Diplomacy & Crisis News

The United States maintains a technological edge in defensive technology and capability, but our Achilles' heel might be our industrial base.

In a recent war game run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States ran out of missiles against China within days of conflict breaking out. This has been echoed in the Ukraine-Russo War, as manufacturers struggle to fill the massive demand. On top of that, defensive firms often fragilely rely on one manufacturing plant. Attempts to revive supply have been slow. Meanwhile, the shipyards can’t build even two destroyers a year, citing supply chain issues and labor shortages. One can be all for developing cutting-edge projects like the B-21 bomber, but there’s something to be said for mass—possessing more than enough quantity of cruise missiles, rockets, and bombs. All this should serve as a warning that we may simply not have the industrial base to support a protracted conflict.

This realization comes at a critical time as China’s single-minded obsession with submerging Taiwan under its rule threatens to cause massive global disruptions. Taiwan is a doorstep to the all-important shipping lanes and is the main producer of semiconductors, which practically every industry relies on. Washington would be under immense pressure to enter the war if China decided to invade.

To prevent this, American diplomacy needs teeth. The lethality of the U.S. military should be unquestioned by our adversaries as generations ahead of their own. Making this possible means that a robust industrial and technology sector is not only an issue of jobs, but of national defense.

Lawmakers are aware of the problem, but so far, their response has been misguided. Much of it has been reactive, seemingly stemming from a panic of watching China spend massive amounts on subsidies. We try to “keep up with the Jones” and mimic their actions to an extent. Earlier this year, Biden signed the $52 billion CHIPS Act into law, providing massive subsidies for the semiconductor industry—certainly an important industry for defense, especially given that the Department of Defense uses 1.9 billion chips a year.

If only it were that simple. As Bloomberg’s editorial board notes, throwing money at the problem won’t solve it. Renowned historical economists like Henry Hazlitt, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman wrote extensively on how subsidies misallocate resources, create distortions, and stymie growth. China, often admired by some for its remarkable growth and development over the past few decades—made possible by subsidies and government policy—now faces deep economic problems. This was entirely predictable. It is not a strategy we should mimic.

What really stifles dynamism in the United States is overregulation—big government, as it were. Clean Air Act permits can take eighteen months. National Environmental Policy reviews take an average of four and a half years. As new technologies continue to quickly develop, this is time companies can’t afford. Tariffs, designed to protect the defense industry, have instead hurt it. President Joe Biden’s hostility towards low-cost, reliable energy only adds to production costs. The Jones Act, designed to protect American shipping, has instead made it incapable of meeting national defense needs. This is all without even including the maze of local “not in my backyard” laws that in 2015 were estimated to cost the U.S. economy at least $1 trillion a year. The list goes on. This overregulation has serious consequences in both time and money.  Producing semiconductors in the United States, for example, takes 25 percent longer and is 50 percent costlier than in Asia.

Then there’s the labor shortage. According to one study, 300,000 more skilled workers were needed just to fill current chip plants, much less start new ones. Addressing this will require immigration reform. This is a thorny political issue, but the simple reality is that ample labor keeps production high and costs low. Attracting the best minds in the world is one of the best and easiest ways to stay competitive. Currently, foreign STEM students receive their graduate degrees in the United States (often at taxpayer expense), but caps on green cards make it hard for them to stay. We literally pay for their education and then kick them out—often to China’s benefit. In fact, Chinese leaders in semiconductors and other technologies were all educated in the United States.  

There are, of course, security risks in expanding visas, which China will try to exploit for espionage purposes. But the upside is too great to ignore, and the downsides can be enormous; educating foreigners and kicking them out seems to be the best way Beijing can piggyback off of U.S. research. The creator of 5G technology, who was sponsored by the Chinese company Huawei, and the father of Chinese missile and space technology were both immigrants forced out of the United States. “The stupidest thing this country has ever done” is what former Secretary of the Navy, Dan Kimball said about the latter. Surely creative ways to strengthen security while tapping into the talent that accompanies visa expansion must exist.

As historian Victor Davis Hanson and others have written, the freer nations are the more powerful their military. Authoritarian regimes don’t have the dynamism to build and adapt. The challenge for Congress and the next president will be to position him or herself as a reformer that can unshackle U.S. industry from the burden of onerous regulation. A nation of liberated innovators, visionaries, and entrepreneurs would put China to shame, full stop.

Daniel Duffy is a Marine veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan that writes on foreign policy. His work is found in several publications.

Image: Official White House Photo/Flickr.

The December 2021 election of Gabriel Boric as President of Chile was hailed by progressive opinion around the world. Here was a new type of Latin leftist—young, untainted by authoritarian tendencies, sensitive not only to longstanding issues of inequality but also to newer ones of climate change, gender, sexuality, and indigenous rights. He would represent a new, impatient generation of Chileans who would supplant the stodgy, timid centrists and implement real change.

Now, a year and a half later, the picture looks very different. Boric’s support has sunk in the polls, hovering around 30 percent. A new constitution drafted by a convention dominated by the political Left was soundly rejected in a referendum. The country’s Right triumphed in a follow-up election to name delegates to a second convention. Issues of crime, terrorism, and illegal immigration dominate the public agenda, while much of Boric’s legislative agenda is stuck in a divided Congress.

