Diplomacy & Crisis News

Great power competition is old hat. Systemic rivals are already passe. The Second Cold War has started. China and Russia started it. It is past time to acknowledge this and start fighting back.

The Chinese regime is an existential threat to the peace and prosperity of the United States and its allies, partners, and friends. Xi Jinping’s appetites are global—from occupying democratic Taiwan to reshaping land borders with India, from redrawing maritime boundaries with its neighbors to imposing strategic dependencies on other nations and blackmailing them economically—all the while building both nuclear and conventional forces to intimidate any opposition.

Xi also greenlit Vladimir Putin’s aggressive war against Ukraine and forged a de facto alliance between China and Russia. Over the past decade, the two autocrats have held an astonishing forty one-on-one meetings—a frequency surpassing their engagements with any other foreign leader by more than twofold. While the United States and other democratic countries were isolating Putin diplomatically, Xi paid a visit to Moscow in March of this year, concluding his trip with a remarkable statement: “Right now there are changes—the likes of which we haven't seen for 100 years—and we are the ones driving these changes together.” The Russian president agreed. Russia, in short, has made itself part of the China challenge.

The thought of living in a world dominated by China and Russia is intolerable to Americans and all freedom-loving peoples. Like any war, a cold war is a contest of will between determined, committed adversaries. It is high time that the United States and its allies start fighting back. We thought long and hard for the list of indicators that would demonstrate America was serious about protecting its interest from the onslaught of aggressive forces that want to remake the world. Here is what we came up with.

Say You are Serious

The Biden administration has never communicated clearly to the American people and the world what we are up against. When it comes to China, Biden’s mantra is weak tea a decade out of date: “compete where we must, but cooperate where we can.” When it comes to Russia, Biden declares the United States will “support Ukraine as long as it takes,” without giving thought to explaining in detail what the plan to deal with Moscow as a threat in the long term. This makes our adversaries sound more like a nuisance than a threat, akin to saying that it’s not our business what Hannibal Lecter does next door, as long as we don’t go over for dinner.

That does not cut it. China has 1.4 billion people, the second-largest economy in the world by various measurements, and a nuclear arsenal that will soon rival that of the United States and Russia. They already dominate many of the world’s most critical supply chains. Beijing is a destabilizing influence on every continent. It is among the world’s worst dictatorial regimes, abusers of human rights, and polluters. Russia is a nuclear peer, meddles in every theater where the United States has vital and important interests, and has violated every norm of responsible behavior. If we can’t label them the cold war adversaries they are—we have lost before we begin.

Secure Your Own Territory

What nation leaves its borders wide open in times of cold war? This is madness. Under Biden’s presidency millions of illegal aliens from all over the world are pouring into the United States through our southern border. In 2022 alone, the Customs and Border Patrol encountered almost 100 people on the terrorist watchlist. Apprehensions of Chinese nationals, many of them men of military age, crossing into the United States illegally are up over 800 percent over the same period last fiscal year. Nobody checks their backgrounds and they are released into the United States on their own recognizance with a court date to be determined at some point in the future. Until America regains control over its open southern border, no nation in the world will believe America is serious about defending its interests.

Claim the Moral High Ground

America is in a contest with brutal dictatorships. The Biden administration must stop describing its China policy as competition, confrontation, and cooperation. This language implies an equivalence between the United States, a democratic country that respects international law, and Xi’s China, a brutal dictatorship that routinely violates key international norms, including through its support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Biden administration should communicate more about America’s freedom and achievements and less about its flaws. Some of the criticism of America’s shortcomings undermines the legitimacy, cohesion, and confidence of the American polity. It simply must be stopped.

Strengthen Deterrence

America cannot prevail unless we demonstrate the will to defend America’s interests. That’s not done by being the world’s policeman, babysitter, or any other metaphor. It is not about muscular actions like regime change or supposed “nation-building.” Nor does the United States have any inherent responsibility to protect some illusory world order. It is simply this: we must have armed forces with the capacity to protect America’s vital interests and be unafraid in our determination to safeguard them.

