Diplomacy & Crisis News

So-called fence-sitters are rejecting zero-sum geopolitical binaries in favor of multi-alignment.

En 2014, le Yémen est coupé en deux après un soulèvement d'opposants houthistes. Un an plus tard, une coalition menée par l'Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis intervient pour contrer cette rébellion. Et en 2019, un coup de force d'indépendantistes venus du sud divise le pays en trois. Dans ce (...) / Guérilla, Réfugiés, Yémen, Droit international humanitaire, Guerre civile, Conflit - 2023/06

As Russia and China grow closer, Central Asian leaders don’t have as much leverage—or independence—as they once did.

In the midst of uncertainty, people stick with the devil they know.

Tandis que le conflit en Ukraine a conduit Suédois et Finlandais à renoncer à leur neutralité, les Suisses restent attachés à ce statut autant qu'à leur ancrage occidental. Si Berne participe aux sanctions contre Moscou, ses clients ne peuvent réexporter leurs armes d'origine helvétique vers Kiev. (...) / Suisse, Conflit russo-ukrainien 2022-, Diplomatie, Relations internationales - 2023/06

« L'année 2021 est la plus sûre jamais enregistrée au Salvador », se félicite le président Nayib Bukele le 16 décembre 2021 . Sourire radieux, casquette vissée sur la tête, barbe finement taillée et bras écartés, celui qui se présente sur les réseaux sociaux comme le « PDG du Salvador » arbore une posture (...) / Violence, Armée, Criminalité, Salvador, Politique - 2023/06

Why documenting abuses should be part of the intelligence community’s job.

The modern world faces a conundrum: how can policymakers and nations meet rising energy demand while simultaneously protecting the environment from rising greenhouse gas emissions?

Doomberg—a widely-read writer and commentator on energy, heavy industry, private equity, hard sciences, cryptocurrency, and a host of other complex issues—recently attracted attention by making a provocative-but-true declaration that addresses the above question directly: “there is no path to significant decarbonization of our economy without a global nuclear renaissance.”

Yet such a renaissance may be in the works. A recent joint development agreement made by two companies provides some insight into the quiet revolution happening in the realm of nuclear energy, that scalable decarbonization is possible, and why policymakers should be more attentive.

The Xe-100 Deal

In early March of this year, X-energy, a leading developer of advanced nuclear reactors, and Dow, the chemical and material sciences multinational, made an intriguing announcement. According to the press release, Dow has agreed to place X-energy’s Xe-100 small modular reactor (SMR) at Dow’s UCC Seadrift Operations manufacturing site in Texas. The project’s state goal is “to reduce the Seadrift site’s emissions by approximately 440,000 [megatons of carbon dioxide per year].”

According to Dow, its Seadrift site “covers 4,700 acres and manufactures more than 4,000,000 pounds (1,816 tonnes) of materials per year used in applications such as food packaging, footwear, wire and cable insulation, solar cell membranes and packaging for pharmaceutical products.” Such a large facility with over a thousand employees requires a significant amount of energy to provide power, process heat, and steam, ideally while producing zero carbon emissions.

This is where the Xe-100 enters the picture: it is a high-temperature, gas-cooled, 80 Megawatts electric (MWe) reactor that can be scaled into “a four-pack 320 MWe power plant—with [its] modular design, the scale can grow even larger as needed.” 

X-energy and Dow’s new partnership signals that advanced nuclear technology can be implemented to abate carbon emissions in the industrial sector without sacrificing the bottom line. After all, it is traditionally difficult to mitigate higher carbon emissions in heavy industry. Yet this project has the potential to do just so, since nuclear power produces zero emissions during baseload generation. If successful, this would be the first project between two private companies, with some government assistance, to develop and demonstrate “the first grid-scale next-generation nuclear reactor for an industrial site in North America.”

 

How the U.S. Government Is Helping—and Preparing to Do More

Dow and X-energy are now working to submit a construction permit application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). But regulatory hurdles continue to be a tangled web standing in the way of advanced reactor deployment in the United States. Bureaucratic inertia creates delays, which forces utilities to continue burning more natural gas, coal, and oil for electricity in New York and New England. The Dow/X-energy project will likely not be an exception to overcome NRC foot-dragging; securing the building permit is estimated to go until 2026, with completion of the whole venture expected by the end of this decade.