Amid Crisis, the Left Triumphs

The saga of the rise and apparent decline of Boric and Chile’s Left began in 2019 with a series of protests, extending for months and throughout the length of the country. The demonstrations were sparked initially by an increase in Santiago’s metro fares. Although many of the protesters, in what was known as the “social explosion,” were peaceful, there was significant violence and destruction of property.

The protests reached a point where it was unclear if then-President Sebastian Piñera could survive in office. Seeking a political solution to the unrest, Piñera and the political establishment agreed to a longstanding leftist demand for a convention to rewrite Chile’s constitution. The document was initially imposed during the dictatorial regime of General Augusto Pinochet but was significantly modified after the restoration of democracy in 1990.

Some on the far left saw the convention as a trap to channel the energies of the protests into normal politics. Boric, a former student leader-turned-congressman for a small, new leftist party (Social Convergence), supported it, giving him new prominence. The legislation authorizing the convention passed and was submitted to a referendum, where it gained extensive support from an exhausted public. In May 2021, an election was held to name delegates to the constitutional convention. To the surprise of many, leftist forces gained over a two-thirds majority.

Meanwhile, with Piñera’s term due to end in March of 2022, Boric, now a prominent national figure, ran for the presidency under the banner of the “Broad Front”—a coalition of relatively new leftist parties together with Chile’s Communist Party, which since the return to democracy had always commanded the support of a hard core of 6 or 7 percent of the population.

The traditional center-left and center-right coalitions nominated lackluster candidates; simultaneously, a new force emerged to their right—the Republican Party, led by Senator José Antonio Kast. The Republicans espoused economic and social conservatism and were prepared to defend the record of the Pinochet years. They have been compared to the new rightist parties which have emerged in Europe, such as Vox in Spain, the National Rally in France, and the Brothers of Italy.

In the first round, the centrist parties which had governed Chile since the return to democracy in 1990 suffered a collapse. The two winners who went on to the second round were Kast with 27.91 percent and Boric with 25.82 percent. No other grouping gained more than 13 percent.  In the second round, the voters decisively broke for Boric, who won with a majority of 55.9 percent.

Between the presidential election and convention delegate selection, it seemed the radical Left had made a remarkable comeback, reaching power not seen since the election of Salvador Allende in 1970. Under the leadership of a new generation of political leaders, Chile was perceived to be on a fast track to major political change. The cautious approach to achieving social progress, as exemplified by the slogans “growth with equity” and “realism without renunciation”—associated with center-left Presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet—was not enough for an impatient public.

Events, however, unfolded very differently. Boric’s administration had to contend with the reality that its majority in the Chamber of Deputies included the center-left parties it sought to replace. In the evenly divided Senate, its position was even more tenuous.

Trying for a New Constitution

While the center-left parties were prepared to cooperate with Boric’s Broad Front coalition, matters were not helped by the measure of patronizing contempt which had emerged from the latter, as demonstrated by the presidential chief of staff who said that the New Left had “different values” from the previous, politically compromised generation.

In that frustrating environment, Boric and his government looked to the constitutional convention to draft a document in which their economic and social views would be permanently inscribed and held off on proposing major new legislation in the meantime. However, the convention, with its clear leftist majority, produced in July 2022 a result that was not palatable to the great majority of Chileans.

Its 388 articles guaranteed a leading role to the state in healthcare, education, and pensions, areas previously dominated by the private sector. Chile would be declared a “plurinational” state, with the indigenous communities exercising unprecedented autonomy, including their own justice systems. The document enshrined strict environmental controls, threatening Chile’s profitable mining, fishery, and forestry sectors. Moreover, the reformed legislature and judiciary gave the Left an unfair structural advantage.

Also, in addition to being radical in its final product, the conduct of many convention delegates offended Chileans. Performative gestures ranged from delegates interrupting the national anthem to the bizarre case of one who dressed up as a Pokemon character. Throughout the year-long convention, the majority lacked interest in accommodating centrist and conservative views. All of this led many voters to feel deep suspicion of the final draft.

Two Resounding Rejections

Although by the time the nationwide referendum on the draft constitution was held in September of 2022, its approval seemed doubtful, the level of rejection was stunning—62 percent of voters opposed it. Given that Boric was closely identified with the convention, his support seemed reduced to his hard-core supporters, a view which was supported by polling on his popularity.

After the rejection of the draft constitution Boric and the Left insisted that the original mandate from the people to write a new document still had validity and pushed for a second convention. While many on the Right were unenthusiastic, they were trapped by their promise to back a new convention if the first failed.

Ultimately Congress passed legislation authorizing a new convention, but this time with significant constraints on radical ambitions. The first draft would be prepared by a commission of experts named by the Congress; the actual convention (now called a “council”) would have limited authority to change the experts’ draft; and a board of arbitrators would review the final document to assure that it stayed within the fairly limited congressional mandate the council had been given.

Unlike the vote to elect the previous constitutional convention, this time, voters selected delegates from slates nominated by political parties—eliminating the independent intellectuals and civil society activists who had been among the most radical members. The results closely paralleled those of the previous constitutional referendum—leftist delegates made up only 34 percent of the new council.