Grow and Protect the Economy

America can’t win without economic might. Too many Biden economic actions, from energy policies to inflation and infrastructure, have made the economy worse and ballooned our national debt. We must adopt policies that foster economic growth at home, including unleashing American energy, tax cuts to incentivize entrepreneurs, and targeted deregulation. Economic security is national security.

We must expand the safeguards that prevent China from exploiting America’s economy. We are efficient today at stopping Chinese companies that want to invest in U.S. companies in national security-sensitive sectors. We must also prevent U.S. investments in Chinese companies related in any way to the military or repression establishments in the People’s Republic.

Challenge Allies to do a Lot More

Putin’s war in Ukraine served as a global wake-up call for America’s allies. For instance, twenty countries in Europe are increasing their defense spending—but the figures ultimately amount to only about one percent in real growth over last year’s level.

The willingness to spend more on defense is not the long pole in the European tent—the big challenges are inflation, energy costs, debt servicing, and weak economies. There are serious fiscal structural challenges to Europe spending a lot more on its own defense. This is a key point because it’s not just about telling Europe to “defend yourself because the United States has to pivot to Asia.” Post the Ukraine war, Europe now agrees that it must do more for its own defense.

America’s task nowadays is to encourage Europe to overcome self-imposed constraints on economic growth. This is particularly true regarding energy, where the “green agenda” is hamstringing Europe—energy prices are so high now that there are serious concerns that European companies will move to countries with cheaper energy, resulting in the old continent deindustrializing.

Make the Case for a Freedom-Based Development Model

The unfortunate reality is that many developing countries have little interest in joining one camp or the other on the basis of ideals such as freedom. Their primary focus is on lifting the standard of living of their people. America must be very clear that our free market economic system is superior to the Chinese economic model controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and to the Russian model controlled by the kleptocracy in the Kremlin.

Contra popular notions, the China-Russia model has less to offer. In 2021, the United State’s GDP per capita was $63,670. In stark contrast, after seventy-four years of Communist Party rule and twenty-three years of Putinism, Russia’s level was $27,960. And after seventy-two years under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s was only $16,997.

America ought to partner with developing countries to help them on the path of prosperity, not write blank checks of foreign aid. Economic partnerships that encourage foreign direct investment are the better answer for development. Partnerships are the answer even on security matters: Active diplomacy, encouraging foreign direct investment, security cooperation on strategic projects, and building stronger bridges can do more than raw military force.

Check the Checklist

When Washington starts delivering policies that achieve the ends we have laid out here, it will be a sign the United States is serious about winning the new cold war. Until then, we are just a target.

Dan Negrea is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. He served at the U.S. Department of State in leadership positions in the Policy Planning Office and the Economic Bureau.

Dr. James Jay Carafano is a Heritage Foundation vice president, directing the think tank’s research on issues of national security and foreign relations.

Image: Shutterstock.

Last month, Lebanese authorities began a new campaign of harassment against Syrian refugees, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the recipient of billions of American taxpayer dollars, is putting muscle behind the policy. The LAF has conducted dozens of raids in recent weeks, arresting hundreds of Syrians and forcibly deporting many of them to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria in violation of international law.

Herein lies the irony: at the outset of the Biden administration, Secretary of State Antony Blinken pledged to put “human rights at the center U.S. foreign policy.” But in Lebanon, U.S. policy is predicated on a paradox. On the one hand, Washington’s stated policy is one of support for accountability, rule of law, and respect for human rights. On the other hand, the administration remains wedded to the misguided belief that Lebanese institutions, like the LAF, are a positive counterweight to Iran-backed Hezbollah, the country’s dominant political and military force. In truth, however, the LAF answers to the Lebanese government, which at the moment is beholden to Hezbollah. So Washington ends up propping up the very order it claims to oppose.

At best, then, the recent LAF campaign against Syrian refugees reflects failed U.S. policy. At worst, the deportations reveal the administration’s stated policy to be nothing more than empty rhetoric.