Despite this impediment, nuclear power is at the forefront of clean energy options available. It is for this reason that the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) is not only pushing for this project, but also helping fund it. The Xe-100 was one of two next-generation reactor designs selected by DoE in 2020 to receive $80 million each for “initial cost-shared funding to build an advanced reactor demonstration plant that can be operational within seven years.” Since the award, X-energy has completed the engineering, begun the initial design of the reactor, and is working with the NRC, along with state and local authorities, on the licensing and development of a fuel fabrication facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Relatedly, the DoE named Dow a sub-awardee under the recent deal between the two companies, which “provides for up to [$50] million in engineering work, half funded by the [DoE program] and half by Dow.”

Other companies have taken notice of this new model of pairing advanced nuclear reactors with other hard-to-mitigate sectors. For example, Nucor, the largest steel manufacturer in the United States, is now considering using NuScale Power’s SMRs to power its scrap-based electric arc furnace steel mills, and has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to further that possibility.

Policymakers are also increasingly recognizing the viability of SMRs. The U.S. Congress is supporting these projects and future projects by considering passing the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act, which would “facilitate the development of the next generation of advanced nuclear reactors.”

Companies focusing on developing SMRs are intent on demonstrating that it is possible to build a new fleet of atomic plants that are smaller, easier to finance, and construct. If successful, the X-energy/Dow project and others like will show that these reactors can be used in a wide variety of settings, from industrial sites to remote military installations. For its part, if everything goes well with the Seadrift project, Dow envisions retiring its gas-fired combustion and steam turbines at the site.

This would be an astonishing development and would signal to the wider economy that the use of SMRs should be adopted on a grand scale. It is entirely possible that in the future the United States could achieve energy superabundance

With the Xe-100, and other projects in the development and MoU stage, it’s an exciting time for the U.S. nuclear economy.

Todd Royal is the Senior Project Analyst for E4 Carolinas, a non-profit energy advocacy firm located in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is working on a three-year grant for the U.S. Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration focusing on a value chain study for the advanced nuclear technology sector (Generation IV reactors, SMRs, and advanced reactors). Todd lives outside of Dallas, Texas.

Image: Shutterstock.

Since Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele began his crackdown on violent street gangs, the Biden administration, international media, and NGOs have made the small Central American republic the focal point of negative attention about accused corruption, civil liberties violations, and creeping authoritarianism. In contrast, the Dominican Republic, which is using much harsher forms of “preventative detention,” has seen virtually no hand-wringing about “democratic backsliding,” corruption, and human rights violations. Instead, the Biden administration has praised the Dominican Republic’s criminal justice system. The media and U.S. government’s disparate treatment of these two Latin American nations demonstrates a lack of consistency and principles in our diplomacy towards our neighboring countries.

After an unprecedented spike in gang-related homicides, El Salvador instituted a state of exception to address the violence. The crackdown increases the time someone can be detained without charge from three to fifteen days, restricted bail and other alternatives to pre-trial detention, and strengthened police powers. Even critics acknowledge the moves have popular support and have dramatically reduced violence. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken criticized the crackdown because it “lends itself to attempts to censor the media, prevent reporting on corruption and other matters of public interest, and silence critics of the Salvadoran government.” The United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights called it a violation of human rights law, focusing on the fact that “the previous two-year limit to pre-trial detention has been eliminated.” International media has put the spotlight on these criticisms with heavy coverage for an otherwise obscure country of six million.

In contrast, there has been almost no attention given to the Dominican Republic’s far more draconian “pre-trial detention” regime. According to the country’s National Office of Public Defense (ONDP), 70 percent of the prison population in the country is held under the “preventive detention” mandate imposed by President Luis Abinader. Most of the inmates are imprisoned for extended periods, even years, without formal charges or court proceedings. A recent ONDP report acknowledges that half of these detainees remain in confinement even past the expiry of their preventive detention mandate, the exact issue raised by the United Nations.

While Blinken warns that El Salvador’s pretrial detention can be used to silence critics of the government, the Dominican Republic has arrested nineteen members of the opposition leadership including Abinader’s 2020 opponent, Gonzalo Castillo. Six of these leaders were ordered to serve eighteen months of preventive detention without any charges, as the investigation continued. These preventive orders do not expire until after the 2024 re-election, effectively neutering their ability to conduct a campaign.

