Diplomacy & Crisis News

The Biden administration’s effort to isolate climate negotiations from broader foreign policy goals has become untenable. Rather than reconciling the conflicting objectives of its top foreign policy decisionmakers—Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Special Climate Envoy John Kerry—the division of function has created a crisis of authority, leading to confused negotiations with China.

The divergent stances on China policy have been evident since the earliest days of the Biden administration. Secretary Blinken’s first international trip was to Japan and South Korea. During his trip to Tokyo, he highlighted the strength of America’s Pacific alliance and accused China of acting “coercively and aggressively” in the South China Sea. Kerry, by contrast, visited China just a month later to discuss green energy policy. The Chinese delegation took the opportunity to criticize Japan’s treatment of nuclear waste from the Fukushima power plant meltdown.

As relations sour between Beijing and DC, the role of climate envoy (tasked with cooperating with China on climate) and the position of secretary of state (responsible for upholding American interests abroad) continue to diverge. When US authorities discovered Chinese spy balloons drifting over the continental U.S. in early 2023,  Blinken canceled his first planned trip to Beijing. Canceling visits is an age-old practice in the diplomatic toolbox, serving as an effective yet non-escalatory form of retaliation. Yet within months of Blinken's announcement, Kerry accepted an invitation to visit China “in the near-term.”

In the past, DC policymakers have always disagreed on issues from free trade agreements to America's military engagements overseas. What makes the two diplomats’ conflicting China strategies unique is not the fundamental dispute over policy but the crisis of authority. Kerry spent four years as Secretary of State and boss to then-Deputy Secretary Blinken. Kerry can count on established rapport with foreign leaders and career officials in Foggy Bottom. The crisis of authority does not just come from overlapping responsibilities of the positions of climate envoy and secretary of state. It also comes from Kerry's history leading the organization and his relationship with Blinken.

As the first-ever climate envoy and a long-time friend to the president, Kerry is uniquely positioned to shape his own role. While his role is not explicitly concerned with foreign policy, former Secretary of State Kerry has chiefly focused his efforts abroad. His overseas focus can be partly attributed to his pre-existing knowledge and relationships in the foreign policy sphere and the stubbornness of domestic policymaking bodies (i.e., Congress).

Despite having offices and employees at the Department of State, the climate envoy is outside the department's chain of command, reporting only to President Biden. Kerry’s position is a unicorn in the history of American statecraft. He is a cabinet-level official on par with Blinken, even sharing access to military aircraft for diplomatic visits. Yet, he leads no agency and requires no confirmation from the Senate.

The only historical comparison is President Eisenhower’s appointment of Harold Stassen as “special assistant to the president for disarmament” to aid in reconstructing post-WWII Europe. Stassen’s ad hoc appointment antagonized incumbent Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The following years were consumed by unnecessary bureaucratic competition that ultimately distracted American foreign policy. Order was only restored when Eisenhower effectively eliminated Stassen’s position.

While Kerry and Blinken appear to have a cordial relationship, the potential for conflict is even more troubling than the historical analog. Dulles was nearly 20 years senior to Stassen. Dulles had a more extensive network in DC and had a longer relationship with the President, which encouraged Stassen to act deferentially. The relationship between Kerry and Blinken is inverse. Here, the secretary of state is nearly 20 years junior to the special envoy. The secretary of state not only has less experience in DC—and formerly worked under the special envoy—he has fewer years leading his department.

Kerry's seniority does not mean he will have the president's support over Blinken if a serious dispute arises. However, it creates an ambiguous wrinkle in the foreign policy hierarchy. Will Chinese Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua and senior Chinese foreign-policy official Wang Yi treat Kerry where they left off when Kerry was Secretary of State, or will they defer to Blinken? Will foreign negotiators be able to extract concessions from  Kerry that  Blinken would not have offered up and vice versa?

Though Kerry insists that he exclusively works on climate issues, climate concerns are inextricably linked to economic policy and security. Kerry’s position on the National Security Council questions the notion that his position is hermetically sealed from the rest of American foreign policy. The roles of climate envoy and secretary of state have become further blurred by Kerry’s speech at the Munich Security Conference and Blinken's appearances at COP 26 and COP 27.

While the US foreign policy establishment declares that Kerry only represents climate issues, Beijing disagrees, and they have repeatedly said so. In one meeting, Wang told Kerry that climate “cannot possibly be divorced” from geopolitical tensions. It comes as no surprise that Beijing is only willing to subsidize failed industrial reforms to lower China's carbon emissions in exchange for something from the US. Kerry seemed to acknowledge the challenges of persuading China to produce less carbon with few meaningful concessions, asserting “...[o]ur president has tried hard to separate climate from the other issues that are real that we obviously have with China, but we can’t get bogged down by that...” This comment directly contradicts statements by Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and even Kerry’s previous assertions that climate is a critical, stand-alone issue.

Foreign policy is messy. Overlapping issues like climate policy, industrial policy, trade policy, and security cannot be neatly separated from one another. Climate change's transnational nature makes it especially difficult for bilateral negotiations. The number of battleships or nuclear warheads a state possesses is easily verifiable. However, allocating greenhouse gas emissions (already an imperfect indicator of climate change) on a per-country basis is difficult. It becomes even more challenging to establish which country or people are responsible for what pollution considering that Europe and the US effectively outsource the production of consumer goods and resulting pollution to China.

Bilateral negotiations with competitor states are inherently zero-sum. China cannot be a competitor in one domain and an ally in another. Attempting to negotiate in a climate vacuum where no outside issues interfere is implausible. Expecting a former secretary of state to remove himself from statecraft altogether is impossible.

Now is not the time to win favor among domestic environmental constituents. The White House must restore a unified foreign policy front under the leadership of the office of the secretary of state. If the status quo continues, we risk paralyzing our diplomatic efforts with Beijing during one of the most pivotal times in Sino-American relations.

Daniel McVicar is a Research Director at the White House Writers Group. He is a regular contributor to Jamestown Foundation and has written for leading foreign policy outlets, including the Council on Foreign Relations.

Image: Courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.

Le hobo, ce vagabond qui se déplace clandestinement de ville en ville sur des trains de marchandises, multiplie les petits boulots et apprend la vie, est une figure récurrente de la littérature américaine, rendue célèbre par Jack London et plus tard par Jack Kerouac, qui furent eux-mêmes de ces (...) / États-Unis, Culture, Animal, Transports, Littérature, Pauvreté - 2018/05

In recent days, US Ambassador to Armenia Christina Quinn has said that the United States believes that the Armenian people will be able to live safely in Karabakh: “We believe it is possible and we hope all parties will work together to make it a reality.   The US believes that this is the right approach.  We call on all sides to make joint efforts to ensure the rights and security are established.”  Unfortunately, the American Ambassador to Armenia has faced a backlash within some extremist circles in Armenia for making this statement, yet that does not take away the truth of what she stated.

I have visited Azerbaijan four times and I can attest that Azerbaijan is a bastion for Christians in a region of the world dominated by countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, who routinely imprison and torture Christians for seeking to practice their faith.    In Baku, I visited an operating Russian Orthodox and Catholic Church.   There are also numerous Christians who are thriving professionally in Azerbaijani society.   This is because Azerbaijan is a secular country, who believes in protecting all religious heritage sites and citizens, regardless if they are Muslim or not.   

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev stated last Easter, “Preservation and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity, rich multicultural values and centuries old traditions of tolerance in our society is one of the main directions of the state policy of the country.  Azerbaijan is one of the few countries with exemplary state-religious relations, where all-round attention and care is paid to the cultural heritage of different peoples.  In the conditions of national-spiritual solidarity, Christians of Azerbaijan live their traditions, religious beliefs, language and culture, and as citizens of the country, they take an active part in all spheres of our socio-political and cultural republic.”

According to the US State Department’s last report on Religious Freedom, “The constitution stipulates the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions before the law. It also protects the right of individuals to express their religious beliefs and to practice religious rituals, provided these do not violate public order or public morality. The law prohibits the government from interfering in religious activities; it also states the government and citizens have a responsibility to combat “religious extremism” and “radicalism.””