Lebanon is home to 805,000 registered Syrian refugees but Lebanese officials estimate the actual number is upwards of 1.5 million. (The United Nations stopped registering new refugees in 2015, on the order of the Lebanese government.) In a country with a native population of only 5 million, the presence of so many refugees is impossible to ignore.

Four years ago, untrammeled corruption led to the implosion of the Lebanese financial sector, resulting in a historic economic collapse from which there has been no sustained recovery. Two-thirds of the country now lives in poverty and the refugee population continues to serve as a convenient scapegoat for a political class unserious about genuine economic or political reform. Worse yet, Lebanese officials are now using the refugees as pawns in a political game with Damascus.

The latest chapter in this story began in late March when, on a visit to Lebanon, the European Union Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarcic announced €60 million in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon. But, Lenarcic said, the European aid is “not a sustainable long-term solution” to Lebanon’s malaise. The financial crisis “was not created by the Syrian refugees” and it is incumbent upon Lebanese officials to implement critical reforms.

Lebanon’s caretaker Social Affairs Minister Hector Hajjar begged to differ. “Dear [Lenarcic],” Hajjar tweeted, “The Syrian displacement does not alone bear responsibility for the situation in [Lebanon], but it bears a huge part.” Hajjar proceeded to unload on Lenarcic a list of grievances against the refugees.

And so, Beirut started cracking down, deploying the U.S.-subsidized LAF as its enforcer. The LAF intensified raids and began summarily deporting refugees without any legal process; one refugee told reporters the LAF raids entailed “no search of the apartments, no questioning nor any suggestion of wrongdoing.”

In late April, an LAF official disclosed that some fifty refugees were forcibly deported to an uncertain fate in Syria. That number reportedly ballooned to 600 by early May. Back in Syria, the returnees face potential arrest, torture, and conscription.

According to deportee testimony, some of those expelled are held by the Syrian Army’s Fourth Division, which the U.S. Treasury sanctioned in 2020 for aiding in “the large-scale displacement of Syrian civilians.” The risks of remaining in Syria are prompting some to shell out hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars for gangs to illegally smuggle them back to Lebanon.

The United States and international community have provided Lebanon billions in humanitarian aid to address the refugee file, but that has not stopped Beirut from taking unilateral action before: in July, caretaker Minister of the Displaced, Issam Charafeddine, announced a government plan to repatriate 15,000 Syrian refugees per month. The plan was opposed by the United Nations and human rights NGOs who argued Syria remained unsafe for returning refugees. Charafeddine dismissed these concerns as a “fear campaign.”

The timing of the renewed campaign, including the increased role of the LAF, suggests that the Lebanese government and its military are leveraging Syrian refugees to serve their political agenda—namely, reconciliation with Assad. This round of forcible returns is taking place against the backdrop of Damascus’ readmission into the Arab League, and Beirut is eager to exploit the new political landscape.

While Beirut and Damascus have coordinated on the refugee file in the past, official engagement ran through Lebanon’s General Security Directorate. With Assad out in the cold, ministerial-level engagement was politically problematic. But now that the Arab states have opened the door for this type of engagement, the Lebanese are eager to walk through it.

Sure enough, Lebanese ministers convened in late April and delegated individuals to coordinate with the Assad regime on refugee returns. And, Lebanon’s caretaker Minister of the Displaced announced soon after Assad’s welcome that caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati is willing to lead a ministerial delegation to Syria. In the likelihood that Hezbollah succeeds at installing its ally and Assad’s personal friend, Suleiman Frangieh, as Lebanon’s president, this official track between Beirut and Damascus is posed to strengthen.

This brings us to the current moment. Speaking at the Arab League Summit on May 19, Mikati called on Arab states to invest in Syria’s reconstruction and “establish a roadmap” for Syrian refugees to be repatriated.

Predictably, it was Hezbollah that choreographed this entire dance. In a speech earlier this month, the leader of the U.S.-designated terror group directed Beirut to “restore normal relations with Syria,” adding that “there is no excuse anymore after Arabs restored ties.”

