Diplomacy & Crisis News

(Own report) - The German government has contributed to the causes of people fleeing in three of the world's five countries generating the largest number of refugees. This was exposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). By the end of 2014, Syria, according to the UNHCR, was the country that generated most refugees, with Afghanistan second. Since mid 2011, the West had massively exacerbated the civil war in that country, causing a steadily growing number of refugees. Back in the 1980s, the West began supporting the complete destruction of Afghanistan's social structures, which has been driving countless numbers to seek safety abroad. Pursuing geopolitical objectives, the West pressured South Sudan - number five in the UNHCR's statistics - to declare its independence in 2011, disregarding warnings by observers that secession could inevitably re-enflame tensions inside the territory, possibly even leading to a new round of civil war. The civil war is now reality with millions fleeing. To ward off refugees ("border management") from Europe, Berlin and the EU are seeking an even closer cooperation with the Juba government - whose militias have carried out horrible massacres.

Putin at a BRICS summit in 2014. Photo Credit: Presidential Press and Information Office

Is Russia’s aggressive foreign policy finally catching up to it?

A recent poll of 26 countries, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center, found that views of Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, are largely unfavorable, and in some countries, still on the decline.

Anti-Russian sentiment was highest in Jordan and Poland, where 80 percent of participants expressed a negative view toward the country. Some notable runner-ups included Israel (74 percent), Japan (73 percent) and Ukraine (72 percent). In Western Europe, Germany and France followed shortly behind, with 70 percent of participants expressing unfavorable opinions toward the country.

For the most part, public perception of Putin was lower in all of these countries, even if only marginally, than perception of Russia. Here, Spain took the lead, with 92 percent of participants expressing no confidence in Putin’s ability to do the right thing in world affairs. Poland (87 percent), France (85 percent) and Ukraine (84 percent) followed closely behind.

To some extent, these numbers are not tremendously surprising. Even before the conflict in Ukraine kicked off in early 2014, relations between Germany and Russia had begun to sour. In 2010, 50 percent of Germans expressed favorable views toward Russia; by 2014, that number had dropped to a staggering 19 percent. Meanwhile, in Russia, positive feelings toward Germany dropped from 78 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2015.

Distrust runs rampant — and for good reason. Eastern European and Baltic states, even those that are NATO members, view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a stepping stone. “Little green men,” the title given to the unmarked, unacknowledged forces that entered Ukraine in 2014, are just a hop, skip and a jump away. In preparation, Baltic and Eastern European states have girded themselves up in a defensive position. Some, like Poland, have witnessed a dramatic rise in membership to paramilitary associations. There’s even been a proposal to scoop up some of the members of these associations to establish a Territorial Defense Force, somewhat akin to the U.S. National Guard.

Of course, pissing off — or at the very least, freaking out — the EU is undoubtedly on Putin’s agenda. The question is how Russia’s relationship with those countries with a positive opinion, or even no opinion at all, will change in the years to come.

Pro-Russian sentiment was highest in Vietnam (75 percent), Ghana (56 percent) and China (51 percent). All three were mostly supportive of Putin’s conduct in world affairs as well. That makes sense: Russia’s own so-called pivot to Asia has emphasized both Vietnam and China.

Where things get murky for Russia is in Africa. Although Russian influence in Africa was extensive during the Cold War, it pulled back dramatically after the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia continues to engage in arms and resources trade with a number of Africa nations, albeit under different ideological pretexts. This time it’s more about business, not exporting a revolution.

Although Russia has actively pushed for more economic engagement in both Africa and Asia, more trade doesn’t necessarily lead to an empathetic public. In South Africa, a member of the BRICS partnership, of which Russia is an integral part, only about 25 percent of people viewed Russia in a positive light. As a leader, Putin was viewed slightly more favorably — 28 percent were confident he would do the right thing in world affairs. Meanwhile, over half of South Africans held negative opinions of Russia.

But there were also a number of countries where participants claimed to have no opinion of Putin. In Ethiopia, for example, only 10 percent expressed an unfavorable view of Russia, but that’s because a little less than 50 percent of those polled expressed any opinion at all. So as Russia pushes to build its ties with Africa and Asia, a little charm offensive may be in order.

Auteur de l’article « Les enjeux du chaos libyen » paru dans le numéro été 2015 de Politique étrangère (2/2015), Archibald Gallet a accepté de répondre à trois questions en exclusivité pour politique-etrangere.com.

Quels sont les principaux acteurs du conflit libyen ?

Depuis juillet 2014, deux gouvernements, l’un à Tobrouk, l’autre à Tripoli, s’affrontent pour le contrôle des institutions et des richesses libyennes. Chaque gouvernement exerce une souveraineté théorique sur une mosaïque de territoires contrôlée par les différentes milices qui la soutiennent. Après près d’un an de guerre civile, l’enlisement du conflit a mis chacune des coalitions à l’épreuve. La montée en puissance de l’organisation État islamique (EI), puis plus récemment la signature d’un accord de paix sous les auspices de l’Organisation des Nations unies mettent à jour les divisions internes à chaque camp. Beaucoup de groupes armés ne rendent de compte à personne, et le Sud saharien jouit d’une autonomie de fait. Les milices des ethnies locales Toubou et Touareg s’y affrontent pour les routes de commerce transsahariennes et des revenus de protection des installations pétrolières du Sud-Est.

L’organisation État islamique peut-elle durablement s’implanter en Libye ?

