Diplomacy & Crisis News

The threat of nuclear war was diminished greatly in the early 1980s after the SALT II treaty between the United States and Soviet Union created an agreed upon reduction of nuclear arms. The emergence of MIRVs, missiles that could release multiple warheads on various targets using one rocket as its base, was considered to be a significant risk to both sides. MIRVs and similar systems were limited and eventually banned by the SALT I and SALT II treaties. However, in 2013, the Russian government announced it was going to replace their late generation SS-18 Satan missiles with a new system. The new system, named Sarmat, will begin testing in October 2015. This new ICBM will likely be the newest and most advanced system to be put into service in a generation.

The re-establishment of Russian and NATO military units across the borders is ramping up while diplomacy in Ukraine continues to be usurped by active battles in Eastern Ukraine. NATO’s commitment to place heavy tank and artillery divisions in countries bordering Russia has given Russia the narrative and catalyst to increase its military presence on its own border. Russia’s 2015 May Day parade showed several new ground systems being introduced into their arsenal based on the T-14 Armata tank hull and chassis. Air defense systems similar to that of the BUK-M1 were also on display, such as the related BUK-M2, TOR-M2E and Pansir-S1. Russia’s public demonstrations of new equipment used to be the way Western powers saw how the Soviet army’s capabilities changed from year to year. It seems like this tradition will continue with the “Armata” parade

Mobile nuclear missile systems like the SS-25 Sickle have been the mainstay of Russian nuclear forces for the last few years. The May Day parade featured the SS-27 system, an updated SS-25, along with the new Armata-based systems. Another recent announcement that Russia will start to upgrade more TU-160 strategic bombers after years of stalled production also confirmed a return to the Cold War status quo that was diminished at the end of the 1980s.

The return to large and complex weapons systems might require a shift in U.S. policy in order to compete with new Russian equipment. If the United States and NATO are unable to balance Russian forces on the border, diplomacy may only come after deterrence neutralizes any future “hot” conflict in Eastern Europe.

Jusqu'à présent, Washington a fait du traité transpacifique de libre-échange une arme pour contenir le géant asiatique. Pékin lui-même est resté à distance, préférant lancer sa propre alliance. Il y a fort à parier que les deux capitales évolueront en parallèle. / Asie, Chine, États-Unis, États-Unis (...) / Asie, Chine, États-Unis, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Japon, Agroalimentaire, Commerce international, Économie, Libéralisme, Mondialisation, Multinationales, Propriété intellectuelle, Pacifique, Services - 2014/11

“Nhiệm Vụ Tối Mật” – “Secret Mission” 2015 by Pham Huy Thong

Just when the memories of anti-Chinese protests and rioting have started to fade among the Vietnamese, the Chinese are stoking the fires again with another salami-slicing maneuver.

Last Thursday, Beijing announced the redeployment of the deepwater oil rig Haiyang Shiyou-981 to the waters near the disputed Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands. The placement of the rig this time around is in waters south of the Gulf of Tonkin and northwest of the Paracels, according to the website of the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration, and is expected to be operational up until August 20.

The website announcement also requested passing vessels to stay at least 2,000 meters away, perhaps fearing a repeat of last May’s confrontation, where several Vietnamese coast guard boats, fisheries surveillance ships, and fishing boats were rammed by Chinese naval vessels for coming too close to this same Chinese rig deployed offshore but within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

This year, however, the Chinese have located the rig outside the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam, in a grey zone currently being negotiated between Vietnam and China. According to a Vietnamese Coast Guard source, should the Chinese oil rig violate Vietnam’s sovereignty, the Coast Guard would “make announcements.”  This small, possibly incremental step by Beijing can be described as “salami-slicing”, or “Salami tactics,” a term first coined by the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi in the late 1940s to describe the destruction of the non-Communist parties by “cutting them off like slices of salami.”

The announcement of the rig’s arrival by Vietnamese media follows a visit by Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh to Beijing on June 17 to 19 for the eighth meeting of the Vietnam-China Steering Committee on Bilateral Cooperation. During the meetings, both sides agreed to use negotiations to keep territorial disputes under control, avoid any actions to complicate disputes, emphasize the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (East Vietnam Sea/West Philippine Sea) and make progress toward a Code of Conduct. Given the lack of outrage here in Vietnam over the rig’s deployment, the positioning of the Chinese rig was also likely negotiated between Hanoi and Beijing, with Beijing promising to strengthen economic, trade and investment ties.