And within the conservative majority of 66 percent of the delegates, its composition skewed well to the Right, with Jose Antonio Kast’s Republican Party becoming the dominant force with 46 percent of the total seats. This would make it, to judge by this vote at least, the most popular political party in Chile. This was a true earthquake, given the party had emerged recently, and it raised the prospect of a conservative renaissance.

It is worth noting that in both the first constitutional referendum and the election of the delegates to the second constitutional convention, voting was mandatory (it is not in the regular congressional and presidential elections.)  This new element of the electorate, which skews towards older voters, came down decisively on the political Right and had a key role in the final result in both cases.

This outcome, on top of the rejection of the previous draft constitution, has meant that any new constitution is not likely to differ vastly from the existing one. But beyond that, it means Boric, who is in office until 2026, is obliged to trim back his legislative ambitions while keeping his own coalition together. Even before the most recent debacle, he gave senior positions to figures from the old center-left parties while nonetheless claiming to stay true to his radical election platform.

The decline in support for Boric, as evidenced both in polling and in the results of the two votes regarding constitutional reform, has several causes. Certainly, the disastrous management of the first convention had an impact. But also, during his first year in office, other issues came to the forefront of national life: namely urban crime, especially in Santiago; the unprecedented flow of immigrants into Chile from Haiti and Venezuela; and the violence generated by radical indigenous groups in southern Chile.

The Boric administration, which ran on a platform of diversity and social inclusion, was ill-equipped and slow to address these issues. Eventually, it took reluctant steps, such as deploying the military to support the police in the south. It had to swallow hard and accept legislation passed over its objections which limited the liability of the police and army when faced with brutality charges. But at the same time, in what proved to be a highly unpopular step, it reached out to its far left base by pardoning several protesters convicted of violent acts during the social explosion.

Who Will Win the Center?

Faced with low popularity and lacking a solid working majority in Congress, Boric has lowered his sights while still proclaiming fealty to the radical program on which he ran. He has scored some successes—a law increasing royalties on Chile’s crucial mining industry has passed after a downward adjustment. The work week has been reduced from 45 to 40 hours, and the minimum wage raised.

But other elements of his platform, such as a large general tax increase, massive increases in the state’s role in the health and pension systems, and a proposed state-run lithium mining enterprise, will face considerable modification in Congress if they are to have any chance of passing in face of emboldened moderates and conservatives.

Boric, however, should not be written off completely. He retains his appealing, youthful persona. While his fundamental views remain radical, he has taken steps to moderate his message and frustrate his Communist and independent leftist base. Old center-left establishment figures remain in key cabinet positions, and Boric’s legislative agenda is limited to his top priorities.

If he gets some legislation passed, even if it is watered down, and the economy picks up, he may see improvement in his standing. Indeed, his recent address to Congress, which struck a conciliatory tone, has given him a momentary uptick in the polls.

Chile’s center-right and center-left governments had real achievements, making the country a poster child for economic development and poverty reduction over the last thirty years. However, they became complacent, with the same faces cycling through key positions over the years. At the same time, there was a failure of nerve, particularly among the center-left, which seemingly felt guilty about defending the merits of gradualism in the face of the public’s rising expectations.

This opened the way for Boric and the far left. But they erred in assuming that the center’s collapse meant that Chilean public opinion had shifted to the point where they had free rein to implement their vision. This overreaching, in turn, opened the door to Kast and the hard right.

But Chile’s disillusioned centrist voters remain the key battleground. Kast’s Republicans will try hard to permanently capture them and will likely give special attention to those older Chileans who came out for the recent votes on constitutional issues. At the same time, the centrist parties will seek to reconstitute themselves and regain their lost support.

But it is also possible that Boric—now rebranded as a more moderate social democrat—will find a way to once more reclaim the center while retaining much of his hard left support. He is down, but not out, and Chile’s center remains up for grabs.

Richard M. Sanders is Senior Fellow, Western Hemisphere at the Center for the National Interest. He is also a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he has served as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs and at embassies throughout Latin America.

Image: Shutterstock

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Washington DC was completely obscured by smoke on June 8; a consequence of Canadian wildfires occurring several hundred miles away. The situation was uncomfortably symbolic of the importance of foreign policy: something happening far away can still affect the daily lives of people in a separate country, including political leaders and decisionmakers.

But the smoke’s obscuring effect was also symbolic of the state of conservative foreign policy in Washington, best exemplified by, coincidentally happening at the same time, The American Conservative’s tenth foreign policy conference: somewhat unclear, though with a visible goal in the yonder distance.

The magazine’s history is reflective of American conservatives’ own evolution over the past few decades on foreign policy matters: it was founded by disaffected paleoconservatives and others who opposed the mainstream conservative movement’s endorsement of the Iraq war, its well known for consistently critiquing the current state of American foreign policy and related topics (globalization, mass immigration, neoconservative interventions, etc.), it aligned with Donald Trump’s populist movement, and it is now a leading publication—if not the unofficial voice—of the American “New Right.” Its annual conference—with Congressmen (arriving on time!), staffers, foreign policy experts, journalists, political activists, and students attending—is thus a rich opportunity to gauge the state of thinking on the U.S. political Right.

