Diplomacy & Crisis News

Changes to the platform have systematically amplified authoritarian state propaganda.

Modi’s party is intent on demonizing Nehru, the country’s first prime minister. A new book adds nuance to the debate.

Thousands of people worldwide were forced from their homes this week to escape deadly environmental disasters.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, President Obama’s first Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, famously said the quiet part out loud: “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” More recently, self-appointed masters of the universe, such as World Economic Forum chairman Klaus Schwab used the COVID pandemic to justify a so-called “Great Reset” of capitalism “to revamp all aspects of our societies and economies.”

Also sensing a moment to capitalize on a crisis, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has proposed his own plan to enhance the power of the United Nations greatly and, not so coincidentally, the power of the secretary-general.

As Guterres argues, recent crises “have challenged our international institutions,” and the Summit of the Future, where he will present the details of his plan to world governments, is a “once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance.”

Guterres unveiled the contours of his plan in a series of meetings and policy briefs, some still forthcoming. There are eleven such briefs underway, covering topics ranging from “Future Generations” to “Outer Space” to “Beyond Gross Domestic Product” to a “Global Digital Compact” to “Transforming Education” to “United Nations 2.0.”

This so-called “Pact of the Future” represents a stunning attempted power grab by the secretary-general. These proposals raise serious concerns and objections from the U.S. and other governments that value their sovereignty and that question the wisdom of granting more authority to international bureaucrats and establishing new supra-national rules and institutions that might dramatically impact the U.S. and its future interests.

Among the most concerning policy briefs is one that would grant Guterres authority to “convene and operate an Emergency Platform in the event of complex global crises,” whether that be another pandemic, an environmental crisis, disruptions in global flows of goods, people, or finance, or some other “black swan” event.

Under the proposal, Guterres would be granted “standing authority to convene and operationalize automatically an Emergency Platform” with minimal consultation from governments. Specifically, he would consult in advance the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council, relevant national authorities, regional organizations, and other relevant UN agencies and other multilateral institutions “that have been mandated by Member States to respond to sector-specific crises.” There is no requirement to consult with all governments. In other words, the UN could take important decisions without input from the U.S.

The purpose of the Emergency Platform is to “overcome obstacles and bottlenecks to an effective response”—i.e., the reluctance of governments to heed the dictates of the UN Unsurprisingly, the proposal specifies that “Any response mechanism must ensure that participating actors make clear commitments [such as financial or technical resources or a significant policy shift] that directly and immediately support the global response to a complex shock... Participants would need to accept accountability for delivering on these commitments.”

Indeed, the structure—where Guterres would invite international organizations, experts, academics, and non-governmental organizations to participate alongside governments—seems designed to diminish the authority of national governments and pressure them into cooperation with their decrees.

Rest assured that Guterres and future UN secretaries-general will utilize this authority. If you take the UN's word, the migrant, climate, poverty, and debt crises demand urgent attention. Although the “Emergency Platform should initially be convened for a finite period to respond to a specific shock... the Secretary-General could extend the work of an Emergency Platform if required.” Emergency powers are hard to give up once grasped.

But the policy briefs also proffer ideas beyond this that should trouble Americans.

For instance, the policy brief on information integrity calls for developing a “United Nations Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms that would provide a blueprint for bolstering information integrity while vigorously upholding human rights.” Examples cited of information where integrity has faltered include misinformation and disinformation during the COVID pandemic, “climate denialist content,” and hate speech.

Of course, Americans have seen firsthand how efforts to repress “disinformation” and “misinformation” instead are misused to silence opposing opinions and repress inconvenient evidence, as seen with the Chinese lab leak theory on the origin of COVID. Moreover, countries like China and Russia are eager to censor content and will be delighted to use the UN to extend domestic repression internationally. It is hard to see any UN Code that would not run roughshod over the First Amendment.

Another policy brief suggests reshaping the international financial architecture to increase investment in “global public goods” like climate action, update the international tax architecture, and make the system more “inclusive, representative and, ultimately, more effective global economic governance.” Developing countries have long clamored for developed nations to provide more assistance, and liberals have long desired global taxes to finance their environmental efforts. This policy brief seems designed to facilitate those objectives.

These are still notional proposals by the secretary-general. The granular details have not been fleshed out. While the Pact will not possess legal force, it will create political pressures on future U.S. presidential administrations. The overarching goal is to aggregate power to the UN and the secretary-general and away from the Member States. If all goes according to plan, this effort will culminate with all the world’s governments endorsing the “Pact of the Future” in September 2024.

As reported by The Federalist, the Biden administration has expressed support for the effort, apparently content to subject the American people to the whims of the secretary-general. This is entirely misguided. The President should instead be defending their sovereignty from this naked power grab.

Brett D. Schaefer is the Heritage Foundation’s Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs.

Steven Groves is the Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Fellow, concentrating on issues that threaten to undermine American sovereignty, self-governance, and independence.

Image: Shutterstock. 

This article expresses my understanding of the viewpoints regarding the U.S. deterrence strategy over potential Taiwan Strait conflicts, made by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Mark Milley, on June 30, 2023. By examining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) principle of unification with Taiwan in the context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and explaining why the continuation of implementing this historical mission is unstoppable in the new era, I attempt to argue that relying solely on deterrence to stop Xi Jinping’s ambition would be imprudent and could even jeopardize U.S. national security although the deterrence strategy influences China’s decision-making process. I hope that the three parties, the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States, will reevaluate their strategies and adopt the right approach to promote peaceful triangular relations.

When Milley gave a speech at a National Press Club event in Washington on June 30, 2023, he commented on Xi’s stance on Taiwan. According to Milley, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Xi has made a firm decision on ordering a military unification with Taiwan by 2027, but the decisionmaking process is still underway. Milley suggested the United States and its allies build up deterrence to ensure that every single day Xi wakes up and says today is not that day, and that decision never comes.

It is understandable when Milley emphasizes the significance of a deterrence strategy in influencing China’s decision-making process based on the historical experience of U.S. foreign policy and implementation. However, it would be imprudent and could even jeopardize U.S. national security if the policymakers believe that the deterrence strategy alone could change Xi’s determination to fulfill China’s historical mission of reunification of Taiwan in the context of China and the vision of the CCP.

The reunification of Taiwan is not Xi’s personal idea, but a longstanding principle upheld by all top leaders of the CCP. The founding father of the PRC, Mao Zedong, made it clear that Taiwan is part of China and pointed out that “Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs.” Mao declared that the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression or interference in our internal affairs because China does not fear its enemies. According to him, enemies are like flies: “On this tiny globe, a few flies dash themselves against the wall.” Mao tried to take over Taiwan several times by force, but unfortunately, he failed due to various factors, such as the ripple effects of the Cold War, the failure experience during the Taiwan Strait crises during 1954 and 1958, the interruption of the Cultural Revolution, the changing attitudes of the Taiwanese people and the U.S. intervention.