L’EI a jusque-là fait preuve d’une résilience remarquable sur les théâtres ou elle s’est implantée, et la Libye d’aujourd’hui lui offre des conditions particulièrement favorables : une économie à l’arrêt, une situation sécuritaire fortement dégradée, un discours islamiste dominant le champ politique, et une immense quantité d’armes aux mains de milices. En 2014, l’organisation s’est progressivement implantée dans l’Est du pays, puis à l’Ouest de Tripoli, se livrant notamment à des activités de soutien des djihadistes internationaux. Son recrutement au sein des autres milices, ainsi que son agenda régional ont rapidement été facteur de tension avec les autres groupes armés, souvent pourtant de la même obédience islamiste radicale. L’EI est désormais en difficulté dans le port de Derna face à Ansar Al-Sharia, et autour des infrastructures pétrolières de Syrte contre les milices de la ville de Misrata. Comme en Irak, l’EI cherche à s’implanter là où sont les richesses naturelles. À cet égard, la mort probable de Belmokhtar, le leader des Mourabitounes qui gardait la haute main sur le djihadisme saharien, ouvre des opportunités autour des champs pétroliers du Sud-Est. Une consolidation de la présence d’EI dans le Sahara libyen pourrait aussi permettre une jonction avec Boko Haram à travers le Niger et le Tchad.

Comment peut-on contenir les effets du chaos libyen (contagion djihadiste en Tunisie, afflux de réfugiés en Europe, etc.) ?

La menace djihadiste et l’augmentation du trafic de migrants demeurent deux problèmes distincts. Les réseaux de passeurs libyens ont pignon sur rue et entretiennent des complicités avec des responsables des deux gouvernements, utilisant souvent des infrastructures publiques pour détenir et transporter les migrants. Les groupes terroristes préfèrent, pour leur part conserver une certaine clandestinité, et n’ont pour l’heure nul besoin d’avoir recours à une traversée hasardeuse de la Méditerranée pour s’infiltrer en Europe. La Libye s’est constituée comme le principal pays de transit en provenance de l’Afrique subsaharienne à cause de la corruption généralisée et de l’absence totale d’état de droit. Seul le rétablissement d’un contrôle effectif du territoire par un gouvernement légitime pourra avoir un effet significatif dans ce domaine. La solution du périmètre de sécurité maritime en Méditerranée est à cet égard un aveu d’impuissance de l’Union européenne, tandis que les partenaires européens se méfient, à juste titre, de l’idée d’une intervention militaire sur le sol libyen. Au-delà, le problème des migrants appelle une politique régionale ambitieuse. La création d’opportunités économiques tant pour les candidats au départ que pour ceux qui les transportent aura certainement plus d’effets sur les flux migratoires qu’une politique simplement axée sur le renforcement des capacités sécuritaires des pays concernés.

  S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

NEW YORK, NY – SEPTEMBER 27: Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, points to a red line he drew on a graphic of a bomb while addressing the United Nations General Assembly.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just addressed the American Jewish community via live webcast. He spoke for 10 minutes, followed up with a 10 minute question and answer.

All of his standard arguments against the deal were there; he didn’t cover too much new ground. But there were some interesting tidbits.

For one, he re-stated the idea that giving Iran 24-days notice of inspection was like giving several weeks notice to a drug dealer that you’ll be raiding their labs. It’s a great talking point, and he’s used it before. The problem is that the response is stronger than the accusation.

FACT: The half-life of uranium is 700 million years. That’s 10 billion 24-day periods. It will be detected, thanks to the #IranDeal.

— The Iran Deal (@TheIranDeal) July 23, 2015

Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, one of the architects of the Iran deal — and an MIT trained nuclear scientist — prefers to refute this line with an example of Iran from 2003.

“In February 2003, the IAEA requested access to a suspicious facility in Tehran, and negotiations dragged on as Iran tried to remove evidence. But even after six months, tests revealed nuclear activity despite Iran’s attempt to cover it up.”

Netanyahu commented that after receiving notice, Iran would flush their “nuclear meth” in order to hide it from inspectors. It’s powerful language that conjures criminal mastermind Walter White, the main character in the award-winning show “Breaking Bad,” outsmarting the authorities, season after season. But it’s not in line with the facts, and Netanyahu surely knows that. It undermines his position to use talking points that are so blatantly without merit. He clearly believes deep in his heart than this deal is bad — for Israel, the U.S. and the world. But he won’t win his argument through manipulation.

Netanyahu argues that he is not against all deals, only this deal. The glaring problem here is that he is been vocally, vehemently and vociferously against this deal since well before this deal even existed. He says he believes a better deal could have been reached. The Obama administration is just as vehement in their rejections. But it doesn’t matter. Bibi has been talking about a better deal for years! He is the face of all global opposition to this deal, he seems to see himself the leader of a movement, bent on preventing the actualization of this deal. He has thus made himself irrelevant as a force for change. He’s been arguing, since 1993, that Iran is just years away from a nuclear weapon. How can anyone take seriously the Bibi who cried bomb?

The most glaring issue with his remarks, however, revolved around Israel’s neighbor’s reactions to the agreement. When Bibi first came out against the deal, he pointed out that both Israel and the Arab states were against it. He posed the question: How often do Israel and our Arab neighbors see eye-to-eye on anything?

It’s a powerful argument. Israel was against the deal, so too Saudi Arabia and their Arab allies.