At present, that thinking is broadly critical of Washington’s current approach to foreign policy, along with the principles and ideas that underlie that approach—the universality of liberal (if not progressive) and democratic values, a conviction that illiberalism (in any measure) is an existential threat, a generous interpretation of what constitutes the national interest, an equally generous understanding of what means can be used to pursue said interests, and so on.

In contrast, New Right conservatives lean strongly toward realism—or rather, their values are more congenial to those that underline realism. These include: a conviction on the importance of national sovereignty and non-interventionism in the affairs of foreign countries (unless absolutely necessary, conservatively understood); an appreciation of power politics and the struggle between states; prudence and caution, preferring a stable international environment over pursuing idealistic but potentially risky endeavors that promote liberal values; a strong skepticism of global governance and international institutions; and a conservative understanding of human imperfection and our flawed nature, along with a deep apprehension of any endeavor that would seek to surpass or ignore such.

Much of this was discernible given the various speakers’ comments. “If you think wars end by good defeating evil, you’re not realistic,” declared Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), one of the conference’s featured speakers. Similarly, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), giving a keynote, stated that he identifies as “a constitutional realist” who sees “foreign policy first through the lens of our constitution,” including that Congress must reclaim its power to declare war. “The people who comprise the blob have been badly, consistently wrong,” he went on, calling for the inclusion of alternative viewpoints in the foreign policy discourse.

These views translate into a more realist and restraint-oriented policy. Consider the War in Ukraine. Attendees of this event expressed sympathy towards Ukrainians fighting against Russia’s invasion but do not believe that Kyiv should be given a blank check to “fight authoritarianism” all the way to Moscow. What is the American political objective in this conflict? To what extent are we willing to engage in a proxy war with Russia? When and how will the conflict end? Conservatives here note that such questions are going notably unanswered in the halls of power. Lee critiqued the politics surrounding the Ukraine debate, including that “anyone raising dissent or questions is immediately labeled a Putin apologist.”

Likewise, the topic of China and its challenge featured prominently. This is a particularly interesting issue, given that it was the Trump administration that emphasized the China challenge and forced the Washington foreign policy set to abandon its old approach to Beijing. Curiously, the roles are now somewhat reversed; neoconservatives and the foreign policy establishment, realists believe, are becoming dangerously hawkish. “Adopting a Cold War mindset regarding China would have horrible consequences here at home,” warned Dan Caldwell, the newish vice president of the Center for Renewing America. Meanwhile, Michael Anton, the famous/notorious (depending on your political inclinations) Trump administration staffer and essayist, counseled that “if the anti-Chinese rhetoric remains focused on security instead of economics, we’re going to wind up somewhere really dumb.” Sen. Paul was particular on this topic, acknowledging that if “you come to my Republican caucus and you’ll hear the beating of drums. These are drums for war with whomever, but primarily war with China. Everything is about war with China.” Paul warned against this trend, emphasizing that “strategic ambiguity has kept the peace for fifty years,” and overturning that would be courting disaster.

For realists and those oriented toward realism, this all sounds well and good. The goal of this movement is clear: a more sane, restrained, and cautious foreign policy that places America’s national interests (more strictly defined) first. The problem, however, is that there are two major obstacles to their ambitions.

The first is that conservative realists at this event (and further afield) share an unfortunate trait with their Washington DC blob nemeses: a Western-centrism that blinds them to events unfolding abroad. Outside of the principal spheres and topics of importance—China, Russia, Europe, and Middle Eastern forever wars—very little to nothing was said about what is happening in the rest of the world. Latin America is often mentioned in passing either as a component of the mass immigration question or in the context of having to reinforce the Monroe Doctrine to ward off foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere. Africa is barely talked about. Central and Southeast Asia goes unmentioned. One could retort this is being nitpicky or that these regions do not present a direct or strong challenge to American interests as Russia and China do. Yet the observation does raise a question: how do conservative realists and restrainers intend to dramatically affect U.S. foreign policy if they lack informed views, policies, or even experts on what happens outside of Washington’s typical narrow focus?

Consider, for instance, that in the coming multipolar world, where America jockeys with China and Russia for influence, Central Asia will assume outsized importance given its energy reserves, trade routes, and growing economic strength. U.S. policy toward the region will require knowledgeable individuals who understand Central Asian geopolitical dynamics, speak one or more relevant languages (Russian, Chinese, Kazakh, Uzbekh, etc.), and can articulate why the region merits more attention. Do realists, especially conservatives, have enough qualified people to fill these roles? If they do not, then their political opponents will fill these spots by default, some of whom might very well push non-realist views or enact more culture-war-oriented policies that conservatives are diametrically and virulently opposed to.

This dovetails to the second obstacle bedeviling conservative realists: how will they achieve their goals? The lesson the New Right took from the Trump administration is that even if you control the presidency, policy is ultimately executed by a vast army of staffers, appointees, and more—personnel that the New Right currently lacks. A few of suggestions were thrown up: the utilization of Schedule F to “shatter the deep state” and appoint realists to positions of power or to identify, train, and prepare a new generation of young Americans who can fulfill this role. It’s worth noting that young students and staffers—especially from American Moment, an organization whose explicit goal is to prepare the next generation of realist-oriented conservatives—made up a large proportion of the conference’s attendees. Yet given the vast numbers required to operate the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, fielding this new army of conservative realists will take years of preparation and significant resources.

