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Amin Abou Rashed, president of the European Palestinians Conference (EPC), was rubbing elbows with Swedish politicians at an EPC event in late May. A month later, Rashed and his daughter were reportedly behind bars in the Netherlands for funneling €5.5 million to Hamas. This is just the latest instance of Hamas and other terrorist groups operating under the guise of charities and non-governmental organizations.

According to Dutch law, the names of suspects are not released until after a conviction. But the ages of the suspects, Abou Rashed’s conspicuous social media absence, and the analysis of those familiar with the case strongly suggest that the fifty-five-year-old man and twenty-five-year-old woman Dutch police arrested are Abou Rashed and his daughter.

Speeches by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh have been a fan favorite at the EPC, launched by the London-based Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) in 2003. Israel declared the PRC a front for Hamas in 2010.

Israel is not alone in identifying NGO networks in Europe affiliated with Palestinian terrorist groups. Treasury began sanctioning European-based Hamas-backed entities in 2003, including the UK-based charity Interpal, which is also designated by Canada and Australia. Two individuals who have served on the PRC’s board were also a board member and an activist in Interpal, respectively.

Beyond Interpal, the United States got serious decades ago about tackling charities and NGOs operating as fronts for Hamas. The most public of these cases involved the Holy Land Foundation (HLF). The United States designated the Texas-based charity as a terrorist group in December 2001, months after the 9/11 attacks. Over the course of years of investigations, U.S. prosecutors unraveled HLF’s web of fundraising on behalf of Hamas, particularly to support martyrs and their families. The HLF case highlighted Hamas’ strategy of collecting money through front groups.

Given his extensive connections to Hamas, it appears Abou Rashed was running the same playbook out of Europe. Israel sanctioned Abou Rashed, as well as two other EPC board members, in 2013 as an operative of Hamas in Europe. Abou Rashed also heads the Israa Foundation and was a member of the Al Aqsa Foundation Netherlands. Both are part of the Union of Good, a coalition of organizations fundraising on behalf of Hamas in Europe. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the Union in 2008, but the European Union has yet to follow suit. Abou Rashed has been affiliated with other NGOs tied to Hamas as well.

Swedish officials have yet to be deterred by Abou Rashed’s close, if not overt, ties to Hamas. In early May, Abou Rashed boasted about his successful meeting with Swedish Left Party member Mats Bilberg. At the EPC gathering in late May, Abou Rashed embraced a Swedish legislator known for anti-Israel remarks, while another Swedish lawmaker was in attendance.

Abou Rashed is just one of several Hamas members operating out of Europe. There is also Majed Khalil Musa Al Zeir, a German resident and senior member of Hamas. Al Zeir has held positions in entities based in Europe designated by Israel as Hamas proxies.

Then there’s EPC board member Mohammad Hanoun, who heads an Italian charity. In 2013, Hanoun led a European-Arab convoy to Gaza, where he met with various members of Hamas, including Ismail Haniyeh and Ahmed Bahar. Hanoun is on Israel’s sanctions list for Hamas activity.

Millions of euros flow into Gaza annually from Hamas-affiliated NGOs in Europe. But Hamas has also succeeded in attracting aid from non-Hamas European charities. In 2018, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), a Norwegian government-funded NGO, was involved in a civil fraud complaint from USAID in which NPA was required to pay over $2 million to the United States for admitting to providing material support to Iran, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Beyond Hamas, Israel has identified an NGO network operating on behalf of the PFLP, which is likewise a U.S-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Following an investigation into a murder committed by Palestinians who were PFLP members and affiliated with NGOs, Israel designated six Palestinian non-profits, all of which have received European funding, as PFLP proxies.

Though some European countries have recently made strides in arresting suspected European Hamas affiliates or even outlawing the group as a whole, the lack of European sanctions on individual Hamas members and other covertly affiliated groups allows operatives to run freely on European soil. By allowing terrorists to incite and operate on the continent, Europe becomes increasingly vulnerable to domestic extremism, endangering Europeans.

Burying their heads in the sand is not an option for Europeans. British cleric Anjem Choudary leads the al-Muhajiroun network, which preaches an extreme interpretation of Islam similar to that of Hamas. Usman Khan, inspired by Choudary’s radical message, murdered two people on the London Bridge in 2019. Michael Adebolajo, one of the two men who murdered British soldier Lee Rigby on a London street in 2013, also drew inspiration from Choudary. Adebolajo had attended Choudary protests and claimed he carried out his attack to “take revenge for the killing of Muslims by British soldiers.” Just this Monday, a London court charged Choudary with terrorism offenses.

Europeans might be inclined to think that Hamas’ brand of terrorism is separate from that of other jihadist movements. But they would be wrong. Abou Rashed was a regular feature at anti-Israel protests in the Netherlands, where he spewed his hatred of the Jewish state. This type of hatred inspired Shehzad Tanweer to carry out the July 7, 2005, London transit bombings that killed 52. Tanweer explained his motivations in a video released shortly before the attack, saying, “You have offered financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, in the massacre of our children in Palestine.”

Both the Abou Rashed and Anjem Choudary cases further prove how terrorist groups use NGOs as fronts for illicit activity. It should serve as a wake-up call to Europe. From Amsterdam to London and beyond, allowing Islamist terrorist groups to operate on European soil puts European lives in danger.

Melissa Sacks is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where David May (@DavidSamuelMay) is a research manager and senior research analyst. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the days since Moscow canceled its participation in the Ukraine grain shipment deal, there has been much proverbial gnashing of teeth in Washington, Brussels, Kyiv, and other capitals. Primarily, the concern is how to proceed with the shipment of vital foodstuffs to developing countries in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, which are dependent on Ukrainian exports to sustain the diets of their combined populations of hundreds of millions of citizens.

Skilled diplomats have been tasked with bringing together the parties again, to meet Moscow’s conditions for resuming Black Sea exports, and sustaining Ukraine’s battered wartime economy in what may be just the initial phase of a years-long struggle with Russian armed forces. But even so, strategic thought is required now to adapt to the transformed geopolitics of not only the Black Sea region, but throughout southeastern Europe, where NATO and EU borders form the trans-Atlantic frontier with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus amid perennial shifts in Europe’s fragile security architecture.

One ideal option is centered in the northern Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis, whose modest size and economy belie the significant opportunities it offers to resolve the conundrum of maritime supply lines embarking from Odesa and other Ukrainian ports through the Mediterranean Sea to foreign markets.

The Strategic Importance of Alexandroupolis

Located in a relatively underdeveloped region of northern Greece, several miles from the Turkish border and 60 miles north of the Dardanelles Straits that lead into the Black Sea, Alexandroupolis is the starting point for a vertical corridor that leads directly north into Bulgaria and Romania, which shares a 380-mile border with Ukraine.

The overland corridor runs parallel to current Black Sea shipping lanes closed off to Ukrainian exports by the Russian navy, serving as a gateway to southern Europe without having to enter the perilous Black Sea theater, thereby saving precious transportation time and costs and providing a superior alternative in the face of Moscow’s intimidation campaign.

According to the U.S. Defense Department, the port has provided strategic readiness, logistics support, and power projection, enabled by robust synchronization between the United States and Greece.

Washington’s interest began about five years ago, as the Trump administration sought to help Athens develop a pro-Western anchor point to compete with the Chinese-controlled port of Piraeus, acquired by Beijing during the 2008 financial crisis when U.S. and European companies rejected Athens’ pleas to invest in the modernization of that historic port city. The State Department was also concerned about Greece’s major northern port of Thessaloniki, owned by a Greek-Russian businessman with party ties to Vladimir Putin.

Under the most recent Mutual Defense and Cooperation Agreement with Greece, the United States has helped advance plans to upgrade Alexandroupolis into a strategic logistics hub whose expansion plans now include military, energy, and transportation. In the three years prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Pentagon had already transported enormous arsenals, including 117,000 tons of U.S. military equipment, including seventy planes and 165 armored vehicles, all through Alexandroupolis.

