Sunset in Siberia, 2018. J.Quirk
Reports from Russian announced that Vladimir Putin won over 76% of the votes in his reelection bid March 18, with turnout over 67%.
The view from Siberia was a little different.
OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, sent nearly 600 short-term, long-term, and other election observers to Russia. In its next-day report, OSCE noted that in an environment of state-owned television networks, “television coverage was characterized by extensive and unchallenged reporting of the incumbent’s official activities.” More curiously, OSCE described election day itself as technically competent but ultimately spoiled. “Overall,” it judged, “election day was conducted in an orderly manner despite shortcomings related to vote secrecy and transparency of counting.” The election was run well, it seemed to judge, except for the voting and the counting.
OSCE dispatched more than 200 pairs of short-term observers, each with a local driver and interpreter, all over the country. Some observers had done this many times across the Balkans and post-Soviet space, while for others it was their first mission. Observers included chief elections administrators from cities across the U.S., EU “Former Ministers of Something,” and at least one former member of the U.S. Congress.
A voter in Siberia, March 18, 2018. J.Quirk
My partner and I joined four other teams on an overnight flight to a mid-sized Siberian city; from there we drove four hours to smaller communities. The flat, snowy landscape was broken up only by lines of birch trees and the occasional petrol station. We benefited from the beginning of spring weather and reliable roads. Other teams enjoyed 15⁰C resort-living in the south or the chance for a bit of tourism in St. Petersburg, while some endured flying ten or more hours east, or driving off the road in a snowstorm.
After two days of briefings in Moscow, the short-term observers’ work begins the day before the election. Our responsible driver and informative polyglot kept us safe and on course. We located and inspected the polling stations in a hospital, at a football stadium, at a coal mining company HQ, and in several schools. People were generally finishing or finished with preparations for the next day. Across the towns, there were a few posters and billboards for candidates. Most, though, were targeting turnout with patriotic white, blue, and red calls to vote for “Our country, our president, our choice.”
Voting was brisk in the morning, but we had a question about mobile voting. Large percentages of voters in some polling stations were scheduled to be individually visited, handed a ballot, and have their vote collected in a mobile ballot box. These visits are a nice service for homebound voters, but they are not followed by international or local observers. In cases where mobile voting was intended to serve 20 or 30 percent of the polling station’s list of voters, we were told it was because there were many older voters. But the challenge to visit 200 or 300 voters in a few hours seemed substantial.
“Our country, our president, our choice.” J.Quirk
The counting itself gave us as much pause. It was at the individual polling stations, not regional or central locations, where the actual counting was done. In theory, a ballot box would be emptied on a large table. One by one, each and every ballot would be displayed to the polling station workers and to any observers. (There were observers from several candidates or parties at most polling stations.) “A vote for Candidate X,” and anyone could question it. It would make for a long but accurate count. Instead, the big pile of ballots was divided by four or five poll workers into new piles, one for each candidate. Observers watched from a distance and could see some accuracy but not each ballot. Each poll worker counted her pile (poll workers were overwhelmingly women in our area), and in turn announced simply, “Zhirinovsky, 22”, “Sobchak, 44,” “Putin, 701,” etc. There was no recounting of someone else’s pile, and no obvious reconciliation among the number of the day’s voters and the total of the candidates’ piles. (The next-day OSCE report noted that many observation teams reported this same practice.) These tallies were recorded, entered into a computer, and sent. The ballots themselves were sealed in bags and delivered to the regional center, where we were told they would be locked in a room for a year. There seemed to be no built-in sampling of the bags of ballots, for example – “this one says Yavlinsky, 18 votes, let’s check it for accuracy.”
This doesn’t mean there was fraud at this stage: I watched one woman count her Grudinin pile. I was several feet away, but she seemed to be counting earnestly, flicking the top right corner of each ballot in her pile with her right index finger. She and I got the same number, but she went through the whole pile only one time.
At least one more difference between this election observation mission and others on which I served was the motivation of the host country. In Albania’s 2011 local elections, for example, they needed to demonstrate that they had the technical capacity and political commitment to hold free and fair elections, as one small step on the long road to the EU. Instead, the race for Tirana mayor was extremely close, the national election commission overruled the local ones in some key ways, and Edi Rama launched a series of controversial appeals before officially losing by just 81 votes.