The report continued: “Local experts on religious affairs, religious leaders, and civil society representatives said the general public continued to show tolerance of, and in some cases financially supported, minority religious groups including Jews, Russian Orthodox, and Catholics.”  

The report added: “The constitution stipulates the separation of religion and state and the equality of all religions and all individuals regardless of belief. It protects freedom of religion, including the right of individuals to profess, individually or together with others, any religion, or to profess no religion, and to express and spread religious beliefs. It also provides for the freedom to carry out religious rituals, provided they do not violate public order or public morality. The constitution states no one may be required to profess his or her religious beliefs or be persecuted for them; the law prohibits forced expressions or demonstrations of religious faith.”

According to the US State Department, “There is no religious component in the curriculum of public or private elementary or high schools; however, students may obtain after-school religious instruction at registered institutions. The Administrative Code prohibits clergy and members of religious associations from holding “special” group meetings for children and young people or forcing children to practice religion. The religious freedom law provides that religious education of children “should not have a negative impact on their physical and mental health.”” 

Considering all of these facts, why should Armenians fear living among Azerbaijanis in Karabakh once peace is established between the two peoples?    Just as Jews, Bahais, Russian Orthodox, Georgians, Udi Christians, and Catholics manage to coexist peacefully with the Muslim population in Azerbaijan, why cannot the Armenians if they desire for peace to be upheld between the two peoples?   Thus, America’s Ambassador to Armenia should not have been condemned for stating the obvious.     

Les lectrices et les lecteurs du « Monde diplomatique » ont pour particularité qu'il faut, avant d'espérer recueillir leur avis sur notre journal, leur garantir que les réponses ne serviront pas les publicitaires. Par conséquent, disons-le d'emblée : ceci n'est pas un sondage. Ni une étude de marché… (...) / A propos du « Diplo », Presse - 2018/05

Countries will have to choose between America and China.

Republican anger at Mexico, long-simmering over the continuous immigration and narcotics crises on the United States’ southern border, is now spilling over into bellicosity. Led by Republican presidential candidate Ron DeSantis, some Republicans are advocating for military action against drug cartels on Mexican territory. Even the recent two-decade debacle of using the U.S. military to fight drugs coming from Afghanistan has not dissuaded these Republicans from what will likely be another futile martial approach.

DeSantis has proposed conducting unilateral raids into Mexican territory to disrupt fentanyl manufacturing, contributing to over 100,000 overdose deaths in 2022 alone. Supporting the offensive, a naval blockade of Mexican ports would intercept the producers’ raw materials imported from China. The first option resembles progressive president Woodrow Wilson’s failed attempt to capture Mexican outlaw Pancho Villa in 1916–1917, which ended in a humiliating U.S. military retreat from the territory of our southern neighbor. A naval blockade is risky since it's traditionally considered an act of war. Both Mexico and China, the latter a great power armed with nuclear weapons, would be incensed by this gambit. The international community would be in uproar over the violation of the freedom of navigation. Moreover, a blockade would significantly undercut Washington’s Asia policy. The U.S. Navy conducts regular missions in the South and East China Seas to deter Chinese forces from making good on their own grandiose territorial claims. A blockade of Veracruz or Tampico would make claims to uphold a “free and open Indo-Pacific” ring hollow.

As president, Donald Trump toyed with the idea of designating Mexican drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, which would then have opened the way for cross-border military action against them. His secretary of defense, Mark Esper, has since reported that he openly wondered why he could not launch missiles at drug-making facilities in Mexico. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, and neither step was taken.

Presidential candidate Tim Scott voiced an even more ambitious and dangerous plan to deal with the cartels: “When I am president, the drug cartels using Chinese labs and Mexican factories to kill Americans will cease to exist. I will freeze their assets, I will build the wall, and I will allow the world’s greatest military to fight these terrorists.” Is he advocating for attacks on Chinese soil and property?

Although hot campaign rhetoric cools once a candidate wins the presidency and faces the demands of the office, the fact that the temperature is this high is counterproductive and perilous.

As the last twenty years have shown, military force authorization can be a slippery slope to unrestrained military adventurism. Instead of limiting operations to the capture or killing of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, per Congress’ 2001 joint resolution, then-President George W. Bush interpreted the declaration loosely to authorize unilateral military action against any nation that was unwilling or unable to combat terrorism. This policy included the invasions and occupations of two countries, spurring more retaliatory violence worldwide.

Bush’s usurpation of Congress’s constitutional war-making power resembled the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, promulgated by Teddy Roosevelt, the first progressive president, in 1904. Prior to the Roosevelt administration, the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the United States would stay out of Europe’s conflicts but oppose European colonization or re-colonization in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt amended the doctrine, proclaiming the right of U.S. intervention throughout the Americas if political instability or financial insolvency increased the chances of European intervention. This corollary emboldened other presidents to meddle in Latin America, including Wilson’s ill-starred foray into the Mexican Civil War.

The 2024 Republican candidates’ martial rhetoric on unilateral military action in Mexico echoes the failed policies of early twentieth-century progressives and the Bush administration after 9/11. Yet most Republican candidates have repudiated the Bush administration’s general interventionist foreign policy that led to the protracted quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A better policy would be to deal with drug use by cutting demand through changing culture and by remediation through medical treatment instead of aggressively and unsuccessfully trying to reduce supply using law enforcement or military action. Still, those solutions aren’t macho enough for a party whose base wants to blame Mexico for what is America’s drug addiction problem.

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow with the Independent Institute and author of several books, including, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and the Middle East.

Image: Shutterstock.

Former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro resembled former U.S. president Donald Trump in so many respects that he became known as the “Trump of the tropics.” Bolsonaro’s brand of right-wing populism certainly paralleled much of what Trump exhibited in terms of policies, ideology, and rhetoric. But the resemblance became especially marked in the way each man threatened his country’s system of democracy and respect for free elections.

Fearing defeat in his re-election bid last autumn, Bolsonaro—just like Trump—made unfounded accusations of widespread voting irregularities and suggested that if he did not win then it must be because the election was rigged. He even made some of the same assertions as some Trump supporters did about supposedly rigged voting machines. After his election loss, Bolsonaro, like Trump, refused to accept the outcome of the vote as legitimate.

Bolsonaro’s inculcation among his followers of his lie about a supposedly rigged election led to a violent riot and ransacking of government offices in Brasilia, two years and two days after Trump’s corresponding election lie led his supporters to attack and ransack the U.S. Capitol. Similarly to how Trump later would sometimes talk about the Capitol rioters as “loving,” “great,” and “peaceful” people, Bolsonaro described the Brasilia rioters as “little old women and little old men, with Brazilian flags on their back and Bibles under their arms.”

Like Trump, Bolsonaro did not attend his successor’s inauguration—which in Brazil’s case meant not participating in the traditional transfer of the presidential sash from the outgoing to the incoming president. Like Trump, Bolsonaro instead flew to Florida.

But there the stories diverge. Trump is still a major and active political factor in the United States and currently is the clear frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination in 2024. But Bolsonaro has just been barred by Brazil’s electoral court from running for any public office until at least 2030, because of his election lies. Specifically, the court determined that Bolsonaro had violated election laws when during last year’s campaign he held a televised meeting with foreign diplomats in which he made some of his baseless claims about the voting system being rigged against him.

The United States does not have any institution comparable to Brazil’s electoral court, with the power that the court has under Brazil’s constitution to sideline offender candidates. The U.S. Federal Election Commission has only a limited mandate to investigate violations of campaign finance law, and much of the time in recent years the commission has been crippled anyway by partisan division or lack of a quorum. The U.S. judicial system is geared more toward achieving justice between private parties than toward holding politicians accountable for offenses against democracy. The one determination in a U.S. court of law about the lies concerning supposedly rigged voting machines was in a case involving two private parties, with Fox News—the principal mass media purveyor of Trumpist election lies—paying a $787.5 million settlement to a manufacturer of voting machines.

