Diplomacy & Crisis News

President Gustavo Petro’s time at the helm of Colombia thus far has come in two acts. The first began with his taking office in August 2022 and was defined by his pushing ahead on key policies and living up to the hope that his center-left government would help steer Colombia to a more peaceful, greener, and economically equitable future. Act two began with the failure to pass health care legislation in April 2023, which was followed by a cabinet reshuffle and the failure to pass other reform bills. Furthermore, a scandal broke in June involving his former chief of staff, Laura Sarabia, and his ambassador to Venezuela, Armando Benedetti blindsided the administration.

Petro is now seeking to regain momentum, but he faces a challenging political and economic landscape, which could be defined by gridlock with Congress, policy drift, and potentially opening the door to social instability. Given Colombia’s importance as a reliable U.S. partner in South America, observers and policymakers in Washington ought to pay attention to these developments.

The Petro Show: Acts I and II

Petro’s victory in 2022 came amid considerable excitement. A former member of M-19, a flag holder for Colombia’s Left, and mayor of Bogóta, he inspired many youthful voters and other marginalized groups who had tired of center-right and conservative governments often hit by corruption scandals, human rights violations, and a hard-nosed approach to dealing with the country’s arms-bearing radical Left. Petro was seen as a new type of Colombian leader; one that could clean up the country’s politics and enact a progressive agenda that would, among other things, pursue more eco-friendly policies (by downsizing the country’s coal and oil sectors) and orient Bogóta toward ensuring socio-economic justice.

Petro’s first act saw the formation of a broad-based cabinet, the passage of a tax reform bill, and an accord to buy land from cattle ranchers and give it to landless rural people. At the same time, he was able to bring the country’s largest remaining armed revolutionary (and drug trafficking) group, the ELN, to the negotiating table as part of his “Total Peace” policy—an ambitious plan to minimize violence, protect civilians, and dismantle the country’s many armed groups. He also restored relations with the dictatorial Maduro regime in Venezuela in 2022—a sharp change in direction that seeks to normalize the border and improve trade, departing from the approach of his predecessor, President Iván Duque.

Act two began roughly around April 2023, following the failure of his health care reform package to make it through the lower house of the country’s congress. Petro, in response, took his government leftwards. He replaced seven cabinet members with leftists, seeking to reinvigorate his reform program. Particularly noticeable was the departure of the market-friendly and internationally-respected Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo, who was seen by the country’s Left as a sop to the center-right and Right (and whose earlier support was essential to passing legislation in the Congress). He was replaced by Ricardo Bonilla, a former finance chief of Bogóta and close Petro ally.

In practice, the cabinet reshuffle is important. Petro barely won the majority of the vote on the second round (50.47 percent) and his party and allies failed to obtain a majority in either chamber of Congress, making a politically broader cabinet necessary passage of his legislation. While the president appears intent on having a more ideologically cohesive group of people around him that will pursue his agenda with greater vigor, it also sets the stage for less cooperation in Congress and potential gridlock.

The Nanny Scandal and the Family Scandal

Following the cabinet reshuffle, Petro’s administration was hit by a scandal in early June around accusations that his former chief of staff’s nanny, Marelbys Meza, had stolen a large sum of cash in a briefcase from her apartment. Meza told the media that she was taken to a basement near the presidential palace in January 2023, accused of stealing the briefcase, and forced to take a polygraph test.

The scandal quickly blossomed into a wider tangle of alleged illegal wiretapping (something Petro has previously railed against), the alleged suicide of a security officer (suspected of being involved in the wiretappings), expletive-laden leaked audio messages by Benedetti to Sarabia, and allegations of campaign finance violations (made by Bendetti and later retracted). Adding another layer of complexity to the scandal is that Meza appears to have been at the center of a bitter power struggle between Benedetti, a major conservative power broker who allied with Petro during the election, and Sarabia, who worked under Benedetti before leading Petro’s campaign. Sarabia and Benedetti were dismissed from their posts following the announcement that the attorney general’s office had commenced an investigation into the affair. Rounding out the picture, relations between Petro and his attorney general, Francisco Barbosa, are strained, with the president having accused Barbosa, who was appointed by a prior conservative government, of acting against his “change” agenda.

Petro faces other legal problems; there are accusations that his son, Nicolás Petro, might have kept donations to his father’s campaign for his own personal use (some of them allegedly from a former drug trafficker), and that the president’s brother, Juan Fernando Petro, may have received money from the country’s drug cartels. Both men have denied the allegations, but the attorney general’s office has indicated that it is investigating matters. If nothing else, this development only adds to the sense of embattlement felt by Petro and further polarizes the country between his supporters, who believe that this is part of a plot against the president, and those opposed to his progressive agenda.

The scandal has eroded public confidence, with some of the most recent opinion polls putting Petro’s popularity around 33 percent and disapproval ratings a little over 50 percent. When elected he had an approval rating of 56 percent. At the same time, Petro’s reform agenda has stalled. In June a bill to regulate the purchase, sale, and distribution of marijuana narrowly failed in the Senate, while a labor reform bill was shelved after committee members in Congress’ lower house failed to reach a quorum. The fate of two other reforms, pension, and healthcare, remains in limbo.

Where to, Colombia?

Where does Colombia head from here?

Petro sees himself first and foremost as a man of the Left, who, according to The Economist, “believes he is predestined to liberate his country from conservative elites.” He is known to be zealous, temperamental, and impulsive as well as having a tendency to radicalize rather than reconcile after disputes. Petro’s political personality is likely to be severely tested. He is increasingly facing public discontent with lackluster economic growth (with 1.0 percent real GDP projected by the International Monetary Fund for 2023) and high inflation, which is being felt in food prices. Though slowing for the third month in a row, inflation remains high by Colombian standards at 12.13 percent in June.