Conservative realists know this and retort, not unfairly, that the primary focus right now is raising awareness and fighting for greater numbers. Adherents to this worldview, though rising, are still very much in the political minority; fighting to claim greater numbers to be able to properly challenge the pro-interventionist foreign policy establishment takes priority. Perhaps it was recently-elected, casually-dressed, Peter-Zeihan-reading, rather authentic Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ) who best captured this sentiment, expressing that the Republican Party has not yet fully grappled with the sheer number of geopolitical and technological changes that have occurred in only a few decades.

This is quite probably true, but not only must the Party grapple with these changes; conservative realists must also grapple with the reality that they face a long, uphill battle. They may have their eyes on the summit, but getting there will be harder than they anticipate.

Carlos Roa is the Executive Editor of The National Interest.

Image: Office of Sen. Rand Paul/Twitter.

The recent flare-up in northern Kosovo between NATO peacekeeping troops and ethnic Serbians has reminded the world that while the brutal war in Ukraine may be the greatest threat to European stability at the moment, it is by no means the only one.

On May 29, Serb protestors clashed with NATO troops after the authorities in Kosovo attempted to escort newly elected mayors into government administration buildings in the Serb-dominated northern municipalities. The ethnically Albanian mayors were elected in November 2022 with a meager voter turnout of 3.5 percent, as ethnic Serbians in the region boycotted the elections as part of their ongoing struggle with Kosovo’s government. This came on the heels of the July 2022 decision in Pristina, the country’s capital, to force Serbs in the region to adopt Kosovo license plates rather than Serbian ones.

Although the matter may seem trivial to outside observers, the move was interpreted by many as simply the latest example of Pristina’s overreach. Though Kosovo officially proclaimed its independence in 2008, it was a contentious move that many countries do not recognize. Although the four Serb-majority northern municipalities compose a relatively small portion of the country, with ethnic Serbs composing only 6 percent of the country’s total population, a 2013 EU-brokered deal was meant to allow for a degree of self-rule in the region. The Serbs living in Kosovo have grown increasingly discouraged by Pristina’s failure to implement the terms of the agreement, a fact that both the United States and the EU have acknowledged.

Back in July, protestors set up a number of roadblocks in northern Kosovo following the initial move to alter licensing and registration. Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić described the gravity of the situation by stating that “we [authorities in Belgrade and Serbs in northern Kosovo] have never been in a more difficult situation”—quite a statement considering the region’s notorious volatility.

Nonetheless, Pristina decided to move forward with the mayoral elections despite calls from both Washington and Brussels to delay the vote. There was further cause for consternation when the Kosovar government then went on to ignore Western pressure to have the mayors conduct government operations from a remote location in order to avoid a potential physical clash with demonstrators obstructing access to municipality centers. This is exactly what happened when Pristina decided to use Kosovo law enforcement to forcibly escort the “elected” representatives into official administrative buildings being blocked by Serb protestors. The subsequent attempt by NATO peacekeeping forces to manage the turmoil resulted in dozens of injuries, including eleven Italians and nineteen Hungarians who were a part of the peacekeeping contingent. Over fifty Serb protestors were additionally injured. Belgrade responded to the incident by raising the combat readiness of Serbia’s armed forces to its highest level.

Both the United States and the European Union were swift in their condemnation of the Kosovo government. U.S. ambassador Jeff Hovenier tweeted out his disapproval of Pristina’s actions, stating that “today’s violent measures should be immediately halted.” On June 2, Secretary of State Antony Blinken further laid the blame at the feet of the country’s leadership and its course of “escalating tensions in the north and increasing instability.” An EU-brokered agreement to hold new mayoral elections in the northern municipalities was subsequently reached at a meeting in Moldova attended by Vučić, Kosovo president Vjosa Osmani, and EU high representative for foreign affairs Josep Borrell. French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Olaf Sholz were also present.

It remains to be seen whether the decision to conduct new elections will be enough to lower the tensions in the region. The present situation is a reminder that the United States, for better or worse, remains the ultimate arbiter in guaranteeing Kosovo’s independence and maintaining general stability in the region. This means that the authorities in Pristina must understand the necessity of playing to international audiences, especially those located in the halls of Washington. Prime Minister Albin Kurti has certainly acknowledged as much: the U.S. flag is often seen at his rallies, side by side with Kosovo’s national flag (as well as that of Albania).

Kurti has also attempted to defend his government’s actions by utilizing the current lexicon of U.S. domestic politics. He has continually equated the protestors in northern Kosovo to “right-wing extremist groups,” and took to Twitter to state that “in a democracy there is no place for fascist violence”—language eerily similar to U.S. president Joe Biden’s multiple references to political opposition that still support former president Donald Trump as “semi-fascists.” The protestors, according to Kurti, are “extremists and militias,” and do not represent “the people.” In the past, the prime minister notably feuded with Trump-appointed special envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Richard Grenell, and eagerly endorsed Biden for president in 2020.