In the sixteen months since the start of the conflict, the port has been a critical maritime lifeline for supplying NATO forces on Ukraine’s western border, providing constant resupply of weapons, foodstuffs, and essential humanitarian supplies to provide for the country’s ravaged citizenry, as well as to millions of Ukrainian refugees throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Alexandroupolis’ existing infrastructure includes a usable 500-yard post space, along with adequate road and rail links north into NATO’s eastern flank. It retains excess spare capacity, unlike Piraeus and Thessaloniki, and has granted priority access to U.S. military forces. U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin publicly recognized Greece’s role in enabling “the expansion of U.S. forces in Greece to support the United States and NATO’s objectives for strategic access in the region,” especially in Ukraine.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallender visited the port in February, reportedly followed by CIA director William Burns in June. Their presence marks the growing U.S. interest in the port for both military logistics and strategic energy supplies. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez visited in August 2022, as the Pentagon moved 2,400 light armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition boxes through the port. At a committee hearing in Washington last week, Menendez called Alexandroupolis “the Souda of the North and a major NATO energy and transshipment hub.” He was comparing the Aegean port to the strategic deep-water port of Souda Bay on the southern Greek island of Crete, which provides operational support to the U.S., NATO, and coalition forces throughout the eastern Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and northern African theaters.

During the course of the Ukraine war, Alexandroupolis has served as the starting point for scores of rail missions and about 4,500 truckloads into Balkan and Baltic states, delivering more than 2,400 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. For the recent annual Defender Europe 23 exercise in eastern Europe, the Pentagon’s local logistics team coordinated the shipment of more than 600 pieces of military equipment and vehicles within just four days—and the Pentagon plans to install heavy equipment to handle even more cargo.

The port’s proven NATO interoperability, readiness, and ability to deploy allied forces has multiplied its strategic value for long-term regional planning. British, French, Italian, and Portuguese forces have all used the port since its ongoing expansion. Cargo ships docking at Alexandroupolis unload directly onto, and load from, four parallel rail systems running through Bulgaria and Romania, reaching Poland in as little as five days.

The newly re-elected government of Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is proceeding with a major port modernization plan that includes improved rail, road, pipeline, and sea-land infrastructure to interconnect central and eastern Europe. In June, U.S. ambassador to Athens George Tsunis convened in the port a meeting of diplomats from western Black Sea countries to explore deepening cooperation and strengthening infrastructure, corridors, and networks that cross and connect Greece with Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova.

In this context, their regional governments are assessing how best to transport Ukrainian grain to Alexandroupolis en route to dependent foreign markets in nearby northern Africa and the Middle East. According to the European Commission, Ukraine accounts for 10 percent of the world’s wheat market, 15 percent of the corn market, 13 percent of the barley market, and a substantial portion of the global sunflower oil sector.

This project is bolstered by a $1.1 billion European Union investment upgrade to add extra track, electrify the entire underutilized rail system, and connect the port to the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network. The first phase involves a 35-million-euro project to deepen the port, purchase cranes, build new warehouses to store as much as 200,000 tons of Ukrainian grain exports per month, and construct a local ring-road bypass.

This will facilitate a substantial, if incomplete, replacement of traditional Black Sea shipping routes for Ukrainian grain exports, as Alexandroupolis is not currently deep enough to handle the largest bulk carriers. It would also enable exporters to avoid expensive war risk insurance premiums currently in place for Black Sea shipping.

An Potential Energy Hub

Concurrently, Europe seeks to accelerate its independence from Russian hydrocarbons. The eastern Mediterranean region can provide abundant liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from offshore reserves in Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and potentially Greece that would be shipped to a floating storage and regasification unit under construction just off the coast of Alexandroupolis and set to begin operation by January 2024.

American and Qatari LNG supplies are also expected to be in the mix of up to 5.5 billion cubic meters of annual capacity linked inland via the port to an expanding network of natural gas pipelines delivering LNG through the port into central and western Balkan economies, through North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia, and eventually into Albania, Montenegro, and Croatia along the Adriatic coast. A second future floating terminal southwest of Alexandroupolis is already moving forward.

In addition, expanding the current Trans-Adriatic Pipeline moving Azeri gas through Turkey into northern Greece, expanding the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria pipeline, and potentially reversing the Trans-Balkan pipeline to carry natural gas northward from Greece through Bulgaria, Romania, and possibly Ukraine and Moldova can together transform the regional energy grid of southeastern Europe.

Overall plans for Alexandroupolis include an ambitious expansion plan adding significant dock space, a new cargo terminal, an extra 500-meter pier, and a bypass to the local motorway to connect to the modest 8,470-foot runway airport only three miles away, and especially to the 420-mile Egnatia highway across northern Greece, linking the western Ionian Sea ports to Istanbul in the east.

Ankara has viewed these Greek port developments skeptically, through the prism of Black Sea competition rather than operational complementarity. The vertical axis north of Alexandroupolis will enhance transshipment options beyond the choke points of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits controlled by Turkey, and the northern route through Poland into western Ukraine. Such a configuration will become essential when a peace agreement is eventually achieved, and the projected half-trillion dollars of reconstruction materials, equipment, and energy capacity will need to rebuild Ukraine’s battered infrastructure and persuade millions of refugees to return home to a secure post-war environment.

Turkish authorities have long warned about the safety and environmental damage risks of steadily increasing tanker and shipping traffic through the straits, where more than 140 maritime incidents have occurred since 2006. The Alexandroupolis port would alleviate logistical bottlenecks and environmental stress on the straits astride a growing Istanbul population of nearly twenty million citizens.

Given the recent rapprochement signals by Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, reliable and environmentally sound supply lines throughout southeastern European markets from the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas should be a new sector of strategic cooperation between the neighboring allies.

An Opportunity for Regional Development and Security

There is no assurance that Russia will stop blocking Ukrainian ports any time soon following its withdrawal from the grain deal. Even if Black Sea shipping is restored, the threat of recurring crises will loom for years, perhaps decades. The need for strategic diversification of energy and food corridors in case of future crises, or as an alternative scenario if Russia-Ukraine agreements collapse, is self-evident. Ship owners can expect to bear increased insurance premiums to enter the Black Sea and will remain reluctant to have their vessels and cargoes pass through a recent war zone without safety assurances.

Rather than be turned into a geopolitical flash-point, developing the Alexandroupolis port can help to stabilize the global food market and provide abundant natural gas supplies to directly replace Russian LNG supplies which remain excluded from EU sanctions until at least 2027. It will also deliver to NATO new routes from the south to project power against serious Russian and Chinese inroads, including growing influence over critical infrastructure in Syria, Libya, the Balkans, and across southeastern Europe.

U.S. support for the peaceful development of regional overland interlocking markets via sea-based communication lanes emanating from Alexandroupolis positions the port to become the next military, energy, transport, and logistics hub within the arc of regional crises during and beyond the war in Ukraine.

John Sitilides is a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors and diplomacy consultant to the State Department under a U.S. government contract.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the U.S. government.

Image: Flickr.

L'« Azur », bien sûr, c'est Mallarmé, le symbolisme, le Parnasse, l'air pur, l'immatériel, l'idée sublime… Comme son titre l'indique, En vain l'azur c'est tout le contraire : la férocité, l'expressionnisme, l'horreur, la matérialité, la sueur, le sang. Bref, la condition humaine, ou, de Mallarmé, les (...) / France, Art, Littérature - 2001/12

Economic independence could make the world more dangerous.

How domestic politics muffled the country’s voice.

South Africa recently sent a senior ministerial delegation to the United States to make its case it should remain a beneficiary of its trade preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Pretoria is in danger of losing these preferences due to what Washington regards as a de facto pro-Russian bias in the war in Ukraine.

This would be a mistake; there are good reasons why it is in America’s interests to keep South Africa as a trading partner and within its sphere of influence through AGOA membership.

Under AGOA, signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000, America decides which Sub-Saharan countries have duty-free access to U.S. markets unilaterally. President Joe Biden will determine Whether South Africa keeps its benefits with the advice of international trade officials.