But the day before this speech, the Washington Post reported that during a visit from Secretary of State Kerry, the Persian Gulf Arab states had publicly endorsed the Iran nuclear deal. They continued:

“The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) support leaves Israel as the only country in the Middle East to vehemently oppose the agreement.”

This is extremely problematic for Netanyahu since he is supposed to be the learned teacher, patiently explaining why this deal is so bad for the entire world. Ignoring such developments make him look either dishonest or uninformed. Neither are great traits for the leader of a movement, especially not one as serious as this.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

Un récit de la crise grecque par Yanis Varoufakis, l'ex-ministre des finances ; combattre à l'étranger, les similitudes des parcours des brigadistes et des djihadistes ; un voyage sous bonne garde en Corée du Nord ; l'illusion des fast-foods nouvelle génération : voici une sélection d'archives en (...) - La valise diplomatique

Venezuela está al borde del colapso, tanto en materia de salud, como económica y alimentaria. La comunidad internacional, especialmente la UNASUR, todavía está a tiempo de resolver una crisis que va camino de desbordar una débil Venezuela que necesita desesperadamente consenso político, crecimiento sostenible y bienestar social. Así lo describe el director para Latinoamérica de Crisis Group Javier Ciurlizza en esta entrevista a El Venezolano TV.

(Own report) - The German judiciary has initiated new criminal proceedings against German arms companies because of their multi-millions in bribes payments in Greece. Last month, the states attorney's office in Munich brought charges against a former manager of the Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) tank producing company. He is charged with having personally pocketed up to €1.5 million of a much larger bribe without paying the adequate taxes. Other managers, for example of the Rheinmetall arms manufacturer, are also being threatened with criminal charges. In late last December, a German court sentenced the Düsseldorf-based Rheinmetall company to pay the unprecedentedly inflated profit of nearly €37 million into the budget of the Federal State of Bremen. These €37 million were paid by the Greek government for bribery-induced arms deliveries. In answer to its compensation demands, the Greek government is being told that Rheinmetall cannot be punished twice for the same offense. Greek lawsuits against German managers usually remain without consequences, because the German government refuses extradition to Greece after German courts gave more lenient sentences, than they could have expected from a court in Athens. The Greek government estimates its damages alone from the bribes in arms deals at €100 million.

Secretary Kerry presides over meeting of anti-ISIS coalition members at NATO Headquarters in Belgium. Photo Credit: U.S. Department of State

I went into this year’s Aspen Security Forum with the opinion that an effective terrorism strategy should not just be about addressing our options against Al Qaeda and/or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations; rather, I viewed defeating these groups as a worldwide problem that requires a worldwide policy. In spite of the many critics, the Obama administration does have a robust strategy for dealing with terrorism; it just does not go far enough in forming an effective, unified global alliance against all violent extremist organizations (VEOs). What you have are separate ongoing, unconnected efforts of various nations, many with varying degrees of U.S. assistance, against groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia.

What is needed, in my opinion, is an organization much like the NATO alliance, which was formed to deal with the threat of Communism during the Cold War. This time around, however, such an alliance would be directed against VEOs. The organization would maintain a multinational standing rapid deployment force that would be dispersed when requested by a member nation. Although the U.S. government, specifically the Department of Defense, has tried to tackle this issue with varying degrees of success, I heard nothing during the forum that caused me to change my views.

Many of the speakers were asked if Al Qaeda was still a threat. Others weighed in with their opinion on whether ISIS or Al Qaeda posed a the greater threat. My takeaway was that while it has been severely degraded, Al Qaeda was still a threat, but ISIS presented what I call a more “clear and present danger” to the homeland because of the efficacy of their outreach and the potential effect of “lone wolfs.”

As I mentioned in my last blog, FBI Director James Comey considers ISIS the greater threat to the homeland. Others weren’t so sure. James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, when asked if the use of social media by ISIS made it a greater threat to the homeland than Al Qaeda replied: “Well, that’s a hard…question because it’s different; it’s threatening. To say one is of greater magnitude than the other at least for me is hard.”

Still, I think Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, summed this issue up best during his talk when he remarked:

[O]ver the last 14 years, since 9/11, we’re seen core Al Qaeda, as everybody knows, AQAP, the Al Qaeda-affiliated elements of Al Shabab, which, while I was at DoD, we were focused on in our counterterrorism efforts. We have done a lot to degrade core Al Qaeda, through our good efforts. We have done a lot to degrade AQAP and Al Shabaab through our good efforts. The global terrorist threat now, as everybody knows… has evolved, and it has evolved in a very significant way from those groups to more groups, [ISIS] being the most prominent example, obviously, and it has evolved from terrorist directed terrorist attacks to terrorist-inspired attacks.… I think that the distinction between terrorist directed and terrorist-inspired is a significant one that the American people need to understand…why we are where we are in our efforts.

And so if you catalog the terrorist attacks and attempted attacks in this country and in Europe, for example, they almost fit neatly into one of two boxes, the terrorist-directed attacks, with an operative who has been recruited, trained, directed overseas and exported to someplace else to commit a terrorist attack, to terrorist-inspired attacks, which very often, most often involve a homegrown or even homeborn threat, and the individual has never even come face to face with a member of [ISIS] or AQ, but is inspired, through the very effective use of social media, to commit an attack or attempt to commit a small-scale attack.

And I think the American people need to understand how we have evolved to this new phase, because it does involve a whole of government approach, it does involve a lot of domestic-based efforts, in addition to the good work of the FBI and in addition to taking the fight to the enemy overseas.