None of this is to say that Brazilian judicial or political mechanisms can or should be installed in the United States. The establishment of a body comparable to Brazil’s electoral court would require an improbable constitutional change. Given how much the composition, and to a large extent the conduct, of the U.S. Supreme Court has become wrapped in partisanship, it is questionable whether even if such a constitutional provision existed, the resulting court would function the way the one in Brazil has. Moreover, giving a court such powers over politicians would lead to accusations that the court itself was undemocratic. Such accusations have been heard in Brazil, as they are heard today in Israel as a rationale for the Netanyahu government’s plan to curb the judiciary’s role in reviewing legislation.

Not just in Brazil, however, but in many Western democracies, a centralized role for courts and/or commissions to oversee elections in a fair and nonpartisan manner works rather well. For example, in the United Kingdom—the original source of much of American political culture—an electoral commission and independent boundary commissions that draw constituency lines perform those functions, not entirely without controversy but generally in a way that is widely accepted as democratic and unbiased.

An argument is sometimes made that a decentralized system of election administration, as prevails in the United States, is less vulnerable to serious corruption. But in practice, that decentralized system has seen parties that control state legislatures indulging in extreme gerrymandering and voter suppression laws. Such partisan manipulation is a major reason that in the Freedom House scorecard on political rights, the United States currently ranks behind 64 other countries—not only Western democracies such as the United Kingdom but many others worldwide, from Micronesia to Mongolia.

The Trump part of the story is not over, and more accountability regarding the attempt to overturn the 2020 election result may follow from special counsel Jack Smith’s ongoing investigation and a parallel inquiry by the district attorney in Fulton County, Georgia. But even criminal convictions of Trump in these cases would not bar him from running for office.

The story in Brazil is not over, either, and not only because Bolsonaro is also subject to further criminal investigations. Much will depend on the direction set by other politicians on the Brazilian Right. Some of them are already moving on to leaders other than Bolsonaro, although there also is talk of Bolsonaro’s wife or one of his sons running for president.

For Brazil, or any other country, to be a healthy democracy requires major parties both left of center and right of center that respect democratic norms. A Brazilian voter who values democracy but disagrees with the economic or social policies of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—or who consider Lula, who served time in prison on corruption charges, unfit for office—needs someplace to turn.

The United States also, to be a healthy democracy, needs responsible, democracy-respecting parties on both the Left and the Right, something it does not now have. A democracy cannot survive if the task of maintaining democratic norms falls on only one side of the political spectrum, whether that is the Left or the Right.

The different turns taken by the stories of the Trump of the tropics and the Trump of Mar-a-Lago may reflect not only the different constitutional mechanisms in Brazil and the United States but also how the national histories of the two countries lead its citizens to think about democracy and threats to democracy. Especially during the Independence Day season—and probably even more so as the nation approaches its semiquincentennial—Americans have a tendency toward smugness about their polity, notwithstanding that mediocre score from Freedom House. “World’s oldest democracy” and all that. Many Americans tend to take for granted their nation’s democracy and political stability, and they should not.

Brazil has not been as historically blessed. As recently as 1985 it was under a military dictatorship. Perhaps this has made Brazilians more conscious of how fragile democracy can be and of threats to it. Too many citizens of the United States are insufficiently conscious of how immediate is the threat to their own democracy.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.

En Amérique latine, les chefs d'entreprise raflent les plus hautes fonctions exécutives : présidences du Pérou, du Chili, du Paraguay, de l'Argentine… Une étude confirme la très large surreprésentation actuelle des élites économiques au sein du pouvoir législatif. / Amérique latine, Économie, Entreprise, (...) / Amérique latine, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Parti politique, Politique, Amérique centrale, Amérique du Sud, Néolibéralisme - 2018/05

Beijing’s global assault on transparency and open government.

Lessons from the country’s civil war in the 1960s.

In a timely warning about what could soon happen stateside, European Union (EU) regulators are shamelessly weaponizing antitrust in an attempt to dislodge Silicon Valley’s hold over European consumers. Aggressive regulation of technology companies, especially American ones operating in Europe, is nothing new for Brussels lawmakers. The EU has been waging its war against Silicon Valley for some time. It employs an extremely loose definition of “monopoly,” passing sweeping regulations which broadside the U.S. tech industry. Warm words about innovation and competition, which often accompany new European antitrust laws, have not helped its own efforts at such.

The main front in Brussels’ antitrust battle is a pair of bills with innocuous-sounding names: the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA). Together, they form a wide-ranging legislative package that aims to tackle past, present, and future problems with Internet use in one fell swoop. The time bombs in these two pieces of legislation are too numerous to name.

They propose, for example, preventing children from viewing adult content by mandating age verification for websites. That obviously won’t protect many young eyes; having grown up in the digital age, many kids are more adept than most adults at using VPNs and other tools to dodge digital obstacles. Standard age verification tools look like Stone Age technology compared to those children use to, among other things, play Fortnite on their school’s Wi-Fi network.

When the EU implements its blanket restrictions on content access, those tools will become even more accessible and sophisticated than they already are in Europe, leaving the law redundant. It could be disastrous for data privacy and security. Adult users will have to comply with ID checks. Criminals trading stolen personal information online is already common. Laws like this, which compel legitimate Internet users to hand over their details, will be a boon for online criminals profiting off it.

Through bills like the DMA and DSA, the EU insists on bombarding technology companies with gargantuan responsibilities, such as obliging online service providers to review user content pre-upload to tackle copyright violations, accompanied by the promise of relentless enforcement. The consequences for free speech and investment in Europe are likely to be dire. Europe’s share of global venture-capital investments fell dramatically in the 2010s, and data since then suggests the trend is continuing.

Most U.S. tech companies will have to modify their practices significantly to comply with these laws, such as by dramatically expanding their content moderation efforts, which seems sure to make their platforms much less convenient to use. They have a negligible impact on online safety, since it’s so easy to skirt the rules online. See no further than the creation of “PizzaGPT” after Italy banned ChatGPT.

Like most EU tech regulation, and indeed EU regulation in many other policy areas, the DMA and DSA reek of protectionism. When defending their aggressive approach to antitrust, European lawmakers speak of their desire to foster a new generation of European tech entrepreneurs and start-ups. But shutting out foreign innovators won’t help achieve that. Their measures hamstring innovation, increase costs for companies and consumers, and set Europe behind in the innovation race by curating an environment that is unduly hostile to American technology companies.

Even the artificial intelligence (AI) sector, brimming with competition between industry giants like Google, Microsoft, and insurgent new forces like OpenAI, is not enough to ward off the sledgehammer of EU regulation—in this case, the recent AI Act.

The EU boasts that it has created “the world’s first comprehensive AI law.” In practice, the Act clumsily categorizes some AI technologies as “high risk.” Creators of “high risk” products, which include any AI related to toys, cars, education, or any kind of biometric identification, will face a series of strenuous “conformity assessment procedures” and “horizontal mandatory requirements” before they can trade within the EU.

The Act also promises to “protect fundamental rights throughout the whole AI systems’ lifecycle” through further ongoing centralized monitoring of “high risk” technologies. Meanwhile, the Act classifies other technologies, such as real-time biometric identification, as “unacceptable risk” and bans them outright, cutting Europeans off from any innovative new products which use them. Rushing to be the first to regulate a fast-changing emerging technology when the landscape remains unclear is more of a curse than a boon for good policymaking.

Like many EU tech regulations, the AI Act is comprehensive—so much so that its sweeping pre-market requirements almost seem designed to make life difficult for technology companies wanting to do business in Europe. EU lawmaking often tars those companies with the same brush, seeing them all as part of a single monopolistic force rather than the competing forces they are.

Europe’s bad example ought to serve as a warning. The risk of the United States falling down a similar regulatory rabbit hole is real and urgent. Activist regulators in the Biden administration, such as the FTC’s Lina Khan, have made clear their admiration for the European approach. Only a concerted effort to speak up for basic freedoms and common sense in antitrust policy can halt the tide of overregulation in antitrust.