But that is not all. The nanny scandal has given Petro’s enemies a chance to portray him as a hypocrite, and there is also a degree of public discontent over growing insecurity in urban and rural areas. Under this scenario, there is a risk that Petro may shift his attention away from party politics and seek to take his case for reforms directly to the people hoping for them to demonstrate in favor of his proposed reforms thus pressuring Congress to act.

Frustration with the democratic process has raised the concern that Petro could seek to govern in a more autocratic and populist fashion, much like El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. Bukele’s populist approach and hard line on law and order are seen in a positive light by increasing numbers of Latin Americans frustrated by threats to their personal safety and the corruption of entrenched political elites. Petro did beat the drum of populist change as Bogóta’s mayor and as a presidential candidate, though it has yet to be seen whether he would take steps to undermine the autonomy of institutions that could check his concentration of power.

Opinion polls are not giving Petro any relief. According to an Invamer poll released in late June, 70 percent of Colombians feel that their country is on the wrong track, 79 percent are convinced that the economy is in bad shape, and 74 percent are convinced that the corruption rates have increased. This of course is bad news for Petro, but he is not alone; Colombia’s congress has an unfavorable rating of 74 percent, the supreme court with 60 percent unfavorable, and the media at 58 percent. The institution or group seen as most unfavorable was the ELN at 89 percent.

While the Petro administration faces a challenging landscape, the political right is happy to goad Petro into moving further left to cast him as a radical of the same ilk as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, who presided over their country’s economic collapse and the exodus of seven million Venezuelans. Moreover, the peace process with the ELN remains controversial, with plenty of critics. In October 2023, Colombians will vote in gubernatorial and local elections. By stalling Petro’s reforms and goading him to become more radical the right can claim that he is an ineffectual leader and position itself as a force for law and order and economic growth with an eye to the next national elections.

The Future of Colombia

The state of Colombian democracy is important to the rest of Latin America and the United States. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are dictatorships and there are concerns over much of Central America, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Argentina is amid an economic crisis and could be in for contentious elections in October 2023. Prospects for Mexico have also deteriorated, with President Andrés Manuel López Obrador silencing critics, tampering with the country’s independent electoral authority, and expanding the military’s role in the economy.

While there is a pressing need to maintain a constructive relationship with Colombia, policy differences between Bogóta and Washington clearly exist, with Petro’s policy toward Venezuela probably being the most challenging. Considering the Colombian leader’s willingness to accommodate Maduro despite his obvious rigging of the upcoming elections, Petro’s refusal to meet Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó in April 2023 during a Colombian-sponsored Latin American, European, and North American conference on unfreezing negotiations between Maduro’s regime and the opposition, and ongoing call for the lifting of sanctions against Venezuela, Colombian-U.S. relations have developed a certain edge. That said, it is important that the relationship remains constructive. More democratic backsliding in Latin America is not in Washington’s interest and plays to the authoritarian narratives out of China and Russia.

Colombian democracy is stressed, confidence in key institutions is sagging, government policy is in drift mode and the country seems to have tired of the government of change in less than a year. The country’s leader is temperamental but has thus far worked his way through the democratic system, having served as a congressman and senator, the mayor of Bogóta, and run for the presidency twice before he was successful in 2022. Moreover, Colombia’s political stability has been challenged before by revolutionary movements, populist uprisings like the Bogotazo of 1948 and drug cartels. It has weathered each storm. It will probably do so again, but there is considerable downside risk as the Petro administration is increasingly embattled. Another round of social turmoil cannot be ruled out.

Dr. Scott B. MacDonald is the Chief Economist for Smith’s Research & Gradings, a Fellow with the Caribbean Policy Consortium, and a Research fellow with Global Americans. Prior to those positions, he worked for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Credit Suisse, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, KWR International, and Mitsubishi Corporation. His most recent book is The New Cold War, China and the Caribbean (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

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Though the commercial low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite industry is booming, it could have an adverse geopolitical impact.

The LEO satellite market is highly fragmented as firms compete for a dominant share. However, the finite nature of orbital slots and spectrum allocation creates a natural market threshold that will likely prevent future entrants from joining the industry’s competition. This dynamic has created what is in effect a satellite race, with both domestic firms and other countries trying to launch their own satellite constellation to compete with the combined might of U.S. firms. We need to ensure that this scramble for space isn’t a race to the bottom.

The Competition for Space

Earth’s lower orbit has limited orbital slots, or specific satellite positions. Each satellite also requires spectrum access on specific frequencies for communication, which companies in the LEO industry and other industries want and compete for. In other words, both orbital slots and spectrum allocation exhibit dynamics similar to a parking lot: once the parking lot is full, there are no spaces left.

As such, the rapid proliferation of LEO constellations and the dearth of orbital slots and spectrum allocation highlights a need for a proactive space policy that can ensure the sustainability of space as a new frontier for technological and economic progress.

The latter is particularly notable, given how LEO satellite constellations have become remarkably popular for commercial uses. Companies such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper have capitalized on consumer demand for high-speed, low-latency Internet connectivity and are vying for the opportunity to send thousands of satellites into LEO to achieve global coverage.

Though the United States has been paving its own path in the space industry, U.S. policymakers need to be conscientious of how the country is setting a precedent in space exploration. Given our current advantage, we can establish policies that ensure safe, proactive space innovation and LEO practices.