So far, the Vietnamese people appear to have accepted the deployment of the Chinese rig, as there have been no reports of anti-Chinese protests or rioting despite media coverage. However, some Ho Chi Minh resident representatives voiced their strong opposition to China’s recent actions in the East Sea on Monday to State President Truong Tan Sang and Tran Du Lich, head of the NA delegation of the city. Residents there called for a strong, official response from the National Assembly to China’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty, which President Sang acknowledged has not been strong enough.

The arrival of the Chinese rig also coincides with the delivery of a fourth of six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines to Vietnam, under a $2 billion deal signed in 2009. Vietnam may be able to tolerate some salami-slicing by the Chinese, but for this tactic to work most effectively, the true long-term motives should be hidden and cooperation emphasized. Given Vietnam’s long history of successfully fighting off the Chinese, the Vietnamese are traditionally skeptical of Chinese motives and cooperation, and should Beijing choose to slice too much, history tells us the Vietnamese will be ready once again.

Photo Credit: CH’7K via Flickr

A leading naval strategist asks: Could cyberattacks actually prevent war?

In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization directly inform our understanding of critical issues today. Part 1 examined the lessons for current maritime security concerns from naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan and Nobel laureate Norman Angell. Part 2 considers their competing insights into a very modern challenge: cybersecurity.

Mahan’s ideas of the late 19th century set the track for U.S. naval policy for decades, including growing and strengthening the fleet and developing reliable resupply stations worldwide. Angell described in 1909 that war had become futile as a means to enhance state power and wealth, but not impossible because men sometimes act irrationally. Each saw enormous potential from the surges of trade and technology by the turn of the 20th century. Mahan saw mostly threats; Angell saw more possible benefits.

For Angell, the extent of trade and investment created an “interdependence” among European powers, so that “war, even when victorious, could no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.” His ideas are found in international relations theories that developed nearly a century later: complex interdependence, democratic peace, and even constructivism. In each of these, states choose paths other than conflict-for-power and power-for-conflict. The Internet would have made perfect sense to Angell: Social networking, online commerce, and “Twitter revolutions” across borders and cultures increase national wealth, standards of living and human aspirations.

For Mahan, the analysis is more complex, and the policy implications more surprising. Mahan’s cybersecurity policies depend upon his views on “freedom of the seas” and on populations used to material comfort. Freedom of the seas popularized by Grotius’s 1609 Mare Liberum, which asserted that the high seas are open to all, especially for commerce. This idea has been supported by the American Continental Congress, Elizabeth I, Woodrow Wilson and the U.N. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR generally left alone one another’s seaborne trade.

But for Mahan, commerce produces the national wealth necessary for military power:

Ships and cargoes in transit upon the sea …are national wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying itself, to the intensification of the national power…[commerce is] therefore a most proper object of attack.

Additionally, Mahan argued that modern populations had an “excessive sensitiveness” to their new wealth. Attacking international private (commercial) sea trade was actually a benefit to mankind, “more humane, and more conducive to the objects of war, than the slaughter of men.”

The lessons for cybersecurity are evident. Mahan’s realism would endorse state-on-state cyberattacks, like digital spying, Stuxnet, or degrading the military systems of a country you are planning to attack. But Mahan essentially validates cyberattacks on civilian and commercial interests as well. Where private property is the ultimate source of national power, he argues, it is a legitimate target. When populations are “exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations,” not used to widespread discomfort or “privation,” cyberattacks might be used to achieve the intended goals of the attacker without the extensive violence and casualties traditional warfare.

In this way, cyberattacks among great states might serve as proxy wars did during the Cold War: great power contests with minimal casualties to the principals. The risks of this approach then and now, of course, are multiple. Cyber casualties can still occur from economic, financial, industrial or infrastructure damage. Cyberattacks can begin or escalate a conflict which leads to kinetic warfare. Mistaken attribution of cyberattacks can widen the conflict to unrelated or unintended parties.

If Mahan is right, a number of implications follow. Countries are already developing offensive and defensive cyberstrategies – these need to be fully integrated into national security and economic means and ends. (As Peter Singer and Allan Friedman note, whether these questions are fully understood by the key decision makers remains a question.) Governments must work closely with other public and commercial organizations – preventing a cyberattack on finance, industry, and infrastructure as they would from a terrorist or traditional warfare. Many countries are already well into these kinds of discussions, including with each other. Too often though, security measures have proven inadequate. The recent U.S. government’s loss of millions of employees’ personal and security data is just the latest example. Internet security firms like Mandiant and Symantec have detailed intense ongoing efforts, not merely hypothetical ones.