Jason Reed is a British policy writer based in London, UK, contributing to a wide range of outlets on both sides of the Atlantic. He works as Global Projects Manager at Young Voices, a U.S.-based non-profit organization. He tweets @JasonReed624.

Image: Shutterstock.

In the wake of center-right President Guillermo Lasso’s move to dissolve a National Assembly to prevent impeachment proceedings, Ecuador will head to a snap presidential election on August 20. This election will have a notable impact on U.S. relations in Latin America, as China and Russia continue to gain allies and leverage in the region. Ecuador could once again become an anti-American force.

Luisa González, a former member of the National Assembly from the socialist Citizen Revolution party, has quickly become the frontrunner in the election, leading with 41 percent in recent polls. She promises to continue the vision of former President Rafael Correa, who implemented hard-left reforms as president and made himself a staunch opponent of social and economic liberalism.

That would be horrendous for U.S. relations with Ecuador. If González wins, the United States will lose influence in a country with which it has had an extensive security and commercial relationship since the late 1990s. That would be replaced with an adversarial relationship motivated by the decidedly anti-American stance of Correísmo.

Correa’s Legacy

Correa was part of the Pink Tide—a movement of populist left-wing Latin American governments in the mid-2000s. He, along with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, implemented a number of anti-American and, in some cases, anti-democratic measures. In Ecuador specifically, Correa changed the Ecuadorian constitution to extend his rule and power. He kicked out the American defense staff from Ecuador, expelled American diplomats, halted the United States’ counter-narcotic program, and provided asylum for Julian Assange—the infamous journalist who published leaked U.S. defense secrets. These measures impeded U.S. security objectives against organized crime and espionage in the region.

Correa’s post-presidential career has not exactly been clean; he has been sentenced to eight years in prison in Ecuador on corruption charges. He is currently evading justice from Belgium.

Yet despite evidence of his corruption and anti-democratic posturing—which she characterizes as a witch hunt—González and her party expressed they would prefer Correa to become president again. After all, she served in Correa’s administration for ten years and has said she would have Correa as her “principal advisor” while in government. In turn, Correa has endorsed González.

Who is Luisa González?

González’s party, Citizen Revolution, espouses a Marxist message, calling its members “comrades” and “revolutionaries” and repeatedly using Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara’s famous quote, “¡Hasta la victoria siempre!” (“Until Victory Always”). Correa himself used the quote in his endorsement of González.

In foreign policy, González has firmly opposed the American position on the democratic future of Venezuela. She argues that President Nicolás Maduro was democratically elected and that she would engage diplomatically with Maduro as an equal partner. “The Venezuelan people have their president, they have chosen him,” argued González the same day the Biden administration called for free and fair elections in that country. Simultaneously,

González has also aligned herself with Presidents Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) of Mexico and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina. Both are veterans from the Pink Tide era who have made standing up to “American neoliberalism” a key tenet of their governing ideology. AMLO forcibly kicked out U.S. military and intelligence personnel from Mexico, and Kirchner signed various security and economic cooperation agreements with Russia and China while criticizing US foreign policy in the region. During a visit to Mexico City, González shared that she would model her government after theirs.

When asked about relations with Washington, González only said she would respect the UN charter and treat the United States “the same” as other countries. She insisted that America should respect Ecuador’s “self-determination.” These comments belie the level of U.S. involvement in the South American country, as Washington continues to provide security Ecuador even dollarized its economy to escape an inflationary trap.

Yet the latter development shouldn’t come as a surprise. Both González and Correa have demonstrated poor judgment in economic and financial matters, and have been critical of the U.S. international financial institutions while embracing China’s debt-trap diplomacy.

As president, Correa reportedly refused to deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to finance Ecuador’s debt. It didn’t matter that the IMF offered lower interest rates; he took a deal with China instead. As a result, Beijing now holds the majority of Ecuador’s foreign debt, granting it significant power in Quito. There is no indication that González would deviate from this course as president.

In short, González wins this election, it will be a blow to U.S. economic power and leverage in the region.

The Other Candidate

There are other contenders for the presidency on the ballot. One particularly interesting candidate is Yaku Pérez, an eco-socialist from the indigenous-environmental alliance of parties. He currently presents González’s main opponent from her left flank.

Yaku, meaning “water” in Kichwa, has been fighting extractive projects for more than a decade on the basis that they threaten water access and quality. He has promised to halt all oil and mining extraction.

Despite this, there is some ground for progress and cooperation between the United States with Yaku, as his intentions are sincere and his background is impressive. Yaku has expressed the desire to sign a free trade agreement with the United States, and looks to maintain energy subsidies and boost international investment, particularly from the rest of the Americas. Unlike Lasso, Correa, and González, Yaku has extensive credentials signaling his attachment to democracy and constitutional rule, promoting citizens’ assemblies and peaceful protest, for which he and his wife—an American-educated political activist that has promoted cooperation with the United States on trade, democracy, and human rights—were persecuted by Correa. Yaku has also openly criticized China and Venezuela for authoritarianism and human rights abuses and proposed to create a global anti-corruption organization with support from the United States, the Organization of American States, and the UN.

Yet, at present, González is projected to win in Quito next month.

In a region that continues to be plagued by instability and leaders with contempt for democracy and liberal values, González would add to the long list of leaders exacerbating the problem. She would damage the U.S. position in the country and the region at large, instead favoring America’s adversaries. Washington ought to take note.

Joseph Bouchard is a freelance journalist covering geopolitics in Latin America. His articles have appeared in The Diplomat, Mongabay, and Global Americans. He is an MIA candidate at Carleton University in Ottawa.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of The National Interest or its editors.

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Secoué par une vague de violences, le plus grand pays d'Amérique du Sud multiplie les ruptures avec l'ordre constitutionnel. Au point que certains droits acquis après la fin de la dictature, en 1985, semblent désormais menacés. À commencer par la liberté d'expression et celle de choisir ses (...) / Amérique latine, Brésil, Inégalités, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Police, Politique, Violence - 2018/05

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All European eyes may be on Ukraine’s future these days, but this will not be the only subject at this year’s NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11–12. In fact, despite their physical proximity to the frontlines, Lithuanian authorities have announced that up to a third of the summit’s agenda would be dedicated to the Indo-Pacific.

This may look like a bold move for Lithuanian hosts, but their experience in dealing with autocracies tells them that the European and the Indo-Pacific front are interlinked. In fact, Vilnius has recently faced sharp power attacks from both Russia (via Belarus) and China in the recent past. In 2021, the Belarusian authorities, likely incited and advised by Moscow’s FSB, engineered a migrant crisis by recruiting volunteer migrants in Iraq, taking them by plane to Minsk, and then walking them through the Polish and Lithuanian border. The result was an artificial flux of refugees designed to blackmail Vilnius into backing down in its policies of support to the Belarusian opposition.

A few months later, Beijing used economic warfare to try and put Lithuania back into line after Ingrida Šimonyte’s government agreed to the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in the country. The boycott imposed by Beijing was severe and designed to inflict considerable pain. However, because the government had built economic resilience, the move only succeeded in strengthening the ties between Lithuania and Taiwan. To strengthen the resilience of both countries’ supply chains, Vilnius and Taipei reached an agreement to produce high-end chips in Lithuania—Teltonika, the Lithuanian company at the heart of the deal could be accounting for as much as 5 percent of the country’s GDP within a decade as a result.

Having been exposed to both Russian and China’s sharp power and being dangerously close to Moscow’s hard power, Lithuania understands full well that Ukraine and Taiwan are inextricably linked, and that both represent a test of strength for the international order. If one of them were to fall, autocracies would be once again on the ascendant, and the global rules-based order on which Lithuania depends for its very existence would be at threat. It seems therefore somehow logical that Lithuania would adhere to much of the U.S. establishment’s view that the rest of the twenty-first century will be dominated by a long-term struggle between autocracies and democracies. Because the Lithuanians understand the double threat posed by the Dragonbear, they are more than inclined to encourage NATO to look into the Indo-Pacific.