The U.S. embassy in the Dominican Republic has expressed significant concern over the pretrial detention programs, noting that the detention periods “equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for the alleged crime, with some detentions reportedly lasting years.” It also reported that “Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings by government security forces; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by police and other government agents; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary detention; [and] arbitrary interference with privacy.”

Yet these reports are ignored and contradicted by the White House and State Department leadership. Instead of criticizing the pretrial detention of political opponents under the guise of anti-corruption, President Joe Biden recently praised Abinader for “moderniz[ing] its anti-corruption law.” In contrast, there has been little evidence that El Salvador’s gang crackdown has been used on political opponents. Under Secretary of State for Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Urza Zeya has called the Dominican Republic a “bright spot” for "combating corruption, improving citizen security" and "protecting human rights"

Part of the disparity is no doubt caused by Bukele’s eagerness to highlight his crackdown on Twitter and criticize the Biden administration. But our foreign policy should react to substance rather than social media. To the extent that the U.S. and international organizations enact diplomacy in Latin America based on civil liberties, we should look to the actual policies rather than the bombast of media coverage and Twitter.

John Bugnacki is an attorney and director of government affairs for a technology company. He has served as a Fellow at the American Security Project focusing on Latin America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. He received his J.D. from the University of Chicago.

Image: Shutterstock

Hezbollah’s recent military exercise in the south provoked criticism and condemnation from opposition forces including the National Bloc. Michel Helou, the party’s secretary-general gave his thoughts on the maneuvers and discussed what should be the proper alternative for Lebanon. “Our position is the military demonstrations clearly shows that Hezbollah is a threat to the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. It violates the monopoly of weapons that belong to the legitimate state.”

These operations in the south are not a new phenomenon. Hezbollah has mobilized its forces to demonstrate its power in the wake of either threats from Israel or to remind local opponents not to cross its authority. People in Lebanon are constantly on edge and fear the outbreak of additional violence. Lebanon’s international partners like the United Nations have put forward proposals to end the phase of hostilities through resolutions 1559 and 1701. UNSC Resolution 1701 was written and released on August 11, 2006, with a clear road map for peace in the Levant-Mediterranean region:

“This resolution calls for the full cessation of hostilities, the deployment of Lebanese forces to Southern Lebanon, parallel withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the Blue Line, strengthening the UN force (UNIFIL) to facilitate the entry of Lebanese Forces in the region and the establishment of a demilitarized zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River.”

Helou said the National Bloc respects this UN resolution and wants to see its implementation. “We also demand the application of all UN resolutions 1559 and 1701. On top of that, Hezbollah today is trying to escape the problems that are affecting the Lebanese people. Starting with the socio-economic collapse because they are not able to deal with that. This demonstration is another attempt at reclaiming their lost legitimacy as the resistance.”

It is a curious thing to see Hezbollah parading around with heavy weapons and soldiers while the people of Lebanon still live in increasingly worse conditions. The power Hezbollah holds is at this point extremely hollow. It does not impress most Lebanese. Rather, seeing a display of militarization when the region is calming down emits signals of weakness, not strength. In the recent weeks, the Arab League re-invited Syria and its leader Bashar al Assad back to the organization. Years of bloodshed caused by a Syrian government crackdown on protesters in 2011 forced Damascus out of the league. Now, there is a new approach from both Syria (a Hezbollah ally) and the Arab world that wants to focus on development and avoid war.

This maybe putting Hezbollah in an awkward situation. From its inception, it sold itself as a resistance movement waging a fight against Israeli occupation in the south, but also a group that represents the disenfranchised Shia Muslim community (a historically neglected community). It fought off the Israeli occupation when the Lebanese army didn’t. It provided social services when the state was non-existent. But these were temporary measures that are less relevant today.

Now, however, the people of Lebanon are searching for something more than a resistance. If the resistance Hezbollah speaks of is about building a state with normal institutions, no one in Lebanon would object. But today, the situation is that the presence of Hezbollah as paramilitary group is endangering Lebanon’s fate and circumvents the government’s legal mandate. As part of its principles, the National Bloc is calling for a secular state where every citizen enjoys the same rights and responsibilities regardless of sect.

Nevertheless, calls for a state over militias by individual politicians are not enough to make it happen. But the momentum is certainly there to pursue it until the end. Otherwise, there will be an atmosphere of more division, anger, and resentment among the Lebanese people. This is where the leaders must step up and use their influence to remind all Lebanese that opposing a party does not equal animosity toward a fellow Lebanese from a different sect. Lebanon’s social cohesion must come first, which must be preserved by the national security forces and the rule of law.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

Image: Shutterstock.