The main sticking point for the U.S. government, and many commentators, is South Africa’s position in the Russia-Ukraine War. Critics believe that the government of President Cyril Ramaphosa—which allows joint military exercises with Russia, loads mysterious cargo onto a Russian ship, and refuses to condemn the Russian invasion—is effectively pro-Russia and harmful to U.S. interests. According to AGOA, African beneficiaries must “not engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests.”

But it would nonetheless be harmful to America’s interests to terminate South Africa’s AGOA membership since it would likely drive South Africa further into the arms of Russia and China. Considering South Africa’s strategic position as an alternative sea route to the Suez Canal, its strategic minerals bounty, and its relatively high level of industrialization, America has a strategic motivation to keep South Africa in the AGOA fold.

South African retention in the AGOA is vital because America is rightly worried about expanding Russian and Chinese diplomatic and trade ties to the African continent. Secretary of State Antony Blinken toured Africa in 2021 and 2022 to show African countries how much they are valued in Washington and showcase offers of U.S. assistance. Why undermine his message?

Last year, Biden unveiled a new Africa strategy with a policy document stating, "Sub-Saharan Africa is critical to advancing our global priorities.”

Removing South Africa from AGOA would frustrate this aim. Why would Washington force South Africa, and possibly other African nations, into an adversarial camp? Trade and diplomatic ties could be followed by military sales, basing agreements, or even alliances. A Russian or Chinese naval base in Simonstown would complicate American naval presence in the Indo-Pacific.

In addition, removing South Africa from AGOA would be costly for U.S. manufacturers and taxpayers.

First, America is a beneficiary of the AGOA terms of trade, not only because of increased access to the South African markets but also because South African manufactured goods, such as parts for motor vehicles assembled in America, enter the country duty-free. U.S. industry would lose these supply chains if the president disqualified South Africa.

Second, when Congress renewed AGOA in 2015, it forced South Africa to accept a substantial annual quota of American chicken portions free of the anti-dumping duties to which they were previously subject. Because of the quota, poultry suppliers benefit because they are the leading supplier of frozen chicken portions to South Africa, even though South African chicken farmers object. If AGOA goes, the South African poultry industry will rejoice, but U.S. poultry producers would forfeit a substantial market they have developed.

Third, losing AGOA membership would be a harsh blow to the South African economy, with ripple effects beyond its borders, punishing workers and poor people throughout the southern African region. Expelling South Africa could result in costly increases in U.S. aid to Africa if the already fragile South African economy collapses under the weight of its pre-existing domestic problems and the denial of access to U.S. markets.

The United States spends billions annually in aid to Africa—$8.5 billion in 2020 alone.

AGOA does exactly what its name indicates—it helps African economies grow, increase their trade ties with America, and create jobs, improving opportunities for social mobility.

Expelling South Africa from AGOA would hurt poor Africans the most—particularly workers in South Africa’s manufacturing and agricultural industries dependent on AGOA benefits. Each wage earner has to support multiple dependents in a region noted for record unemployment. One job lost means that many go hungry.

It is undoubtedly not in America’s interests to take actions that could destabilize the economies of Southern Africa, frustrate the AGOA vision, and increase the billions that U.S. taxpayers spend to uplift African countries and their peoples. AGOA benefits the United States and South Africa, and removing South Africa from AGOA is not in the interests of America or American taxpayers.

Francois Baird is the founder of the FairPlay trade movement.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary said in an interview released on July 21 that the airline could resume a small number of flights to Ukraine as early as the end of 2023 should Ukraine open part of its airspace for commercial aviation. The executive revealed that the Ireland-based airline was weighing two options for resuming business in Ukraine—the first being “the war finishes, and everything reopens in one day or two” and the second “more likely” situation in which the airline resumes a “small number of flights” during wartime at the year’s end.

Despite this chatter, Western regulators should prohibit such wartime flights to avoid risks to the lives and safety of those onboard and ensure commercial aviation does not become a convenient stairway for those seeking to escalate the Russia-Ukraine War.

O’Leary is not alone in expecting, if not hoping for, the partial wartime reopening of Ukrainian airspace to commercial flights, despite the air traffic management body Eurocontrol forecasting that the closure of Ukraine’s airspace to civilian aircraft will persist until 2029.

In April 2023, France’s Minister for Transport Clément Beaune told European Pravda that Ukrainian authorities were “working hard” to open airspace for civilian planes either “fully” or “partially.” “As I understand it, Ukraine already has certain considerations for this event, and Kyiv is working hard on it. However, of course, the main issue is still security,” Beaune said.

From a purely symbolic standpoint—holding off the debate on feasibility and risk—the resumption of flights to Ukraine might allow Ukraine and its supporters to celebrate a victory, making claims that Russia’s ability to destroy Ukrainian latent power and infrastructure is waning due to the supposed ‘bravery’ of the Ukrainian armed forces. As such, a resumption of flights could temporarily boost Ukrainian morale. However, the risk and feasibility of such a move indicate that it is dangerous and should only be encouraged once the war ends.

The leading threat vector airlines will encounter during wartime flights to Ukraine is Russia’s anti-air capabilities. Consequently, O’Leary’s comparison of the risks of flying to Israel falls apart when one realizes that Russia’s ground-to-air and air-to-air attack capabilities are far superior to those of Palestinian militants.

The weaponry currently available to Palestinians can only threaten aircraft when parked at an airport or flying at low altitudes. These include rocket-propelled grenades, artillery rockets, and Strela-2 shoulder-launched anti-air missiles. Conversely, Russia enjoys a full spectrum of sophisticated anti-air capabilities beyond unguided rocket artillery, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched missiles.

In range and speed, Russian air defense systems, many intended for ballistic and cruise missiles, can conveniently down civilian aircraft, including those flying at cruising altitude. As such, they would make civilian airplanes easy targets.

The 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over the Donbas by a Buk surface-to-air missile is a notable warning to any airline that seeks to send airplanes into a warzone where Russia and Ukraine are engaged in combat. With ranges of 250-400 km, Russian S-400s from Belarus can down any approaching aircraft in Western Ukraine, rendering major and minor airports in cities such as Lvov, Ternopol, Vinnytsia, and Ivano-Frankivsk dangerous for civilian aviation. Buk and S-300s can assist Russian air defenses, although their ranges are lesser than the S-400s. Other parts of Ukraine, including Kiev, are also unsafe for civilian aircraft, considering their proximity to Belarus, Crimea, or Russia and its newly annexed regions in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk.

Russian air-to-air capabilities are no less dangerous. The Russian air force can fire long-range air-to-air missiles from a distance, notably the Vympel R-37 missile. While Ukrainian fighter jets could dodge this missile, according to reporting from Forbes, civilian jetliners lack the hardware for jetfighter-like evasive maneuvers.

One might be tempted to point to the Patriot missile systems in Kiev and their relative success at intercepting Shahed drones and cruise missiles. However, the relative success of Ukrainian air defense is not a reliable indicator of civilian aviation safety.

Air defense system interceptors risk producing shrapnel when they strike missiles near jetliners—the shrapnel either from the interceptor or the intercepted projectile. Once shrapnel shreds the fuselage or enters the engine, it can severely damage a civilian plane, possibly causing destruction sufficient to down it.

Aside from the risk of shrapnel, Russian strikes on Odessa demonstrate that successful interceptions in Kiev are no reason for celebration—Russia can still develop and deploy missiles that evade air defenses and deliver immense destruction.

Furthermore, the threat of airstrikes on airbases and runways, especially those shared by Ukraine’s air force, renders the authorization of civilian flights to Ukraine a negligent and reckless move for regulators and airlines.

Passengers choosing to fly on such wartime flights to Ukraine will be making a suicidal gamble. The other risk of allowing such wartime flights is that they could catalyze military escalation.

Though Ukrainian officials and their supporters can present civilian airplanes as civilian transport, such flights can become, in essence, “dual use” when used to ferry Ukrainian officials, male conscripts, soldiers, and Western intelligence personnel in and out of Ukraine. Civilian passengers would become human shields for strategically important cargo onboard such flights.