Since most of the terrorism discussions revolved around ISIS, that will be my focus for the rest of this blog. I’m a bottom line kind of person, so it seems fitting to start with defining what is President Obama’s ISIS strategy and the status of the threat and the challenges as described by the intelligence community. The White House was represented by Lisa Monaco, Deputy National Security Adviser and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Monaco stated the goal was “to degrade, defeat and ultimately, to destroy [ISIS]. But we’ve got to be very clear-eyed about this. It is going to take time.”

ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “the caliph,” has urged other groups to join them. Many VEOs around the world, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram have responded and declared allegiance to ISIS. Monaco indicated the Obama administration was prepared to respond to this challenge by taking the fight into areas other than Iraq and Syria.

[ISIS] is undertaking an effort to establish an Islamic State, first in the heartland of Syria and Iraq. But…they’re trying to expand to at least eight provinces at this point, Libya being the most advanced and concerning in terms of sending actual operative focused on external attacks, but everywhere, from North Africa to the Caucasus. So yes, we’re absolutely concerned about their ability to find safe haven, to take root, and to attract fighters and to then extend their reach against our partners, our allies and ultimately to the homeland. And we’re going to make sure that we’re taking steps. If there is a threat posed to the United States from Libya, from one of these places, there should be no satisfaction amongst [ISIS] that they’re going to have a safe haven and that that threat won’t be addressed.

What form these efforts take or how robust they would be was unclear. The Obama administration has been pretty adamant about the boots on the ground issue.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration is working with a coalition of 62 nations to implement its strategy. Former Marine General John Allen, now the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, remarked that the coalition operated along five lines of efforts: military, counter-finance, countering flow of foreign fighters, counter-messaging, and humanitarian assistance and stabilization support. The intent of the effort is to achieve the U.S.’s strategic goals.

As for the challenges the intelligence community faces, the senior leaders present were pretty much in agreement. Clapper best summarized these challenges:

[T]he problem for us in intelligence is with the way people radicalize on their own or are radicalized via social media where they don’t leave out a signature. They don’t emit, if you will — and I mean that in a holistic sense — some attribute or trait or behavior that would lead you to begin watching them.

And so we’re lacking that. And this phenomenon of the radicalization, either on one zone or through the vehicle of social media — and I think [Comey] spoke to the challenge we have now where someone is proselyted by an [ISIS] recruiter sitting in Syria or some place, and then if there is an interest that is evoked on the part of the one being proselyted or the potential extremist, and then they’ll switch to, you know, encrypted communications that we can’t watch, we can’t warrant.

And as Jim has said, probably there are now investigations in every one of the 50 states. And this is a real worry, a real concern for us because I personally think it’s a question of time before we have more of these than we have already. And it’s a very daunting challenge for us. And so — and I think it’s illustrative of how the threat has morphed to a certain extent from, you know, industrial-size attack of the magnitude of the 9/11 in which there are or were, as we learned afterwards, signatures that could have forewarned us had we seen them.

And in this case, you don’t have those, even though there are a smaller scale, but as we’ve seen with the case of the shootings in Chattanooga, the psychological impact that has is, I think, quite profound. So it’s a serious threat.

Think I’ll end here. More to follow on terrorism, cyber and other issues discussed at the Forum in the coming days.

Representatives of ASEAN countries gather at Putra World Trade Centre on Saturday. RAJA FAISAL HISHAN/The Star.

“It should not be discussed,” remarked Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin on Monday, referring to the South China Sea dispute prior to Tuesday’s meeting in Kuala Lumpur of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China claims close to 90 percent of the South China Sea, amid rival claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, many of which overlap.

Liu, in an interview with Reuters, warned non-ASEAN countries, such as the U.S., not to interfere. “This is not the right forum. This is a forum for promoting cooperation. If the U.S. raises the issue we shall of course object. We hope they will not.” Other non-ASEAN participants in this week’s meeting include China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the European Union.

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also argued on Monday that the upcoming ASEAN meeting is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes” and noted that discussion would “heighten confrontation.”

The most vocal of nations criticizing China’s actions in the South China Sea is the Philippines, which recently took Beijing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague for a ruling over its right to waters in a 200-nautical mile “exclusive economic zone” off its coast. The U.S. has also been critical of Beijing’s actions, calling for a halt to the construction of artificial islands and an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef. Last week, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) speculated Beijing is building another artificial island for military purposes.

While the U.S. is officially neutral in the dispute, arguing for freedom of navigation to protect the $5 trillion in shipping trade that passes through the region each year, the U.S. military has become increasingly active in the region, stepping up military drills with regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan. The Obama administration will send Secretary of State John Kerry as its representative to Kuala Lumpur on Wednesday, who will likely press for a halt to island reclamation and a demilitarization in the South China Sea, regardless of any attempt by Beijing to stifle discussion.

Indeed, the dictatorial attempt by Liu to halt discussion is almost laughable in diplomatic circles. It is counter to Beijing’s policy of non-interference in other countries affairs and inherently unenforceable. Furthermore, Wang’s similar attempt to stifle discussion of the South China Sea at the ASEAN meeting by suggesting the forum is not “the appropriate place for discussing specific bilateral disputes,” purposely fails to take into account that some of these disputes are multilateral. Many disputes are multilateral and overlapping.