In short: the LAF, as an instrument of the Hezbollah-run Lebanese political order, exploited Syrian refugees to facilitate a political maneuver and potentially extract foreign aid and investment. The former head of Lebanon’s General Security admitted as much to the press on the eve of a donor conference in Brussels: “Come and pay, come and do something for us, so that we slow down [these deportations],” he said.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has done little more than pay lip service to “humanitarian issues in the region.” The administration continues to support the LAF, and even advocate energy deals between Syria and Lebanon that would profit Assad, as officials in Washington express qualified approval of reengaging Damascus. U.S. officials continue to reiterate that the return of Syrian refugees must be “voluntary, safe, and dignified,” but the LAF, apparently, gets a pass.

If the Biden administration is serious about human rights, it’s time to reconsider aid to the LAF.

The United States has invested over $3 billion in the Lebanese Armed Forces since 2006. In January, the Biden administration announced a new plan to subsidize LAF salary payments: $72 million will be funneled to the LAF and Lebanese Internal Security Forces through the United Nations Development Program. The scheme is legally suspect because it involves repurposing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds for functions outside FMF purview and circumvents statutes prohibiting the government from directly paying foreign military salaries.

For all its rhetoric about human rights, the Biden administration continues to underwrite Lebanese state institutions, such as the LAF, even if those institutions neither counterbalance Hezbollah nor conduct themselves responsibly. That American taxpayer dollars perennially flow irrespective of the LAF’s behavior suggests Washington’s stated policy, however well-intentioned, is hollow.

Natalie Ecanow is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Image: Shutterstock.

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At a closed-door Iran briefing in May, Biden administration officials reported to the U.S. Senate on the rapid advance of Tehran’s nuclear program. Senators who emerged from the briefing could not point to any clear plans the administration has to stop Iran from approaching the nuclear weapons threshold. Negotiations have stalled, but the White House also lacks a plan to turn up the pressure. Rather, the administration appears content to kick the can down the road, a strategy that may soon become untenable as Tehran’s nuclear capabilities approach a critical juncture—beyond a certain point, sanctions, and diplomatic pressure will not be able to deter Iran from building a bomb.

Inertia prevails in the White House even though the administration insists it is fully committed to preventing Iran from getting the bomb. Biden’s emphasis on great power competition entails a focus on China and Russia, not Iran. His priority for the Middle East is avoiding any new military intervention. Persian Gulf oil once commanded Washington’s attention, but the shale revolution has made the United States the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, so there is less pressure to play an active role.

The Biden administration is also short on foreign policy bandwidth. The war in Ukraine and fears of a confrontation over Taiwan are both consuming senior officials’ attention.

Clearly, the White House would like to conclude a new nuclear deal with Iran, but the changing nature of Tehran’s nuclear program makes it impossible to return to the original deal from which Donald Trump withdrew in 2018. Iran’s clerical regime has enriched uranium to much higher levels than ever before, approaching the production of weapons-grade material it could use in a warhead. Most of this progress occurred after Biden made clear he wanted a new deal—Tehran understood this meant the White House would tolerate new provocations.

Washington acknowledges that there is no simple way to return to the original nuclear deal and a longer and stronger deal is needed. Yet the lack of a viable alternative leaves the Biden administration seemingly rudderless. Instead, the White House appears to be stalling for time, hoping some unforeseen bit of good luck resolves its nuclear dilemma. But deferring decisive action may soon become impracticable. Time is on the side of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Soon, no combination of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions will be sufficient to stop him if he decides he wants the bomb.

The Iranian economy continues to struggle, yet Biden’s decision not to enforce sanctions vigorously has strengthened Khamenei’s hand. The regime continues to grapple with very high inflation, massive devaluation of its currency, and sluggish growth. Yet Iran still has substantial export revenue thanks to the lack of sanctions enforcement. In the Persian year 1401 (April 2022 to March 2023), Tehran exported $53 billion in non-oil goods. In just the first half of that year (April 2022 to October 2022), Tehran exported $29.4 billion in oil, gas, and condensate, according to the Central Bank of Iran. For comparison, between April 2020 and October 2020, Tehran managed only $8.6 billion of such exports. The majority of Iran’s crude oil exports go to China, which is glad to help undermine U.S. leverage.