Dealing with Europe’s Indo-Pacific Skepticism

Not everyone agrees: France and Germany, but also others, are not so keen on tilting NATO towards the Indo-Pacific—at least not while war rages in Europe. This was the message conveyed by French president Emmanuel Macron in his infamous interview on the plane back from Beijing in April 2023, and he recently backed up his words with action by objecting to the opening of a NATO office in Tokyo, Japan. This is not that France has suddenly become a friend of China, or that it no longer supports the status quo over the Taiwan Strait. Rather, the French do not want to entangle themselves into alliances within the Indo-Pacific at a time of growing tensions. Macron knows full well that in case of a full-blown confrontation between the United States and China, the French navy would have to focus on defending its territories in the Indo-Pacific (which range from Mayotte and La Réunion in the Indian Ocean to New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the South Pacific), and could not possibly spare its resources on anything else.

But whatever the motives of Macron, he is not alone in thinking this way: most European governments worry about being drawn into direct conflict with China, and so does public opinion, apparently. A recent poll released by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) on a sample of citizens from eleven EU countries shows that 62 percent of Europeans would prefer their country to remain neutral if war were to break out between America and China—a view rather shared rather equally by a large majority in all countries studied.

This is not to say that Europeans are not worried about China—all recent polling (including that conducted by ECFR) suggests that NATO allies have shared worries about Beijing’s aspiration and its aggressive global behavior. But whereas for the United States this is a direct and perhaps even existential threat, Europeans perceive it as a much more distant problem than, say, Ukraine. Furthermore, most NATO countries close to Russia still perceive their nearer Eastern neighbor as their real, immediate, and existential threat—Finland and Sweden did not abandon neutrality for fear of Beijing but to secure their territory from potential Russian expansionism. It seems difficult at this stage to see them agreeing to NATO out-of-area operation in the Indo-Pacific, at least as long as the Russian threat endures.

Furthermore, even considering a change of hearts in Europe’s public (and elite) perceptions, and if the Europeans would more likely support the U.S. diplomatically in case of a direct armed conflict with China, their military contribution to any war effort in the Indo-Pacific would be more symbolic than of actual real value—a conflict over the Taiwan Strait would most likely be a naval affair possibly involving huge quantities of naval assets, and this is something Europeans are ill-equipped for, when they have a functioning navy at all.

In Search of a New Strategy

NATO’s raison d’être was famously described by Lord Ismay as keeping the Germans down, the Americans in, and the Russians out of Europe. The fact is that at this stage, NATO remains geographically an Atlantic alliance whose purpose is to defend Europe from outsiders. This was certainly the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and this is certainly the case for Russia today. But NATO will not likely tilt its geographical scope to the Indo-Pacific—this would alter too much the identity of the alliance. Additionally, the memories of out-of-area operations (in the Middle East) are still too close and too bitter for the Europeans to subscribe to.

A NATO directly active in the Indo-Pacific is therefore a dream that would best be forgotten—at least for the foreseeable future. However, this does not mean that the alliance could not reinvent its role with regard to China; in this case, it would not be not only to keep the Chinese out, but rather far from Europe. This would tap into Europeans’ concerns about Beijing’s economic in-roads into European economies and would strategically keep the Chinese at arms’ bay in Europe’s neighborhood.

Keeping the Chinese far away could indeed be a strategy for Europe, as the former have recently made in-roads in Europe’s southern neighborhood. Not only on-land in parts of Africa and the Middle-East, but also at sea: it is not by chance that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) built its first military base outside of Chinese borders in Djibouti, the chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, which itself connects the Indo-Pacific and the Mediterranean.

As Asia develops and with the land “silk roads” closed as long as Russia remains hostile to the West, the Mediterranean has returned to its strategic place as a strategic connector between East and West—much like in the days of not just the Roman but also the British empire. After all, control over the choke points between China and Europe, from Gibraltar to the Strait of Malacca (many of them in the Mediterranean), has once again become an issue, particularly given that the Mediterranean as a sea that is becoming increasingly territorialized and, indeed, contested. This explains why China has been holding joint naval operations with Russia in the recent past to increase military presence, but also why it has expressed much interest in building up an economic presence in the region. Beijing has gone on an acquisitions spree over the past decade, acquiring via its public-owned shipping company COSCO the Greek port of Piraeus in 2016, developing another port in El-Hamdania, Algeria since 2021, and eyeing the ports of Genoa, Trieste, and Taranto in Italy—a country that was lured into signing up to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2019. Of course, none of these projects have a direct military component (at least for now), but it is easy to imagine how this strategy could lead to the dual use of ports and the weaponization of commercial agreements to make headways in Europe’s southern backyard, threatening American interests north and south of the Med.

Most southern European countries are well aware of the growing Chinese presence in the Mediterranean, which they are increasingly worried about, while most Central European allies have come to understand over the years that Russia’s own disruptive strategy also goes south from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and Africa. There would be little dissent in advocating for a NATO strategy bent on pushing the Russians and Chinese out of the southern as well as the eastern borders of Europe. And considering the crucial commercial link between the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, it would be a way to involve the Europeans, via a more familiar strategic region, in America’s global strategy. For NATO, the Indo-Pacific may not be consensual, but a Med-Indo-Pacific strategy may be a key for Washington to get the Europeans moving.

Thibault Muzergues is the author of War in Europe? From Impossible War to Improbable Peace (Routledge, 2022).

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Ahead of NATO’s Vilnius meeting on July 11, forty-six foreign policy experts, in an open letter, recommended measures to secure Ukraine’s victory and reestablish full control over its internationally recognized 1991 borders; as well as anchoring Kyiv in the security and economic arrangements of the transatlantic alliance.

Departing from the notion that Russian president Vladimir Putin had failed in his revisionist ambition to remake the security of Europe, the authors emphasized that Putin had to abandon his goal of establishing control of Ukraine and that Kyiv not to be left in a gray zone of ambiguity inviting Russian aggression. The authors stressed that the transatlantic community can only be stable and secure if Ukraine itself is secure, and that Ukraine’s entry into NATO, fulfilling the promise made at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, would achieve that.

It is with these goals in mind that the authors supported a swift admission of Ukraine into NATO while at the same time offering Kyiv the same security guarantees each NATO member has under Article 4. Theirs is a roadmap to make Ukraine a member of NATO in all but in name until its official admission. In this respect, the authors recommended that NATO 1) supply Ukraine with all kind of weapons— including longer-range missiles such as ATACMS, Western advanced combat aircraft, tanks and necessary ammunition— in sufficient quantities to prevail on the battlefield, and 2) develop a Ukrainian long-term national security strategy, national defense strategy, and national defense posture compatible with NATO standards and planning.

Only then, the authors conclude in their letter, the transatlantic community would be a more stable, secure, and prosperous.

Simply put, this letter is an open invitation to WWIII and the mutual destruction of the West and Eurasia. It is based in flawed analysis wrapped in hubris, indifference, and ignorance of history, geography and geopolitics.

The authors made the crafty argument that Putin had a revisionist policy to remake the security of Europe without even giving lip service to the impact of NATO’s eastward expansion to the hearth of the capital of Peter the Great. Yet they underscored that Ukraine’s admission into NATO would fulfill the promise made in Bucharest in 2008, disregarding the obvious that NATO would therefore encircle Russia.

At the same time, the authors paid no attention to the objections and attempts the Russian leadership made to dissuade the West from expanding NATO. Seen through the Russian prism, the West, especially United States, has continued to either renege on its assurances or beguile Russia into burying its head in the sand regarding its national security. Reconfirming what President George H. W. Bush had told Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the Malta Summit in December 1989, Secretary of State James Baker told Gorbachev in February 1990 in Moscow: “We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”

Few years later, at its summit in Madrid in July 1997, NATO formally invited three former Soviet satellites, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the Western alliance. No less than two weeks after their membership became effective in March 1999, NATO began to bomb Serbia, Russia’s ally, in an effort to end its military operations in Kosovo.

Discounting any Russian security consideration, the second round of NATO enlargement began in 2002, whereupon Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia became NATO members in March 2004. Moscow was clear and vocal about its concern particularly with the accession of the Baltic States to NATO.