Beijing, of course, prefers to approach the dispute on a bilateral basis, using potentially lucrative trade deals as an economic carrot and its vast military clout as a stick. This carrot and stick approach has been used to stifle discussion during other ASEAN meetings held in Laos and Cambodia, but this time around in Kuala Lumpur may prove more difficult, given heightened island reclaiming activity by China in the Spratley Island chain, increased military activity by Beijing, budding anger among other South Sea claimants, and (given the slow pace and inability to enforce any decision reached by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague) the lack of an alternative multilateral platform for resolving the issues.

July saw a worsening of the situation in Yemen, where nearly 2,000 civilians have been killed since the war started in March, while in Turkey a dramatic escalation in violence led to the collapse of the state’s two-year-old ceasefire with Kurdish insurgents, and the launch of attacks on Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL) positions in Syria. Meanwhile, a surge in clashes in Kashmir aggravated tensions between India and Pakistan, attacks by IS-linked militants escalated in Egypt, and Cameroon and Chad were both targeted by deadly and potentially destabilising Boko Haram raids and bombings. In contrast, the Colombian government and FARC rebels took steps to bring the peace process back on course after a series of setbacks, and South Sudan is faced with a unique chance to negotiate an end to its devastating conflict. Lastly, the nuclear agreement reached between the P5+1/EU3+3 and Iran in mid-July, provided it is approved by lawmakers on all sides, could mark a historic victory for diplomatic efforts in the face of entrenched global security challenges.

As part of a series of Quick Thoughts with International Crisis Group Middle East analysts, Jadaliyya asked April Longley Alley, Crisis Group Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula, to shed light on the causes and course of Yemen's conflict.

(Own report) - The Greek government does not exclude the eventuality of indictments of German companies on charges of corruption, according to recent reports, on a contingency plan Athens has prepared for the event that Berlin forces it into state bankruptcy ("Grexit"). According to this plan, Athens would try to bring German companies to court - who have not or have only partially been subject of bribery investigations - to have them pay at least part of the restitution for damages caused by the alleged corruption, officially estimated in the billions. Siemens is the most famous example. A Greek parliamentary investigating committee estimated that, through systematic bribery, this Munich-based company has caused damages of two billion Euros in Greece. However, Siemens got off cheap in an out-of-court settlement and had to pay only 270 million Euros - hardly one fifth of its current quarterly profit. A court in Munich gave a Siemens manager a suspended sentence - significantly less than what he could have expected from a trial in Athens. Already in the fall of 2014, new legal proceedings had been opened in Athens to comprehensively investigate this systematic corruption.

Photo of elaborate cross-border drug smuggling tunnel discovered inside a warehouse near San Diego. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Photo by Ron Rogers

How to Think About Islamic State
By Pankaj Mishra
Guardian

Is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), now known as the so-called Islamic State, a medieval or modern phenomenon? In this essay, Mishra looks at the alienation bred by some forms of modernization and Westernization has played in drawing more and more fighters to ISIS.

The Mystery of ISIS
By Anonymous
The New York Review of Books

ISIS’s rise — and indeed, its success — has been shrouded in mystery. Riddled with contradictory explanations for anything from its military success in Iraq to how it draws foreign fighters en masse, many of the accounts that attempt to explain the group’s success in detail are lacking in some way. Whatever the “real” secret is to ISIS’s success, it will do little to quell the fear its rise instills within us.

Against All Odds
By T.A. Frank
National Journal

With such a crowded Republican field, one of the main questions that’s come up this primary season is:  Why even bother running for president when you know you’re not going to win the nomination? In this article, Frank looks at the logic behind George Pataki’s campaign, which has, to the say the least, been received without much fanfare.

Cattle-Camp Politics
By Jérôme Tubiana
Foreign Affairs

Underneath the power struggle among the “big men” of South Sudan (i.e., military leaders), there’s another far more longstanding conflict: that which has been created by inter-tribal tensions. These conflicts have played out over control of land and cattle and represent a far deeper conflict within the country — one that has left Tubiana wondering, “Is no one innocent in South Sudan?”

Underworld
By Montel Reel
New Yorker

The infrastructure supporting the U.S.-Mexican drug trade is vast. Indeed, within the past century, officials have come across over 181 illicit passages between the U.S.-Mexican border. Some are small, offering barely enough space for a single person to travel through; others are far more complex, fitted with electric lights, elevators and ventilator shafts. Reel delves into some of the recent investigations that have shed light on how these so-called supertunnels came to pass and how they have impacted the international drug trade.

Blogs:

How Beijing’s Foreign Policy Can Backfire on its Tourists by Gary Sands
Burundi’s Electoral Quagmire by Eliza Keller
GailForce: Aspen Security Forum Part I by Gail Harris
Syrian Conflict Drags On by Scott Bleiweis

It is with sadness that Crisis Group has received the news that a former colleague and friend, Professor Stephen Ellis, died on 29 July 2015 after a tenacious fight with leukaemia. Stephen was Africa Program Director at Crisis Group from 2003 to 2004. During his time with us, he expanded our presence to Nigeria and South Africa and enriched our work, especially in West Africa. After leaving Crisis Group, he returned to the African Studies Centre in Leiden, Holland.

The tide is turning against the Houthis and troops loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the south of Yemen. But they and their adversaries now face a tipping point in the four-month-old civil war. Both can recognize that neither side can win outright, and choose peace. Or they can condemn the country to another bout of even more devastating conflict.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (2/2015). Myriam Benraad, chercheur à l’Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (IREMAM, CNRS), propose une analyse croisée de deux ouvrages : celui de Pierre-Jean Luizard, Le Piège Daech. L’État islamique ou le retour de l’Histoire (Paris, La Découverte, 2015, 187 pages) et celui de Patrick Cockburn, Le Retour des Djihadistes. Aux racines de l’État islamique (Paris, Équateurs, 2014, 174 pages).