American space companies are ahead of the pack when it comes to space exploration, and other countries are taking notice. America’s peer competitors recognize the risk presented by American orbital and spectral slot dominance and are encouraging commercial satellite development accordingly. For example, China’s state-backed “Starnet” system plans to launch thousands of satellites into low-Earth orbit to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink and other Western competitors. To Beijing, mega-constellations such as Starlink give the US a strategic edge and threaten China's national security interests.

Space Chokepoints

Aside from national security concerns raised by American rivals, the finite nature of LEO slots creates a low-Earth atmosphere bottleneck. Any object launched further into space must safely navigate through the orbital paths of the thousands of satellites operating in LEO. A densely packed LEO approaching its carrying capacity could serve as a chokepoint, obviating other space activity. As such, the country that de facto “controls” LEO will determine who can explore beyond it. These dynamics may create a security dilemma and encourage more aggressive space activity, such as intentional satellite collisions.

Encouraging efficient utilization of orbital slots should be paramount to international policymakers. Creating an effective satellite allocation system, such as an assigned “parking space” framework, wherein each LEO satellite is assigned a specific orbital slot, could help provide stability and lessen the downstream effects of the projected satellite trends, which anticipate nearly all Earth observation and communication satellites to be sent to orbit without “comprehensive governance.”

Another chokepoint created by commercial LEO satellites is spectrum allocation—the process of issuing frequency bands for communication, which is required by LEO constellations for seamless communication between the satellites and ground stations.

Spectrum band capacity is finite, and distribution is regulated by various international regulatory bodies, which can stifle competition between LEO providers by enabling uneven spectrum access. For example, if different countries try to use the same frequency bands for their LEO satellites, communication failures can be created by interference between the satellites.

If the United States were to create an effective spectrum allocation across different jurisdictions, we could decrease the risk of interference, which would be in all satellite companies’ best interests.

Overall, Washington should reevaluate space regulation and propagate international space norms to foster safe, proactive space innovation and LEO practices. The alternative is the eventual development of aggressive and potentially damaging space competition, culminating in armed conflict for the future of space.

Cassandra Shand is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cambridge and a Young Voices Innovation Fellow. Twitter: @CassandraShand.

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Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, called Israel a “racist state,” touching off a controversy about America’s views toward the world’s only Jewish state.

The House on Tuesday passed a resolution pledging unfailing support for Israel, condemning antisemitism and declaring that the country is neither racist nor an apartheid state, in an implicit rebuke of Democrats who criticized the nation ahead of an address by its president to a joint session of Congress.

Americans have supported Israel since the minute of its re-birth in 1948, when President Harry Truman recognized the country. Large majorities of Americans have told pollsters that they supported Israel for more than seventy years—one of the most durable results in American polling. What’s more, America is home to more Jews than any other nation on Earth, including Israel itself. Until recently, support for Israel was nearly unanimous in both political parties.

Israel’s demography is far more complex than critics like Rep. Jayapal imagined. One of out every five Israelis was either born in Morocco or the parents of Moroccans. Another fifth hail from elsewhere in North Africa or East Africa, such as the Ethiopian Jews, many of whom were airlifted out to Israel in the 1980s. Then there are the Israelis from the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Then there are Jews who hail from the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and other eastern lands. And, of course, there are European descendants of the Nazi horror. And all of that only counts the Jews.

Israel also has many Christian and Muslim citizens who fully participate in public life. Indeed, more than a baker’s dozen of Muslims sit in Israel’s Knesset, the country’s parliament. Non-Jews enjoy full constitutional rights in Israel, something that cannot be said of non-Muslims in many nearby states.

Comparing Israel to Apartheid South Africa, a now well-worn cliché, ignores the reality that is visible to anyone who stands on an Israeli sidewalk.

That this controversy erupted during the Israeli president’s visit to Washington DC, who told the press in the Oval Office that he had brought a message of greetings and gratitude from “the whole country of Israel, from all sides of the political spectrum,” only added fuel to the fire.

It is true that the differences exist, and they are publicly aired by the Biden administration, but the American public’s support for Israel has never wavered.

The U.S.-Israel relationship is not simply the convenient overlap of shared interests in fighting terror and promoting democracy. It is far deeper. American non-Jews support Israel in larger numbers than American Jews, according to numerous polls. Christian evangelicals, who make up nearly one-third of the U.S. population, support Israel in numbers approaching unanimity. More than half of the U.S. Catholics tell pollsters that they support Israel.

Why do so many U.S. Christians support Israel? One reason is a Bible-focused religion makes Israel a familiar place, at least in the mental maps of many believers. It does not seem far away or even all that foreign; they have grown up reading and hearing about ancient Israel and seemingly have no trouble translating that into an affection for modern-day Israel.

Another reason is a parallel history. Like America, Israel was settled by farmers and homesteaders . Yet they persevered and built a modern country that waters fruit trees in its deserts and invents software companies in its cities. It is a nation that doesn’t like war, but fights vigorously when attacked and invariably wins. It doesn’t revolt against unpopular rulers; it patiently votes them out.

Perhaps the biggest reason for warm feelings is that both countries have similar institutions and shared values: elected government, social tolerance, dynamic capitalism, the supremacy of law, a reverence for the past, and a passion for innovation.

But Israel is not America in one important respect: it has real extremes that could tear the tiny country apart. In the 1960s, Palestinian politics took a feverish turn, and extreme regimes, like Iran, have funded violent factions for decades including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In response, an extreme Zionism emerged. While it does not carry out terror attacks, it advocates for extreme policies that would result in many Arabs being deported from the land where they were born.

Tragically, but inevitably, these two extremes feed off each other, threatening to ignite a scorched-earth civil war of undiluted barbarism.