The Internet offers “interdependence” far beyond what Angell could have imagined. But the natures of conflict, spying, industrial espionage, organized crime, and “attack” are all very different from what Mahan understood. By Mahan’s logic, withholding energy exports as diplomatic leverage, theft of commercial intellectual property, manipulating industrial controllers or breaches of financial institutions may be “more humane” alternatives to conventional war.

But Mahan’s logic helped lead the great powers into war.

This post and the previous one are drawn in part from J.Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.

L’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) vient présenter à Moscou, vendredi 3 juillet, le dernier numéro de sa revue Politique étrangère (2/2015), consacré à la Russie et dont le dossier, « La Russie, une puissance faible ? », est l’objet de l’attention de nombreux médias.

La crise en Ukraine a eu un impact profond sur tous les États concernés – l’Ukraine, la Russie, les pays de l’Union européenne et ceux du voisinage – et leurs relations. Plus d’un an et demi depuis le début de la crise, le débat semble toujours polarisé autour de la question « Qui est coupable ? ». Or, la profonde divergence entre l’Occident et la Russie – qui semble décidée à incarner une alternative au modèle occidental – pose la question fondamentale du fonctionnement du système international dans son ensemble.

L’ambassade de France en Russie, l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) et le groupe RBK vous invitent à assister à la table-ronde « La crise en Ukraine : quel impact sur l’évolution de la Russie et du système international ? », le vendredi 3 juillet, de 11h à 12h15, au Centre de presse de RBK (oul. Profsoiouznaïa, 78).

Modérateur : Nicolas Miletitch, chef du bureau de l’AFP à Moscou.

Intervenants :

• Fiodor Loukianov, professeur à la Haute École d’Économie de Moscou, rédacteur en chef de la revue « Россия в Глобальной политике», Moscou.
• Thomas Gomart, directeur de l’Ifri, Paris.
• Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Responsable du centre Russie/NEI de l’Ifri, Paris.
• Vladislav Inozemtsev, chercheur associé à la DGAP à Berlin, chercheur associé non résident au CSIS à Washington.

Accréditation auprès du service de presse de l’ambassade : Svetlana Terzi/Anna Tikhomirova.

Photo Credit: Theophilos Papadopoulos via Flickr

Greece’s far-left may have reached its day of reckoning far faster than anticipated.

As negotiations between Greece and the troika came to a screeching halt last week over the terms of a multibillion-euro bailout — a few days before the country is expected to vote on the troika’s terms and conditions for a bailout — the country’s already-weakened economy has come to a standstill. Just hours before the deadline for the country’s 1.6 billion euro debt payment on Tuesday, markets were relatively calm, but capital controls to prevent cash from flowing rapidly out of the country have been in full effect. Banks have been forced to close as well and will remain so until July 7, and withdrawals, if one can find a working ATM, are severely limited.

But for Alexis Tsipras and his party, Syriza — both of whom rode into Athens on a wave of popular frustration with Greece’s pro-austerity political establishment — what comes next will be the make-or-break moment for the party’s ability to lead in difficult times.

As far as leadership is concerned, Tspiras’ motives for backing such a referendum are clear. Putting the creditor’s offer to a vote takes some of the weight of his shoulders and opens up the opportunity for the party to lead the country through a time of trial without (presumably) as much backlash. In essence, it’s a way of saying: Whatever road we choose to take, we’re all in this together.

It’s no surprise, then, that Tsipras has presented the referendum not as a vote on Greece remaining in the eurozone, nor as a vote between the euro or the drachma. Rather, for Tsipras, the referendum is a democratic imperative — an exercise in sovereignty before all else.

“Greece, the birthplace of democracy, should send a resounding democratic message to the European and global community,” he said in his address on the referendum on June 27.

“I am absolutely confident that your choice will honor our country’s history and will send a message of dignity worldwide. In these critical times, we all have to remember that Europe is the common home of all of its peoples.”