Dans l’abondance d’essais, de récits et de témoignages récemment publiés autour de l’État islamique[1], les ouvrages de Pierre-Jean Luizard et Patrick Cockburn sont particulièrement bienvenus. Rédigés par le spécialiste de l’Irak le plus reconnu de sa génération en France pour le premier, et par un journaliste intimement familier des crises qui déchirent le Moyen-Orient depuis déjà plusieurs décennies pour le second, ils se distinguent par leur sérieux et la rigueur de leur démonstration. Les approches du phénomène djihadiste proposées par ces deux auteurs se complètent : tandis que Luizard illustre, à travers son argumentaire, en quoi l’Occident est tombé dans le « piège Daech », fruit du « retour de l’Histoire » selon lui, Cockburn met en avant la duplicité de ce même Occident qui a longtemps soutenu – et continue à soutenir – des puissances régionales étroitement liées à la mouvance radicale.

À travers un propos documenté et concis, Luizard vient combler les incompréhensions qui peuvent encore subsister concernant les conditions d’émergence et de développement de l’État islamique, ainsi que son fonctionnement interne et ses structures. Il y a encore un an, ce dernier était méconnu du grand public. Il a fait une entrée fracassante dans l’actualité internationale avec la chute de Mossoul le 10 juin 2014 et la conquête d’un vaste pan de territoire s’étendant entre l’Irak et la Syrie. S’il se penche nécessairement sur ces événements encore brûlants, Luizard relève le pari de rompre avec les commentaires à chaud en faisant « dialoguer l’actualité immédiate et la grande Histoire ». Historien et fin connaisseur du monde arabe et musulman, il ne se contente ainsi pas d’éclairer la réalité de cet « État » islamique, transformé en « califat » par ses concepteurs, mais réintroduit son irruption dans un continuum. L’État islamique n’est-il pas, de fait, le produit macabre d’une déliquescence plus ancienne des États nés du colonialisme au Moyen-Orient, dont l’Irak et la Syrie demeurent les symboles ? L’auteur réussit avec brio à mettre au jour des logiques moins visibles, locales et globales, sociales et religieuses, dont les racines remontent au début du xxe siècle, à l’époque où Français et Britanniques esquissaient secrètement les frontières contemporaines de la région.

La première partie de l’ouvrage s’ouvre sur une remise en perspective des origines de l’État islamique, issu de la mouvance irakienne d’Al-Qaïda et autoproclamé sur plusieurs provinces du pays en octobre 2006. Depuis la disparition de son premier émir Abou Omar Al-Baghdadi, tué en avril 2010 dans un raid américain, c’est Abou Bakr, prédicateur salafiste originaire de Samarra, qui en a pris la tête. Luizard rappelle à cet effet la centralité du contexte irakien dans l’essor de ce que l’on nommera communément par son acronyme arabe « Daech » – l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant (Dawla islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa al-Cham). Entre marginalisation chronique des sunnites depuis le renversement de Saddam Hussein, « communautarisation » excessive du nouveau champ politique en faveur des chiites et des Kurdes, dérive autoritaire et répressive de l’ancien Premier ministre chiite Nouri Al-Maliki et faiblesse généralisée des institutions, synonyme de toutes formes d’abus, la situation était propice à l’offensive des djihadistes. Luizard décrit parfaitement la détérioration continue du climat politique à Mossoul à l’aube de la crise, qui a contribué à la passivité des tribus et civils face à l’avancée de l’État islamique – quand ceux-ci n’ont pas directement collaboré avec ses membres contre l’armée et le gouvernement.

Au-delà de l’Irak et de la Syrie, l’État islamique entend redessiner le Moyen-Orient, dont il rejette la géographie née des calculs coloniaux et du démembrement de l’Empire ottoman. Son autre objectif est d’internationaliser le conflit, d’autant que ses combattants ont été arrêtés aux portes de Bagdad à l’été 2014 et que s’est organisée la contre-offensive armée, tout d’abord kurde, puis chiite, puis internationale avec la formation d’une large coalition conduite par les États-Unis. Le « retour de l’Histoire » évoqué par Luizard ne consiste pas uniquement en une vengeance contre l’occupation étrangère en Irak et contre le sort des sunnites dans ce pays, mais aussi en une revanche contre les accords Sykes-Picot[2] et les engagements trahis des Européens qui avaient promis l’indépendance aux Arabes à l’issue de la Grande Guerre. Al-Baghdadi entend ainsi entraîner l’Occident dans un véritable « choc de civilisations ».

Les États du Moyen-Orient, à maints égards artificiels et construits contre leurs sociétés, ravagés par l’autoritarisme sous couvert d’indépendance nationale, et finalement rattrapés par le confessionnalisme, s’évanouissent inlassablement face à ce califat sunnite débarrassé des influences extérieures et des « obstacles » intérieurs – chiites, chrétiens, yézidis, tous mécréants aux yeux des salafistes qui pourchassent et persécutent sauvagement ces communautés au nom de la défense d’une unicité (tawhid) aux accents totalitaires. Prônant un retour à l’islam des origines et une application rigoureuse de la chari‘a, ceux-ci visent l’édification d’un État au sens strict du terme, doté d’un territoire, d’une armée équipée et entraînée, de ressources économiques et financières, et d’un personnel administratif pour le régir. Daech se pose aussi comme une internationale révolutionnaire pour tous les opprimés à travers le monde, usant d’une communication hypersophistiquée et volontairement choquante par la mise en scène d’actions barbares ; il s’agit, par la violence, de glorifier un passé mythique et d’attirer dans ses rangs tous ceux qui souhaitent en découdre avec le système. En cela, l’État islamique a su susciter une réaction de l’Occident, piégé et incapable de résoudre la crise au Moyen-Orient.