Russia and President Putin didn’t seem to have to appease international observers, only national public opinion. Live Internet webcams inside polling stations across the country captured a number of apparent irregularities, including ballot-box stuffing, that were shown on foreign newscasts around the world. But it seemed to some of us that an inspiring turnout to match the candidate-choice results was a higher priority than impressing temporary guests.
A final note: in some ways, these are not just technical, legal administrative matters, but foreign exchange programs. We met dozens of people working the polls, but also on airplanes, in hotels, in shops and cafes, and elsewhere. Most Russians were met were friendly, cooperative, and interested in doing their work while we did ours. The political atmosphere prevented more opportunities for rich, personal exchanges, but I hope my partner and I were as effective unofficial ambassadors for our countries as so many of the Russians we met were for theirs.
The post Russia’s Elections: The View from Siberia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.
À l’issue du scrutin des élections présidentielles en Égypte qui se sont déroulées du 26 au 28 mars, Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi a été réélu sans grande surprise.
À cette occasion, nous vous invitons à relire l’article de Chloé Berger, « L’Égypte du général Sissi, entre réaction et aspirations révolutionnaires » (publié dans Politique étrangère n°1/2018), ainsi que son interview publiée le 20 mars dernier sur notre blog.
The Horn of Africa is among the most congested, eventful, and most volatile geopolitical intersections on earth. It is where the West meets the East in a highly competitive game of strategic positioning for economic or hegemonic advantage.
China and Turkey who, more or less, employ similar soft-power strategies have tangible investments in various countries in the region, including Ethiopia. However, the widespread discontent with Ethiopia’s repressive impulses and its ethnic favoritism that led to a particular ethnic minority (Tigray) to exclusively operate the state apparatus has inspired Arab Spring-like mass protests. These protests have caused serious rancor within the ruling party. It is only a matter of time before this haemorrhaging government might collapse.
So, who is likely to gain or lose from this imminent shockwave in the region’s balance of power?
The Nile Tsunami
Ethiopia — a country previously considered as a stable regional hegemon, a robust emerging market, and a reliable counter-terrorism partner — is on the verge of meltdown, if not long-term civil strife.
Today, the Ethiopian government is caught between two serious challenges of domestic and foreign nature: the Oromo/Amhara mass protests tacitly supported by the West, and the water rights conflict with Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.
Ethiopia is claiming the lion’s share on the Nile that runs through it and other rivers that flow from its highlands for the Grand Renaissance Dam – thus presenting existential threats to the connected nations.
For the third time in three years, the Shabelle River has dried up, putting millions of Somalis at risk of starvation.
But the current government is not ready for a substantive change of guard. The longer the mass protests continue and the minority-led government continues to offer artificial or symbolic gestures of prisoner releases — while declaring a second ‘state of emergency’ in two years— the faster Ethiopia will become destabilised and the faster foreign investments will fizzle away.
Worse — though seemingly unthinkable — the ‘favorite nation’ status granted to Ethiopia after becoming the US’ main partner in the global ‘War on Terroris’ is slowly corroding.
Despite this week’s visit from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the US State Department is gradually turning its back on Ethiopia for a number of reasons; chief among them, is its double-dealings on the South Sudan issue.
Despite the facade of US/China collaboration to end the South Sudan civil war, the geopolitical rivalry between these two giants has been pressuring Ethiopia to pledge exclusive allegiance to one over the other.
With China’s huge investments on Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan’s oil fields – making a choice won’t be too difficult.
The Kenya Factor
Several years ago I wrote an article arguing that the two most stable nations in the Horn (Kenya and Ethiopia) will become more unstable as Somalia becomes more stable.
Today, the Ethiopian government is facing the most serious threat since it took power by the barrel of the gun, and Kenya has a highly polarised population and two presidents ‘elected’ along clan lines.
Kenya — the nerve center of the international humanitarian industry — could just be one major incident away from inter-clan combustion.
The Somalia Factor
The Ethiopian government has launched a clandestine campaign of strategic disinformation intended to fracture or breakup opposition coalitions and recruit or lure potential comrades.
Ethiopian intelligence officers and members of the diplomatic corps together with some ethnic-Somali Ethiopians have been recruiting naive Somali government officials, intellectuals and activists with a Machiavellian disinformation campaign.
Meanwhile, IGAD — Ethiopia’s regional camouflage — calls for an open-borders agreement between member states. Despite broad-based public perception that for a fragile state like Somalia, such an agreement would be tantamount to annexation, some Somali politicians are eagerly carrying its banner.