For her part, Osmani has also recognized the importance of political narratives and curating the proper international image. She has presented her country as a besieged nation in a similar situation to that of Ukraine and its ongoing war with Russia. Meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy on June 1 at the EU summit in Moldova, she later tweeted that “No one understands Ukraine’s pain, struggle and resilience better than the people of Kosovo.” She concluded with the statement that “nothing can stand in the way of a people’s will to be free.”

Outside the government administrative buildings in the northern Kosovo municipality of Zvecan, Serb protestors carried signs displaying a similar message: “We are not criminals, we just want freedom,” as well as “You will not drive us out of our homes.” In fact, the political dynamics of the situation in northern Kosovo are in many ways similar to that of eastern Ukraine. Much like Ukraine, Kosovo is a historically disputed territory that’s secession from its former arbiter of political control has not been accepted by a significant portion of the citizens in the country which it seceded from. Ethnic Serbs who found themselves in the newly independent Kosovo (exacerbated after its official independence in 2008) felt displaced from their rightful political home, much like some Russians in the Donbas felt in relation to Moscow, particularly after 2014.

It is no coincidence then that Kurti would claim that the Serb protestors in northern Kosovo are Moscow sympathizers. In an attempt to tie his own struggle to that of Kyiv against the destructive war waged by Vladimir Putin, Kurti also made specific reference to the fact that many protestors displayed the “Z of Russian aggression in Ukraine.” He would go on to state that “the pro-Russian elements in Serbia and the north of Kosovo want to destabilize everything that has been agreed so far.” Many Serbs in the region have been seen displaying their solidarity with Putin and Russia in general, ostensibly as a means for appealing to Moscow for support in the current situation.

Regarding the Kremlin’s stance, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov commented on the situation in Kosovo to Russian state media, saying that “a huge explosion is being prepared in the center of Europe, in the place where, in 1999, NATO attacked Yugoslavia, violating every imaginable (international) principle.”

This is an analysis shared by many ethnic Serbs. The potential for a wider conflagration is certainly a real possibility. However, the relative strength of the United States and the broader transatlantic alliance which it controls is a powerful incentive for Serbia to remain within the bounds of Western-dictated behavior.

The war in Ukraine may very well end up as a type of frozen conflict similar to the situation between Kosovo and Serbia. And much like the latter situation, the United States will almost certainly end up as the ultimate guarantor of the Ukrainian situation as it is for Kosovo. Policymakers should keep this fact in mind as they try to reach a settlement that accounts for the much more significant security implications surrounding a direct military challenge with Russia.

Dominick Sansone is a Ph.D. student at the Hillsdale College Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship. Previously a Fulbright recipient to Bulgaria, his writing on politics in the Black Sea region has been published by The National Interest, the Euromaidan Press, The American Conservative, and RealClear Defense, among other publications. He also previously wrote as a contributing columnist focusing on Russia-China relations at The Epoch Times.

Image: Shutterstock.

The post-Western, multipolar international order is coming to pass. As the world grapples with the implications of this shift in power, the foundations of a great reckoning are taking shape. This reckoning will challenge the long-held beliefs and structures that have sustained Western dominance of the world for the past few hundred years, exposing along the way the nature of the West’s perceived entitlement to lead the global pecking order. The end result will be a significant re-evaluation of international relations as we know it.

This great reckoning will be driven by five major trends, which are compelling Western nations to confront and adapt to a future where power must be shared with the rest in a multipolar world. A failure to recognize, or attempting to strongly resist, these trends could pose significant risks not only to the West itself but also to global stability. Yet future conflicts can be avoided if this period of change is viewed as an opportunity to build a more equitable world, rather than as a crisis that threatens preferred and entrenched privileges.

Five Trends to Consider

What future awaits the West—a smooth transition toward multipolarity or a period of instability and potential conflict—will largely depend on how policymakers respond to the following five trends.

First is the unravelling of the hitherto telling of history. The West, across its colonial history, has practiced and perfected the selective interpretation and telling of events, choosing to portray itself as the originator of modern civilization and a benevolent guiding force. This is now changing; information technologies, such as the Internet and social media, have broken the monopoly over information and history once held by Western gatekeeping institutions (media companies, universities, book publishers, and more). As a consequence, people around the world are recognizing that history is no longer confined to Western interpretation—including its projection of benevolence.

A significant component of this has been the West’s frequent failure to acknowledge its own imperfect past. Despite amplifying the perceived wrongdoings of others, it has been silent about its own unsavory moments, such as early American pioneers’ destruction of First Nation cultures, European exploitation of the African continent, or Australia’s treatment of aboriginal peoples. Addressing these historical episodes matters all the more because they affect current behavior; Western nations also have problems admitting to contemporary mistakes and intentions. 

Non-Western nations can now make clear that their own countries and communities have long histories that not only exist despite Western interpretation, but these histories need to be explored, understood, and told. The West must grapple with this trend and its implications, rather than continue to obscure it in denial. Consider the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the Indian government to compel Great Britain to return the treasure stolen from India, including some of the crown jewels.

The second trend is the re-evaluation of the” rules-based” international order. Policymakers in Washington may not like hearing it, but the concept is the subject of much derision around the world and is widely regarded as a tool used by the West to control global affairs and maintain hegemony. There is ample resentment growing against Western nations given the repeated breaching of their own rules, meaning that the legitimacy of this order is being questioned despite its positive aspects.