Diplomacy with rogue states rarely results in disarmament. Even North Korea, with far fewer natural resources than Tehran, proved itself capable of withstanding a combination of economic and diplomatic pressure. It strung out negotiations over multiple decades, all the while building its nuclear arsenal. Libya did agree to dismantle its nuclear program, but only when the alternative appeared to be U.S. military intervention. In contrast, Israeli airstrikes destroyed both Syrian and Iraqi reactors.

Instead of its current policy (or lack thereof), the United States needs a “Plan B” that restores economic, diplomatic, and military pressure on Tehran. The Iranian nuclear program has reached a point where containment is not enough; rather, the United States needs to reverse the advances the program has made over the past two and a half years. The first step is to restore the credibility of U.S. military option through bold actions, such as the 2020 elimination of Qassem Soleimani, or destroying vessels that harass the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf. Washington could also enforce crippling sanctions, including using the Navy to stop Tehran’s exports of sanctioned goods such as crude oil and petrochemical products. If all else fails, and Tehran makes it clear that will acquire the bomb no matter what, then what is left is implementing a comprehensive plan to support the revolutionary movement seeking to overthrow Iran’s clerical regime.

The only alternative to Plan B is to accept the emergence of a nuclear-armed radical Islamist regime.

Dr. Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior Iran and financial economics advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), specializing in Iran’s economy and financial markets, sanctions, and illicit finance. Follow him on Twitter @SGhasseminejad. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Image: Shutterstock.

Since the beginning of the 2010s, the United Kingdom has developed its Indo-Pacific policy in pursuit of economic opportunities and expanding its security engagement. As part of these initiatives, Japan and the UK have developed defense and security cooperation since April 2012, when Japanese prime minister Yoshihiko Noda and British prime minister David Cameron issued the Joint Statement: A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security.

Against this background, on May 18, 2023, British prime minister Rishi Sunak, who was in Japan to attend the G7 Summit, issued the Hiroshima Accord: an Enhanced Japan-UK Global Strategic Partnership with Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida. The Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord, a comprehensive agreement on bilateral cooperation in the field of defense and technology, is a milestone for further enhancement of the bilateral defense and security cooperation that has been strengthened over the past decade or more.

The Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord indicated the development of cooperation among defense authorities based on the Japan-UK Reciprocal Access Agreement that was signed in January 2023. In the accord, both countries will conduct more practical joint military exercises to improve interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the British Armed Forces, including the future redeployment of the UK’s aircraft carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific.

It is also noteworthy that the accord positioned Japan-UK defense cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative and the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific Partnership. On March 13, 2023, the UK released a new foreign and security policy paper, “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world” (IR23), with an eye on rising China. In it, the UK positioned its Indo-Pacific policy as “a permanent pillar of the UK’s international policy” in the context of the Japan-led FOIP and the NATO-led Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific partnerships. Such a British Indo-Pacific policy in IR23 was also reflected in the Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord.

However, in the history of Japan-UK defense and security cooperation, the two countries have consistently pursued cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology. Of the eight defense and security cooperation items agreed upon in the 2012 Japan-UK Joint Statement, three were related to defense equipment and technology. On this basis, Japan concluded an Agreement for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the UK in July 2013. Within this framework, Japan and the UK promoted defense equipment and technology cooperation, culminating in the announcement of the Joint Leaders' Statement on the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), a Japan-UK-Italy joint development plan for fighter aircraft, in December 2022.

On the other hand, given the importance of economic security in the face of intensifying great power competition, the Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord included a section entitled “Economic Prosperity and Security Underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation,” which called for the establishment of a more comprehensive science and technology cooperation framework beyond purely defense technology. To do so, that section announces the establishment of a Ministerial Dialogue Framework between Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and the UK’s Department for Business and Trade (DBT) to facilitate comprehensive cooperation between Japan and the UK in the areas of supply chain resilience, access to critical natural resources, semiconductors, digital data, AI, and health sciences.