Although Deng Xiaoping prioritized the development of the Chinese economy in the post-Mao era and set forth a low-profile strategy, he still felt urgent to fulfill unification so he developed a roadmap toward the reunification of Taiwan by proposing the framework of “one country, two systems.” Jiang Zemin insisted that One China is the fundamental principle of reunification which is an inevitable trend of Chinese history by proposing an eight-point proposition for China’s reunification of Taiwan. Hu Jintao confirmed that China will continue to adhere to the One-China principle and firmly opposed any form of Taiwan independence and any attempts to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Meanwhile, he urged unification with Taiwan. Despite that the PRC firmly insisted on the reunification of Taiwan, it still adopted a more pragmatic and flexible approach to the Taiwan issue under before the Xi administration.

It is not surprising that Xi has been taking a tougher stance on Taiwan as China has become the world’s second-largest economy because foreign policy always reflects national comprehensive power. Xi has promised that China must be and will be reunified and asserted that the problem of Taiwan cannot be passed on from generation to generation. He also warned that China makes no promise to renounce the use of force and reserves the option of taking all necessary measures to achieve the reunification of China. Yet, Xi’s view on unification with Taiwan is essentially the same as all his predecessors. Since the inception of the PRC, all of the five top CCP leaders uphold the One-China Principle as they believe that Taiwan is an integral part of China; they firmly reject any form of Taiwan independence; they vow to safeguard national sovereignty including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; they believe the reunification of Taiwan is an inevitable outcome and a historical trend; and they express a commitment to achieving reunification as an important aspect of maintaining national unity.

Each leader’s viewpoints have unavoidably been influenced by their respective historical contexts and the evolving circumstances of the global community, so their viewpoints toward Taiwan’s reunification have varied over time in their emphasis, approach, and specific policies. While all five top CCP leaders express the goal of reunification, Deng, Jiang, and Hu, placed a stronger emphasis on peaceful means of achieving reunification, highlighting the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Mao and Xi, on the other hand, have a more assertive policy and practice, and they do not explicitly prioritize peaceful reunification. Each leader has pursued their own approach toward Taiwan’s reunification. Deng and Jiang advocated for the framework of “One Country, Two Systems,” which was implemented in Hong Kong and Macau, as a model for future reunification with Taiwan. Hu emphasized the importance of deepening exchanges and cooperation between the mainland and Taiwan, particularly in economic and cultural areas. Xi has emphasized the concept of the “China Dream“ as a broader framework for reunification. However, none of the five leaders explicitly renounced the option of unification by force.

Therefore, the unification task is the PRC’s consistent ideology and has become the untouchable foundation of the PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The CCP won’t change its historical mission of unification with Taiwan. The CCP sees unification as a matter of national pride and a symbol of China’s unity, an opportunity for increased economic integration and development, and a means to preserve and strengthen the Chinese nation’s unity and cultural heritage. If the CCP gave up the principle, it would lose its ruling party’s legitimacy and authority of governance.

Undoubtedly, Xi’s tougher stance on Taiwan is not only driven by the CCP principle but also motivated by his personal ambition. He must have had a specific plan when he revised China’s constitution to make it possible for him to stay in power without term limits. Evidently, as Mao’s faithful disciple, he hopes to achieve what his predecessors failed to do—the unification with Taiwan and cement his place as a remarkable person in China’s history. The catchword “China dream” is the iconic mark of Xi’s worldview and reflects his ambition to make China a global power that can rival and surpass the United States. According to Xi, the China Dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that requires the reunification of greater China.

China’s global expansion is the external aspect of the China Dream. Xi envisions that the goal of unification with Taiwan could inspire the Chinese people, leading toward the future under the sole leadership of the CCP. A unified China would bolster China’s international standing and fortify its geopolitical position in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically by overcoming the obstacles posed by the first island chain—an area within which Taiwan holds immense strategic significance. Unification would help China improve its access to the Pacific Ocean, heighten its control over this crucial maritime zone, advance its ability to extend its military influence beyond the first island chain, secure its influence over vital resources and trade routes, safeguard its economic interests, and minimize potential vulnerabilities within the first island chain. Ultimately, China will attain a balanced distribution of power with the United States in both the Eastern and Western spheres.

It is noteworthy that the determination of unification with Taiwan does not only represent the interests of the CCP but also represents the will of the Chinese people. First of all, the common will of unification is due not only to patriotic nationalism but also arises from traditional Chinese culture—the idea of great harmony between individuals, nature, and human society. Mencius said that harmonious human relations are more important than good opportunities granted by Heaven and favorable geographic position (天时不如地利，地利不如人和). From Mencius’s idea to Dong Zhongzhu’s theory of the “interaction of heaven and People” (天人感应) to Zhu Xi’s theory of “unity of heaven and man unity” (天人合一), and to Sun Yat-sen’s harmonious world, 大同世界, the idea of the union of heaven and individuals is one of the basic principles of Confucianism-based Chinese traditional culture—traditional Chinese concept of all-under-heaven. The objective of a harmonious China and a harmonious world (大同世界) has been pursued by Chinese philosophers and politicians from ancient to communist China. The Chinese people believe that unification with Taiwan is the implementation of traditional Chinese culture, so the majority of the Chinese people will not relinquish this mission under any circumstance. Xi’s blueprint for building a community of shared future for mankind (建立人类命运共同体) or China Dream (中国梦) is a continuation of the concept of all-under-heaven.

Second, public opinion in China supports the idea of unification. According to a study conducted by Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li, although public opinions toward the unification with Taiwan are mixed, 55 percent of the respondents supported “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely,” while 33 percent opposed it and 12 percent were unsure. According to another online survey in China published in ThinkChina and Taiwan Inside, 53.1 percent supported armed unification with Taiwan, while 39.19 percent opposed it among Chinese elites. This shows that the CCP’s principle of unification with Taiwan has a broad popular base.

Apparently, unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP and the Chinese people. If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission and betraying his own promise. In addition, he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP and among the Chinese people, lose credibility and legitimacy as a leader who can defend China’s national interests and dignity against external pressures and challenges, and face criticism, opposition, or even a coup from within the party or the military. More seriously, he would also risk provoking social unrest or nationalist backlash from the public, who have been indoctrinated with patriotic education and propaganda for decades. Xi’s legitimacy has been largely based on the unification with Taiwan since the 20th National Congress of the CCP. Therefore, he cannot afford to give up his historical unification task voluntarily.

While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider its actions and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction.

The CCP may postpone the implementation of the unification mission under certain circumstances: Significant shifts in the regional or global landscape might prompt a reassessment of priorities. Substantial domestic opposition to the unification task or mounting international pressure could compel a leader to reconsider their top priority. The potential Chinese domestic political fallout may lead to backlash from factions or interest groups within China. A change in the CCP’s political ideology can also influence a leader’s position on the unification task. A significant shift in public attitudes toward the unification task has the potential to influence a leader’s decisionmaking process and could also create opportunities for alternative arrangements and potentially reduce the urgency of pursuing reunification through military force. Nevertheless, all these hypothetical conditions are highly unlikely to occur under any CCP administration.

Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later. While Xi has not ruled out the use of force, he has also expressed his preference for peaceful reunification based on the One-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Is it possible for the PRC to reach the goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus? Reality shows that since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s, Taiwanese people’s minds are getting farther and farther away from the PRC.