Whether or not the referendum is a practical exercise has been the matter of some controversy. Those opposing the referendum, including a number of former Greek government officials, have framed the vote as “yes” or “no” to Europe. Even Former Prime Minister George Papandreou — who carried out a similar referendum in 2011, which he has since defended — has repeatedly condemned the July 5 referendum, referring to it as a “tactical ploy” and a sort of negotiating weapon.

Still others have argued much of the blowback comes from the fact that the European project wasn’t all that democratic to begin with. Writing in The Guardian, economist Joseph Stiglitz noted, “[W]hat we are seeing now, 16 years after the eurozone institutionalized those relationships, is the antithesis of democracy.” European leaders, Stiglitz continues, want Tsipras and Syriza out, and they want a Greek government in power that is willing to accept the terms and conditions of eurozone membership without a fight.

What happens on July 5 is up to the Greeks, and only the Greeks, to decide. No matter that outcome, it’s impossible to deny that this is the moment for Syriza. Tsipras’ government is young, but it’s already had its share of fights. They’ve already confronted the EU — but will they capitulate?

“More than ever we must be clear that there is no middle course between confrontation and capitulation,” wrote Stathis Kouvelakis, a member of Syriza’s central committee, after the party was elected in January 2015. “The moment of truth is at hand.”

Those words couldn’t be more relevant now.

MC3 Ian Carver/U.S. Navy

Is the U.S. accidentally preparing for World War I again? In this two-part series, leading thinkers from a prior era of globalization instruct us on maritime and cyber security today.

In our constant consumption of the latest news, we risk overlooking history and missing context. Competing insights from a century ago inform debates today on Russian and Chinese naval strategies (this post) and cybersecurity (the next).

Alfred T. Mahan and Norman Angell were prominent thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan was a U.S. naval officer who literally wrote the book that shaped American naval strategy for decades. Angell warned of the futility of war for so long that ended up he winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Mahan and Angell each saw enormous consequences of the trade and technology boom of their time, with steamships, transatlantic telegraphy, radio communications and the Panama Canal. Mahan focused on the many new threats posed by the emerging technologies, while Angell saw a range of potential benefits.

Mahan understood that a surge in technology and trade could lead to more luxuries, but at heart was a realist: “All around us now is strife…. Everywhere is nation against nation.” He warned, for example, about European access through the Panama Canal to the undefended West Coast of the United States, the dangerous rise of Asian states and wars driven by economic ambition. European and U.S. navies responded with massive shipbuilding campaigns and by securing ports throughout the Caribbean.

Angell, meanwhile, concluded that the rise of trade and economic integration – “interdependence” – made war an irrational choice. The direct and indirect costs of war were greater than any possible gains. Trade became a more efficient means to wealth than accumulating geography. Moreover, the role of government had evolved: raising a country’s standard of living became more important than conquering foreign territory.

Mahan’s views seemed to be borne out by World War I, punitive postwar policies, the failure of the League of Nations, and World War II. These (and the Cold War) demonstrated a world of zero-sum, state-vs.-state conflicts less focused on democracy, human rights, and trade. But beginning with the Atlantic Charter, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the new UN Declaration of Human Rights, Angell’s ideas began to rise. By the 1980s into the 1990s, democracy, global trade and investment, non-state actors and the World Wide Web were replacing simple realism.

Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001, though, provoked a complicated response of

new, new realism – high-tech network-centric warfare with global surveillance and targeting technologies, along with special forces on horseback, to fight state and non-state actors, in order to preserve the presumed benefits of the peaceful globalization status quo.

Today’s geopolitics blend and contrast Angell’s and Mahan’s visions. Seaborne international trade fuels much of the global economy, while increasingly assertive naval strategies are changing geostrategic analysis.

China’s naval ascendance focuses for now on the South China Sea. Its claims of sovereignty are contested by Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries in the region. China uses diplomatic and military pressure, and the construction of “new islands,” to strengthen its claims. Locally, the disputes impact fishing, mineral and drilling rights. Key commercial shipping lanes, and the passage rights of foreign navies, are concerns of India, the United States and others. At the same time, the U.S. military asserts that China’s naval upgrades aim toward an “anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force — a force that can deter U.S. intervention.”

The Russian question is even more similar to Mahan’s concerns over “coaling stations” for a global navy. With a coastline extending across nearly half of the Arctic Circle, Russia is developing its Arctic infrastructure to support its naval and merchant fleets. Supported by scientific expeditions to extend it claims — an effort other countries also undertake — it is preparing for considerable increases in shipping Arctic melt is expected to allow. On its southern front, Russia has been developing Novorossiysk to house the Black Sea Fleet, and annexed Crimea, home of Russia’s naval facility in Sevastopol. Meanwhile, in 2014, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced negotiations for military bases and refueling sites for Russian strategic bombers in Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles, Singapore and other countries.