The accord also states that these efforts will be facilitated by “a new Industrial Science, Innovation and Technology Implementing Arrangement” that will include not only relevant ministries but also the private sector, education, and research institutions. A press release issued by Sunak on May 17, 2023, the day before the launch of the Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord, announced the deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific in 2025 and also noted the strategic relationship between Imperial College London and the University of Tokyo, as well as technical cooperation with Japanese private companies such as Hitachi Ltd. and Fujitsu. These remarks suggest that the development of bilateral cooperation on industrial science, technology, and innovation has already made considerable progress.

Thus, the Japan-UK Hiroshima Accord is a joint declaration by Japan and the UK on the efforts to prepare for the irreversible reorganization of global supply chains and international joint research networks in the context of economic security under great power competition. In other words, the release of the Japan-UK Accord means that defense and security cooperation has gone beyond the framework of diplomatic and defense authorities to reach a stage where it extends to the entire society of both countries.

Shingo Nagata is a visiting researcher at the Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Japan. He also serves as an editorial board member of the Japan Society of Strategic Studies.

Image: Shutterstock.

In June 2020, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) formally designated Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers Huawei and ZTE as national security threats, effectively banning their equipment in the United States. “We cannot treat Huawei and ZTE as anything less than a threat to our collective security,” commented FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr. “America has turned the page on the weak and timid approach to Communist China of the past … and our efforts will not stop here.”

Now, the world is facing a new threat from telecom providers backed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But this time the threat resides not in cell phone towers, but in low-earth orbit.

The satellite internet industry has experienced a boom in recent years and competition is beginning to heat up. The CCP has selected its national champion and plans to launch nearly 13,000 satellites, with the intent of further expanding its influence in the developing world. If the United States and its allies are to counterbalance China’s growing influence and promote internet freedom internationally, it is imperative that the U.S. create a regulatory ecosystem that fosters domestic competition in satellite internet.

Less than a decade ago, satellite internet networks offered relatively spotty, low-speed service that was ill-fitted for mass commercial uptake. But in 2019, SpaceX’s Starlink was the first to take a new approach. Rather than operating a low number of high-flying satellites as others had done, SpaceX took advantage of declining launch costs, thanks in part to its successful Falcon 9, to begin launching constellations consisting of a large number of satellites in low-earth orbit (LEO). These new LEO satellite internet networks have proven to be a gamechanger, offering consumers service with higher throughput, lower latency, and more global coverage than older networks.

With nearly 3,500 active satellites and more than 1 million subscribers, Starlink is reaping the benefits of being the first mover. But it isn’t the only project vying for this growing market. London-based OneWeb has nearly completed the first phase of its satellite constellation and projects that it will have global coverage by the end of the year. Amazon’s Project Kuiper plans to launch its first satellites early next year and to begin providing services to consumers soon after.

Then there’s China’s planned constellation. Alarmed by the speed and size of Western satellite constellations, China’s response to Western innovations became clear in late 2020 when the country submitted a spectrum allocation filing with the International Telecommunication Union—a branch of the United Nations charged with coordinating issues related to telecommunications networks. This filing indicated for the first time China’s plans to establish its own “megaconstellation” in LEO. The CCP contemporaneously added satellite internet to a list of “new infrastructure” projects that are the targets for significant investment, research, and development. Not long after, the state-owned China Satellite Network Group was established “to oversee the constellation project known as ‘Guowang.’” This new project fits squirrely within the CCP’s ongoing strategy for exporting internet and communications technology around the world.

For more than a decade, the CCP has been engaged in what the Council on Foreign Relations described as “one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived.” Known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this project is a collection of development projects and investments across the globe directly funded or financed by China. Foreign policy and national security experts regularly warn that the BRI is a thinly veiled exercise in sharp power where the Chinese government continually leverages BRI projects and investments to increase economic dependence and its political influence abroad.

One major component of the BRI is telecommunications networks. Dubbed the Digital Silk Road, China has invested heavily in building telecom infrastructure, particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. As a report from the Democratic staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations warned in 2020, “China’s rise as a key player in the digital domain that uses its influence to promote digital authoritarianism presents fundamental security, privacy, and human rights concerns for the United States and the international community at large.”