Si Luizard étaie sa thèse avec conviction, doit-on réellement considérer Daech comme un « piège », considération faite de la responsabilité également très lourde des Occidentaux dans l’expansion du djihadisme depuis la fin des années 1980 ? C’est à cette question que Cockburn, journaliste de renom, tente précisément de répondre. Outre un retour tout aussi fouillé sur les origines de l’État islamique, constitué sur les ruines de l’invasion militaire américaine de 2003 et assimilé à « une version proche-orientale du chaudron des sorcières de Macbeth », l’auteur insiste sur le rôle écrasant joué par les États-Unis et l’Occident au sens large. En démantelant l’armée irakienne au début du conflit, Washington a mis à bas un État irakien traditionnellement dirigé par des élites sunnites et a pavé la voie au chaos. Cockburn fait bien aussi de rappeler la responsabilité de nos « alliés » actuels, dont l’Arabie saoudite et les monarchies du Golfe, dans la naissance du monstre djihadiste. Ces « parrains idéologiques et financiers des djihadistes » ont ironiquement fini par prendre peur face au « Frankenstein » qu’ils ont engendré. En face, l’Iran et ses relais chiites apparaissent comme les principaux bénéficiaires de cette expédition occidentale contre la barbarie ; de fait, le réengagement de l’Occident au cœur du Moyen-Orient s’insère dans le droit fil des fiascos qui l’ont précédé et dont les conséquences imprévisibles ne sont plus à démontrer.

En six chapitres, Cockburn retrace les étapes du passage d’un groupe insurgé sunnite tout d’abord minoritaire dans le paysage de la violence armée en Irak et rejeté par les autres factions nationalistes et islamistes, à une organisation militaire et politique surpuissante. Il s’appuie, comme Luizard, sur ses nombreuses enquêtes de terrain dans la région et sur une observation fine de ses réalités, que certains cercles stratégiques occidentaux, du haut de leurs concepts idéologiques tantôt sommaires et abstraits, tantôt volontiers manichéens, ont refusé d’accepter et peinent encore à appréhender. Aux antipodes de ce que beaucoup avaient prédit, le régime de Bachar Al-Assad – dont Cockburn reconnaît le caractère criminel tout en rappelant que la dictature baasiste en Syrie ne saurait se résumer à la communauté alaouite et à son soutien au tyran – ne s’est pas effondré. De même, Daech n’a pas jailli du néant, mais a construit sa popularité sur l’impasse politique, l’incompétence des élites, la corruption endémique et la brutalité des forces armées répondant du pouvoir de Bagdad et Damas.

Enfin, comme le mentionne très justement l’auteur, la tentative de promotion d’une opposition dite « modérée » dans ces pays n’a pas abouti en raison de la confessionnalisation extrême des dynamiques conflictuelles et du « détournement » des deux soulèvements irakien et syrien par les combattants ayant fait allégeance à l’État islamique ou à d’autres formations djihadistes. À ce titre, la promotion du wahhabisme par le royaume saoudien et ses partenaires sunnites dans la péninsule au détriment d’autres courants de pensée de l’islam, conjuguée à l’appui militaire malgré tout apporté par l’Occident à ces États en contrepartie d’opportunités commerciales et de bases militaires, ne sont aucunement dissociables de la « longue période de fermentation » dans laquelle le Moyen-Orient semble être entré. Luizard et Cockburn sont formels : il sera extrêmement difficile d’extraire la région du tourbillon dans lequel Daech l’a emportée.

[1]. Il serait trop long de dresser ici une liste exhaustive des titres disponibles, mais en voici trois d’intérêt et en français : L. Napoleoni, L’État islamique. Multinationale de la violence, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2015 ; Ph. Bannier et F. Balanche, L’État islamique et le bouleversement de l’ordre régional, Paris, Éditions du Cygne, 2015 ; O. Hanne et Th. Flichy de la Neuville, L’État islamique. Anatomie du nouveau califat, Paris, Bernard Giovanangeli, 2014.

[2]. Accords secrets conclus le 16 mai 1916 entre le Royaume-Uni et la France et prévoyant le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman.

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President of Burundi Pierre Nkurunziza addresses guests during the state banquet at Tuyhuis in Cape Town. (Photo: DOC)

By Eliza Keller

The east African nation of Burundi went to the polls last week in an election marred by violence, media suppression and human rights abuses. Burundi, a country roughly the size of Vermont, is in the midst of its worst crisis since 2005, when a tentative peace agreement ended 12 years of civil war. More than 170,000 men, women, and children have fled to neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda, putting a strain on already scarce resources.

The government of Burundi first held parliamentary elections in late June, despite pleas for postponement from the international community. The European Union and the African Union pulled out their election observers in advance of the elections, fearing that their presence would lend legitimacy to an illegitimate process. A few days later, the United States announced the cutoff of security assistance, and threatened to remove Burundi’s preferential trade status under the recently renewed African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In a statement at the time, the Department of State declared that the United States “regrets” President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to move ahead with elections.