Coinciding with this growing frustration is the reality that the distribution of power across more nations is transforming the current world order and creating new opportunities and challenges. China has assumed a more prominent position, offering global public goods such as peacemaking and addressing climate change in a manner Western nations are not willing, or able, to do. Similarly, India is beginning to assert itself, as are other smaller nations, like the UAE and Indonesia.

As more countries determine their own trajectories in the twenty-first century, the West must recognize that the international balance of power has shifted. It cannot continue to impose its will on others—the rise of China and other nations is evidence of such. The West must come to terms with this new reality and recognize that a new, more pragmatic, and multipolar approach is needed, where nations pursue foreign policies committed to co-existence, driven by their own best interests rather than aligning themselves with “one side” or the other.

Third is the unmasking of Western “peacekeeping.” Despite portraying itself as the guarantor of global security, much of the world now views the United States‚ and Europe to a lesser extent, as profiting from war rather than being interested in promoting authentic peace. The Western military-industrial complex—particularly the United States’—is so powerful that it is now well-known to drive U.S. foreign policy to the extent that it perpetuates conflicts to thus profit from war.

At present, the United States and its NATO allies are driving the rise in global military spending, with America spending more on defense than the next ten countries combined. It is similarly well known that almost half of the Pentagon’s budget goes to private contractors each year, and the military-industrial complex donates millions of dollars to U.S. Congressional races, resulting in state capture and significant increases in defense budgets.

The rest of the world has realized that the West alone cannot be trusted to lead global peace efforts, especially if a significant portion of their economies are geared to profit from conflict. In light of this, a positive change is occurring, with China brokering ground-breaking peace agreements—between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example—while world leaders like Indonesia’s Joko Widodo, India’s Narendra Modi, and Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pitch peaceful resolutions to modern conflicts.

The fourth trend underway is the dethroning of the Western financial superstructure. That the West makes ample use of its financial might for geopolitical advantage and purposes is no great secret—policymakers and experts openly talk about the “weaponization of finance” and applying sanctions on countries that do not comply with Western intentions. Likewise, the ability of the United States and its allies to freeze and even confiscate the reserves of sovereign states—Afghanistan, Venezuela, Russia—sent shock waves across the world.

Because of this and the West’s own track record of financial greed and impropriety—which resulted in devastating crises such as the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the recent collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, which has had global reverberations—distrust in and a rejection of Western financial structures is growing.

Efforts are now underway to dismantle the exorbitant privilege bestowed on the United States via its currency. De-dollarization is very much happening, with the currency’s share of global reserves falling to 47 percent last year, down from 73 percent in 2001. Additionally, countries are seeking alternatives to the SWIFT system, which also has been used in aid of Western-based sanctions and thus alarmed the global majority. As countries with stable currencies gain influence, a more multipolar economic order emerges, reshaping geopolitical alliances, economic diplomacy, and the balance of power within international institutions. This change may grant developing nations greater flexibility in managing their currencies and monetary policies and limit the West’s capacity to unilaterally impose sanctions. Moreover, BRICS nations have recently surpassed the G7 in terms of GDP, signaling a redistribution of economic power and hinting at a future of cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and development assistance.

Fifth and finally, there is the notable collapse of the Western press’ credibility. This comes at a critical juncture, as repeated shortcomings in the last few years have heightened global awareness of Western media’s role in perpetuating the West’s preferred aspects of the current world order—often to the detriment of other countries.

For instance, persistent China-bashing in Western headlines has perpetuated an unproductive and fear-mongering narrative of Beijing as a threat to its own citizens and the world at large. The geopolitical contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, though complicated affairs, have been particularly and selectively drummed up to push an “us vs. them” narrative, rather than encouraging understanding between the West and China.

Similarly, overwhelmingly one-sided coverage of the Ukrainian conflict regularly overlooks national and regional geopolitical complexities in the long-standing Russian-Ukrainian relationship and the history of NATO expansion in Europe. A lack of reporting on the Nord Stream bombing, which many believe was perpetrated by a Western nation—with reporting to back this claim up—is a glaring hole that has contributed to the lack of trust in Western media from both non-Western and Western readers alike. Only months later is the Western press quietly admitting potential Western culpability, or at the very least, knowledge.

Moreover, inadequate, and biased coverage of non-Western conflicts, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Palestine, has led to global accusations of neglect, bias, and even racism.

The Writing on the Wall

Western governments operating in an echo chamber of denial need to reach out to their friends across the world and realize what is obvious to everyone except to themselves: that the world is not like what it was in the post-Cold War era. The old ways are finished, and the West simply does not have the political and financial power, not to mention the international legitimacy, it once did. Western nations must adapt to this changing international environment, rather than stubbornly insisting upon business as usual. Failure to do so will make the world a more dangerous place and erode the credibility and influence of the West even further.

Chandran Nair is the founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT). He is the author of Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a Post-Western World.

Image: Shutterstock.