These kinds of desperate campaigns and the abrupt resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn only underscore the fact that the government’s days are numbered.
The Sudan Factor
Sudan is caught in a loyalty triangle (Ethiopia, Egypt and Turkey) with competing powers. Sudan needs Egypt to address threats faced by the two nations regarding the diminishing access to the Nile by reasserting rights granted through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
It needs Ethiopia to protect China’s economic partnership and to shield President Omar al Bashir from Western harassment through IGAD.
It also needs Turkey for development and for a long-term strategic partnership. Sudan has become the second country in Africa to grant Turkey a military base, with Somalia being the first.
The Eritrea Factor
When neocons dominated US foreign policy and the global ‘War on Terror’ was the order of all orders, Eritrea was slapped with sanctions. It was accused of being the primary funder and weapons supplier to al Shabab.
Today, though neither the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia or Eritrea nor any expert free from Ethiopian influence holds such a view, yet the sanctions have not been lifted.
The Ethiopian lobby and certain influential elements within US foreign policy-making circles continue to label Eritrea as a Marxist rogue state that undermines regional institutions such as IGAD and international ones like the UN Security Council; a closed society that espouses a deep rooted hatred towards the West.
Against that backdrop, the UAE has been investing heavily in Eritrea since 2015 or the beginning of the Yemen war that has created one of the the worst humanitarian disasters. The Emirati military (and its Academi/Blackwater shadow) now operates from a military base in Assab. Whether that’s a Trojan Horse or not, is a different discussion altogether.
Ins And Outs
The current wave of discontent against the Ethiopian government is likely to continue. But, considering how the Tigray has a total control on all levers of power, a transition of power will not be an easy process.
Ethiopia has also created an ethnically Somali counterinsurgency force in the Liyu Police. This ruthless force has already been used against the Oromos as they were used against Somalis of various regions that share a border with Ethiopia.
The extrajudicial killings and human rights violations are well documented. Despite all this, the Oromo and Amhara are set to reach their objectives albeit with bruised and bloody faces.
Will their coalition remain or, due to their historical distrust, will each eventually invoke its constitutional right to secede?
Whatever the outcome, any scenario of civil war or chaos in Ethiopia could put the entire Horn in danger and create a potential humanitarian catastrophe, especially in Somalia.
Meanwhile South Sudan is a lightyear away from sustainable political reconciliation especially since the foreign elements fueling the fire are not likely to stop any time soon. Djibouti remains the host of the most intriguing geopolitical circus. So, that leaves Eritrea as an island of stability in the region.
In the foreseeable future, Turkey could divest her investment out of Ethiopia into Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. China will diversify her portfolio to include Eritrea. And the US — with no new policy — will continue droning her way through geopolitical schizophrenia.
** This article was first published by TRT World
** On Twitter:@Abukar_Arman
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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Philippe Contamine propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Jean-Marie Moeglin et Stéphane Péquignot , Diplomatie et « relations internationales » au Moyen Âge (IXe-XVe siècle) (PUF, 2017, 1 112 pages).
Si l’on s’arrête à la seule histoire européenne, l’opinion commune voudrait que la diplomatie, dans ses formes actuelles, n’ait réellement pris naissance qu’au XVIIe siècle, les traités de Westphalie (1648) jouant un rôle de référence. Le premier mérite des auteurs est ici de montrer que la période médiévale, depuis le démembrement de l’empire carolingien et l’émergence consécutive des royaumes, des principautés et des cités-États, a connu d’authentiques « relations internationales », dans la guerre comme dans la paix. Autrement dit, en dépit de l’enchevêtrement des vassalités et des fidélités, des rapports existaient de puissance à puissance ne ressortissant pas aux affaires intérieures. Ainsi, il fallut longtemps aux rois de France pour imposer dans l’étendue de leur royaume le monopole de la diplomatie légitime, complémentaire du monopole de la violence légitime. Quant au pape et à l’empereur, ils furent toujours incapables, malgré leurs prétentions, d’être des juges suprêmes au sein de la chrétienté. À des degrés divers, celle-ci fut toujours politiquement divisée.