Before long U.S.-Russian relations cooled following the Rose, Orange and Maidan Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Ukraine (2014) respectively, placing Washington and Moscow on a headlong clash. Long regarded as buffer zones between Russia and the West, the pro-Western change of governments in Georgia and Ukraine more or less instigated by United States reconfirmed to Moscow that NATO’s expansion targeted Russia and left it with an unabated perceived security threats. This led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022 following a comprehensive and systematic expansion of NATO’s security in the Black Sea, Romania, Bulgaria, while at the same time arming Ukraine.

In fact, back in Evian in 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev summarized Russia’s concerns:

The real issue is that NATO is bringing its military infrastructure right up to our borders and is drawing new dividing lines in Europe, this time along our western and southern frontiers. No matter what we are told, it is only natural that we should see this as action directed against us.

Medvedev was not alone in amplifying NATO’s security threats to Russia. George Kennan, author of Washington’s containment policy of the Soviet Union and preeminent Russian expert, asserted that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” He later on explained:

I think it is the beginning of a new cold war…I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves.

And if as looking into a crystal ball, he rightly underscored that there is “little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history,” and predicted “Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are -- but this is just wrong.''

Treading in his footsteps, fifty prominent foreign policy experts, including former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Bill Clinton in June 1997 outlining their opposition to NATO expansion, penning it as “a policy error of historic proportions.”

As Kennan’s prophecy actualized in 2022, the misguided foreign policy mindset that paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has assumed an infallible standpoint. Supporting Ukraine rose to the altar of a divine obligation to protect democracy and defend peace in the West against autocracy and wickedness. Russian President Vladimir Putin, like Saddam Hussein, epitomized evil and therefore had to be removed or defanged to redeem Russia. Dissent has become tantamount to violation of a sacrosanct script, a script for war for democracy detached from reality, democratic norms, and the staggering cost of war. In much the same vein as the Clinton administration, the Biden administration, encouraged and incited by the mainstream media, neoconservatives, liberal interventionists and think tanks tied to the defense establishment, has gradually escalated the tempo of war by dismissing prospects of peace and steadily upgrading the quantity and quality of deadly weapons delivered to Ukraine.

To be sure, despite its grievances, Russia committed a strategic blunder by invading Ukraine and underestimating the will of Ukrainians to fight a patriotic war. NATO’s military support of Ukraine led to Russia’s retreat to Crimea and Donbas, where Moscow dug its defenses. Herein, neither Putin nor any Russian leader will concede defeat in those areas. The Donbas has been integral to the formation of Russia and thereafter the Soviet Union since Moscow’s defeat of the Mongols in the fifteenth century. Significantly, Crimea and its vicinity in eastern-southern Russia figured prominently in Moscow’s drive to expand, protect, and project the power of the Tsarist Empire. Early on, Peter the Great set his sights on the Sea of Azov and Crimea. He seized the Azov fortress from the Ottomans, formerly known as Azak fortress, overlooking the port of Azov, and in September 1698, he founded the first Russian navy base, Taganrog, on the Sea of Azov. Catherine the Great continued his imperial project and seized Crimea and its vicinity in 1774, whereupon Moscow established its strategic naval base at Sevastopol, which has served as the main base of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Moscow not only established a strategic foothold on the Black Sea but also projected its power over the restive Caucuses. From Moscow’s past to the present, Crimea and Donbas have constituted a center of geopolitical gravity and prestige for Moscow as a big power, save a legitimate pretext for Putin’s belief in his righteous war.

Putin has not only underscored their historical, strategic, and cultural importance but also made them a testament to his legitimacy as the leader who reconstituted Russia as a big power. In his address to the Duma in March 2014, for example, Putin stressed:

Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

He then added:

It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered… Now, many years later, I heard residents of Crimea say that back in 1991 they were handed over like a sack of potatoes. This is hard to disagree with. And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the situation. This country was going through such hard times then that realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice.

Putin’s speech underscored the humility with which Moscow had to deal with in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But more importantly, Putin stressed the notion that Crimea is an inseparable part of Russia and a cornerstone of its emergence as a civilization and an empire. Keeping Crimea is an act of righting an egregious historical injustice committed against Moscow. Crimea and Donbas are Russia’s red lines.

Regardless, the authors have paid little attention to Russia’s history and historical disinclination to concede defeat. Russians preferred to set Moscow ablaze rather than concede defeat to Napoleon. The Red Army struggled against the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union along the Eastern Front. This largest invasion in history included some 3.5 million German and nearly 700,000 German-allied troops. Yet, the Red army stood its ground at a staggering cost and dealt the Wehrmacht a severe blow. By repelling the Nazi invasion, Moscow paved the way for the Normandy landing.

Significantly, the authors tied Ukraine’s defeat of Russia on the battlefield to maintaining the security, stability and prosperity of the transatlantic community. In this respect, they supported providing Ukraine with offensive and defensive weapons making the theatre of war inseparable from territorial borders. By so doing, they committed a fatal strategic error by making a NATO-Russia war almost inevitable. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has constantly reversed its position on weapons it initially deemed provoking a bigger war by delivering them to Ukraine. Not surprisingly, the timing of the letter coincided with Ukraine’s counteroffensive and the Biden administration’s apparent approval to provide Ukraine with long range missiles (ATACMs) and cluster munitions, which could make Washington a party to violations of laws of war since they are indiscriminate weapons that disproportionately harm civilians at the time of use and for years after a conflict has ended. One could also expect the Administration will eventually send combat aircrafts to Ukraine, all in all to help Ukraine prevail on the battlefield.

But have the authors considered Russia’s possible reactions? It’s hardly possible that a leader armed with a nationalist history and the largest inventory of nuclear warheads—whose use in conventional warfare is official military doctrine—and resentful of egregious historical injustices will not lethally respond to NATO and Ukraine’s strategy of defeating his regime. In this respect, the authors will have made supporting Ukraine’s victory on the battlefield the trigger to WWIII and the plausible destruction of Europe and Eurasia.

Gripped by a false sense of morality enveloped in hubris and Machiavellian calculations, the Biden administration is steadily taking Americans and many nationalities the world over to the precipice of nuclear abyss and global destruction over faraway lands demographically, politically, and historically conflicted. The time has come for Americans to take a stand and push back against this concerted but foolhardy march to WWIII. Americans must stop this madness and disabuse the Western alliance of its mantle that “weapons are the path to peace.”

Robert G. Rabil is a professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University. Follow him on Twitter @robertgrabil. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Florida Atlantic University.

Francois Alam is an attorney at Law and Secretary General of the Christian Federation of Lebanon and the Levant. Follow him on Twitter @francoisalam.

Image: Shutterstock.

Confrontational and often accusatory, Al-Mahatta, a Lebanese YouTube channel, is emerging as a de facto digital mouthpiece for Hezbollah. Its aim is to consolidate its influence by gaining a broader digital audience while continuing to cater to its well-established constituency in Lebanon.

The success of this channel should come as no surprise, as many members of Al-Mahatta’s team are either originally from or still affiliated with Al Akhbar—a Beirut-based, daily leftist Arabic newspaper widely regarded as a mouthpiece for Hezbollah. Despite Al-Mahatta’s attempts to present itself as a novelty in the Lebanese media landscape, employing a rhetorical claim of “independent, but not neutral” journalism and utilizing YouTube—a popular platform for political commentary in the Arab world—the familiar language and recurring themes clearly demonstrate that Al-Mahatta’s coverage is nothing more than an audiovisual extension of Al Akhbar’s agenda.

The Origins and Agenda of Al-Mahatta

To better understand Al-Mahatta, it is necessary to explore its precursor, Al Akhbar.

Conceived in the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, it was emerged out of an alliance between the Lebanese left and Hezbollah (and its allies) in opposition to the neoliberal economic policies initially championed by the late Lebanese former prime minister Rafik Hariri in the 1990s. To this day, it unabashedly articulates resistance against Israel and holds an anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal stance, particularly against U.S. policies in the Middle East.