The question of American and allied policies also look back to Mahan and Angell’s time. In the decades before World War I, the United States and European powers engaged in a naval modernization arms race and secured bases across the Caribbean Sea. The U.S. then partially withdrew from European politics until World War II, after which it took a dual-track approach. Toward the Soviet Union, it waged a Mahan-informed foreign policy of strength, expansion and containment. With its allies, though, it helped build a new community of interdependence.

How is the U.S. moving today? In recent weeks, the U.S. has moved forward on two elements of its “pivot to Asia”: the Defense Department’s new Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (like Mahan) and progress in Congress on the coming Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal (like Angell, except that it excludes China). The deputy secretary of defense talked tough when he testified to Congress on Russia nuclear plans (and softer on China), while the Pentagon also announced it would move “approximately 250 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers throughout six countries that are close to Russia” (both Mahan).

And while it is useful to understand that Mahan and Angell offer insight into current maritime security debates, it is remarkable that they also contribute significantly to understanding questions of cybersecurity – the subject of the next post.

This post and the next are drawn in part from Jim Quirk’s article in the Mediterranean Quarterly, June 2015.

Gathering at a religious festival in Ajmer, India. This northern city of 550,000 has been selected to become a smart city, with modern infrastructure systems operated by “smart” technology. PM Narendra Modi unveiled the $7.5b plan on June 25. But will it work? The jury is still out. Photo: The Hindu (newspaper)

On June 25, 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled a plan to modernize the infrastructure of 100 cities. The Indian government is devoting $7.5 billion to the initiative, with a goal of completing the upgrades by 2022. Yet there is criticism that the idea is destined to fail as it is putting the cart before the horse: attempting to bring Indian cities into the 21st century when many are barely in the 20th.

Modi’s vision is based on the cutting-edge design of so-called smart cities, which use technology based on computer networks to create “grids in which water, electricity, waste removal, traffic, hospitals and schools are seamlessly integrated with information technology to run them more efficiently.” Prototypes have been installed in South Korea, India and Abu Dhabi.

Adapting the smart city to India faces significant challenges. Notable among them is that Indian political, economic and cultural focus has traditionally been on its villages. Despite its burgeoning population, creating policies centered on villages has been practiced for decades. Only recently has attention shifted to cities, which politicians can no longer ignore. Now about 350 million Indians live in cities; staggeringly, this figure is projected to nearly double (to 600 million) by 2030. Yet the infrastructure of many of India’s cities cannot support their strain currently, let alone the additional burden of population growth expected soon.

For example, take Ajmer in northern India, with a population around 550,000. It is one of the cities selected for upgrade by Modi. In May 2015 representatives from IBM, Oracle and several other companies visited Ajmer to plan out (and promote) how smart city technology will fix the city’s debilitating water and waste management and traffic problems.

Yet, Ajmer only provides running water for two hour per day. A pitifully small number of homes are connected to a sewage system. Dirty water freely flows through open drains. And only 2 traffic lights function properly in the entire municipality. As Mukesh Aghi — president of the U.S.-India Business Council, which organized the meeting with U.S. companies in May — deftly observes, “While we are trying to bring 21st-century technology, we also need to sort out some 19th-century challenges in Ajmer.” Suresh Mathur, a retired schoolteacher in Ajmer, asks, “Can we first work toward becoming a functioning city before aspiring to be a smart city? We lack even the basic services that a city should typically provide.”

Technology has the potential to solve many problems but also tends to create just as many. The infrastructure problems in India are severe and also unique, meaning solutions that worked elsewhere would likely not work there. Of course the smart city model could succeed if adapted properly, but this process needs to be carefully planned and tested. Thus expecting fully functioning modern cities by 2022 seems completely unreasonable.

I saw a BBC program recently that talked about the many problems with installing highway overpasses and alternate routes aimed to combat traffic congestion in Mumbai. Dozens of these structures sit half-completed, with no progress being made and no realistic completion date in sight. With this in mind jumping directly from antiquated to modern doesn’t seem feasible.

Maybe Modi should focus on making the infrastructure of India’s cities average, before arriving at smart.