Pendant tout un temps, médiévistes et modernistes français ont délaissé l’histoire diplomatique, l’« histoire-traité » ayant subi le même sort que l’« histoire-bataille » : trop événementielle, trop élitiste, et d’ailleurs écrite depuis longtemps. Le réveil s’est fait lentement, à partir des années 1980. Le livre de Moeglin et Péquignot, imposant et rigoureux, maîtrisé et novateur, adossé de surcroît à une immense bibliographie, donne une impulsion décisive à cette démarche. Il est appelé à faire date.
À l’évidence, il n’était pas question d’évoquer, même sommairement, les principales négociations qui scandèrent alors l’action politique. L’option a été de retenir les thèmes essentiels, quitte à y introduire la chronologie. Tour à tour sont passés en revue les acteurs des relations internationales (en droit comme en fait, qui à l’époque féodale pouvait mener une « politique extérieure » ?), les conditions pratiques des échanges (les langues utilisées, le rôle de l’oral et de l’écrit, l’archivage des traités), le statut des ambassadeurs, l’esprit qui présidait aux négociations, la formulation d’un premier droit public international, etc.
L’idée maîtresse est que, même au XVe siècle, les relations extérieures se nouaient non entre des États mais entre des hommes – avec leurs passions –, détenteurs à titre personnel et en général héréditaire de droits et de prérogatives. Ceux-ci leur procurant profit et honneur, il leur revenait de les maintenir et de les accroître par conquête, alliance ou mariage. Le rôle de l’amicitia et de l’inimicitia est ici fortement souligné. Cela dit, on voit ces princes – au sens que le droit romain donne à ce terme – s’identifier de plus en plus à leur pays : d’où l’introduction de la notion de bien commun.
Les auteurs sont loin d’admettre la radicale nouveauté de la Renaissance italienne : au-delà de la rhétorique qu’y maîtrisent les oratores, au point qu’ils font de la diplomatie une branche des belles-lettres, les ambassadeurs de Charles VII et de Louis XI, confrontés par exemple à l’Angleterre et à la Bourgogne, soutiennent la comparaison avec leurs contemporains de Florence, de Milan ou de Venise.
Philippe Contamine
Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.
At this critical hour, when the influence of radical Islamist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Al Nusra Front, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Taliban and Lashkar e-Toiba alongside the oppressive Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi regimes plague the Islamic world, the Hindu, Buddhist, Yezidi, Christian, Druze and Jewish minorities who are presently being oppressed across the Islamic world should unite and stand together against their common persecutors. The minorities of the Islamic world are stronger together than they are divided.
For the radical Islamists and the regimes that support them, it does not matter if one is Jewish, Yezidi, Hindu, Christian, etc. In their worldview, the Hindus are polytheists, the Christians are crusaders, the Yezidis are devil worshippers and the Jews are the sons of apes and pigs. As a result of these perverted beliefs, from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to the Middle East, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Ahmadi Muslims, Sufis, Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Yezidis and Druze are presently being gravely persecuted.
In Afrin, Syria, the Yezidis are currently being massacred by Turkish-backed jihadists as we speak. Hundreds of Yezidis have been forced to flee their villages after taking refuge in the Afrin region following the terror implemented by ISIS and other jihadist groups in the country. Turkish-backed jihadists have just arrived in the Afrin region but already, Turkish journalist Uzay Bulut reported that they have destroyed many Yezidi temples and converted others into mosques. There have been reports that Turkey has been ethnically cleansing Afrin of Christians, Kurds, Yezidis and other groups, hoping to replace them with Syrian Muslims who are presently refugees in their own country.
Under ISIS, Yezidi men and women too old to be sexually appealing were massacred. ISIS sold Yezidi women and girls into sexual slavery while indoctrinating young Yezidi boys into becoming ISIS cannon fodder. Over 3,000 Yezidi women and girls are still being held captive by ISIS despite the fall of the Caliphate. Christians under ISIS rule faced a similar fate. However, ISIS is not the only Islamist group to have persecuted Christians. According to Father Gabriel Naddaf, a Christian is slaughtered every 5 minutes in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Islamist groups other than ISIS in Syria have forcefully converted Druze to Islam, destroyed Druze holy sites and forced Druze to sell their properties.