In a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2020, the majority of Taiwanese hold a negative view of China, and about 66 percent of Taiwanese people identify solely as Taiwanese. The numbers of Taiwanese who hold a negative view of China continue to grow and about 90 percent of Taiwanese identify themselves as “Taiwanese” according to a survey in 2021. Although more than 90 percent of Taiwanese originally came from mainland China, they are now embracing an identity that is distinct from the PRC. The Taiwanese people’s desire for unification with China fell further to a near-record low in 2022, and only 1.3 percent of respondents wanted unification with China as soon as possible.

Taiwanese public opinions will drive the Taiwanese government to make tougher policies toward the PRC, but it could also drive nationalism in the mainland to run higher and create more difficulties for the PRC to fulfill a peaceful reunification. This suggests that the window of peaceful reunification is closing. Twenty years ago, in my book Remaking China’s Public Philosophy for the Twenty-first Century, I posited that reshaping China’s political institutions through the transformation of its public philosophy would be the most effective means to address the potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits. However, it has now become a distant possibility.

Thus, a critical question remains: is it more advantageous for China to achieve early reunification with Taiwan? Or is it more advantageous for China to achieve reunification with Taiwan later? With the intensification of competition between China and the United States and the gradual deterioration of China’s international situation, it is increasingly preferable for China to unify Taiwan earlier rather than later.

Under Xi’s regime, China has been promoting the process of military modernization at unprecedented speed and preparing for an armed occupation of Taiwan on a massive scale. China has upgraded its missile bases and deployed a new hypersonic missile along the mainland’s eastern coast, which could target Taiwan and U.S. bases in the region. China has been conducting large military exercises near Taiwan, simulating amphibious landings, air assaults, and missile attacks, as well as crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which had been a tacit boundary for decades. The United States has recognized that China’s military has reached or is approaching the ability to take over Taiwan.

Most recently, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded testing and evaluation of its weapons systems to simulate a total war waged on a global scale, especially with the United States. This is another example indicating that China is speedily preparing for the worst-case scenario—reunification with Taiwan by military force. On July 6, 2023, the same day that the U.S. secretary of treasury, Janet Yellen, arrived in Beijing, Xi inspected Eastern Theatre Command, the branch central to keeping up cross-strait pressure on Taiwan, saying that the PLA must deepen its planning on war and combat and improve its ability to win any war. This sent a signal to the United States that the reunification of Taiwan is China’s core interest. The PRC is approaching the verge of reunifying Taiwan by military force to fulfill the CCP’s historical mission of the reunification of Taiwan and Xi’s global ambitions.

For now, it is hard to precisely assess if China could win a war with Taiwan; yet, it is certain that U.S. deterrence strategy is based on the idea that the United States can prevent China from using military force against Taiwan by making the costs of such action outweigh the benefits, and by signaling the U.S. commitment and capability to defend its interests and allies in the region. It is also clear that U.S. deterrence strategy is built upon assumptions that underestimate China’s resolve and ambition to achieve its national goal of unification with Taiwan.

Even assuming that the United States did not overestimate its ability and willingness to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, the Taiwan Relations Act does not explicitly guarantee U.S. military intervention in the event of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan by force. Even if the United States ends up getting involved in a possible war across the Taiwan Strait, the initial defense will rely on Taiwan’s own military capabilities and the Taiwanese people’s determination to counter Chinese military actions. However, the Taiwanese government and its people are far from fully prepared to defend the island. According to a survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation in 2022, about 51.5 percent of Taiwanese lack confidence in the country’s defense capacity and their government’s ability to deter possible Chinese military action. Taiwan’s politics are divided along pro-independence and pro-unification lines, making it difficult for the government to mobilize public support and allocate resources for island defense. Most Taiwanese prefer to maintain the current status quo to avoid provoking China or engaging in a military conflict over sovereignty. Instead of making a commitment to defend their territory, most Taiwanese people have a huge hope to rely on external support, particularly from the United States in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait.

As a result, Taiwan’s military lags behind China’s military buildup and faces shortages in personnel and equipment, along with low availability rates and obsolescence of certain platforms, which adversely affect training and readiness. Under the current conscription system, all qualified male citizens of military age are only required to perform either 1 year of active-duty military service or receive 4 months of military training. Clearly, this system does not meet the needs of the Taiwanese defense. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen announced a plan to extend the compulsory conscription program but received backlash from younger Taiwanese. U.S. deterrence strategy without sufficient Taiwanese military capability and determination of Taiwanese people would lose its solid foundation.

Conclusion

After tracing the historical context and evolution of the CCP’s stance on Taiwan, exploring the consistent ideology and principles of the CCP, delving into Xi’s personal ambition and plan, and discussing the differences of people’s attitudes in Taiwan and the PRC toward the “unification,” it is apparent that peaceful reunification is increasingly unlikely. Considering Xi’s efforts to maintain his legitimacy for a possible life-long tenure, the reasons stated above, and the current domestic problems and international pressures facing China, it is likely that Beijing will act early against Taiwan. The secret meetings held between former senior U.S. national security officials and prominent Russians, allegedly aiming to lay “the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine,” could even further encourage China to speed up the unification of Taiwan. The PRC will use force to ultimately solve the Taiwan issue if it does not have any other feasible options. It is wishful thinking if the United States believes it can only rely on a deterrence strategy to stop the process of the PRC’s unification with Taiwan. In fact, U.S. deterrence strategy lacks solid ground based on the reality of Taiwan’s preparation regardless of the actual preparation of the U.S. side. While developing a comprehensive strategy toward China, it is imperative to understand the CCP’s intentions and objectives in the Chinese way in the Chinese context.

Dr. Jinghao Zhou is an associate professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. His research focuses on Chinese ideology, politics, religion, and U.S.- China relations. He has published dozens of journal and news articles and six books. His latest book is Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China-U.S. Relations (2023).

Image: Shutterstock.

At the recent NATO summit in Vilnius, world leaders expressed concern over Russia’s nuclear posture and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, given the ongoing conflict between Russia and Western-backed Ukraine. Yet the international community also ought to pay attention to equally-as-important developments in the Indian subcontinent. A recent speech by Pakistan’s Lt. General Khalid Kidwai has sent shockwaves across the region, potentially signaling that Islamabad may have just changed its own nuclear doctrine, and not for the better.

If implemented, these changes could be highly destabilizing not just for the region, but also for the rest of the world. Washington ought to take notice and consider this development will affect its Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Nuclear “Horizontal” and “Vertical”

Kidwai’s speech, delivered on the 25th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, matters for two major reasons.

The first reason is that it came from Kidwai himself. As the former head of the Strategic Plans Division—which administers all policies and strategies regarding Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs—and an adviser to the country’s National Command Authority, Kidwai is one of Pakistan’s most senior and decorated generals. He has been described as the mastermind behind Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines, and “the architect” of the country’s nuclear energy program. He is, in effect, the foremost author and authority on Pakistan’s nuclear strategy.

The second reason is what Kidwai actually said in his speech. In reiterating Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy, Kidwai described the country’s ongoing efforts to ensure “full spectrum deterrence” (FSD), supported by a nuclear triad of land, air, and sea-based capabilities. This, in short, is Pakistan’s policy of having sufficient capabilities to able to respond to a wide range of threats—presumably originating from India.