Russia could briefly tolerate such flights to avoid escalation. However, analysts should not mockingly dismiss Russian restraint as a weakness. If Russia feels pressed too hard with the possible exploitation of civilian transport for military purposes, it might not be long before the military strikes a commercial plane.

The sinking of the British ocean liner RMS Lusitania, which catalyzed U.S. entry into World War I, is a helpful analogy to understand the risks here. The German attack on the ocean liner killed 1,198 people, including 128 American citizens—a fact British propaganda did not fail to emphasize. However, Lusitania was no harmless vessel. Like several other civilian vessels at the time, it was carrying war munitions headed for Britain, arguably a legitimate military target. This inconvenient fact, nonetheless, failed to deter war advocates pushing the United States to intervene in Europe.

As Western countries increasingly edge toward the escalation cliff, such flights could ferry clandestine war cargo, Ukrainian officials, western intelligence officers, and soldiers to Ukraine, making them an attractive target for Russian forces. The presence of civilians onboard, including possibly citizens of other NATO countries, will make the aircraft’s downing a tripwire that pro-escalation activists and politicians in Ukraine and the West might exploit to pressure NATO into further escalation with Russia.

Citizens of Western and European countries, airport workers, and regulators must play a crucial role in resisting the implementation of wartime civilian flights to Ukraine, even if their governments give tacit consent.

In his interview with Interfax-Ukraine, O’Leary said that whether flights to Ukraine would resume is contingent on European regulators deeming any total or partial opening of Ukrainian airspace safe for European regulators. This gives one hope that reason—not premature celebration over the supposed “successes of Ukrainian resistance” or escalatory brinkmanship—will triumph in the regulators’ decisionmaking calculus.

Andrew Jose is a freelance news reporter and analyst covering politics, foreign policy, and transnational security. He has written for several notable publications, including The Jewish News Syndicate, Stacker, The Daily Caller, and The Western Journal. Andrew is a Master of Arts in Security Policy Studies candidate at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. He received his Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

Image: Shutterstock.

Until this past week, Niger was the bastion for the United States and its Western allies in the volatile central Sahel region of Africa. Not only does the country host more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel on two airbases and some 1,500 French troops engaged in anti-terrorism operations, but in the wake of coups in Mali (2020) and Burkina Faso (2022), and an improvised succession in Chad (2021) after the assassination of that country’s longtime leader, Nigerian president Mohamed Bazoum led the last democratically elected government in the region. Niger was also a key development partner. Yet with the overthrow of the Nigerien government announced by the commander of the Presidential Guard and the European Union cutting off its budget support for the country in response, years of patient effort and billions of dollars of investment to support what was thought to be an anchor for regional security and stability seems to have been lost in the blink of an eye.

While the situation remains fluid, the regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), met in an emergency summit on Sunday and decided to impose sanctions on the coup leaders, freeze financial transactions with the Nigerien government, close land and air borders between members of the bloc and Niger, and give the junta a one-week deadline, after which it would take additional measures which “may include the use of force.”

Policymakers need to keep in mind four points in the days ahead:

First, avoid facile narratives and simplistic conclusions about a complex political-military situation. The putsch was barely underway when headlines like “Niger Coup Leader Joins Long Line of U.S.-Trained Mutineers” began appearing. Aside from being simply wrong—the commander of the Presidential Guard, Brigadier General Abdourahamane “Omar” Tchiani, emerged at the head of the junta, not Brigadier General Moussa Salaou Barmou, the Fort Moore- (formerly Fort Benning) and National Defense University-trained chief of the Nigerien Special Operations Forces as the Intercept headline proclaimed—those repeating these tropes also evidence a lack of basic understanding of internal dynamics within the armed forces of a country like Niger.

The clichéd accusation of American training leading to coups is particularly inapt in the case of Niger, where much of the $500 million that the U.S. government spent on military assistance to the country since 2012—one of the largest security assistance programs in Africa—has gone to training and equipping specialized units such as the Special Operations Forces as well as aerial medical evacuation teams, logistic companies, and even two battalions for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The unintended, but foreseeable, consequence of this intensive program was to create new elite units within the Armed Forces of Niger (FAN), which rose in prestige as they accumulated resources. At the same time, the 2,000-strong Presidential Guard, hitherto a quasi-Praetorian corps, declined relatively, giving rise to tensions within the FAN. Ironically, however, while the Special Operations Forces units are dispersed across the country combating jihadist insurgents, the Presidential Guard is stationed in the capital of Niamey, where they were well-positioned to act on their frustrations. (Until things clarify, I would caution against reading too much into General Barmou’s sullen appearance on Nigerien television, standing silently with other senior officers behind the spokesman of the putschists as the coup declaration was read: he may have had little choice in the matter since the only personnel he normally has in his headquarters are operations planners, intelligence analysts, and logisticians—hardly the force with which to resist, much less launch a countercoup.)

Notwithstanding the self-justifying claims of General Tchiani about the “continuing deterioration of the security situation” leading to “the gradual and inevitable demise of our country,” the evidence is that the sustained investment of Niger’s partners in FAN Special Operations Forces seems to have been paying off. As The Economist reported: “While death and destruction have soared in Mali and Burkina Faso, less than a tenth of the deaths in the three countries last year were in Niger, despite its also having to deal with separate jihadist violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, a group that spills over from north-east Nigeria. Deaths from conflict in the first six months of this year in Niger have been the lowest of any similar period since 2018.”

Second, while security is a necessary precondition for state legitimacy, it is by no means sufficient. While serving as U.S. special envoy for the Sahel, I repeatedly emphasized: “The heart of the crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy—a perception by citizens that their government is valid, equitable, and able and willing to meet their needs. Absent states’ commitments to meeting their citizens’ needs, no degree of international engagement is likely to succeed.”

To their credit, both President Bazoum and his predecessor, President Mahamadou Issoufou, understood this and made building up Nigerien state legitimacy a center of their domestic political agenda. America and its allies have generously supported these development efforts. Until last week’s coup caused the European Union to cut off budget support to Niger, the EU allocated approximately €125 million per year for improved governance, education, and sustainable growth programs. France, acting through the official French Development Agency provides approximately €100 million per year. In fiscal year 2022, the United States provided $101 million in development assistance, primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development, plus $135 million in humanitarian aid.

Moreover, last year, the Nigerien government adopted a five-year Economic and Social Development Plan (Plan de Développement Economique et Social) built around three pillars: developing human capital, inclusion, and solidarity; consolidation of governance, peace, and solidarity; and structural transformation of the economy. At an international conference in Paris in December 2022, the Nigerien government received pledges from various international partners amounting to some $23.4 billion of the estimated $30 billion price tag for the ambitious plan, to be paid out between 2022 and 2026.

The problem, however, is that transformative change takes time and that was one commodity that the Nigerien government not only did not possess much of—but clearly had even less of than it thought it had. The critics of “militarization” of the response to the crisis in the Sahel may be wrong in their instinctive disparagement of security assistance, but they have been not entirely incorrect in observing the often-stark disparity between military and non-military aid programs.

Third, be realistic not sensationalistic about the involvement of malign outside actors. The coincidence of the coup and the opening of the second Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg—a meeting that President Bazoum was pointedly not attending—immediately raised suspicions of possible involvement of the Wagner Group, which is entrenched in the Central African Republic and Mali and has its tentacles in Burkina Faso, Sudan, and elsewhere in the Sahel belt. Researchers from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab have documented how, as the coup unfolded, Russian Telegram channels stepped up longstanding propaganda campaigns that “portrayed Bazoum as a vassal of the West, and Niger under Bazoum’s leadership as being ‘directly dependent on France’ and ‘part of the remnants of the French neo-colonial empire.’” Some channels even claimed that the coup leaders were associated with Wagner. Yevgeny Prigozhin did not go that far, but did not shy from making what amounted to a sales pitch to the Nigerien junta for the services of his mercenary company, posting on social media:

What happened in Niger has been brewing for years. The former colonizers are trying to keep the people of African countries in check. In order to keep them in check, the former colonizers are filling these countries with terrorists and various bandit formations. Thus creating a colossal security crisis…The population suffers. And this is [the reason for] love for PMC [private military company] Wagner, this is the high efficiency of PMC Wagner. Because a thousand soldiers of PMC Wagner are able to establish order and destroy terrorists, preventing them from harming the peaceful population of states.