The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the second largest Jewish population in the Middle East but it is one that is gravely oppressed. In Iranian courts, the testimony of a Jew is worth half that of a Muslim. Muslim principals control what Jewish students learn in Hebrew schools, the Shabbat is not respected as a Jewish day of rest and according to Iranian Jewish author Sima Goel, it is difficult for the local Jewish community to obtain Jewish religious items due to the fear that they could somehow be associated with Israel, an enemy state. The constant fear that Jews can be arrested due to their association with Israel permeates Iranian Jewish society and the fear is justified. Recently, the Times of Israel reported that a Jewish grandmother was sentenced to death in Iran merely for running an underground organization that found housing solutions for women with abusive husbands that could not obtain a divorce. It is very likely that the penalty would not have been that severe had the grandmother been Muslim. As a result of this reality, Iranian dissidents report that Jews in Iran are afraid to protest and celebrate their holidays under wraps, with the Iranian Secret Police ensuring that non-Jews cannot join the festivities.
In Bangladesh, Hindus have been raped, murdered, assaulted, kidnapped, forcefully converted to Islam and had their properties seized and their temples desecrated. The indigenous tribes of the Chittangong Hill Tracts, which are mainly Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and Animist, face an especially horrific predicament. Routinely, the Bangladeshi military backed by Bengali settlers, who have burned down Buddhist and Hindu temples, have slaughtered and gang raped the population to the level that some describe it as genocidal.
While the conflict between the Bangladeshi government and the indigenous tribes officially ended in 1997, grave persecution of the Hindus of Bangladesh continues to date. According to local sources, JMB and ISIS, who are controlled by Sheikh Hasina, are in the process of ethnically cleansing Hindus and other minorities from the country. Not too long ago, a Hindu man and his wife were tortured within the same country. The victim related: “I cannot stretch my arms and legs. I don’t have any place in my body where he has not touched. Where is the law in the country?” In addition, the Dakeshwari Temple Committee reported that temple property was seized from them and handed over to the Muslims in order to destroy the property.
These are only a few incidents of the grave persecution experienced by the Hindu community in Bangladesh. The systematic persecution experienced by Hindus and other minorities such as Buddhists and Christians in Bangladesh is highlighted on a daily basis. For example, a Hindu man in Bangladesh was recently arrested merely for sharing a report on four women wearing a Burka playing cards in Mecca. According to local sources, no Muslim was arrested for sharing this report but as a Hindu, he was. The World Hindu Struggle Committee claims that Hindus are being ethnically cleansed from the entire region, noting that 39 Indian Hindus and Sikhs were killed by Islamists recently on the Indian Subcontinent merely for being born into the wrong faith.
As bad as the situation is in Bangladesh, in Pakistan, the situation is even direr for the minorities. The Blasphemy Law is spreading terror across the country and Christians as well as other minorities have fallen victim to it. Asia Bibi, a Christian field worker, was sentenced to death for no other reason than saying something that the witnesses around her considered blasphemous. In Pakistan, having a Muslim witness say that blasphemy was committed is sufficient evidence to arrest and charge someone. According to CNN, once blasphemy is alleged, Amnesty International claims that the accused is as good as dead for the legal system offers them zero safeguards to protect them against mob violence or to defend themselves in case they are innocent.
There also have been reports that the Pakistani Army is presently ethnically cleansing both the ethnic and religious minorities from the country at a much faster rate than what exists in Bangladesh. Whether one is Sufi, an Ahmadi Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Baloch, Bahai, Buddhist, Zoroastrian or a member of another minority group, the minorities have no future in Pakistan. Nadeem Nusrat, the president of the Free Karachi Campaign, told the Business Standard: “The Punjabi dominated elite of the Pakistani Army have carried out the systematic ethnic cleansing of every minority group in Pakistan and the intensity of the savagery continues to grow with every passing day. Thousands have been extra-judicially killed. Thousands have disappeared after being picked up by the Pakistani security forces and their families are living in a state of an unending fear and helplessness with no knowledge of the whereabouts of their kins.”
According to Shipan Kumer Basu, the President of the World Hindu Struggle Committee, “The Hindu residents of the Sindh Province in Pakistan have suffered a serious calamity. These people from the border areas came to India seeking shelter but no one did anything to let them stay in the country. They have been sent back to Pakistan. Upon being returned, there, they are being pressured to convert to Islam. They are told that if they do not convert, the family members including the women cannot be saved. If they don’t agree, it will be ruthless torture. This is the situation in the Sindh Province, where more than 500 Hindus are being forced to change their religion.”