Marie-France Chatin, journaliste chez RFI, a reçu samedi 27 juin dans  son émission radio « Géopolitique, Le débat », Igor Delanoë, chercheur associé au Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute ainsi qu’à l’Institut des Études Européennes et Internationales de l’Université de Kadir Has à Istanbul, et Julien Nocetti, chercheur au Centre Russie/NEI de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales.

Au cours de cette émission, c’est le « renouveau de l’influence russe sur la scène moyen-orientale » qui est examiné et analysé. Les invités évoquent notamment « l’impact des printemps arabes sur la politique moyen-orientale de Moscou, soulignant en particulier les aspects sécuritaires et la nécessité pour la Russie de protéger son environnement proche des risques de contagion, face au développement de l’organisation État islamique en Syrie et en Irak, notamment dans le Caucase, en Tchétchénie » .

C’est également pour la journaliste, l’occasion d’évoquer le dossier sur la Russie publié dans le numéro d’été (2/2015) de Politique étrangère : « La Russie, une puissance faible ? ».

Pour réécouter l’émission, cliquez ici.

Pour lire l’article associé, cliquez ici.

Invités de l’émission

Igor Delanoë est chercheur associé au Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute et à l’Institut des Études Européennes et Internationales de l’Université de Kadir Has à Istanbul. Il est également l’auteur d’un article récemment publié par le centre Russie/NEI de l’Ifri, « Les Kurdes : un relais d’influence russe au Moyen-Orient ? ».

Julien Nocetti est chercheur au Centre Russie/NEI de l’Institut Français des Relations Internationales.

Old Fanous Ramadan, also known as Ramadan lantern is a famous Egyptian folklore associated with Ramadan. The holiday takes place from June 17 to June 17 this year. Photo Credit: Ibrahim.ID

The $80 Million Fake Bomb-Detector Scam—and the People Behind It
By Jeffrey E. Stern
Vanity Fair

Historically, advertisements that depict a product as “foolproof” are better off not being believed. But in the uncertain, dangerous and tumultuous climate of Iraq today, it’s a promise that, even if too good to be true, is easily embraced. In this article, Stern delves into the bizarre and depressing story of how Iraqi officials were tricked by a deceitful British salesman selling bomb detectors that, in the end, were nothing but a glorified golf-ball detector.

The Lonely End
by Matthew Bremner
Roads and Kingdoms

Bremner looks into the Japanese phenomenon of kodokushi, or “lonely death.” The word has become increasingly prominent in the country since 1995 — so common, in fact, that an industry tasked with the sole purpose of cleaning up homes after these deaths has begun to appear.

The Decline of International Studies
By Charles King
Foreign Affairs

“The rise of the United States as a global power was the product of more than merely economic and military advantages,” notes King. Indeed, one large, and comparatively inexpensive, factor has been education. Why, then, are federal and non-governmental international educational programs coming under attack?

Can Politico make Brussels sexy?
By Gideon Lewis-Kraus
The Guardian

In the eight years since its launch in 2007, Politico has become a media staple in the United States, turning inside-the-Beltway reporting into the “clubby and exhilarating” coverage we see today. Now, it’s expanded to Brussels. Lewis-Kraus looks into the media outlet’s new transatlantic operations.

A World Without Work
By Derek Thompson
The Atlantic

One day this list could be written by a machine — it’s certainly not inconceivable. Jokes aside, the eventual automation of numerous jobs could rattle the framework of our society. Work — how we define it and how we engage with it — is at the heart of our society, our politics. So, as Thompson asks, “What might happen if work goes away?”

Blogs:

The Case for Regional AUMFs by Michael Crowley
Much Ado about the South China Sea by Tim Wall
Pirates of the South China Seas by Gary Sands
The Systemic Deficiency in the U.S.’ Cybersecurity Mindset by Joseph Karam
In Ukraine, Peace Should First be Made with Words by James Nadeau

Earlier this year, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress a draft Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). President Obama, like President Bush before him, has claimed authorization for military activities to combat terrorism under a previous AUMF passed on Sept. 14, 2001 and dedicated to combating those responsible for the 9/11 attacks (the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were authorized under a separate AUMF). The emergence of IS and the simple passage of time prompted a re-examination of the terms of the prevailing AUMF. However, the White House and Congress each have reasons to pantomime action on an AUMF without committing to it. They reach beyond the standard legislative gridlock to matters of military strategy, preserving the president’s military authority, and simple partisan politics. Many observes see a new AUMF as unlikely politically or unnecessary constitutionally. Were it to happen, there is reason to consider framing it in a different way: on a regional basis, rather than against a specific military threat.