Il est des livres charmants, qui rencontrent la mémoire collective et servent d'embrayeurs de rêves rétro, et tout aussi bien de rêveries autour d'avenirs possibles. C'est ce qu'offre cet ouvrage consacré à l'Orient-Express, ou, plus précisément, aux trains de la Compagnie internationale des (...) / Europe, Transports, Loisirs, Tourisme - 2018/04

Un pays où les divisions caractériseraient avant tout le camp conservateur ? Où la gauche susciterait l'enthousiasme des foules ? Où l'espoir de nouvelles conquêtes électriserait les progressistes ? Ce pays existe : il s'agit du Royaume-Uni, depuis que l'élection de M. Jeremy Corbyn à la tête du Parti (...) / Europe, Royaume-Uni, Élections, Idéologie, Parti politique, Politique, Syndicalisme, Socialisme - 2018/04

The war in Ukraine hinges on one man’s thoughts and feelings.

Why accidents pose the biggest risk.

Despite China’s growing assertiveness in the competition for marine resources, Beijing has openly discussed its vulnerabilities in the Strait of Malacca. In November 2003, then Chinese president Hu Jintao coined the term “Malacca Dilemma,” referring to China’s vulnerability to a naval blockade at the strait—the shortest sea route connecting the Middle East and East Asia. Although imposing a naval blockade could incur high economic and diplomatic costs to all involved, intensifying tensions in the Indo-Pacific region increase its possibility of happening. This is of great concern to China’s leaders, as the Malacca Strait is an effective choke point in China’s economic network because of Beijing’s huge dependence on importing energy and its lack of reliable allies in the region. Seeking to remedy this situation, China, by promoting its recently proposed Global Security Initiative (GSI) to expand its security partnership with countries around the region, can potentially minimize the impact caused by the Malacca Dilemma.

The Malacca Dilemma

The Strait of Malacca is an 805-km stretch of water that falls between the Malay Peninsula on the northeast and the Indonesian island of Sumatra on the southwest. It connects the Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in the Pacific Ocean, making it an important marine route for hydrocarbon, container, and bulk cargo shipments between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. About a quarter of the world’s traded goods and one-third of total global petroleum and other liquids production transported using marine routes pass through the strait annually, making it the second-largest oil trade chokepoint in the world after the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, 80 percent of China’s exports pass through here, meaning China’s economic destiny is heavily tied to the strait’s stability.

The strait, however, is itself a narrow stretch of water only 65–250 km wide, meaning that it could easily be blocked by nearby nations with sufficient force. To China, this is especially threatening because of the political dynamics in the region. The strait is surrounded by neutral countries like Malaysia, U.S. allies like Singapore, and geopolitical rivals like India, which also recently joined the United States’ Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Some of these countries have a central geographic location in the region and possess outlying islands like the Andaman and Nicobars (controlled by India), which could allows said nations project naval power and control the strait more easily. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy (the 7th and 5th Fleets), which operates in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, is the only force capable of guarding the strategic sea lines of communication stretching from the shores of Africa to East Asia. As such, the United States still maintains tight control over the Strait of Malacca—something Beijing is ever conscious about.

In contrast, China’s navy operates at a farther distance from the strait. If geopolitical tensions between China and the United States or the Indo-Pacific countries escalate (e.g., if China decides to invade Taiwan), the latter can weaponize this essential chokepoint by imposing a blockade, resulting in a disruption of trade, energy resources, and raw material flows. This would significantly increase China’s costs in pursuing its great power ambitions or waging a war in the Indo-Pacific region, to say nothing of the calamitous consequences to its economy.

Can China Avoid the Malacca Dilemma?

Admittedly, China has attempted to minimize the impact of a potential blockade by diversifying its energy sources. Beijing has been establishing alternative land links and energy partnerships with Russia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and other Arabic and Central Asian countries which are politically distant from the United States so as to ensure access to key resources in volatile times. Besides, China has allocated more resources to developing renewable energy to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels and thus oil imports. For example, China’s fourteenth Five-Year Plan has indicated that it will continue to develop green technologies.