Yet Kidwai went further, describing two dimensions of FSD: “horizontal,” which comprises of a robust tri-services inventory of a variety of nuclear weapons, and “vertical,” which encapsulates adequate range coverage of its vectors from “zero meters to 2,750 kilometers,” encapsulating “destructive yields suited for strategic, operational, and tactical levels.” Such an elaborate arsenal, he argued, provides Pakistan with a “strategic shield”, blunting the extant conventional asymmetry with India.

In other words, Kidwai is seemingly suggesting that Pakistan could or ought to develop short-range, potentially even front-line, nuclear weapons. These could include anything from nuclear artillery to even nuclear land mines.

“Zero Meters”

On one level, this proposed shift in nuclear doctrine, brazen as it may sound, is not out of the ordinary. Pakistan’s current doctrinal thinking and capability development are a result of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which it lost. The conflict casts a long shadow over the psyche of the Pakistan’s military, resulting in a mindset that perceives nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor for the security of the country. Thus, the Pakistani military aims to undermine India’s military superiority through rapid nuclear weapons deployment and posturing of shallow thresholds.

Yet an obvious and significant problem arises when Pakistan doctrinally attempts to leverage nuclear weapons, especially its battlefield nuclear weapons, to support a policy of cross border terrorism.

Kidwai first explained the value of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) when the country’s very short-range ballistic missile, Nasr, was first tested in April 2011. He said that it would “pour cold water over Cold Start”—a reference to India’s own punitive response doctrine. Though it has since been dismissed by Indian military leaders, New Delhi has nevertheless developed a carefully curated punitive retaliation strategy against Pakistani-sponsored terror attacks. This, in effect, has shown up the inefficacy of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. After all, of what use are TNWs as a deterrent if India can conduct careful retaliation attacks, far below the nuclear threshold, against Pakistani-supported terrorist attacks?

Nonetheless, Pakistan’s attraction for TNWs, or tactical nuclear responses in general, continues as a preventive deterrence measure, despite the growing asymmetry in conventional military capabilities between the two countries. In fact, Kidwai has now coined a new term called “zero meters.” While he has not explained its meaning, it has been interpreted to mean nuclear artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions, or nuclear land mines. Indeed, such TNWs—including naval cruise missiles carried on conventional submarines/ships, or shorter-range missiles—have generally existed since NATO deployed these weapons in Europe to deter the Soviet Union. Aping their strategy, Pakistan’s military command seems to believe that it can adroitly sequence warfighting into three neat levels, and that its variety of warheads and ranges of delivery systems would counter each move by India.

Yet as British historian and master strategist Lawrence David Freedman pointed out in the context of the NATO strategy, such matters would never unfold neatly, and TNWs could pose several substantial challenges. All this has been corroborated time and again via many wargames and exercises.

Courting Madness

India, for its part, has never accepted a step-by-step nuclear escalation ladder and instead pursues a doctrine of massive retaliation against any nuclear use, irrespective of how the first user describes the weapon or undertakes its use. It is astounding that Pakistani strategists believe that anything they do will be exempted from this doctrine.

The folly of this new Pakistani strategy is also being called out by Pakistani analysts. In a hard-hitting piece in Pakistan’s weekly Friday Times, Ejaz Haider, a prominent Pakistani journalist and commentator on defense issues, recounts classic nuclear deterrence literature to question how Kidwai’s “illogic of instability to create the logic of strategic stability” could even work. Sitara Noor, a prominent Pakistani nuclear analyst, enquired in Foreign Policy magazine that if the “strategic objective” of zero-range weapons is to deter a “newly perceived gap” after the conduct of surgical strikes by India, then how could they be used to country’s advantage? Irrespective of the logic driving such a strategy, she rightly finds it problematic for reasons of operational execution and regional stability.

It is heartening that Pakistani nuclear analysts are holding up a mirror to their misperceived nuclear doctrinal thinking anchored in the idea of “graduated warfighting.” Given the many unknowns that arise once a nuclear weapon, whatever it may be called, is used, the neat schema of nuclear use at every level that Kidwai seems to suggest is unlikely to play out as intended. This is dangerous and wholly destabilizing thinking in the extreme that could result in miscalculation and escalation.

It is worth considering the potential consequences of a deterrence breakdown and the resulting responses. “What” happens after a breakdown?

Not only would such a move prove suicidal for the first user, but it also would wreak widespread havoc on the region and beyond. It is the unconstrained effects of nuclear weapons that set them apart from even the greatest of all conventional bombs, and loose talk about them has been as much a taboo as their use or threat of use. Pakistan’s irresponsibility with its nuclear strategy could prove problematic well beyond its prime adversary.

In fact, it is ironic that Kidwai invoked Youm-e-Takbir, the day of greatness, to glorify the willingness of the Pakistani populace to accept deprivation for the sake of its nuclear weapons program. Even as his country is going through a period of unprecedented political and economic turmoil, even by its own standard, Kidwai seems to be, like Marie Antoinette’s apocryphal response, exhorting his countrymen to not despair for their lack of naans, but rejoice at the existence of nukes.

Concerns to Remember

Pakistan’s continued strategy of sub-conventional provocations and nuclear brinkmanship, to say nothing of its broader societal turmoil, are a shared concern for both India and the United States. In fact, the heavy military hand in Pakistan’s decisionmaking apparatus not only warps the democratic process but also tends to lean towards “first resort,” as highlighted by Ejaz Haider.

There are at least four major concerns regarding Pakistan that could have regional and even global implications, and should be viewed seriously.

First is the highly unstable political-economic environment within the country, including the possibility of social unrest spiraling out of control.

Second is the deep fissures within the Pakistan Army, as seen in the emergence of rival cliques of senior officers, which has with ripple effects through junior ranks. The tendency of the Army to periodically “rescue” the country from incapable democratic government was supported by a united military leadership. That does not seem to be the case any longer, which only grows as a cause for concern as the number of warheads grow, with a wide range of newer type of smaller and even more dispersed “nukes” joining the arsenal.

Third, current public outrage, especially in the Pakistani “heartland,” is unusual even for the seemingly Teflon-coated Pakistan Army. Consider the attack on May 9 on the Corps Commander’s house in the highly-protected Lahore garrison—this seems much more like a targeted attack than spontaneous outrage leading to more than a symbolic breaching of the walls.

Fourth, there is the role and influence of China in the proposed “0 to 2,750 km” nuclear strategy and arsenal. It is entirely possible that low-yield nuclear weapons for Pakistan’s naval platforms, especially the Chinese Yuan class submarines, are being produced. Technically, the challenge of warheads that fit into 533mm (21 inch) torpedo tubes is not insurmountable, and Beijing may have already helped resolve this. The plans and intent for a naval leg of nuclear deterrence are not new. But potentially nuclear naval cruise missiles carried in conventional submarines/ships/patrol aircraft could be highly destabilizing, since India does not see them as merely “tactical” or “operational.”