Israeli Druze diplomat Mendi Safadi, who heads the Safadi Center for International Relations and Public Diplomacy, has emphasized: “The Hindu minority and the other minorities especially those living in the Middle East and in Asia are persecuted and threatened with ethnic cleansing. It is our obligation in the free world to stand against any attempt to harm the Hindus and other minorities such as the Buddhists, Christians, Druze, Yezidis and others.” The time has long since passed for the voices calling for justice in the free world united with the minorities in the Middle East and Asia as one voice seek to end the human rights abuses and to begin a new reality, where minority rights will be respected. As the Passover Haggaddah states, “Now we are slaves. Next year, may we be free men.”
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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2018). Marc Hecker, rédacteur en chef de Politique étrangère et directeur des publications de l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jean-François Gayraud, Théorie des hybrides. Terrorisme et crime organisé (CNRS Éditions, 2017, 256 pages).
Jean-François Gayraud, docteur en droit, est haut fonctionnaire de la police nationale. Après avoir travaillé pour la Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) et l’Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste (UCLAT), il a rejoint, en 2017, l’équipe du coordonnateur national du renseignement et de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Dans ce nouvel ouvrage, il analyse les liens entre terrorisme et crime organisé.
L’auteur distingue trois stades d’hybridation. Tout d’abord, la coopération : organisations terroristes et criminelles peuvent nouer des alliances, notamment pour obtenir des financements ou des armes. Ensuite, la convergence : ces organisations commencent à se ressembler et à agir par mimétisme. Enfin, la mutation : « des groupes deviennent de manière indistincte à la fois politiques et criminels ». Ces processus de rapprochement et de transformation transcendent les idéologies. Gayraud le démontre en proposant un tour du monde des groupes hybrides.
L’hybridation fonctionne dans les deux sens. Des structures criminelles peuvent se politiser et pratiquer le terrorisme. Le cas des cartels mexicains est particulièrement frappant : ils contrôlent des territoires, y imposent leurs règles et leur sous-culture. Pour soumettre la population, ils mettent en œuvre une stratégie de terreur, dont certains aspects – comme les décapitations et les crucifixions – ne manquent pas de rappeler les exactions de Daech. De 1996 à 2016, la guerre des cartels a fait environ 175 000 morts. Il arrive que des organisations criminelles parviennent à prendre le pouvoir. On voit alors apparaître un État mafieux. À cet égard, l’histoire de l’Armée de libération du Kosovo (UÇK) et de sa prise en main du Kosovo est éloquente.
À l’inverse, des groupes terroristes peuvent évoluer vers la criminalité. Au départ, les activités criminelles – trafic de stupéfiants, enlèvements, braquages, etc. – peuvent être un moyen de financer des actions de terrorisme ou de guérilla. Au fil du temps, la cupidité peut prendre le pas sur la cause. L’auteur résume ce processus par une formule : les « paras » (militaires) deviennent des « parrains ». Les exemples de certains cadres de l’Armée républicaine irlandaise (IRA) ou des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) en attestent. Gayraud décrit Daech comme un super gang, et montre que les recrues francophones de cette organisation sont, pour beaucoup, des délinquants de banlieue. Il souligne que le récit du « voyou en quête de rédemption » est souvent erroné, et que l’on a plutôt affaire à des « gangsters islamisés » recherchant une justification religieuse à des pratiques prédatrices.
L’hybridation peut être telle qu’il en devient parfois impossible de distinguer les structures criminelles et terroristes. Face à ce phénomène, nos institutions sont mal adaptées. L’auteur relève en conclusion que les bureaucraties occidentales ont des « habitudes classificatoires » dont elles peinent à se défaire. Les spécialistes de la lutte contre le terrorisme s’occupent des terroristes et les experts de la lutte contre la criminalité traquent les gangsters. À l’heure de l’hybridité, ces frontières bureaucratiques sont un handicap. L’auteur en appelle à une transformation des modes de fonctionnement de l’État « dans le sens de la transversalité et du décloisonnement » des services. Aujourd’hui à l’Élysée, Jean-François Gayraud va pouvoir s’atteler à cette tâche.
Marc Hecker
Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.
For about four years now, since Russia’s occupation of Crimea and China’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, there has been much speculation about whether another Cold War between East and West is coming. In the last month alone, headlines have proclaimed that “The New Cold War Is Here,” heralded “Putin’s New Cold War,” and warned that “Trump Is Preparing for a New Cold War.” But are we really returning to the past? Contemporary politics is full of false analogies, and the return of the Cold War seems to be one of them.