While it would be a mistake to ascribe too much to Prigozhin’s screed or overestimate his ability to deliver after the tumult within his global criminal network since his own short-lived mutiny against the Kremlin in late June, it would also be one to discount his ambitions (or those of Russia) as simply bravado or to overlook the role that foreign actors have played in a long-running, sophisticated effort on social media to discredit the Nigerien government. It was not by accident that Russian flags and signage have popped up at pro-coup demonstrations from the very first day of the mutiny. (What I replied to one high-level U.S. official when asked three years ago for my take on Russian flags appearing after the coup in Mali applies equally to the white, blue, and red colors now seen in Niger: “Where does one buy large quantities of industrially-produced Malian flags in Bamako, let alone Russian ones?”)

But even if Prigozhin is not able to deliver on his boasts of expansion in Africa, that concern in Washington, Paris, and other Western capitals that he might prove sufficient to divert resources to counter the potential threat on the continent and away from where they might otherwise have been deployed. It is a risk that will require sober assessment.

Fourth, understand the options available are limited and be pragmatic in making choices amongst them. With French forces kicked out of Mali and Burkina Faso after the coups in those countries and the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the former about to be drawn down, there is no sugar-coating the strategic setback that the possible loss of the U.S. and French bases in Niger—which not only support the counterterrorism fight against the regional affiliates of Al Qaeda and Islamic State but also surveilled the ongoing civil conflict in Libya—would represent in the short and intermediate terms. Yet, assuming that the putsch is not reversed, if the U.S. administration is to conform to the law as well as remain true to American values, it will have little choice but to declare what occurred in Niger a coup, with all the consequences that such would entail in terms of security cooperation with the country’s new rulers. In this case, given that ECOWAS has categorically rejected “any form of resignation that may purportedly come from His Excellency President Mohamed Bazoum,” it would be difficult to avoid the legal determination that a coup has taken place. As a result, so-called Section 7008 restrictions would be triggered, blocking foreign assistance delivered to the regime and military training and equipment from the Defense Department. The problem is that this is precisely the type of sanction that creates openings for the West’s geopolitical rivals.

In Niger, it is not only Russia—whose entrée into Mali, it is worth recalling, was the denial by the Biden administration of an export license for a non-lethal military part, a refusal that was not required by law—waiting at the wings, at least according to Prigozhin, but also probably China, whose state-owned oil company CNPC has nearly completed a 2,000-km oil pipeline running from eastern Niger to the Port of Seme terminal on the Atlantic in Benin that will be Africa’s largest. Is it any surprise that, having “taken note” of the African Union and ECOWAS condemnations of the coup, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning limited herself to an anemic call for “relevant parties in Niger” to “solve their differences peacefully through dialogue?”

In practical terms, the coup in Niger leaves Chad as the only country left now in the central Sahel to which the United States can turn as a possible security partner, although doing so requires Washington to be cognizant of the unique challenges there. It was no accident that the ECOWAS Summit dispatched Chad’s Transitional President Mahamat Idriss Déby to Niamey to deliver its decisions to the junta and to seek to check in on President Bazoum. For their part, U.S. policymakers will need to become more creative over time, seeking opportunities to reopen channels to and maybe even flip the allegiances of some regimes currently aligned with Wagner, including the Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

In the end, whether the coup in Niger succeeds or is reversed somehow, the dynamic has certainly shifted. Irrespective of the immediate outcome of the current crisis in Niamey, to safely navigate the strategic challenges ahead in the Sahel, the United States and its allies will need to be clear-eyed about both the stakes and the even more limited options they now have remaining in that fragile African region.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council and a Senior Advisor at the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy, is former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel and Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

Image: Shutterstock.

U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken’s visit to Guyana on July 6 was significant, both for the country and for South America more broadly, for a number of reasons. Following so closely on Mike Pompeo’s September 2020 visit, the first ever by an American secretary of state, Blinken’s was confirmation of Guyana’s growing economic and geostrategic importance to the United States. With Guyana’s huge oil reserves and potential to be a major player in energy security in the Americas, this hitherto relatively unknown small state has suddenly become a country of real interest to the most powerful nation in the world.

The courting of Guyana is quite logical given the current geopolitical context of Latin America: the political pendulum swinging to the left in the region; neighboring Venezuela’s political and economic woes, along with its dramatic decline in oil production; the threats posed by transnational organized crime; and U.S. competition with China for geopolitical influence in the wider region. The United States clearly has ample reason to keep Guyana close.

Former Secretary Pompeo’s visit was linked to the fraught period following the 2020 Guyanese election. It was a sign of support for the country’s democracy and recognition of its emergence as an oil producer. Pompeo’s visit brought a firm indication of U.S. interest in enhancing the bilateral relationship, particularly with regard to security and market opportunities, amidst concerns about the erosion of democracy in Venezuela and China’s growing footprint in the region. U.S. interest in developing a robust, private sector-led trade and investment relationship is even stronger today. Secretary Blinken’s visit, however, marks a turning point.

The official announcement of the visit flagged the following issues for discussion: food and energy security, decarbonization, climate resilience, regional migration, and building local capacity. After their meeting, both President Irfaan Ali and Secretary Blinken stressed the solidity of the bilateral relationship based on shared values, common interests, and, more tangibly, the fact that the United States is Guyana’s number one trading partner. Responding to President Ali’s remarks, highlighting, among other things, the aspiration to position Guyana as “a global leader on energy security, food security, and climate security,” Secretary Blinken said their talks had focused on energy security, climate adaptation, and hard security. He also endorsed Guyana’s dual commitment to fighting climate change and to exploiting its hydrocarbon resources to finance the transition to low carbon development, stating that “Guyana will soon be the highest oil-producing country per capita in the world, but it’s also a leader in forest conservation, demonstrating that it’s possible to prioritize climate mitigation and environmental protection while responsibly using fossil fuel resources.” This statement is not insignificant in the context of the debate on fossil fuels and global warming.

While there was no mention of the Guyana-Venezuela border controversy or any public expression of U.S. support for Guyana, it would be reasonable to expect that the matter was privately discussed. One would hope that such support is a constant, even if nothing can be taken for granted. Nor was there any specific mention of new bilateral cooperation initiatives to help build capacity and strengthen national institutions. But, in underscoring the partnership between the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and Guyana, on the “gas-to-energy project that’s going to cut emissions by 50 percent,” Secretary Blinken also made a direct pitch for greater U.S. private sector involvement: “American companies can bring unparalleled expertise, high labor and environmental standards, and transparency to help power Guyana’s dynamic growth, to advance regional energy security, to deliver tangible benefits to all the people of Guyana.”

This second visit in less than three years by a secretary of state to a country with a population of fewer than one million people and not wracked by war or any comparable crisis is a strong message that the United States wishes to remain Guyana’s strategic partner of choice, and is ready to compete with other interested parties.

In the broader context, Blinken’s visit immediately followed his participation in the annual meeting of Caricom Heads in Trinidad on July 5, and built upon Vice President Kamala Harris’ meeting with Caribbean leaders in the Bahamas in June. Both encounters were aimed at advancing the implementation of the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030), through three joint action committees, launched at the Ninth Summit of the Americas in June 2022.

U.S. outreach to the Caribbean and Guyana is very welcome, albeit a little late given the longstanding challenges faced by the region’s governments in accessing cooperation and concessionary financing for development. And with 2024 being a U.S. election year, continuity of engagement cannot be assumed.

Much will depend on how much the three action committees can achieve in terms of addressing energy security, food security, and access to finance in a relatively short time period. In this respect, Guyana has a key role to play. As President Ali already has lead responsibility for food security.