Pakistan Alone

With the kind of nuclear strategy Pakistan seems to be following, it is choosing to stand on the edge of the nuclear cliff. The “zero range” pronouncement may be perceived in the Strategic Plans Division as a major doctrinal shift, but it changes little for India. It remains important for New Delhi to assiduously continue to improve the efficacy and the survivability of its own triad. With a stated Indian strategy of retaliation to cause unacceptable damage, the trigger could be called anything by the adversary. The response, unfortunately, would be far more than zero for that country, the environment, the region, and the world.

Pakistan needs to reflect deeply on this misperceived notion of deterrence. As Haider wrote, such decisions “cannot be left to a few in a closed club.” Meanwhile, the words of U.S. president Joe Biden resonate: “I think (Pakistan) is maybe one of the most dangerous nations in the world…with nuclear weapons without any cohesion.”

Formulations like full-spectrum deterrence, buoyed by new weaponry, may seem cohesive to Rawalpindi. But that is not the case in either New Delhi nor Washington. Policymakers from both ought to make this clear to Pakistan’s military leadership.

Dr. Manpreet Sethi is a Distinguished Fellow at Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi, India.

Radm Sudarshan Shrikhande is a former head of Indian naval intelligence and is an adjunct professor at India’s Naval War College. He is also editor-in-chief of The Naval Dispatch.

Brig. Arun Sahgal is a retired brigadier of the Indian Army and a senior fellow at the Delhi Policy Group. He is also the Founding Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Indian Integrated Defense Staff.

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Integrating Kyiv into the Joint Expeditionary Force would help deter Moscow.

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In a somewhat surprising move, Turkey has decided to support the bid of Sweden to join NATO. Stockholm’s impending ascension will make it the 32nd country to join the transatlantic alliance.

Speaking on July 10, NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg announced that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had dropped (or at least put aside) his previous reservations and “agreed to forward the accession protocol for Sweden to the Grand National Assembly as soon as possible, and work closely with the Assembly to ensure ratification.” This news was unexpected by many, especially considering the fact that only several hours earlier Erdoğan was demanding EU membership for Turkey as a precondition for its support of Sweden’s NATO ascension.

Stockholm’s initial bid to join the alliance was put forward in May 2022 as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, Ankara was hesitant to back the Scandinavian country’s application due to the latter’s perceived failure to crack down on members of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party). Sweden has some of the most generous asylum laws in the EU and has accepted millions of refugees over the last several decades, including many Kurds. Ankara claims that some of these individuals have ties to the PKK and are subsequently operating out of Sweden to plot attacks and sow political chaos in Turkey. Erdoğan has also criticized Sweden’s refusal to resolutely condemn nationalist demonstrations that feature the burning of the Quran.

But the various obstructions were apparently cleared up after Stoltenberg met with both Erdoğan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson later in the day. There have not been any subsequent announcements regarding Turkey’s desire to join the EU. It instead appears that the other factor influencing Ankara’s decision to stall Sweden’s bid—the desire to secure a deal for F-16 jets from the United States in return for promises that they will not be used to threaten Greece—has played a larger role. The Biden administration had been working on a four-country deal that would clear the way for F-16 sales, so progress on that front could certainly have been used as leverage for getting Turkey to sign on to Sweden’s NATO membership.

The geopolitical haggling should come as no surprise and is simply a reaffirmation of the age-old maxim that something is never had for anything. More importantly, though, Sweden’s impending ascension is proof of the increased commitment to collective security that has swept across Europe in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Sweden brings with it a population of 10 million, a GDP of well over $500 billion, and has recently committed to increasing its defense spending to at least 2 percent (a benchmark that every NATO member is supposed to be meeting).

Unfortunately, this fact will have no impact on encouraging the United States to divest itself from Europe and support the creation of a more independent security framework for the latter. The collective GDP of Non-U.S. NATO currently stands at $20.1 trillion compared to Russia’s $1.6 trillion, and its population is 585 million (dwarfing Russia’s 146 million). Despite another economically developed member state signing onto the transatlantic alliance, Sweden’s additional inputs amount to a mere drop in NATO’s already massive resource pool. The logic of an independent Europe has existed since 1991, but the political will to reduce the United States’ wildly inflated defense role on the continent is as much lacking in Washington as it is in Berlin or Brussels.

The discussion over F-16 sales in this regard is more consequential than the simple process of back-and-forth compromise that is inevitably a part of every international deal. Rather, the weight of U.S. arms sales and the prospect of securing favorable terms on the part of Ankara is indicative of a major factor dictating U.S. security engagement with Europe in particular and the world more generally. U.S. military spending currently stands somewhere around $800 billion in comparison to non-U.S. NATO’s $300 billion. Still, of the portion of non-U.S. NATO spending and resources, Turkey is far and away the largest contributor. Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles back in 2019 was a major snub to Washington. It also resulted in sanctions being placed on Turkey.

The prospect of EU membership is undoubtedly a strong economic incentive for Turkey, but getting back in the good graces of the United States may have also played a role. It is not outlandish to imagine the United States telling Erdoğan to shelve the EU talk for the time being, accept some political posturing from Sweden, be content with general statements against Islamophobia, and subsequently receive a favorable deal for U.S. jets. Shortly after Turkey gave the okay to Sweden’s ascension, the Biden administration announced the completion of the F-16 deal, as well as U.S. support of Ankara’s military modernization efforts.

No one, including those in the halls of power, is trying to hide the role of U.S. defense sales in dictating broader transatlantic policy. Moral qualms aside, there is nothing inherently shady about Washington selling arms to exert geopolitical influence; however, it is important to acknowledge this dynamic if one wants to understand international developments in their entirety.

There can be no doubt regarding the reality of U.S. hegemonic control over the European security environment. That is not to discount Washington’s ideological ties to the continent, nor is it to approach the commitment to liberal democracy with cynicism—the borderline brinkmanship of U.S. and European support of Ukraine should dispel any doubts over whether or not the West is genuine in the belief of its principles. But the unfolding of events suggests that it is Washington that walks away the true winner, both economically as well as ideologically.

From the artic edges of Scandinavia through the continental heartland and onto the edges of Anatolia, there has been an outpouring of newfound commitments to defending the principle of national sovereignty. But while the invasion of Ukraine has certainly drawn the European continent closer together, it has also reinforced U.S. control over that increasingly solidified bloc. Whether or not this is of any real benefit to the United States’ citizenry—the only citizenry to which its government is constitutionally beholden—is, of course, another issue entirely.

Dominick Sansone is a Ph.D. student at the Hillsdale College Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. Previously a Fulbright recipient to Bulgaria, his writing on politics in the Black Sea region has been published by The National Interest, the Euromaidan Press, The American Conservative, and RealClear Defense, among other publications. He also previously wrote as a contributing columnist focusing on Russia-China relations at The Epoch Times.

Image: NATO/Flickr.

