältnis: die von Warschau erhobenen Forderungen nach Reparationen, Differenzen in der Reaktion auf Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine sowie Unstimmigkeiten in der Europapolitik. Das polnische Regierungslager hat gegenüber Deutschland eine harte Gangart eingeschlagen und betreibt eine antagonisierende Politik mit dem Ziel, den westlichen Nachbarn einzuhegen. Da 2023 die polnischen Parlamentswahlen anstehen, sind in dem Land bei Themen mit Deutschlandbezug weitere Zuspit­zungen zu erwarten. Rehistorisierung, ein manifester »security divide« und Divergenzen in wichtigen EU-Fragen sollten aber den Blick auf Deutschlands Interessen in Bezug auf Polen nicht verstellen. Gerade in Zeiten von Krieg und externen Heraus­forderungen gilt für das bilaterale Verhältnis ein Konsolidierungsimperativ.

Le Bloc rouge rassemblant les partis de gauche est arrivé en tête des élections législatives anticipées au Danemark le 1er novembre. Le Parti social-démocrate (SD), dirigé par la Première ministre sortante Mette Frederiksen, a recueilli 27,54% des suffrages et remporté 50 des 179 sièges du Folketi...