In the meantime, the Guyana government should do all it can to capitalize on Blinken’s visit, to offer a welcoming environment for U.S. private sector investment, particularly in the fields of energy—both non-renewables and renewables—and infrastructure.

The stage is set for the rolling out of a framework to facilitate U.S.-Guyana private sector partnerships to bid for tenders and promote business activity. Such a framework with clear guidelines, transparent tender processes, and a minimum of bureaucratic red tape could also attract business and investment from the Guyanese-American diaspora, which can draw on the resources of U.S. federal agencies like EXIM.

All this would pave the way for meeting Guyana’s broader infrastructure and development needs, particularly in areas aimed at economic diversification, including agriculture, fisheries, air travel, tourism, education, health, and information technologies. As Secretary Blinken implicitly recognized, the United States can directly support the country’s economic transformation, thereby contributing, in his own words, to the delivery of “tangible benefits to all the people of Guyana.”

Dr. Riyad Insanally was a career diplomat for thirty-one years and last served as Guyana’s ambassador to the United States of America and Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, from September 2016 to June 2021. He is currently a Fellow at the Caribbean Policy Consortium, a nonresident senior fellow at the Caribbean Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and Senior Advisor for the Caribbean at the Transnational Strategy Group in Washington DC.

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The right way to use U.S. leverage with Netanyahu.

China is digging in at home and asserting itself abroad.

The Biden administration has been making efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by brokering an agreement on the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Saudis have set out their goals, which alongside their desire for progress on the Israel-Palestinian issue include several major “asks” from the United States: a security guarantee, easier access to U.S. arms purchases, and U.S.-Saudi cooperation on the development of a nuclear power industry.

What are the prospects for success? Should the United States be willing to offer Saudi Arabia some form of security guarantee or “major non-NATO ally” status? Can the United States and Saudi Arabia find a formula to overcome disagreements on nuclear safeguards? How does this impact the recent moves toward a Saudi-Iranian détente? These are only a few of the relevant questions. The Center for the National Interest hosted a virtual discussion of these issues with two leading experts on July 27, 2023.

Jonathan Lord is Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS, Lord served as a professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee and had previously served as the Iraq country director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and as a political military analyst in the Department of Defense.

Firas Maksad is a Senior Fellow and Director of Strategic Outreach at the Middle East Institute (MEI). He is a recognized expert on the politics of Lebanon and Syria, the geopolitics of the Arab Gulf, and the broader dynamics of the Middle East region. He is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University.

Greg Priddy, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center, moderated the discussion.

Image: Shutterstock.

Taking advantage of disputes between adversaries is an attractive idea and the United States has had success at this in the past. The most spectacular example was how Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were able to take advantage of the growing Sino-Soviet dispute to improve U.S. relations both with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. But there have been other examples as well. 

In his 2021 book, The Power to Divide: Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition, Timothy W. Crawford described how in 1940-41 the United States and the United Kingdom succeeded at dissuading Spanish leader Francisco Franco from allowing German forces into Spain and attempting to seize Gibraltar from Britain by providing food assistance to his civil war-ravaged country. In the late 1940s, the United States was able to take advantage of the growing dispute between two communist leaders—the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin and Yugoslavia’s Josip Tito—to help communist Yugoslavia exit the Soviet bloc and be neutral throughout the rest of the Cold War. In the early 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger were able to leverage Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat’s disillusionment with the Soviet Union to facilitate Egypt’s move from being a Soviet ally to an American one. In the mid-1980s, the previously hostile U.S.-Iraqi relationship underwent a dramatic improvement for a few years on the basis of common antipathy toward Iran. A second rapprochement between Washington and Moscow occurred in the late 1980s/early 1990s on the basis of what appeared to be not just a convergence of foreign policy interests but political values as well. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration embarked on the normalization of U.S. relations with America’s erstwhile adversary, Vietnam, which has developed into a stronger relationship ever since partly on the basis of their common concern about China. In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush administration and Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi turned the previously hostile U.S.-Libyan relationship into a cooperative one partly on the basis of their common concern about jihadist forces which both governments regarded as a threat.

Some of these rapprochements lasted for many years or are still in effect while others were far briefer. More recent U.S. efforts at improving relations with adversaries, however, have either failed to make significant progress or have been reversed by subsequent administrations. The George W. Bush administration’s success in improving ties with Libya ended abruptly when the Obama administration worked with several other governments to bring about its downfall in 2011. The Obama administration’s efforts to improve ties with both Cuba and Iran were reversed by the Trump administration. The Trump administration’s attempts to improve relations with Russia, North Korea, and even (oddly enough) Iran also failed. The Biden administration’s efforts to improve ties with Iran enough to restore the Iranian nuclear accord have so far been unsuccessful, though its efforts to improve ties with Venezuela have been somewhat more so.

This is unfortunate for American foreign policy. The United States now has many adversaries, including formidable states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and various jihadist groups. There are also a number of minor adversaries which cooperate with Russia, China, and/or Iran: Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and others still. In the current war between Russia and Ukraine, Iran and North Korea are both supplying arms to Russia while China is supplying Russia with vital economic support.

It would be beneficial for the United States if it could drive wedges among its various adversaries. And there are numerous disagreements and tensions among them that might provide Washington with opportunities for doing so. At present, though, the United States does not seem able—or even willing—to do this. Why? There are several possible explanations.

One identified by Crawford in The Power to Divide is opposition from existing allies to a state offering concessions to an adversary to induce it to alter its behavior. The cases examined by Crawford, though, all occurred either during World War I or just prior to or during World War II. In these cases, the allies in question were all peers or near peers of the state seeking to drive a wedge between adversaries by offering concessions to one of them. Even if the allies were all (more or less) on board, though, such efforts did not necessarily succeed. But opposition from an ally to an effort to woo an adversary made such an effort more difficult to mount due to unwillingness to risk souring relations with or even losing an existing ally in an uncertain attempt to either gain a new one or just to disrupt alliances between one’s adversaries.  Opposition from an existing ally also tended to make a state’s efforts to woo an adversary less credible to that adversary. 

Since the United States has not had peer or even near-peer allies but only smaller allies since the Cold War up through the present, Washington would appear to be in a very different position than that which the allied nations faced during World War I or World War II. Despite this, however, American allies that are by no means equal to the U.S. in military and economic strength have had an outsize influence on undermining recent American efforts to improve relations with adversaries and reducing their ties to more powerful ones. Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular expressed vociferous opposition to the Obama administration’s efforts in conjunction with the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China to reach a nuclear accord with Iran. Although such an accord was achieved in 2015 despite their opposition, both cheered President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement in 2018 and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has opposed the Biden administration’s efforts at reviving it. A great power whose policies are so subject to influence from its smaller allies will clearly have difficulty in wooing adversaries whom those allies regard as implacable threats—even though improved ties between the United States and an adversary might better serve to reduce the threat from it to America’s existing allies.

Still, small allies can only succeed in disrupting American efforts to take advantage of disputes between adversaries if there is something about the American foreign policymaking process as well as American domestic politics that allows them to do so. And this points to a second explanation, also identified by Crawford, for why the United States cannot successfully pursue wedge strategies: American domestic politics. Improving relations with adversary states is often highly unpopular in the United States. Political forces opposing this are often stronger than political forces supporting it. Allied governments fearing a U.S. rapprochement with an adversary can work with diaspora communities in the United States to oppose it. Diaspora communities from the adversary Washington seeks rapprochement with often oppose it too, especially if they were dispossessed by the regime in power there. Republicans have criticized the Biden administration just for considering lifting some sanctions against Iran and Venezuela in an attempt to change their behavior. (By contrast, Republican efforts to pursue such rapprochements are usually not opposed by Democrats and have had better success in overcoming objections from fellow Republicans.) But as in previous cases (including the Nixon administration’s rapprochements with the Soviet Union and China, the Clinton administration’s normalization with Vietnam, the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran, and even the Trump administration’s efforts to improve ties with North Korea) have shown, Washington has been able in the past to overcome allied and domestic opposition to the pursuit (even if unsuccessful, as in the case of Trump and North Korea) of rapprochements with adversary regimes not undergoing fundamental internal change. Some might argue, though, that heightened political tensions inside the United States in recent years make the pursuit of pursuit or even rational discussion of a host of policy issues more difficult now.