The governments of the Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, seem more and more convinced that a dramatically diminished U.S. interest in the Middle East region is in the works, up to an abandonment, if not total abandonment, of them, resulting in an uncertainty of security commitments to them. After decades in which, in exchange for low cost and abundant supplies of oil, the U.S. security umbrella was informally guaranteed to the Gulf monarchies, those same princes, kings, and emirs are growingly doubting the reliability of the U.S. side of that understanding. None is more uneasy in this than Saudi Arabia, the most significant country in the region. Washington’s perceived failure to respond forcefully to Iran-armed-and-sponsored Houthi drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia in 2019 and against both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 was just the most tangible example undergirding Gulf concerns about U.S. resolution.

A number of factors feeds the perception of U.S. abandonment, from the direct public and private pronouncements of key Biden administration officials to the changing state of U.S. foreign policy discourse. Yet in merits particular attention in Riyadh is the U.S. treatment of Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (colloquially, MBS)—the country’s crown prince, prime minister, and the designated heir to the throne.

Martyring MBS

Never a very warm relationship, the U.S.-Saudi bond has always been one of mutual and calculated advantage while still remaining the bedrock and anchor of U.S. standing and policy in the Gulf. Despite a few structural tensions regarding differing religious views, forms of government, and relations to Israel, the two countries have been in close embrace based on their security-for-oil bargain.

That, however, arrangement is now at risk from the Saudi perspective and perhaps even in America’s view—not that it will no longer guarantee the security of its Gulf partners, but that the guarantee will be more calibrated in light of the Chinese political, economic, and military challenges in the Indo-Pacific and globally. Gulf capitals worry (or fear) that the United States is neither a dependable partner nor perhaps even an honest broker, and their apprehension is grounded in U.S. words and deeds. As a result, these countries are increasingly taking an even more tenuously transactional view of their previously bedrock relation with Washington.

That uneasy, somewhat transactional relation with the Saudis was rocked by the horrific murder and dismemberment of journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents (apparently with the knowledge and probable direction of MBS) inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. A Saudi citizen and occasional columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi had turned from a supporter of MBS to an ardent critic. That horrendous execution shocked Western capitals, particularly Washington, with the Post ensuring regular and protracted coverage.

In response, during the November 2019, Democratic Party primary debate in Atlanta, then-Presidential Candidate Joe Biden labeled MBS and even more broadly all Saudi Arabians “the pariahs that they are” and their government of having “very little social redeeming value,” adding that “under a Biden-Harris administration, we will reassess our relation with the Kingdom, end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.” This attack by the likely next U.S. president only martyred the Saudi royal at home: who was this impudent foreign infidel to assault our prince, country, and society?

Ethics entirely aside, the assassination was a foolhardy and ultimately counterproductive move. Whereas Khashoggi’s occasional columns were critical of the Saudi regime, especially MBS, and had imperceptible effects on the U.S.-Saudi relationship, his murder, fanned by Turkey’s president (for foreign policy reasons) and by Khashoggi’s fiancé Hatice Cengiz (for obvious personal reasons), had substantial and prolonged effect in the United States and abroad.

Unfortunately for Biden, oil prices spiked in 2021–2022. The United States could itself have produced more oil and eased the skyrocketing price, but only with environmental effects unacceptable to Biden’s Democratic Party allies. Biden was forced, hat in hand, to fly to Riyadh in July 2022 and in effect beg MBS to increase Saudi production, which the Prince very publicly did not do. In fact, he did the opposite, leading OPEC+ to a production cut of 2 million barrels a day in coordination with—salt in the wound—Russian President Vladimir Putin. Very embarrassingly, on arrival Biden was forced also to greet MBS—which normally would have meant an embrace but, given the pariah remark, caused Biden to attempt clumsily at best to settle for a “fist bump” which MBS graciously accepted and reciprocated but did not forget. The Price of Alienating Saudi Arabia This breach in the relationship stands at odds with both America’s and Saudi Arabia’s national interests. If continued, it will have adverse impacts on both, and will also provide China and perhaps other challengers like Iran with a rare opportunity to advance their interests at the both the United States’ and Saudi Arabia’s expense. However appalling the Khashoggi murder, it cannot be allowed to rupture a critical geopolitical relationship for both parties. Ironically, in many respects, MBS has taken Saudi Arabia down precisely the right road from both the Saudi and the U.S. perspectives. Under his Vision 2030, he has advanced tertiary education, defanged the religious police (the mutawa), and sought to “bring Saudi Arabia back to moderate Islam.” He has moved to diversify the bases of the Saudi economy away from sole dependence on oil and into technologically competitive goods and services, liberated women from harsh social, economic, and personal restrictions, provided them access to education and to the work force, and has all but broken the original deal with the desert tribes. He has run roughshod over other Saudi princes and families in doing this, but their fate is a domestic matter—it is not, or should not be, a core matter of U.S. national interest.

The potential for an accord between Saudi Arabia and China, however, should be. Just this last December, President Xi Jinping made an unusual trip to Saudi Arabia to meet and then sign agreements with King Salman and MBS—precisely to forge closer ties with the kingdom and then its Gulf neighbors, and to open another front against the United States and its interests. MBS gave him a conspicuously grand welcome and reception. Moreover, MBS has indicated that if Washington is not more willing to warrant Saudi fundamental national interests then he has other options. All of these are detrimental to U.S. interests, in particular closer relations with China, whose investments in the kingdom have mushroomed from almost nothing to around $12 billion over the past fifteen years and $5 billion this June alone.

Other developments paint a grim picture for U.S. interests. Along with Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia is now a Dialogue Partner in the China-founded and Beijing-based Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Thousands of Saudi and other Gulf state students are now studying in China rather than the United States. In May, Saudi Arabia joined Egypt and the UAE in warmly readmitting Syria into the Arab League, notwithstanding President Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of Syria’s Sunni population.

The attempt by the United States to forge a nuclear deal with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s, primary adversary, and to do so on terms the Saudis clearly regard as injurious to their vital national security interests has opened yet another potential fissure. It is a potential fracture which the Chinese have happily exploited as they midwifed a resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, its heretofore sworn adversary. The United States can in part thank its public rebuke of MBS for that remarkable about-face and China’s new standing. The recently closer ties among the U.S.-aligned Gulf states after their rift with Qatar (and the consequent deterioration of the Gulf Cooperation Council comity) has increased even more the stakes inherent in the Saudi-U.S. relation as has the recent feint of MBS and his Omani allies toward his border nemeses the Houthi’s in Yemen.

Mending the Relationship

The estrangement in the Saudi-US relation needs to be repaired. While it does not rise to the same strategic level of importance as the relation with China, it is necessary nonetheless even if only because of the opportunity any fracture affords precisely to China.

But the relation is important in its own terms and not just economically or (given the U.S. bases) militarily. The U.S. has vital geopolitical interests in a stable, friendly Gulf. Iran is a threat to those interests. So is China should it find Gulf bases or even refueling arrangements and with them the opportunity both to project force and economic power into a region hitherto prohibited to it and to thrust yet another dagger into a soft spot for the United States. Although it may be too late for Biden, he can try his best.

Likewise, it is not yet too late for his successors or co-equal branches. The now Republican-majority House should make a better relationship a clear objective. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs ought to take a trip to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries full of sincere interest and earnest expressions of amity, with particular attention to MBS. It should clarify that the United States will indeed “reassess our relation with the Kingdom” but in a way opposite to the way then-candidates Biden and Kamala Harris had in mind. House Democratic members should join rather than abjure let alone repudiate such a gesture.