Here the parallel with America ends. Even America’s newest immigrants only want to join American society, not end its existence. Partisans of both sides cite the U.S. Constitution as their friend and fear that the other side will tear it up. Americans, of all political stripes, seek only readjustments, not revolutions.

The strength of American constitutional institutions has made it the most powerful and influential country in the world. Since its institutions work, Americans know that America will remain America, no matter who is elected to Congress or to the presidency. They may say something different on social media or at political rallies, but no American really believes, deep down, that their elected representatives would dynamite the national institutions.

Israel’s future has been in doubt since its beginning. Its neighbors have taken many decades to acknowledge its legitimacy. Terror groups send rockets and set bombs. Even a sizable plurality of its Arab citizens say that it shouldn’t exist. This is a social challenge far beyond anything that any other industrial democracy must endure. And yet those who call for Israel’s end are not jailed, beaten, or driven from their jobs. Their remarks are shrugged off; their democratic rights are respected.

Israeli openness had also created a dynamic economy. In Tel Aviv, citizens continue to experiment, test, and invent-both software systems and new social ideas.

America and Israel should not doubt the strength of their democracies. The aftermath of dramatic campaigns in both countries shows that a system of government that lets the people rule has the energy to survive and thrive.

At pivotal moments in its history, Israelis have delved into the writings of Zionism’s founders and found a way forward. Today, the words of David Ben-Gurion still ring true: “We don’t have the approach of the German Social Democrats. . . of the British Labor Party. . . [or] Soviet communism. We have paved our own way.”

While the danger of Iran and its proxies are still there, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s greatest challenge is to rely on this exceptional friendship between the two countries to strengthen the Abraham Accords, which brought peace between four Arab lands and Israel in 2020.

Today, a new hope has emerged, to open a new chapter in Palestinian history, The young Palestinians really want peace, prosperity, and dignity.

Rather than faulting Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reform, the Biden administration would be wise to build on the Abraham Accords. The American public would remember those efforts during an election year and enjoy vast, bipartisan support. Peace is always worth a chance.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

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L'opposition à l'« appropriation culturelle » s'apparente à la revendication d'un capital culturel. De telles luttes révèlent en un sens l'avancée impressionnante de la privatisation de toute chose — y compris la souffrance. Elles représentent aussi une variation sur un thème familier : la justice (...) / Mouvement de contestation, Politique, Citoyenneté, Racisme, États-Unis, Mouvement de libération, Capitalisme, Identité culturelle, États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Culture - 2018/05

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The establishment of the U.S. Space Force marked a significant milestone in America’s commitment to maintaining its dominance in space. As the guardians of the final frontier, it is imperative that the Space Force maintain the highest standards when it comes to the launch of mission-critical satellites. However, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recent proposed changes to the launch services procurement process in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) risk undermining the Space Force’s ability to deploy our most crucial space-based defense assets.

The third phase of the Space Force’s National Security Space Launch Program, which covers launch contracts awarded in 2025, includes a two-lane approach. “Lane 1” allows for multiple vendors and diversity of launch technologies. “Lane 2” will select two medium and heavy-lift rockets vendors that will deploy critical satellites into orbit. The importance of these payloads to the national defense requires reliable launch vehicles and companies with proven processes and capabilities. This dual-lane approach affords ample opportunities for entrants in the launch services to develop and demonstrate new technologies with low-risk missions while ensuring that the nation can respond to threats quickly and reliably.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, apparently bowing to pressure from Blue Origin, proposed on June 23 the creation of a “Lane 2A”. This would allow new entrants in the heavy-lift domain to enter the field several years into the procurement process in the name of increased competition. This misguided change to the process introduces unnecessary uncertainties that can compromise the success of our most vital missions.

Blue Origin has experienced multiple delays in developing the New Glenn rocket and its engines. The engines and the New Glenn are over three years behind schedule, and neither has been flight tested. Indeed, Blue Origin’s launch experience is limited only to its New Shepard suborbital flights, which have been on hiatus since a rocket nozzle failure caused an in-flight abort in September 2022.

Other entrants into the space launch business are experimenting with materials and manufacturing innovations that may—or may not—pave the way for cheaper access to space. Some have proven successful, but only after a rigorous testing process and many flights. Relativity Space lost its first 3D-printed launch vehicle in March this year. Virgin Orbit went bankrupt after the failures of its air-launched two-stage vehicle. Even SpaceX lost several payloads due to failures in the past decade while developing and certifying its Falcon 9.

The recent tragedy of the deep sea “Titan” reminds us of the importance of rigorous testing and gaining experience with new technology over the long term before entrusting it to important missions. While failures can be tolerated with lower-risk flights like those envisioned by Lane 1 of the Space Launch Program, the stakes are too high to jeopardize a Lane 2 mission using unproven technology.

Lane 2 satellite launches are not only costly endeavors but also carry significant national security implications. A failed launch can result in the loss of critical assets or disruption of communication systems. The financial implications of such failures are staggering, as taxpayer dollars are wasted on unsuccessful missions. By prioritizing reliability over competitive experimentation, the Space Force can avoid unnecessary costs associated with failures and allocate resources more efficiently.

Finally, the Space Force operates within a complex ecosystem that involves coordination with multiple government agencies, private contractors, and international partners. The utilization of established vendors ensures a cohesive and accountable framework for collaboration. These vendors have well-defined processes, reliable supply chains, and established relationships with key stakeholders, fostering seamless integration of efforts. Using unproven vendors and new technologies may introduce compatibility issues, potentially jeopardizing the cooperative relationships critical to mission success.