There is, however, a third possible explanation for why the United States is less able now to take advantage of disputes between adversaries than it was in the past: several of America's adversaries have become much more successful themselves at exploiting differences not only between the United States and its other adversaries, but also between the United States and its traditional allies. China’s enormous trade relations with so many of America’s traditional allies have given many of them an incentive to resist isolating Beijing in ways that the Trump and Biden administrations have sought. Many non-Western governments—including all of America’s traditional allies in the Middle East—have largely refused to join America and the West either in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or supporting Ukraine militarily. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates not only have maintained good relations with Russia after the start of its war in Ukraine but have recently been pursuing their own rapprochements with Iran.

All of these factors may play a role in explaining why it has seemingly become more difficult for the United States to take advantage of disputes among its adversaries. But while they may be obstacles, they are not insurmountable ones. 

Objections of smaller allies might be overcome if Washington did a better job of explaining what advantages they may receive from the United States improving ties with common adversaries as well as the continuing or even worsening problems that could result if such a policy does not succeed. A firmer U.S. position which warns of the dangers of interfering in U.S. domestic politics as well as points out the inconsistencies between their objecting to American efforts to improve relations with adversaries when they themselves have sought to do so with different or even the same ones would also be in order.

The United States must also do a better job of explaining to the American public why improving ties with adversaries can be useful while not exaggerating what the benefits of doing so are. Washington needs to explain how improving ties with one U.S. adversary which has grown wary of another can be beneficial to the United States while not doing so can mean that alliances among adversaries might persist despite serious differences between them. Above all, Washington must convey to the American public that it pursues rapprochements with adversaries not out of altruism or naïve expectations (as the opponents of such rapprochements loudly claim), but in pursuit of realpolitik interests.

Finally, the success of America’s adversaries in taking advantage of differences between Washington and several of its traditional allies shows that American diplomacy needs to focus not just on taking advantage of differences between America’s long-established adversaries, but also on blunting growing rapprochements between its adversaries and traditional U.S. allies. Indeed, it is because America’s adversaries have been as successful as they have in exploiting differences between the United States and some of its allies that it is now especially important for the United States to increase its own efforts at exploiting differences both between its adversaries and between its adversaries and Washington’s traditional allies. The U.S. inability to do this successfully—whether as a result of allied obstruction, domestic political opposition, or any other reason—will only serve to enhance its adversaries’ ability to do so.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has contributed numerous articles to The National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

The Taliban seized power in Afghanistan almost two years ago, in August 2021. Contrary to what some may have hoped, resistance to the Taliban regime remains sporadic at best, and the strongest opposition group is now likely the terrorists of the Islamic State. The Taliban have proven their ability to maintain stable governance over Afghanistan. Since there is no clear alternative to Taliban rule and no will in the United States for another military intervention, working with the new regime to further American interests appears to be the least-worst option.

The Taliban Can Help Against Rivals

Engaging with Kabul could improve America’s position against its rivals, primarily China. A U.S.-sympathetic Afghanistan will encourage China to bolster its defenses in the areas bordering Afghanistan. This additional military burden would be relatively light for Beijing, but it is a low-hanging fruit and an inexpensive win for Washington. Every People’s Liberation Army soldier guarding the Afghan border is a soldier unavailable for a military invasion of Taiwan. Conversely, if Washington lets Beijing’s influence dominate Afghanistan, it will help China secure its western borders. A China-aligned Afghanistan will allow Chinese planners to focus on projecting power outward instead of border security.  

Cooperating with the Taliban will also harm China in a more indirect way. Pakistan is a close partner of Beijing, and the two have hostile relations with India. But in recent years, New Delhi has become a key U.S. partner for containing China in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, U.S.-Pakistan relations worsened significantly since the 2010s. Hence, by pressuring India, Pakistan is a hindrance for Washington. The more Islamabad is free to focus its energy against New Delhi, the less New Delhi can focus on pushing back Beijing.   

Although Pakistan has armed and funded the Afghan Taliban since its creation in 1994, the two have had a falling out since the takeover of Kabul. Border disputes along the Durand Line poison the bilateral relationship, leading to deadly skirmishes. Furthermore, Islamabad resents the new regime’s lack of help in fighting the Pakistani Taliban.

This brewing conflict opens a historic opportunity for the United States. If Washington can help build a strong and stable Afghanistan, Pakistan will have to maintain significant forces to defend its western border. Islamabad will have fewer capabilities to challenge India in its east. That would be a win for the United States, as the Indians would have more forces available to counterbalance China.

As seen through recent deadly border clashes, Iran-Taliban relations are similarly contentious. The Taliban follows a fundamentalist, Sunni interpretation of Islam, while Iran is predominantly Shia. During the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan from 1996–2001, Tehran opposed the treatment of the Shia minority and supported the Northern Alliance, an opposition group to the Taliban. The Iranians also probably fear that Kabul will partner with the Gulf powers, thus threatening their rear. 

Engaging Afghanistan can help Washington further its objectives regarding Iran, both for negotiation and containment purposes. If the United States wants to reach an agreement with Iran to freeze its nuclear and missile programs and scale down its regional ambitions, a friendly Afghanistan would become a bargaining chip and additional leverage to pressure Tehran. Iran’s domestic political and economic situation is already difficult, and it is increasingly wary of its northern neighbors. Turkey now occupies parts of northern Iraq and Syria, and the Iranians have a growing antagonism with Azerbaijan; they do not want a strong, hostile Afghanistan rising on their eastern border. Hence, if entente with Iran appears impossible, Kabul would become a valuable partner to counterbalance Iranian power throughout the Middle East. 

Now that the United States has withdrawn from Central Asia, Kabul has little to fear from Washington. The Taliban fully understand that American planners are overwhelmingly focused on great power competitors like China and Russia and have no bandwidth left to attack their regime. Meanwhile, Kabul has to contend in its immediate neighborhood with hostile Iran and Pakistan, a rising China, and a lurking Russia. Distant America is thus a partner of choice for this weak state surrounded by actual or potential threats.

Fighting Trafficking and Terrorism

Other benefits would come from working with the Taliban: it is the most straightforward and efficient way to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. The Taliban themselves never participated in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. They are now the only sizable force present on the ground and have proven their ability to contain terrorism. Since they seized power, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their consorts have been unable to reestablish sanctuaries.

For instance, in July 2020, before the fall of the Ghani government, the United Nations reported that Al Qaeda had between 400 and 600 fighters in the country. In June 2023, the UN assessed that Al Qaeda had fewer than 400 fighters and 60 senior officials in Afghanistan, and the U.S. intelligence community believes this figure to be overinflated. Contrary to what some feared, no resurgence of Al Qaeda occurred under the Taliban regime.

Indeed, some discreet cooperation against terrorism between Kabul and Washington is already ongoing. A journalist  reported for Foreign Policy that “U.S. and Afghan security and diplomatic sources say the United States relies on intelligence provided by the Taliban.” While the Taliban are capable of holding their own against terrorist groups, other, far more worrying nests of terrorism exist in the failed states throughout the Middle East and Africa.

The Taliban government can also help fight disruptive drug trafficking. The West has long worried about Afghanistan’s role as a leading producer of opioids, fueling the use of illicit drugs. In 2022, Kabul banned the cultivation of poppy from which opium is extracted. The ban was highly effective, and production collapsed. Other opium-producing countries may ultimately replace the loss, but it is still a step in the right direction. Since the ban will likely destabilize the already troubled Afghan economy, establishing normal economic relations with Kabul will encourage the Taliban to remain on track.

What Should the United States Do?