As that report and others have explained, telecom networks are an essential component of Chinese digital authoritarianism. While we often think of authoritarian censorship and surveillance as taking place on applications and platforms, much of this censorship instead happens on the networks that run these applications. CCP authorities actively monitor nearly all internet traffic running through their networks and use this surveillance apparatus to oppress domestic populations and propagandize to foreign countries.

Meanwhile, the lack of reliable internet infrastructure remains a major obstacle to development in many areas of the world. Traditional broadband connectivity is often limited or nonexistent in remote areas, hindering economic progress and knowledge exchange. By leveraging satellite internet technology, China aims to overcome these barriers and extend ubiquitous connectivity to the farthest reaches of the developing world.

Once established, these services will be used by the CCP in ways that expand its influence over and surveillance of the developing world. As highlighted in the most recent threat assessment from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, China is on pace to “achieve world-class status in all but a few space technology areas,” including LEO-based satellite internet by 2030, and will use these technologies “to advance its global standing and strengthen its attempts to erode U.S. influence across military, technological, economic, and diplomatic spheres.”

China’s strategy for building a tech industry that rivals that of the Western world is to designate certain entities as “national champions,” giving these entities near-monopolies over certain industries, and then backing them to the hilt. This strategy spurred the rise of Huawei, Tencent, Bytedance, and other companies. While this approach has its benefits, competition is more likely to drive innovation and technological advancement over time. Multiple competitors vying for market share drive companies to push boundaries, invest in research and development, and expand into new markets, ultimately benefiting users in the developing world. In this way, strong domestic competition is a key component of winning the international competition for digital preeminence and safeguarding global internet freedom.

There are several ways that the United States could support competition in the satellite internet industry. One agency already endeavoring to do so is the FCC. In late 2021, the FCC began a series of actions intended to support spectrum sharing and coordination between satellite internet providers. As FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel commented, “the rush to develop these new space opportunities requires new rules that keep competition and innovation front of mind. … We want to make sure [the rules] create a level playing field for new competitors.”

Now, the FCC is continuing this effort with further actions seeking to promote domestic competition. As the American satellite industry faces international competition from China, promoting spectrum sharing and coordination allows domestic satellite companies to optimize their use of available spectrum resources, which strengthens their ability to compete globally and deploy service to the developing world.

Beyond spectrum sharing, the FCC should take further steps to promote domestic competition amongst satellite internet providers. One area worth examining is the eligibility of satellite internet providers for certain federal programs. Starlink made headlines last year when the FCC awarded it over $855 million under the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF) auction only to then have those funds later revoked. While the FCC pointed to the fact that Starlink’s upload speeds fell “well below” the required 20 Mbps, questions remain about why and whether Stalink should have been excluded from receiving these funds, leading the company to appeal the FCC’s decision.

RDOF is only one of the numerous programs run through the Universal Service Fund (USF). To create clear rules that put domestic competition and innovation front of mind, the FCC should clarify standards and benchmarks for when satellite internet services have sufficient quality to become eligible for USF programs. Furthermore, the Federal Aviation Administration and Environmental Protection Agency, which are both involved in the licensing and regulation of the satellite internet industry, should follow the FCC’s lead and examine ways to promote domestic competition through standards-setting and streamlining regulatory compliance.

When it comes to countering China’s growing digital authoritarianism abroad, one of America’s most potent weapons continues to be its commitment to free and fair competition. Promoting domestic competition in the satellite internet industry is a critical aspect of geopolitical competition with China and an essential element in the pursuit of global internet freedom. If the United States does not proactively support its own satellite internet companies and encourage them to innovate, it will continue to cede ground to the Digital Silk Road. With a few nudges from federal policymakers, satellite internet may prove a potent catalyst for socioeconomic development, empowerment, and the free exchange of ideas both at home and abroad.

Luke Hogg is the director of outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation where his work focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies and public policy. He is also an innovation fellow at Young Voices. You can follow him on Twitter at @LEHogg.

Image: SpaceX.

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