Although Al Akhbar maintained a certain degree of intellectual left-wing independence during its early years, it gradually veered towards becoming a full-fledged platform for Hezbollah’s rhetoric. While there are currently multiple left-leaning trends present in Lebanon, the paper undeniably promotes a particular form of radical leftist discourse that aligns closely with Hezbollah’s present-day political and economic aspirations. So apparent is this dynamic that, for some, Al Akhbar serves as a prominent example of how Hezbollah successfully hijacked the Lebanese Left, appropriating its anti-neoliberal and long-standing anti-Israel discourse. More recently, however, the newspaper has experienced a rapid decline in popularity and revolutionary appeal due to its stance against the 2011 Syrian uprising and its opposition to the 2019 October mass protests in Lebanon.

It is from this intellectual and journalistic milieu that Al-Mahatta originates. Among its listed five founding members, the outlet’s two principal and most productive founders appear to be the Lebanese journalists Radwan Mortada and Hasan Illaik. Both come from Al Akhbar, and were among the early recruits during the newspaper’s beginnings. Specializing in security and judiciary affairs, they are experienced and crafty in their reporting on such matters. Both are also considered to be early apprentices of Al Akhbar’s editor-in-chief, Ibrahim al-Amin, who is known for his close ties and access to Hezbollah’s senior leadership and Syria-aligned intelligence networks in Lebanon.

The pair appear determined to carry on Al Akhbar’s legacy. They replicate and refine the newspaper’s approach via Al-Mahatta by focusing on a series of key topics that primarily serve Hezbollah’s geopolitical and strategic interests in Lebanon and the wider region. Moreover, whether criticizing Hezbollah’s political opponents, the Lebanese security apparatus, the judiciary, or the media within Lebanon, a consistent aspect of Al-Mahatta’s coverage has been a strong rebuke of U.S. policies in the country. They accuse Washington of seeking to exert significant influence over Lebanon's military, judiciary, financial sector, and media—a clear reflection of Al Akhbar’s anti-U.S. editorial agenda.

It is worth examining more closely the specific topics that Al-Mahatta’s focuses on: Lebanon’s Military/Security Institutions, Lebanon’s Judiciary, and the U.S.-brokered Maritime Border Agreement between Israel and Lebanon.

Military/Security Institutions

Attacks by Al-Mahatta’s team on Lebanese military and security institutions and its members are not only frequent but a cross-cutting issue across the outlet’s coverage. This happens concurrent with promotional content that serves Hezbollah’s preferred narrative, while also highlighting and vilifying the fact that Lebanon’s military and security institutions and members receive financial support from the United States.

For instance, a recent and recurring key target of criticism, primarily as part of a series billed as “the presidential election battle” (as the country’s presidential election race is ongoing), has been the Commander General of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun. Until recently, Aoun figured among the leading candidates for the Lebanese presidency, yet has been perceived by Hezbollah to be backed by the United States. He has been accused by Al-Mahatta of privileging U.S. foreign policy priorities and interests in Lebanon.

Another example is found in the series titled “The Files of Spies,” which consists of the interrogation records of Lebanese individuals suspected of spying for Israel. While this may contribute to Hezbollah’s information warfare, it also strongly critiques the Lebanese military judiciary’s handling of these spying cases. In one episode, Radwan Mortada describes the military judiciary approach as very lenient, further likening its processing of such cases to normalization with Israel.

Next, there is the series titled “The Series of Lebanese State Security,” which is nominally dedicated to exposing alleged corrupt practices involving the Lebanese State Security forces. So far, this series only consists of a few episodes, but the tone is largely accusatory and the reporting is generalized—certain facts may prove to be more complicated, beyond episodic incidents. In one episode, Mortada, who hosts the series, claims that he was asked by the security forces to report on and highlight their achievements as a national institution, instead of focusing on alleged improprieties, but he refused the offer.

Almost as consistently, Hasan Illaik in several episodes accuses the military and security high leadership in Lebanon of serving a U.S. agenda by allowing its members to receive financial aid from the United States. In some episodes, an apologetic tone is adopted toward the medium- and low-ranking staff, proposing that it is not their fault they receive foreign financial assistance but their leadership’s.

Army officials are also targeted in other series and episodes, such as the series “The Investigation Proceedings of the Beirut Port Explosion,”  which places the primary responsibility for said explosion on army officials, including and chiefly Aoun. This conveniently runs counter to any accusations about Hezbollah’s possible involvement in the tragedy; Illaik further claims that the United States is protecting army officials in connection with the matter.

The Judiciary

Criticism toward the Lebanese judiciary is also frequent, except for a few judges who are believed to be biased towards Hezbollah. There are often accusations that many members of the judiciary, including the judicial police, are funded and controlled by the United States.

This is most evident in the series “The Investigation Proceedings of the Beirut Port Explosion,” where Judge Tarek Bitar, who recently led the investigation and pressed charges against politicians aligned with Hezbollah, faces the most criticism and accusations of political bias.

Another instance is the series “The Corruption of Riad Salameh and Banks.”  Here, Al-Mahatta’s team reports on the alleged corrupt activities of Riad Salameh, the governor of Lebanon's Central Bank, and Lebanese banks. They also highlight ongoing domestic or European investigations related to these matters. The entire judiciary, including key members, is criticized for failing to prosecute Salameh and the major shareholders of the banks involved.

On a broader level, the primary target of these rebukes is the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Dorothy C. Shea. She is often accused of orchestrating plots in the investigation of the Beirut port explosion and in Salameh’s case for political purposes. Al-Mahatta alleges that she influenced Bitar and other judiciary members to act in certain ways. While Bitar and even Aoun are portrayed as having close ties to Washington and benefiting from its support and protection, Salameh is accused of being nothing more than an American spy.

The Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement

A series of episodes focused on a notable story: the U.S.-brokered maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the negotiations between the two, Illaik produced numerous episodes that clearly propagated Hezbollah’s perspective on the developments while ridiculing the narratives of other participants, including the Israelis, the United States, and even Lebanese political opponents who were accused of aligning with Israeli and American interests.

In a highly propagandistic manner, here again, the agreement was framed as a victory for Hezbollah, with significant disparagement of the United States’ involvement in the mediation process. For instance, the U.S. government was depicted as not being genuinely committed to reaching an agreement since the beginning of negotiations in 2010, as it had failed to demand either the disarmament of Hezbollah as a political price or to protect Lebanon's southern territorial borders and its rights for gas exploration as a geographical price.

Some episodes seemed to serve psychological warfare purposes, often employing militaristic terms. For instance, Illaik described a “progressive accumulation of strength” on Hezbollah’s side, potentially becoming the decisive factor in the ongoing negotiations. In other episodes, militarism was highlighted, such as when Illaik mentioned that Hezbollah members were instructed not to travel to Iraq for the Shiite “Arbaeen” ceremony, which marks the end of a forty-day mourning period for the slaying of Imam Hussein, indicating anticipation of a potential war with Israel. Additionally, one episode focused on Hezbollah’s deployment of drones over the disputed territory between Israel and Lebanon, portraying it as both a logistical and political tool to defend Lebanon’s national wealth.

In what seemed to be a concluding episode following the agreement reached in October 2022, Illaik addressed critics and skeptics who portrayed the deal as Lebanon’s recognition of the state of Israel. In response, Illaik engaged in a semantic debate about the political and legal meaning of the agreement. In this segment, rehearsed rhetoric was used to emphasize that the outcome between Israel and Lebanon was not a bilateral agreement but rather an exchange of documents in accordance with the terms outlined in the U.S.-brokered memorandum.

A Malicious Actor

While journalism plays a vital role in ensuring independent oversight of national institutions by exposing political bias, corruption, or abuses of power, Al-Mahatta’s targeting of Lebanon’s national institutions, including the security and judiciary sectors, while simultaneously engaging in pro-Hezbollah propaganda, does not seem to serve such a purpose. On the contrary, it appears to be a malicious media campaign aimed at tarnishing the image of state institutions in Lebanon.