While embracing innovation and exploring new technologies is vital for advancing space exploration, Congress must prioritize reliability and mission success for America’s defense satellite launches. Using established vendors with proven track records, robust testing procedures, and technological maturity is essential to minimize risks and maximize the probability of success. By exercising prudence in its current vendor selection process, the Space Force can uphold its commitment to national security, protect taxpayer investments, and ensure a future of robust space exploration and defense.

Jonathan H. Ward is a freelance writer on the U.S. space program and is the co-author of Bringing Columbia Home: The Untold Story of a Lost Space Shuttle and Her Crew.

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Last year, with heavy earthmoving equipment behind him, President Joe Biden proclaimed, “The future of the chip industry is going to be made in America.” His aspirational rhetoric was equal parts political opportunism and wishful thinking, fueled by the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, which authorized $53 billion in incentives for U.S. semiconductor manufacturing.

Perhaps there was reason for optimism. The president delivered his speech as Intel Corp. broke ground in rural New Albany, Ohio for a $20 billion chip fabrication plant. The construction alone would create 7,000 jobs, while the new “fabs” would employ 3,000 workers, each earning an average of $135,000 per year. But that happy day was not the end of the story; it was just the beginning.

Ten months later, just before Independence Day, the Chinese Communist Party struck back against U.S. industrial policy by announcing new export controls on gallium and germanium, set to take effect on August 1. These minerals are critical components in a host of advanced technologies, including semiconductors. Moreover, China corners the market on them. Business insiders don’t hesitate to say that Beijing’s export controls “will have an immediate ripple effect on the semiconductor industry.”

So much for that speech on the construction lot. When President Biden bragged about America’s economic future, it seems he forgot our greatest economic vulnerability: our supply chains’ deep dependence on a regime that wants to weaken and ultimately overtake the United States. This is unsurprising because the president has a decades-long track record of being wrong about China. Unfortunately, his naiveté—or whatever you want to call not learning a lesson in half a century—is infectious.

In April, when National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan tried to acknowledge the threat of Communist China, he summed up the appropriate response as “protecting our foundational technologies with a small yard and a high fence.” That’s a fun turn of phrase, but small yards with high fences don’t offer much protection if you have to go outside the yard for everything you need to maintain it. That is exactly what’s happening now.

In the case of chips, the Biden team assumed government subsidies and export controls on advanced technology would vault U.S. industry to the top. CHIPS Act subsidies will almost certainly increase our production capacity. But through an insane loophole, companies can also invest in China to build so-called “legacy” chips. The Biden administration’s export controls are similarly weak, allowing companies like Nvidia and Intel to sell China advanced chips to build its artificial intelligence sector. Meanwhile, Beijing’s controls on gallium and germanium show the Chinese Communist Party still wields lots of leverage—and isn’t afraid to use it.

U.S. innovation is important, but innovation alone won’t make our economy less reliant on our adversaries. At this moment, China controls 63 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals and 85 percent of its mineral processing capacity. If Beijing cut us off, as it cut off Japan in 2010, we would be at China’s mercy. All our fancy factories and machines would be useless.

The same dynamic plagues the Biden administration’s “green transition” investments, especially those tied to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). President Biden touts this law as an industrial policy aimed at creating jobs and increasing our economic resilience. Yet there are inherent flaws with the legislation that prevent that from occurring. For instance, because the IRA simply seeks to expand solar power in the United States without addressing Beijing’s grip on global solar panel supply chains, it is actively strengthening that grip, sending obscene quantities of cash to Chinese companies—even ones that profit from Uyghur slave labor.

These missteps squander public trust. If we aren’t careful, they will destroy people’s faith in our ability to rebuild and reindustrialize our economy. That would be tragic because there’s a lot we can do to make America a manufacturing power again. And if we fail, the consequences for our national security will be dire. After all, gallium and germanium aren’t just essential to semiconductor manufacturing—they are also key components in weapon systems. Why would China’s communist overlords grant U.S. defense contractors access to these minerals in the event of a military standoff? They probably won’t. This should serve as a wake-up call to Washington and our defense contractors—some of which, like Raytheon, are naively hoping China will play nice.   

What’s more, export controls on a handful of critical minerals barely scratch the surface of China’s economic leverage. Imagine the havoc Beijing could wreak by depriving America of pharmaceutical ingredients or the $100 billion’s worth of electrical machinery we import every year. The United States will not be safe until we act to eliminate these vulnerabilities.

To do so effectively, the Biden administration must move beyond end product-focused projects and begin securing critical supply chains from start to finish. Undeniably, this will be more difficult than throwing money at companies compromised by China. Nevertheless, it is what the American people need and deserve if they are to remain free and prosperous throughout the twenty-first century.

Marco Rubio is the senior U.S. senator from Florida. He is also the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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Since the United States has designated space a warfighting domain, similar to traditional warfighting environments such as air, land, and sea, the interest in the extraterrestrial plane from the American political, military, and industrial world has significantly increased. In 2021, the Biden administration unveiled its Space Priorities Framework, which reaffirmed the nation’s space objectives, helping to align the U.S. government's strategies with the rapid advancements of the American commercial space industry and safeguarding national interests in an increasingly competitive space domain. From this point of view, growing Russian Chinese space capabilities pose military and geopolitical challenges. To cope with these challenges, American policymakers also need their allies to strengthen their capabilities in this domain, particularly if these capabilities have transatlantic relevance and support NATO activities. This is precisely the case with Italy, with whom space has been at the core of cooperation between the two allies over the past years.