Concerns about engaging with the Taliban regime are understandable, given its history of violence and repressive rule. Critics may argue that America should not legitimize or endorse the regime. However, one must distinguish engagement from endorsement. By engaging with the Taliban government, the United States can gain economic and diplomatic leverage to hold them accountable in case of mischief and push for meaningful reforms. Over the long run, engaging Kabul may even urge respect for human rights and foster a more inclusive Afghan society. Isolation and sanctions only marginalize pro-Western voices and embolden extremist elements. On the other hand, engagement would allow the United States to make gains regionally and globally at little cost.

Washington should prioritize three courses of action. First, it must help stabilize the Afghan economy to strengthen the country over the long run. A costless policy is to give Afghanistan back its billions of dollars of financial assets held in the United States and elsewhere. Ending the sanctions is also crucial, as they did little to shake the Taliban’s rule and only harmed the Afghan people.

Second, even small-scale military assistance would significantly bolster Afghanistan. The Taliban’s military maintains large quantities of U.S.-provided weaponry, sometimes even using them in skirmishes against Iran. As time passes and wear and tear do their work, Kabul will find it harder to keep this equipment operational. Washington should thus allow U.S. defense companies to sustain American weaponry there and furnish new ones if necessary. Furthermore, encouraging the Afghans to use U.S. equipment will create a path dependency for the Taliban, offer additional leverage, and keep them away from Chinese and Russian defense industries. 

Third, establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime would further U.S. interests. Exchanging embassies would promote trade and investment in Afghanistan and persuade likeminded international partners to do the same. It would also facilitate cooperation to fight terrorism and crime. 

Only through engagement can the United States contribute to a more prosperous and secure Afghanistan while safeguarding its interests.

Dylan Motin is a Ph.D. candidate majoring in political science at Kangwon National University. He was previously a Marcellus Policy Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society and a visiting research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies. His research focuses on balance-of-power theory, great power competition, and Asian affairs.

Image: Shutterstock.

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What Ukraine revealed about military power.

Last December, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida unveiled Japan’s National Security Statement (NSS), pledging to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, turning Japan into the third-largest military spender in the world. While many commentators see this as a reactive move toward Chinese aggression and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the NSS indicates Japan is deliberately and proactively creating a new vision for the Indo-Pacific: “As a major global actor, Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.”

To pursue this goal, Japan implemented a new diplomatic posture by moving toward ending trade disputes and normalizing defense ties with South Korea. Additionally, Japan’s NSS calls for strengthened cooperation with the United States: “Japan, while ensuring the bilateral coordination at its strategic levels, will work in coordination with the United States to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance in all areas, including diplomacy, defense, and economy.”

Japan’s NSS, in short, highlights that the country aims to become an increasingly active player in Asia and that increased cooperation with the United States is key to maintaining prosperity for both countries.

Tokyo’s willingness to increase spending and cooperation in defense should be seen as a great boon to America’s defense strategy. According to a recent wargame by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, every single optimistic scenario alteration regarding Japan results in a “major change” toward a successful defense of Taiwan, whereas the worst-case scenario of Japan remaining neutral leads to a decisive Chinese victory. This resulted in the paper recommending U.S. leaders to “[prioritize] deeping military and diplomatic ties with Japan.” In particular, operational coordination between the United States and Japanese military was seen as especially important by “participants who had experience with the Japanese military.” However, increased strategic cooperation between the United States and Japan should not be limited solely to the military sphere; Japan can play a vital role in achieving a broad array of America’s strategic objectives.

Under the Biden administration, an American counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed to the G7 but has struggled to get off the ground. One of the issues contributing to this failure is, according to one analyst, “little understanding of the policy strategy or delivery mechanisms.” In essence, the American response suffers not only from a lack of funding, but also from an incoherent organizational structure and vision for actually delivering on promised projects.

Meanwhile, Japan already has a system for offering development funds and furthering its foreign policy goals in the form of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which disburses funds on behalf of their Official Development Assistance, a subdivision of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, this system was established back in 1974, arguably making it an inspiration for China’s BRI. Aside from funding development projects, the agency sends personnel abroad and trains personnel in developing countries, amounting to 197,000 experts sent abroad and 649,000 accepted trainees since 1954. Considering current political realities in the United States and a lack of appetite in Europe to create “grand new projects” due to the war in Ukraine, it is prudent to coordinate with Japan’s already well-established system rather than create a new system from scratch. 

Another pillar of America’s strategy is rebuilding its industrial base, as demonstrated by the passage of industrial policy-oriented legislation such as the CHIPS Act and the Build America, Buy America Act. A key part of this task is improving the quality and quantity of personnel in the industrial sector. Currently, there is a talent shortage in the manufacturing sector which will expand to 2 million unfilled openings by 2030 if current trends persist. The Buy American Act is already struggling to find domestic suppliers for many critical goods, particularly in the construction industry. According to industry officials, no domestic manufacturers exist for dock cranes, trucks, boat lifts, and similar equipment. Furthermore, the recently built Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) chip fab in Arizona has “...yielded very little benefit for TSMC or Taiwan” due to steep construction costs (ten times higher than in Taiwan) and a shortage of qualified personnel.

Japan, meanwhile, has a strong manufacturing base in those sectors, but lacks design talent and ranks dead last in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for the average annual entry rate of new enterprises. Considering that America’s venture capital ecosystem remains the largest in the world and accounts for 43 percent of chip design talent demand, it would be in the best interest of both nations to pursue personnel exchanges and corporate cooperation.

This is already occurring in some key industries: Japan’s Rapidus, a company formed to put Japan back on the leading edge of the semiconductor industry, has partnered with U.S. tech giant IBM to manufacture the latter’s 2nm chip design. However, the focus shouldn’t only be specialization (i.e., America providing chip design while Japan builds them): both nations should instead look to improve on each other’s weaknesses. For example, President Joe Biden could pass an amendment to the Buy America Act that allows for a temporary exemption for equipment the United States cannot currently produce in exchange for Japanese companies either sending some of their engineers to America (to teach current firms the best practices for producing the equipment) or opening joint ventures in America (for producing the equipment).

The latter has been done before, albeit under far less amicable terms. Following Toyota’s rapid expansion into the American car market in the 1980s, Congress implemented a voluntary export restraint with the Japanese government, limiting automobile exports to the United States to 22 percent of the U.S. market. This action, alongside the looming threat of import tariffs on Japan, encouraged Toyota to create a joint venture with U.S. automotive manufacturing giant General Motors (GM) to produce cars in America, leading to the formation of New United Motor Manufacturing Inc. The goal was for Toyota to learn how to run a factory in America while General Motors would learn how to implement the Toyota Production System successfully to increase the quality of its cars. This venture proved incredibly beneficial to both companies: Toyota is now the second-largest carmaker in America, operating fifteen factories across the United States and employing around 176,000 Americans, while GM’s procurement and production system is “world-class and every bit as efficient as the Japanese automaker’s system” according to the White House Automotive Task Force. If such a productive outcome could come from a mix of desperation on GM’s part and coercion on Toyota’s part, then even greater heights could be achieved today with America and Japan having clearly aligned interests.

Additionally, on a cultural level, American analysts more seriously cooperating with their Japanese counterparts concerning Beijing will result in a more effective China strategy. Due to their shared and turbulent history, many Japanese diplomats were ahead of the curve when it came to many of the issues that resulted from China’s ascension as a great power. Early last year, Sasae Kenichiro, a former Japanese ambassador to America, wrote in an article by The Economist stating that: “We warned the US: this is not a small compartmentalized issue between Japan and China, but a sign of a growing power in the region” Unfortunately at the time, these warnings fell on deaf ears. As one China specialist at Tokyo University lamented in the same article: “Fifteen years ago, if I talked to [Western colleagues] about the negative aspects of China, I was treated as a right-wing, China-hating, Japanese scholar.”

This needs to change. Ideally, the United States should have nearly as many personnel dedicated to understanding and working with Japan as there are for China. The America-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the current geopolitical order in the Pacific, and it is time for both nations to work toward strengthening bilateral ties to maintain that status.

Siddhartha Kazi is an undergraduate student studying Industrial Engineering at Texas A&M University.

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