The parliamentary elections were boycotted by seventeen political parties. Burundi’s electoral commission called turnout “enormous,” but media reports noted that streets in the capital of Bujumbura were deserted and polling stations at universities reported attendance in the single digits. A few days later, U.N. observers declared that the elections were not fair or free and that human rights were violated.

Last week’s presidential elections, in which President Nkurunziza won an unprecedented third term, were held after only a brief postponement, far from the months-long delay called for by Burundi’s neighbors and international partners. Secretary of State John Kerry called the vote “deeply flawed.” As the crisis continues, the international community stands by helplessly. Strongly worded press releases and finger-wagging denunciations are piling up at the feet of President Nkurunziza, who appears unfazed. (A few days after an attempted coup in May, the president was photographed playing soccer with friends while protests raged across Bujumbura.)

These bland public statements carry little influence, but the U.S. has few alternatives in its diplomatic repertoire. In the old days of diplomacy, the U.S. ambassador in Burundi would sit down with President Nkurunziza over Cuban cigars and hash out a compromise — perhaps an agreement to step down in exchange for an esteemed university professorship or, even better, a briefcase filled with crisp U.S. bills. Today, just the protocol involved in arranging such a meeting is deterrent enough. Programs like the Ibrahim Prize, a $5 million cash award granted to African leaders who voluntarily relinquish power, attempts to fill this void, but the prize has only been awarded twice in the last six years.

Of course, more transparent and responsible foreign policy is a good thing. But in a region in which relationships tend to carry more diplomatic weight than memos and mandates, this shift to modern diplomacy has come at the expense of diplomatic influence. The escalating situation in Burundi is evidence of the consequences.

The administration’s much-hyped “pivot to Asia” has brought political backing, diplomatic attention, and resources to a region of the world facing immense challenges. The United States’ leadership in brokering a nuclear deal with Iran shows us the potential of what can happen when these resources are brought to bear. In executing this pivot, however, the administration must not turn its back on the small but ambitious countries of Africa and Latin America. President Obama’s visit to Kenya this week represents an important opportunity for renewed U.S. commitment to the region, and the goodwill that it generates must not be squandered.

Despite dire appearances in Burundi, there is good news: The current U.S. ambassador to Burundi, Dawn Liberi, is not a political fundraiser, but a career diplomat with extensive experience living and working in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a lucky break for the United States. Ambassador Liberi must take pains to ensure that her voice remains strong, steady and assuring amid the gunfire and explosions plaguing Burundi’s capital. She and other diplomats must not isolate President Nkurunziza, but must remain engaged and empathetic.

There is still time for President Nkurunziza to graciously step down and, in doing so, preserve the state that he helped build and establish a legacy as an honorable and benevolent leader. With camaraderie and patience (and maybe a little cash), perhaps Ambassador Liberi and her colleagues can swing the pendulum away from an emerging dictatorship and toward a more peaceful, democratic future for the people of Burundi

Eliza Keller is Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Journal of International Affairs and a Partner with the Truman National Security Project. She has more than ten years of experience in politics and public service; most recently, she served as Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation. Eliza is currently an MPA candidate at Columbia University and holds a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University.

La crise grecque dévoile le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne : elle a mis au jour la distance qui s'est créée avec les ambitions formulées par les pères fondateurs — démocratie, solidarité et prospérité —, consacré la victoire d'une idéologie venue d'Allemagne, l'ordolibéralisme, et se montre désormais (...) / Allemagne, Europe, Grèce, Ajustement structurel, Démocratie, Dette, Économie, Finance, Politique, Crise financière - 2015/08

تحوّل ميزان القوى في جنوب اليمن ضد الحوثيين والقوات الموالية للرئيس السابق، علي عبد الله صالح. بات هؤلاء وخصومهم على عتبة نقطة تحوّل في الحرب الأهلية التي تدور رحاها منذ أربعة أشهر؛ فإما أن يدرك الطرفان أنه لا يمكن لأي منهما أن يحقق نصراً كاملاً، فيختاران السلام، أو أن يُدخلا البلاد في أتون موجة جديدة من الصراع الأكثر تدميراً. بعد حصول المقاتلين على دعم عسكري يتمثل في عتاد جديد، وقوة جوية وتدفق مقاتلين يمنيين تم تدريبهم في السعودية، تمكّنوا من الاستيلاء على المطار الدولي في المدينة والمناطق المحيطة به في 14 يوليو/تموز. ويبدو أنهم على وشك تعزيز سيطرتهم على عدن للمرة الأولى منذ وصل الحوثيون إلى مشارف المدينة في أواخر مارس/آذار 2015.

(Own report) - Berlin is legitimizing German military intervention by alleging it is to combat the causes of fleeing. The Bundeswehr must undertake operations in Mali, "so that people will no longer have to flee the violence and hopelessness," claimed Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, early this week during her visit in Mali's capital Bamako. She is using the current refugee crisis in Germany to arouse sympathy for the Bundeswehr's interventions. However, with its aggressive foreign policy, Germany is actively helping create the causes for people to flee. A prime example is the Federal Republic of Germany's Afghan policy since the 1980s. Together with other western governments, Bonn had exacerbated the Afghan civil war with its support for the Mujahidin. Millions of Afghans had to flee the country and Afghanistan has never recovered from its political, economic, and social devastation. The Bundeswehr's deployment in Afghanistan, which began in 2001 and whose main mission was ended last year, has provoked a new wave of refugees.