The recent diplomatic missions to the United States of Guido Crosetto, Antonio Tajani, and Adolfo Urso—respectively, Italian ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and enterprises—have highlighted the growing relevance of the space industry for this partnership. More importantly, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s upcoming trip to Washington DC will devote significant attention to space issues.

From Draghi to Meloni: Continuity is the Keyword

From an industrial perspective, Italy stands out as one of the few nations whose businesses span the entire space value chain, including all upstream, midstream, and downstream operations across all major technological domains. The outgoing government of Mario Draghi released a “Digital Italy” white paper, presenting progress on this front while outlining the vision for the future.

According to this document, space represents a robust sector for Italy and an excellent opportunity for further development. The strategy for the years 2021–2026 commends the industry for “consolidating its presence in the so-called upstream sector: in launchers… satellites with multiple operational characteristics… crucial to enhance Earth observation capabilities, and… space modules functional to the exploration of space.”

On space policy, the continuity between the previous and the current government is striking, an important consideration for foreign governments and companies hoping to invest or collaborate. Italy is among the nine nations that earmark an annual budget of €1 billion ($1.04 billion) for their space sectors. Regarding investment relative to GDP, Italy ranks sixth globally, trailing just behind India and Germany. In an industry globally known for the presence of prominent actors, in Italy is peculiar the relevance for this sector of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

SMEs constitute an astonishing 80 percent of the national space industry and employ more than 7,000 people. Italy is also a notable contributor to the European Space Agency (ESA) ranking as the third-largest donor after Germany and France.

The Partnership with the United States

Space was at the center of Minister Urso’s agenda in DC. He met Chirag Parikh, the Executive Secretary of the National Space Council. The bilateral conversation underscored the intent to fortify the collaboration on space exploration. Urso emphasized that “global challenges are played out in space” while acknowledging the numerous collaborations with the United States.

These collaborations include participation in the International Space Station (ISS) and the Artemis program—Italy was among the first to sign to the latter, even expressing interest through a joint statement in September 2020—human spaceflight, lunar exploration, scientific missions, and numerous agreements with NASA and private corporations. Urso also unveiled that talks have commenced for a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA), expressing hope for a swift conclusion of these negotiations and aiming towards a reciprocal arrangement with the United States.

Interestingly, Minister Urso engaged with a delegation of representatives from leading U.S. space and aerospace corporations. The intent was to cultivate cooperation based on a B2B (business-to-business) approach, transcending government boundaries and extending to the industrial realm. The goal is stimulating interaction and collaboration between businesses, moving beyond mere institutional dialogue. This approach represents a strategic step towards a comprehensive bilateral partnership, underscoring the potential for cross-sector collaborations and a more agile approach to building partnerships in the space industry.

Anticipating the retirement of the ISS and the surge in the commercialization of low Earth orbit, the Italian Air Force has struck a deal with the Texas-based company Axiom, a key player in the construction of commercial space stations. In early March, the Italian Air Force signed an agreement to guarantee Italian Air Force (ItAF) training and an Air Force astronaut's mission participation from the ISS to Earth. This agreement builds upon the joint activities initiated between the two organizations in 2018, further cementing the Italian Air Force’s position in space exploration and commercialization.

Axiom Space is at the forefront of innovative space infrastructure, collaborating with NASA to construct the first commercial space station. In 2025, the first module manufactured by Axiom will link to the second node of the International Space Station (ISS), slated for retirement in 2031. This arrangement will expand the habitability and functionality of the ISS before these modules ultimately detach to form a completely independent residential and commercial entity in space.

This memorandum positions the Italian government and private sector to contribute substantially to the future space economy. It allows participation in building, utilizing, and marketing space infrastructures. The agreement allows for expansive collaboration, particularly the “definition of technological solutions and operational concepts for an Italian module that could subsequently be developed and integrated into the Axiom Space Station.”

The Geopolitics of Space

Developing this sector has several significant geopolitical implications for Italy. This sector is increasingly gaining transatlantic momentum: reflecting this growing interest, NATO recognized space as a major operational domain in 2019, while the 2022 Strategic Concept frequently references space issues. Italy is among those few NATO-allied nations possessing space capabilities, which it avails to the organization through sharing and pooling.

For other Transatlantic partners, the positioning of Italy as a trailblazer in space exploration is worth noting. However, the strategic value of Italy as a partner in the space sector to the United States, and more broadly NATO, transcends immediate bilateral cooperation and expertise sharing within the alliance, as it also has other dimensions.

For instance, Italy’s prowess in this domain could also prove instrumental in other geographies, such as the Mediterranean and Africa, where space-based capabilities can have a significant impact and represent a tool to contain the influence of other actors. For instance, Italy boasts substantial experience in Earth observation, which could equip Mediterranean and African partners with capabilities in diverse sectors, including agriculture, water scarcity management, extreme weather events, and natural disaster prediction.

Italy is introducing the “Iride” program, poised to become a crucial satellite program for low Earth orbit observation. This program will deliver eight core services: marine and coastal monitoring, air quality, land movement monitoring, land cover, hydro-meteorological climate, water resources monitoring, emergency management, and security. Crucially, Iride will generate analytical data to drive the development of commercial applications by startups, SMEs, and various industry sectors.

Cooperation on low Earth orbit observation could also be a key collaboration area with African partners. The Luigi Broglio Malindi Space Center positions Italy as an attractive partner for numerous countries on the continent. Established in 1966 and managed by the Italian Space Agency since 2004, the center is strategically located in Malindi on the Indian Ocean, near the Equator, which is crucial for achieving higher escape velocities for launch vehicles. Despite its potential, the site has only seen twenty-three launches, the latest in 1988.