By producing materials that heavily demonize the Lebanese military and security apparatus while promoting a pro-Hezbollah geopolitical and security narrative, Al-Mahatta seeks to portray Hezbollah’s moral superiority within the complex security dynamics in Lebanon, which involve the coexistence between Hezbollah, the LAF, and Lebanese security forces. Policymakers in both Beirut and the West ought to consider what such propaganda campaigns masking as “alternative” news outlets can mean for policymaking.

Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor’s degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden.

Image: Al-Mahatta/Youtube.

In the lead-up to this week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, there has been renewed debate about the strategic wisdom of offering Ukraine membership in NATO. Proponents of an accelerated path to membership rightly argue that Kyiv deserves robust international support in its brave resistance to Russia’s aggression. As such, they argue that Ukraine’s efforts to defend its territory have earned it a place in NATO. Vocal NATO allies in Eastern Europe have proclaimed their desire to extend a concrete Membership Action Plan to Ukraine, placing it on a path to eventually joining the alliance. Some would exempt Ukraine from that process altogether. Former U.S. congressman Tom Malinowski recently argued that Ukraine should just be granted membership in NATO without any further delay, despite admitting that such a course could easily lead to the alliance becoming an active belligerent in the war. A full-scale Russia-NATO war, Malinowski allowed, “is a serious and legitimate concern, especially since it is in the nature of an active conflict to expand unpredictably.” Nevertheless, in the interest of delivering a decisive defeat to Russia, and definitively welcoming a democratic Ukraine into the West, Malinowski and others apparently expect all current NATO members to go along.

They won’t. These debates are a waste of time. There are myriad practical, political, and strategic reasons why Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO. Worse than mere self-delusion, however, this performative debate diverts attention from the real and urgent imperative of ending the conflict in Ukraine, including through negotiations that could produce an armistice or ceasefire. A futile discussion about Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO membership makes Ukraine less secure by delaying and distracting from a discussion of concrete medium- and long-term steps to end the conflict and, after the killing stops, ensure that Russia doesn’t restart the war.

Why Can’t Ukraine Join NATO?

First, simply put, Ukraine doesn’t have the votes, and it won’t get them. While current NATO members are almost universally sympathetic to Ukraine’s plight and fully supportive of its efforts to defend and restore its territory, they will not unanimously support its accession to NATO—and unanimity is required, as Sweden’s case reminds us. This political reality has been well understood ever since the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, when then-President George W. Bush pressed NATO to make a rhetorical commitment to Ukraine and Georgia eventually joining the alliance, despite clear indications that their bids for membership lacked support among key NATO members.

The reticence around admitting Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance in 2008 was based on the rational assumption that Russia would react harshly to NATO’s further enlargement to the east. Those who objected to the Bush administration’s 11th hour push for Ukrainian and Georgian membership pointed to Russia’s vehement objections to NATO positioning additional forces on its border. At the time, advocates for NATO expansion dismissed such concerns, arguing that because Moscow had acquiesced to previous rounds of enlargement, it would do so again.

Optimistic assumptions about Russia’s tolerance for Ukraine moving into NATO have been definitively and tragically disproved in eastern Ukraine during the last sixteen months. More realistic expectations about Russia’s genuine hostility to the alliance’s enlargement have been borne out. Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia, mere months after NATO’s declaration in Bucharest, was intended, as Michael Kofman explained, “to teach the West a lesson about Russia’s ability to veto further NATO expansion eastward.” With respect to Ukraine, the direct warning signs were apparent at least since 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and initiated a proxy war in the Donbass region. Ukraine’s deepening cooperation with NATO since that year continues to be one of Russia’s stated motivations for the current conflict, and for its attempt to use coercive diplomacy against both NATO and Ukraine prior to its invasion. Assuming that some NATO members would still prefer to prevent a wider war with Russia, Ukraine won’t get the unanimous vote it needs to join the alliance.

Additionally, Ukraine may not meet the standards for membership. In 1995, NATO published a study on the implications of possible enlargement, which it pursued with the stated aim of establishing “increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines.” As part of this study, NATO established a number of minimum standards for prospective members, including: “a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.”

While Ukraine’s fulfillment of these criteria clearly remains debatable, the 1995 Study on Enlargement identified another arguably critical consideration to address Malinowski’s “serious and legitimate concern” about the risk of enlargement leading NATO into a war: “States which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.”

Previous concerns about Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO membership grew out of Ukraine’s difficulties with corruption and good governance, internal jurisdictional disputes with largely ethnic-Russian Ukrainian separatists (supported by Russia) in the Donbass and Crimea, and the failure to resolve these conflicts in accordance with the OSCE process. The existence of an ongoing conflict over Ukrainian territory, with shifting lines of control and disputed borders, only complicates the picture and raises serious doubts about the political feasibility and strategic rationality of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Additionally, Ukraine’s government will have an irredentist political mandate for as long as Russian forces occupy any square inch of Ukrainian territory. For NATO, a defensive military pact, admitting a country with an ongoing war immediately risks dragging all alliance members into it. So again, as long as NATO’s goal is to deter a wider war with Russia, Ukraine won’t be permitted to join the alliance.

For those who still struggle to understand why Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO, it may be helpful to reframe the question: “Will all NATO members unanimously vote to go to war with Russia over Ukraine?” The answer should be obvious: “No.”

Consider this: while many (though not all) NATO members are providing material support to Ukraine in its fight to expel the Russian invaders, none—not a single country in the alliance—currently has overtly deployed their armed forces to help Ukraine.

In fact, NATO members have scrupulously avoided activities that would bring them into a direct fight with Russian forces. Even early attempts to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine, which would have exposed NATO pilots to grave risk, but would not have involved troops on the ground, were roundly rejected by every member. As President Joe Biden explained before the war began, and has reiterated since, any actions that bring NATO and Russian forces into direct conflict would constitute World War III, with a significant risk of escalation to nuclear use.

All NATO members have wisely sought to avoid this outcome—so far successfully, though the continued provision of aid also carries with it the risk of escalation, including through inadvertent strikes on NATO states neighboring Ukraine. Recall, for example, the incident in November 2022, when an errant Ukrainian air defense missile tragically killed two farmers in Poland. In the few short hours before the details became known, some speculated that it could be a casus belli for invoking Article 5, and called for dramatically increasing the military presence along the Polish border (including a “no-fly zone manned by NATO jets”), even if the deaths had been caused by “an inadvertent Russian weapon.”  Others were quick to assume that “Russia [was] to blame for the deaths…of two Poles.” This is precisely how small-scale tragedies can become catastrophic global conflicts, and serves as a stark reminder that even the current strategy carries significant risks.

Those still stubbornly seeking to move forward with Ukraine’s Membership Action Plan, or seeking to waive the normal process and requirements altogether, are threatening NATO’s political cohesion by forcing an unnecessary and unhelpful confrontation over one of the alliance’s most divisive issues. Those who would downplay the implications of admitting Ukraine to NATO should reconsider their narrative that an Article 5 commitment to Ukraine would not commit the United States to war with Russia. Even if it’s true that Article 5 does not actually obligate any member to go to war, how reassuring is that argument for current NATO members, who, unlike the United States, would actually be on the frontlines of a war that spills beyond Ukraine’s borders?

This war is tragic and devastating for Ukraine—that is the most important point. It is also bad for the United States, creating a heightened risk of escalation, straining finite defense funding and production capacity, and diverting resources from other priorities, including the Pacific theater and overdue investments at home. It is also bad for the global economy, contributing to high energy costs and rising food prices, and complicating an already-dire debt crisis in developing countries. U.S. policy should be focused on bringing the war to an end as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the debate over Ukraine’s membership in NATO only sustains one of Russia’s stated motivations for launching its war of aggression, and undermines the cohesion of the alliance.

It’s time for NATO leaders to stop misleading Ukraine’s government and the American public about Ukraine’s prospects for membership in the alliance, and to get serious about ending the conflict as a first step toward NATO’s goal of “increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area.” Whatever security guarantees are discussed as part of any eventual negotiation, they will not—and should not—come from NATO.

Christopher Preble is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.

James Siebens is a Fellow of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center.

Image: Shutterstock.