Arabia and its Gulf neighbors should be reassured that—notwithstanding U.S. legitimate concerns about China and the Indo-Pacific—the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and MBS matter a lot, and the U.S. will act accordingly.

Gerald F. Hyman is a Senior Associate (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. He has published articles in several opinion outlets, including Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Hill, and the Diplomat. Between 2002 and 2007, he was Director of USAID’s Office of Democracy & Governance.

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Following a court order, Lebanese journalist Dima Sadek has been sentenced to one year as a result of a lawsuit filed by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Gebran Bassil. Sadek, a well-known critic of the FPM and its ally Hezbollah, has faced endless attacks for her criticism of both parties including death threats.

The news is still early, and developments are still unfolding. This lawsuit was originally filed three years ago in 2020 at the height of Lebanon’s protest movement. At the time, Bassil was at the center of ridicule by angry demonstrators who were accusing him of corruption alongside other establishment figures.

Judge Rosine Hajili, a legal official at the Court of Appeal in Beirut, issued the decree to sentence Sadek to one year in prison and said she must pay a fine of 110 million Lebanese pounds (about $6,700). This led to a backlash in solidarity with Sadek and with contempt for FPM. There is a genuine concern that this move by the court only increases Lebanon’s climate of fear and makes people think twice before speaking out against establishment politicians. Sadek tweeted a video explaining the recent news and how it originated from her criticizing FPM members attacking two men from the city of Tripoli.

“In Feb. 2020, two young men from Tripoli were assaulted by the FPM,” Sadek said in her Twitter video. “One was attacked by [former member of parliament and FPM member] Ziad Aswad’s bodyguards, and the other, named Zakaria al-Masri ... was beaten up and forced to repeat ‘Aoun is your God and the God of Tripoli,’“ as he claimed in his written testimony, she said.

“Bassil is suing me in the case of Zakaria al-Masri,” she continued. “In both cases, I said that these were racist and Nazi acts.”

The National Interest reached out to Sadek for further comment. As of now, there has been no reply. Bassil’s office did return requests for an explanation on this matter. His lawyer, Majed Boueiz, elaborated on why they chose to pursue the lawsuit against the prominent journalist and said that it wasn’t her criticism that invoked legal action. Rather, it was her “defamation, libel, and slander that the journalist Dima Sadek made by trespassing and overstepping on the freedom of others.”

Boueiz said it was not the lawsuit that threatens freedom of expression or the values of democracy, but the actions of Sadek herself. “Pursuing this lawsuit isn’t against what Lebanon is known for, and does not contradict with our beliefs, principles, and laws. On the contrary, the act that the journalist Dima Sadek did is what contradicts with our principles, beliefs, and what Lebanon is known for.”

Yet, most see this as another political move by the FPM to shut down all kinds of descent by any means necessary.

Already, supporters of Sadek are showing their solidarity online by denouncing this move by the local judiciary. George Wardini, managing director of the PolyBlog social media platform, spoke about the sentence and the precedent it is setting for freedom of speech in Lebanon. “Three years ago, when this lawsuit was filed, the opposition and reform-minded people were actually on the offensive. We had taken the initiative and control over the narrative. Politicians feared us. They stayed at home and wouldn’t go to restaurants because they were being confronted by the public. Three years later, the fact that Gebran Bassil, who was the main recipient of our public rage and anger, was able to put a one-year prison sentence on Dima Sadek, who is hailed as one of our bravest figures, is a dangerous precedent.”

Indeed, if someone like Sadek, a recognized powerful media personality, can’t escape the legal ramifications of condemning politicians for poor behavior and actions, what chances do others have? Member of Parliament Najat Saliba spoke with TNI, highlighting the value freedom of conscience provides and condemning the actions taken against Sadek.

“Definitely, I am against what happened. I think the freedom of expression and press should be one of the most principles and guidance that we cherish and protect. Also, considering the party that is putting charges, and considering what Dima Sadek represents, I think they have gone too far.”

The probability of Sadek seeing a day in prison is low. She can legally appeal the court’s sentencing and avoid this debacle altogether. Nevertheless, this latest round by the Lebanese judiciary hurts the once proud free-thinking atmosphere that Lebanon was respected for—no matter how any political actor would like to spin it.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

L'homme, déjà âgé, qui vient de perdre sa femme. Pas beaucoup d'informations sur son caractère ni sur sa biographie. Aucune story. Le seul sujet du livre est la nouvelle période de sa vie où, d'emblée, il entre ; quand sa femme était à ses côtés, elle était aussi devant lui, sur l'horizon de son temps ; (...) / Littérature - 2005/11

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan had been notoriously high for several years and culminated with an Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. The war lasted about a month and ended with several thousand deaths. Azerbaijan demonstrated its military superiority by capturing most of the land it lost in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994. The war was ended by a Russian-brokered ceasefire which allowed for the free transfer of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijanis to Nakhchivan. The war was marked by several war crimes on both sides. Following the war, there have been numerous more border skirmishes, with the most potent one being in September of 2022, leaving hundreds total dead.

Currently, Nagorno-Karabakh is desperate; Azerbaijan has blockaded the only land corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing essential supplies such as food and water. The ceasefire in 2020 provided for Russian peacekeepers to monitor this corridor -called the Lachin Corridor- but as we all know, Russia has other military duties their troops must attend to. Azerbaijan has violated the terms of the 2020 ceasefire by preventing the exchange of people and goods to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Armenia is part of a mutual defense treaty called the C.S.T.O. (Collective Security Treaty Organization), a mutual defense treaty with members Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The C.S.T.O. is the Russian version of NATO, and according to this organization, an attack against one is treated as an attack against all. The alliance entails that Russia must defend Armenia whenever Azerbaijan attacks Armenia. However, Russia has refused this request which highlights the failure of the C.S.T.O. This shows the true importance of this conflict; it highlights the changing dynamics of alliances in the Caucasus.

Armenia has had strong relations with Russia and the eastern bloc, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ability of Azerbaijan to control its exports, there has been a massive switch in alliances. With Azerbaijan’s mass exportation of oil, they have become increasingly tied to the Western world by trade. Therefore, Azerbaijan is a powerful country supplied by other powerful countries such as Turkey. On the other hand, Armenia is a weak country supported by Russia. However, Russia is an ally of Armenia in name only. So Armenia has no nations to turn to under Azerbaijani aggression. Russia won’t help; the U.N. may condemn it, but will the U.N. send troops to keep the Lachin Corridor open? Probably not. The West would never help Armenia because Azerbaijan is a major trade partner. So Armenia has no options when it comes to allies.

The reason why many Western countries won’t side with Armenia becomes even more apparent when looking at a map of Oil Pipelines in the Caucasus.

The solid red line depicts the BTC (Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, which transports oil from Baku to Turkey, which it can then export to the rest of the world. However, the route is slow because it has to go through Georgia; it could be more direct by cutting out Georgia and connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey via the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. If Azerbaijan connected its mainland to Nakhchivan, it would have a direct route to Turkey and be able to increase its oil exports dramatically. This route would also connect Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world, which includes central Asian countries bordering the Caspian Sea.