Today, the center is a significant hub for receiving satellite and telemetry data, tracking launches, and other space objects. It forms an essential node in the cooperation network with other countries and space agencies such as NASA, ESA, France’s CNES, China’s CNSA, and others. During a state visit to Kenya in March of the current year, Italian president Sergio Mattarella toured the center and attempted to reinvigorate Italy’s partnerships with various African countries interested in advancing their space capabilities.

This element has obvious transatlantic implications: in recent years, China has tried to deepen cooperation with African countries in this domain, seeking to boost their space aspirations in a clear attempt to undermine U.S. supremacy in this field. As such, deepening ties with African countries could also be part of a responsible transatlantic burden-sharing approach, which has been a crucial topic of debate among NATO partners for a few years now.

The Case for Cooperation

The United States’ recognition of space as a warfighting domain, akin to traditional battlefields like air, land, and sea, has spurred considerable interest from the political, military, and industrial sectors to bolster capabilities to cope with potential challenges emanating from the space domain. Against this backdrop, the United States is also interested in bolstering space capabilities among its allies, focusing on those having transatlantic relevance and the potential to aid NATO activities.

The case of Italy served as a prime example of this, with space becoming a central pillar of cooperation between the two nations in recent years. Italy has shown a remarkable pledge to deepen its expertise and expand its presence in the space sector, establishing itself as a critical player in the global space community.

The recent ministerial visits underscored this commitment. The development of this industry has clear geopolitical implications, which can be relevant not only for Italy but also for the US. First and foremost, the emphasis is on strengthening Italy’s transatlantic synergies in this field, which is growing in significance due to the increasing recognition of space as a new crucial operational domain by NATO, but also represents a potential partner for many countries in Africa and the Mediterranean that need support on space activities.

On top of commercial and industrial considerations, the geopolitical logic of Italy’s development as a space actor is of particular relevance for the United States, as—if Rome continues to strengthen its space capabilities—it could provide robust help to Washington to cope with the risks and the challenges coming from this domain.

Dario Cristiani is a Senior Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Opinions expressed are solely of the author and do not express the views or opinions of the German Marshall Fund.

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Chinese president Xi Jinping, speaking to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 19th Congress in October 2017, announced: “It is time for us to take center stage in the world.” Yet a funny thing happened on the way to China’s coronation as a superpower: the very policies Xi implemented to transform his country into a global juggernaut are precisely what is gradually driving China toward an economic implosion.

For certain, Xi had help. The coronavirus pandemic and subsequent lockdown slowed domestic growth in China, much like it did for the rest of the world. And China is still the top trading partner for more than 120 countries—so it may seem premature to predict China’s economic decline. But the signs are there.

The Signs

First, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a trillion-dollar infrastructure push that was supposed to cement China’s role throughout the Global South—has unleashed a flood of unbridled corruption, pointless airports, failing dams, deep debt dependency, and widespread backlash. Instead of building loyalty to Beijing among leaders around the world, Chinese corruption has led opposition candidates to rise to power in unexpected places like Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia—all while riding a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment. China is now far less popular around the world than it used to be.

Second, Xi has implemented a series of “national security” laws that make investment and business operations in China increasingly difficult. For example, Chinese “anti-espionage” laws make it illegal for international companies to collect even basic information about China or Chinese citizens. As a practical matter, this criminalizes basic corporate due diligence and know-your-customer safeguards—protocols whereby multinational companies look into their counterparties for risks of corruption, sanctions evasion, or human rights abuses. American laws, like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, mandate that companies conduct robust due diligence and that such information is directly shared with corporate leadership. Firms that learn about the use of bribes or modern slavery would need to either violate Chinese law, by reporting the information to their leadership, or violate American law by not engaging in customary due diligence. U.S. counterintelligence officials have issued fresh warnings to American businesses about the risks these laws pose to basic operations and safety for companies and executives operating in China.

Additionally, a recent spate of raids on Western companies and detentions of senior employees demonstrate that Beijing intends to act aggressively against legitimate businesses engaged in standard due diligence in the country—actions that are likely to have major chilling effects on multinational corporations in China. The incompatibility between Chinese laws and global business practices will be even more stark when the European Union passes the much-anticipated Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which requires multinationals to conduct comprehensive human rights, environmental, and labor rights due diligence throughout their value chains—a huge percentage of which currently pass through China. As time goes on, these jurisdictional conflicts will increasingly make it impossible for Western companies to operate or invest in China or to route their supply chains through China.

Beijing’s statute claiming the right to examine information and data collected by any Chinese business anywhere in the world is equally damaging. This law applies not only to state-owned entities but every mom-and-pop business operated by Chinese citizens in every single country —in effect turning the entire 10+ million Chinese population living abroad into a massive spying operation. The result of this law will make multinational companies and governments less likely to engage Chinese businesses outside of China, given that such businesses are legally required to pass all information from the transaction directly on to the Chinese Communist Party.

Third, taking for granted China’s role as the world’s largest exporter, Xi has disregarded the opinions of leaders in the countries that buy most of China’s goods. On human rights, on dismantling of Hong Kong’s democracy, on the Russian war, on fentanyl production, and on countless other topics, Western governments have pushed Beijing to rein in its controversial practices—overtures that China has roundly rejected as attempts at interference in its domestic affairs. This attitude ignores that these same countries are China’s main customers—and it is never a good idea to ignore your customers.