Russian efforts to manipulate American elections have made headlines in recent years. But China’s attempts at such have achieved more—largely because they have been overwhelmingly conducted via WeChat, an application popular among Chinese-Americans. As the 2024 presidential election heats up, campaigns, voters, and the federal government must be vigilant against CCP efforts to use the platform to influence American elections.

In February 2016, Chinese-Americans erupted in nationwide protests in support of Peter Liang, a Chinese-American cop convicted of manslaughter following the fatal shooting of an unarmed man in a dark stairwell in Brooklyn. The Los Angeles Times noted that the protests were organized through WeChat and reflected “a rare instance of collective political action by Chinese Americans.”

But far from being organic expressions of anger, significant evidence suggests Beijing’s involvement. David Tian Wang, one of the principal protest organizers, is a Chinese green card holder and activist who has long been associated with people and groups affiliated with the Chinese government. In February 2016, Wang used WeChat to help organize protests in dozens of American cities within one week, taking the lead in rallying as many as 100,000 people from, he claimed, forty-eight different states. “This is how powerful WeChat is,” said Wang. The fact that Chinese state-backed media outlets such as the Global Times and the United Front-linked China Qiaowang promoted Wang’s efforts suggests a relationship with Beijing.

Later that year, whether out of concern over the consequences of a Hillary Clinton presidency for China, or a belief that Donald Trump could be bribed or manipulated, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) threw its weight behind Trump’s candidacy. In March, Wang converted the numerous pro-Peter Liang WeChat groups into pro-Donald Trump groups. In the process, he established what would become the largest pro-Trump Chinese-American organization, Chinese Americans for Trump (CAFT). This group, which would eventually grow to over 8,000 registered members, started canvassing for the future president in battleground states such as Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Ohio as early as March 2016, eventually reaching 10,000 to 15,000 households in each of these states. Other groups, similarly organized on WeChat, sprouted up in places such as Missouri, where 300 Chinese-Americans canvassed for Trump. CAFT and these other Chinese-Americans groups also spent significant sums of money on the race.

Meanwhile, WeChat and Chinese internet sites were flooded with pro-Trump (and anti-Hillary) posts praising his wealth, business acumen, and unconventional style. Pro-Clinton material was consistently demoted, and websites such as the Asian American Democratic Club for Hillary were banned from the platform. The context for all this activity is that Beijing does not permit content on WeChat that runs against its interests.

The result of Beijing’s apparent influence seems evident in the Chinese-Americans community’s 2016 voting patterns. Whereas Chinese-Americans have historically leaned Democratic in previous elections, and almost all Asian-American groups increased their support for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 compared to 2012, Chinese-Americans moved in the opposite direction. Trump captured 24 percent of the vote, up from Mitt Romney’s 17 percent, meaning that 150,000–200,000 Chinese-Americans, roughly one-tenth of that community’s voting population, switched parties due to CCP efforts to influence American politics through WeChat.

However, the Chinese government badly misjudged Trump. He was a very different president than they had expected, confronting Beijing on many issues. The CCP thus changed course midway through his term and started promoting Democratic candidates. The CCP’s pro-Biden strategy was evident in influential WeChat public accounts, moderated chat rooms, and influential personal accounts, all of which flipped their narratives. For example, College Daily, Global Times, and Weinsight, among the largest public accounts focused on news, changed from pro-Trump to pro-Biden. WeChat promoted organizations such as Chinese Americans for Biden and enabled them to use the app in ways Democratic groups could not in 2016.

Meanwhile, group administrators bullied, ostracized, or banned pro-Trump voices. Sites run by progressives that previously had few viewers, such as Chinese-Americans, gained traction in a way that was previously not possible, with certain sites’ viewership levels growing by a factor of ten or even one hundred within a relatively short time. Groups that continued to support Trump, such as the Chinese American Alliance, Civil Rights, and Rainier Store, were banned. As Sam Ni, administrator of the pro-GOP “This Is the Way” account, told me, “WeChat and the arm behind it are too long. Despite focusing only on American issues, I am still under their crackdown. I don't know how to adapt to this and what rules we should follow. It's like a black hole.”

The result of WeChat’s pro-Biden tilt was evident in the 2020 Chinese-American presidential vote. Trump made significant gains among Asian-Americans, increasing his share of votes dramatically from 18 percent in 2016 to 30 percent in 2020. This increase in support included an especially large boost among Korean-, Vietnamese-, and Indian-American voters (twenty-eight, twenty-five, and thirteen percentage points, respectively). However, his increase in support among Chinese-Americans, which includes Taiwanese, was noticeably smaller: seven percentage points. While some may argue this dampening was due to the Trump administration’s proposed WeChat ban, the 5:1 ratio of petition signatories supporting the ban to those opposing it suggests that a significant part of the Chinese community was sympathetic.

Countering the CCP’s influence tactics in a free society like the United States will always be difficult. By leveraging a wide range of non-state individuals and organizations, the Chinese party-state penetrates society in ways that our democratic culture finds hard to grasp, much less confront. WeChat adds a powerful lever to this mix by enabling the Chinese party-state’s propaganda machine to manage the Chinese-speaking public square in America. Given the difficulties of divesting, fixing, and monitoring the app, Washington should simply ban it.

Dr. Seth Kaplan is a professorial lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He lived in China for seven years.

Image: Shutterstock.

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