The future of the Caucasus seems straightforward at this point. Azerbaijan wants control over the Caucasus and a direct pipeline to Turkey. Azerbaijan has been conducting many small military aggressions over a long period rather than at once to avoid international condemnation. Azerbaijan will continue to do this until they achieve what they want, and due to the lack of support for Armenia, Azerbaijan will continue. If recent trends continue, Azerbaijan will get a pipeline to Turkey, the Turkic world will be connected, and Nagorno-Karabakh will be wholly blockaded.

What Armenia can do to stop this seems to be too little too late. Armenia does not have the capacity to return to its territorial extent before the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. However, control of the Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh is more plausible. Realistically Armenia could expand its conscription beyond two years without extreme public outcry due to the extreme levels of nationalism and desire of the public to ensure Nagorno-Karabakh territorial sovereignty. All Armenia needs to do is guarantee the security of free passage of the Lachin corridor, which could be done by force. In a time when skirmishes between the two countries are constant, an operation by Armenia to guarantee international law is followed would not be that outrageous.

Depending on the length of the Russia-Ukraine war, Armenia may also be able to obtain Russian support in guaranteeing free passage of the Lachin Corridor. Armenia can also offer Russia significant oversight over its economy and politics in exchange for Russian intervention on the side of Armenia. Russia has two military bases in Armenia, which allows for the quick deployment of troops. Armenia has to choose just how much they are willing to sacrifice to achieve control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Negotiation may also be a possibility between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia could offer Azerbaijan a contract to build a pipeline through Armenian Territory going to Nakchivan in exchange for the Lachin Corridor and de-facto sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan may be inclined to take this offer as a wholescale invasion of Armenian territory to connect mainland Azerbaijan to Nakchivan would cause too much international condemnation. Although most Western countries would support the lower oil prices caused by the shorter pipeline, an invasion of a sovereign nation is likely to invoke sanctions from many countries.

Ultimately only time will tell how the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will be resolved, but it is undoubtedly in the interests of all that a peaceful diplomatic solution is arrived at.

 

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Aiden Wassermann is a foreign policy commentator and intern for the Studies Department. The views expressed here are his, and not necessarily those of the Foreign Policy Association.

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After months of diplomatic delays, Sweden can now join NATO—a genuine triumph for the Biden administration.

This development has enormous geostrategic implications for the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

One is a direct reduction of Russia’s ability to project naval power. With Sweden as the last link in the chain, the entire northern coast of the Baltic Sea is now inside the NATO alliance. All of the Baltic’s southern coast, except for Russian-ruled Kaliningrad and a sliver of Russian territory near St. Petersburg, is already in NATO hands. For the first time, the Russian fleet must travel through a narrow sleeve of water, over 1,000 miles of NATO territorial waters, to reach the open ocean. It also means that Russia’s Arctic fleet will have to travel past the northern coasts of Finland and Norway—now all NATO allies. To reach the Mediterranean and the Suez, Russia’s Black Sea fleet must first thread through waters controlled by Turkey, another NATO ally. All three of Russia’s Western fleets can no longer move without allied surveillance and could, theoretically, be stopped.

Another implication concerns manpower and technology. Sweden offers a sophisticated military infrastructure, especially its attack aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities. Finland, which directly borders Russia for almost 1,000 miles, possesses extensive defenses and a well-trained army. Once Sweden and Finland’s considerable capabilities become interoperable with NATO, the alliance will be significantly more potent than it was on the day Russian tanks tried to seize Kiev in February 2022.

The Western powers are now more united with the Baltic nations than ever before. Even during World War II, Sweden professed neutrality, and Finland, for a time, allied with Nazi Germany against the USSR.

Undoubtedly, the implications are concerning to policymakers in Moscow.

And NATO is more focused than ever before. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg laid out a clear strategic direction for the organization: victory for Ukraine. “...if we don't ensure that Ukraine wins this war, unless we ensure that Ukraine wins as a sovereign and independent nation, there is no question of membership to discuss,” Stoltenberg said.

It is highly unusual for NATO officials to speak with such clarity, indicating unanimity between member-states.

Indeed, if President Joe Biden had not made it clear that Ukraine was not yet ready to join NATO, one wonders if the European allies might have voted to admit Ukraine now.

NATO leaders have long been cowed by the idea that admitting Ukraine into NATO would lead to a direct war with Russia. Europe would be wise to avoid an open, as opposed to a proxy war, with Russia. While European leaders are starting to realize that the Russian bear’s teeth and claws are not as sharp as they once feared, it would be a mistake to believe that the Russians can no longer wreak vast harm across Europe, even without resorting to nuclear weapons. Now is the time for realism about Russia, not over-confidence.

That said, Russia’s military weaknesses have been laid bare. Moscow has trouble supplying its soldiers in the field with ammunition, fuel, medicine, and spare parts—much of its military supply chains rely on railroad and convoy transport vulnerable to artillery bombardment and drone strikes. Manpower is another Russian weakness. Its troops are poorly trained conscripts or recently freed prisoners. They can man Russia’s extensive World War I-style trench defenses but usually lose men and materiel without gaining ground when they launch their comparatively rare counterattacks. The war in Ukraine is now more than 500 days old, and the Russians have suffered between 100,000 and 200,000 casualties, depending on whose estimates you believe.

By contrast, the U.S. lost 57,000 soldiers in more than 5,100 days of fighting in Vietnam. That’s a quarter of the losses in ten times the time period. Yet, the Vietnam War helped bring down two U.S. presidents. LBJ declined to run for reelection in 1968 on account of war-weariness, and Nixon’s failed “Vietnamization” project weakened the public support he would later need during the Watergate scandal. How can President Vladimir Putin survive an unpopular war when two U.S. presidents could not?

At the very least, the recent mutiny launched by mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin suggests that Putin's regime is growing fragile. Still, Putin’s great unknown remains China.

Chinese president Xi Jinping shares the same convictions as Putin: to create a non-Western-centric, multipolar world order. But his relationship with Russia is a product of interests rather than deeply held values. The two countries share a 2,672-mile border, the exact location of which wasn't settled until the start of the twenty-first century following generations of negotiations. China needs Russia for water and military equipment; Russia needs China as a market for hydrocarbons and other raw materials. This is a shotgun wedding, not a romance.

Being isolated from the West is not attractive for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of zero-COVID policies. As China's relationship with the United States has hit new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid alienating the European Union, which is also one of China’s largest trading partners. Consequently, Xi and Chinese diplomats have been careful not to accept the Kremlin's talking points fully.

All of this leaves Putin in a quagmire. He cannot exit Ukraine without losing prestige and possibly power itself. Meanwhile, a newly enlarged and unified NATO presents Russia with its most powerful foe since Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century at the same time the Russian economy and population are shrinking. Nor can he hold ground in Ukraine during the warmer months, as demonstrated by the modest gains of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Putin, the purported grand chess player, cannot leave the game and cannot find a winning move. This week’s news of NATO enlargement continues to shrink his options.

Ahmed Charai is the Publisher of Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.