Now, new and proposed laws in the United States and Europe are forcing companies to disengage from countries, like China, that continue to brazenly employ forced labor. Furthermore, an increasingly confrontational Beijing has led many Western companies and governments to actively decouple from China or pursue a “China Plus One” strategy by keeping some operations in China while creating supply chain redundancies in alternative locations. China’s economy is still export-dependent, with more than 20 percent of its GDP coming from exports and 40 percent of those being sent to North America and Europe. Ironically, the pandemic has increased dependency on exports to offset slowing domestic growth, putting a damper on the CCP’s objective of transitioning to a consumption-based economy.

Given its substantial domestic economic headwinds and its collapsing real estate market, exporting the economy out of trouble is often a central element of Beijing’s economic recovery plans. But its political intransigence now threatens those exports and, in turn, large portions of its economy. 180 million Chinese workers are employed in jobs that depend upon exports and trade—more than the entire U.S. workforce. This becomes doubly risky for China as it seeks to pivot further away from low-cost manufacturing to producing more high-tech goods and components that are primarily aimed at high-income countries’ markets. Piled on top of that, the Biden administration’s highly anticipated Outbound Investment Executive Order will likely further limit China’s access to critical technology that Beijing will require for this transition.

Possible Paths

At the most basic economic level, China needs the United States—a fact that Xi clearly either hasn’t yet realized or refuses to admit. As a weakening export-driven economy, amid a bursting real estate bubble, with an aging population, the accelerating movement of Western companies and critical supply chains out of China is going to hit a tipping point where China loses economic power slowly and then all at once. This, combined with the Global South starting to push back on the BRI and Chinese meddling in the domestic politics of dependent nations will narrow the potential options left for China to take its time on “center stage.”

With the status quo of the last thirty years eroding, what pathways does China really have left?

Path 1: Appeasement

Given Xi’s policies to date, his temperament, and the domestic popularity of antagonizing the West, this path is almost certainly not on the table for the Chinese Communist Party. And yet, the best and easiest way for China to truly claim its place in the world as a superpower is to play nice with others. If Beijing were to reverse course on its national security laws; engage constructively and meaningfully on Uyghur rights, Taiwan, and Hong Kong; take steps to rein in corruption, money laundering, fentanyl production, and intellectual property theft; and reduce its surveillance state and pro-authoritarian support of global dictators and strongmen, then there is no doubt that the United States and Europe would readily and happily welcome China back into the economic fold. This path is the only way to truly salvage the Chinese economic miracle. China can claim this is all Western-values-based bullying, but the fact of the matter is that we are their customer and we are well within our rights to refuse to buy goods from countries that engage in slavery and actively seek to disrupt the global order.

Path 2: Division

Xi’s preferred path is to divide and conquer Western democracies—fundamentally driving a wedge between the interests of the United States and Europe in hopes of exploiting each. French president Emanuel Macron’s recent statements that France and Europe should take a path of “strategic autonomy” between China and the United States has bolstered Chinese hopes that a fractious and divided Europe can be easily driven apart from a partisan and divided America. And there is truth to the fact that democracies are loud and raucous in internal dissent and international disagreement—particularly in hyper-partisan times.

And yet, Xi’s miscalculation is to underestimate the motivations of a multinational private sector that shares a single, overarching, and unifying goal: to manage risk. While Western politicians banter about divergent approaches to a bellicose China, it is cautious and calculating boards of directors that increasingly are recognizing the costs of doing business in or with China. And while American laws undoubtedly contribute to the compliance-driven decisions of the modern company, it is the imminent EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive that will force private companies to seek alternatives to a regime that fails to embrace responsible corporate governance. Once that happens, China will be unable to attract higher levels of Western investment and economic engagement, irrespective of the number of statements by presidents and prime ministers to the contrary.

Path 3: Resistance

China has long advocated for a multipolar global order to challenge the United States. In reality, however, the United States is just a dominant player in a carefully negotiated international financial system and interwoven global economy. If China seeks to build an alternative to the global economy and order, it is well within its rights to do that. It is unlikely, however, that other major economies have anything to gain by signing on to that. Instead, China will find itself increasingly limited to a rogue’s gallery of autocrats leading weak economies. Russia, which every day inches closer to becoming a failed state, is currently China’s largest ally. And certainly, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, North Korea, and Cuba would love to continue to align with China—but all of those countries combined have a GDP less than that of the Netherlands. This axis of authoritarians is hardly the sort of economic behemoth to fundamentally challenge the global economic order.

Path 4: Regression

Finally, China could downshift its high-octane economy and return to its roots as a producer of low-cost goods for export to the economies that are still within its orbit—the emerging economies of the Global South. And while the citizens of Kenya and Ecuador may resent China’s role in building overly expensive or unusable infrastructure under opaque and corruption-laden conditions, they still may be willing to sign up for cheap Chinese-made consumer products.

All Eyes on Xi

Ultimately, much will turn on what Xi, himself, wants to become. Does he seek a Vladimir Putin-like role as the king of a crumbling kingdom, or as a savvy technocrat that pivoted his country away from disaster by reengaging with the West? As the recent reversal of China’s zero-coronavirus policy shows, it is not impossible for Xi to abruptly change course.

China, as a country of citizens, must also choose its path—does it want to be led by a short-sighted CCP into an axis of weak authoritarian states that are surely on the downslope of history or does it want to re-engage with the global order as an economic leader that constructively engages with the Western world?

If today, Beijing maintained the status quo with Taiwan, provided substantial rights to the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, and removed onerous laws aimed at appropriate due diligence, Xi could re-inject China into the global order and be a peer to the United States for the next fifty years. If, instead, he digs in his heels and pushes disengagement with the West, Xi is very likely to become the leader most responsible for destroying his own standing on the global center stage.

Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of The National Interest or its editors.

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