Start with the analysts who see a new AUMF as unnecessary. Max Boot, a conservative military historian, argues that U.S. military actions on executive authority have a long history, dating back to the early 19th Century Barbary Wars. Moreover, the Obama Administration explains that it seeks the new AUMF for reasons that are more propagandistic than constitutional; writing in Foreign Policy magazine, Micah Zenko quotes White House spokesman Josh Earnest’s argument: “It will send a clear signal to our enemies that if there is any doubt in their mind that the United States of America takes this threat very seriously, it will eliminate that doubt.”

Earnest’s quote telegraphs a larger issue: whether or not the AUMF is necessary constitutionally, the debate surrounding it highlights a political need to organize and constrain U.S. military activity. The AUMF debate may be more useful in clarifying policy as a forcing event than an actual AUMF would be in practice.

That debate has been forced, and it has pointed to the complexity of the problem. In January, Army Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey gave in interview outlining broad principles to which a new AUMF should adhere. Gen. Dempsey pointed to the need to avoid constraints on future action in a way that makes identifying and enforcing boundaries around such action difficult. While emphasizing that all military options should be preserved, Dempsey said that “In particular, it shouldn’t constrain activities geographically, because [ISIS] knows no boundaries [and] doesn’t recognize any boundaries – in fact it’s their intention to erase all boundaries to their benefit.”

What Dempsey requests is unrestricted authority to fight ISIS, a non-state actor. Congress’ war powers are designed to be administered against sovereign nations. They have changed as the nature of war has changed. Congress has declared war a total eleven times – all against sovereign nations – and six out of those 11 declarations pertained to enemy countries in World War II. There is no precedent for Congressional declarations of war against non-state actors.

A “regional AUMF” would codify the long-standing practice of executive “doctrines” governing U.S. policy towards particular regions. The Monroe Doctrine set U.S. policy in opposition to any foreign intervention into its sphere of influence in the Americas. President Jimmy Carter used his 1980 State of the Union Address to announce that the U.S. would defend its interests in the Persian Gulf by military force if necessary (the “Carter Doctrine.)” These executive statements amount to regional policies governing the use of force that were never codified by Congress, but which nonetheless influenced U.S. policy. Moreover, there is an active precedent for organizing U.S. military and diplomatic activities regionally in the way a regional AUMF would. The State Department has a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) section devoted to countries within that region. The Defense Department assigns the countries of the MENA region to its Central Command. An AUMF organized to address military threats within the MENA region – rather than against a specific actor within that region – would fall within the current logistical framework.

The idea of a regional AUMF presents a major drawback to presidents and generals alike. It infringes on the ability to “pick and choose” which conflicts in a given region merit U.S. action. However, the current debate acknowledges the need for AUMFs to be updated consistently. A three-year “sunset” clause is widely discussed as way to keep its terms from growing outdated. In that sense, each AUMF would be temporary. It would have to be: after all, ISIS did not exist three years ago. Debating new AUMF terms could (as now) lag well behind changing security needs. That may give further ammunition to those who see AUMFs as unnecessary. However, if they focus U.S. regional policy priorities and clarify objectives when America commits to using force, they are worthwhile. Given the lives in the balance on both sides of U.S. firing lines, the stakes merit more concerted attention to U.S. military strategy around the world.

In the decades since Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan began working together to end the Cold War, much has changed. But one grim element of the old order war remains a constant: Mankind still possesses the knowledge and means to destroy itself with nuclear weapons, a capability increasingly outside the firm control of two alliances committed to maintaining their own versions of the status quo. How should today’s thinkers and policymakers deal with contemporary and future nuclear threats? By looking for guidance to one of the giants of the earlier age, Andrei Sakharov, write Sidney D. Drell, Jim Hoagland, and George P. Shultz.

Photo Credit: CH’7K via Flickr

Information regarding the size and scope of the cyberattack against the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) continues to grow. As many as 18 million current, former and prospective federal employees — ranging from military personnel to the IRS — are now thought to be affected. This figure is a massive increase in the initial OPM estimate of 4.2 million and it’s likely to grow. Officials speaking about the breach, which is believed to have originated in China, have now acknowledged the incident goes back to June of last year.

The slow drip of information regarding the extent of the security breach has frustrated policymakers, many of whom expressed those feelings to besieged OPM Director Katherine Archuleta, during her testimony on Capital Hill to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee.

Archuleta defended her time as director saying, “In an average month, OPM, for example, thwarts 10 million confirmed intrusion attempts targeting our network. These attacks will not stop — if anything, they will increase,” she said and went on to promote her “aggressive effort” to reform and update the policies and procedures that govern OPM’s aging cybersecurity infrastructure.

The Obama administration continues to express its confidence in Archuleta’s ability to lead OPM. Such a statement is deeply concerning, considering that the Office of the Inspector General warned OPM that critical vulnerabilities in its security authorization system left it open to exploitation. A warning that Archuleta seemed content to ignore, or at best move at a snails pace to address.

The lackadaisical attitude surrounding the OPM breach is indicative of a wider cyber security mindset that is plaguing our national security infrastructure in cyberspace. The U.S. is simply not adapting fast enough.  Every year the U.S. fails to adequately meet the threshold for the development of a robust and comprehensive cybersecurity platform, and we fall farther behind our digital adversaries. There is a mindset in Washington that addressing these security threats are somehow beyond our capability, and that no matter what we do there will always be penetrations of critical systems. You’d be hard pressed to find a policymaker that would tolerate, much less express, such an idea when it comes to terrorist threats from al-Qaeda or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Why such an attitude is allowed to exist when it comes to cybersecurity is deeply troubling.

In February 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The EO was intended to lay out the administrations priorities and commitment to improving critical infrastructure and thus mitigating the threat from cyberattacks. The plan was developed in conjunction with recommendations from the Internet Security Alliance, a multisector trade association that provides a unique combination of advocacy and policy development. The EO outlines a robust plan, full of big ideas but short on a strategy for how it can be implemented.

The perfect example of this is White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel. During an interview with Information Security Media Group, Obama’s point man on cybersecurity came under heavy fire when he down played his own lack of technical expertise and dismissed the importance of understanding the nitty-gritty of implementing cybersecurity policy. While Daniel’s pedigree is impressive, especially in terms the scope and skills he has brought to his numerous positions in government, the decision to appoint him to the position of White House Cybersecurity Coordinator is indicative of a pervasive belief cybersecurity leadership doesn’t require technical expertise in the field. Can you imagine the Director of the Center for Disease Control not being a doctor or the Attorney General not being a lawyer?

A report released from the software security firm Veracode highlights the staggering deficiencies in civilian federal agencies. Entitled State of Software Security, the report examined 208,670 applications over the course of 18 months, and the company audited source code from government and private sector clients.

This particular report focused on the government sector, comparing it to 34 industries across a variety of different sectors. Veracode found that the government agencies ranks last in how often and how fast they are addressing security vulnerabilities — only 27 percent of identified vulnerabilities were adequately fixed and three out of four government sector applications consistently failed the OWASP Top 10, the pinnacle standard assessment of web application security. One reason cited for this high degree of vulnerability cited was an outdated programming language used in many government systems.

So why aren’t these government agencies adequately addressing these problems? The short answer is the government simply lacks the regulatory demands that is so often present in the private sector.

Many in Washington are expressing their collective outrage over the OPM breach, but the alarm bells that have been ringing over the last two decades will continue to be ignored. Incidents of computer attacks have increased 1,100 percent since 2006, the cybersecurity threat facing the U.S. is very real, unfortunately, for many policymakers on Capital Hill these security challenges exist in the abstract. There is no body count to tally from a cyber attack. There is nothing present in the physical world to help policymaker — many of whom purposefully avoid diving into the technical nuances of cybersecurity — properly conceptualize the threat. Right now, unless the problem we are facing in cybersecurity involves a Middle East government on the verge of collapsing, the desire and wherewithal to take action will continue to fall short.

Nations spy on one another; it’s a fundamental reality of the international system. The idea that China is spying on us is not the problem per se but rather the symptom of a much broader disease. The Chinese government is not going to stop trying to breach our digital bulwarks, no matter how much we whine. The problem is, however, that the digital age provides the potential for critical national security information to be taken with far greater ease and at much greater volumes than at anytime in history. We are making it far too easy for foreign governments to exploit our soft cyber underbelly. Can we really blame them for capitalizing on that advantage?