Yet ultimately, China’s economic success is largely derived from its energy-intensive manufacturing sector, and the developmental pace of renewable energy technology can hardly catch up with its growing demand for energy. Thus, China still relies on foreign energy imports. It is now the world’s largest net oil importer and the second-largest oil consumer. Research also suggests that, with an increasing demand for energy, China’s foreign oil dependence level will rise from 65 percent in 2016 to over 80 percent in 2030. In short, it is unlikely that China can avoid importing energy from foreign countries using marine routes in the near future.

Meanwhile, China could face difficulties in searching for alternative routes. While the Malacca Strait has been known as a shallow strait, the Sunda Strait is even more difficult to navigate, due to a strong tidal current and it having a minimum depth is only 20m in parts of its northeastern end. The Lombok/Makassar Strait is a longer route, which can increase shipping costs. And although China can in theory also use the Northern Sea Route, not only is there a discernable lack of infrastructure, but the route is often covered by ice, so the navigation season is short and insurance costs would be high. For now, the Malacca Strait route remains irreplaceable.

Compounding the situation is the fact that, Beijing does not have any regional military allies which could guarantee firm support in a geopolitical crisis. Although China has formed partnerships with countries like Pakistan, the security provided is minimal. It is uncertain whether these countries would give up neutrality during wartime, especially because they could become vulnerable to wartime military threats and retaliatory sanctions. China’s ties with its partners in the Indo-Pacific region were also weakened by its economic exploitation. China’s investments and loans, especially those provided under the Belt and Road Initiative, have prompted countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka to surrender sovereignty over some of their ports, which has led to backlash and triggered a rise in domestic anti-China sentiment. Developments like this may make it more difficult for China to secure support during wartime unless Beijing expands its security cooperation or improve its ties with these countries.

The Global Security Initiative

Though the Malacca Dilemma poses a threat to China’s economic and strategic security, Beijing’s recently announced Global Security Initiative (GSI) could potentially help avoid it.

At the 2022 Bo’ao Forum for Asia, China proposed the GSI, with a concept paper released in January 2023. The initiative contains six core values and principles: (i) pursuing common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; (ii) respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; (iii) abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; (iv) taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; (v) peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and (vi) maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. The aforementioned values reflect China’s growing emphasis on cooperation to maintain international security. It also attempts to create an impression that China desires to help other countries stabilize their political situation. It goes without saying that China is apparently eager to be more active in the security sphere.

Meanwhile, in the concept paper, China has stressed that more engagement with regions like Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Middle East is needed. These regions are, however, core players in the Strait of Malacca. By expanding its security ties with these regions under the GSI, China can potentially build up mutual security commitments and weaken the United States’ security partnerships with countries around the strait. In the long term, China could even build up an opposition force against American hegemony in the security sphere with states which have tensions with Washington. This would help China exert pressure on the United States and dissuade Washington and its Indo-Pacific allies to impose a blockade on the Malacca Strait.

Furthermore, with more engagement, Beijing might be able to operate foreign military bases in these regions to enlarge its military presence and establish an overseas military network. At present, China has already strengthened its alliance with the Solomon Islands and formed a strategic deal that allows it to “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replacement in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands,” therefore possibly opening the door to a Chinese naval base. Further military build-ups promoted by the GSI will enhance China’s capability to interfere with American naval capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.

It must be noted that China’s growing aggressiveness has led to the distrust of some countries against Beijing’s GSI initiative, especially those which have territorial and marine disputes with China like the Philippines. The United States may appear to be a more trustworthy security partner than China, since the former does not have any territorial claims that threaten these countries’ geographical interests. China’s escalating competition with the United States also places the Indo-Pacific countries in a dilemma of their own. Joining China’s security partnership and architecture can potentially be considered an act of “taking sides,” which could worsen Indo-Pacific countries’ relations with Washington. As such, not all Indo-Pacific countries will be incentivized to join the GSI to form security partnerships.

Nonetheless, China can make use of the loose ties between some Indo-Pacific countries with Washington to promote the GSI, so as to tackle the Malacca Dilemma. Some Indo-Pacific countries like Myanmar are less inclined to offer comprehensive human rights protections or implement democratic accountability mechanisms which Washington has always desired them to put forward. The divergence of their values could hinder these countries to form close ties with the United States, which would thus deter cooperation during a conflict.

This, however, allows China to emerge as an alternative. The GSI suggests that China could offer security assistance to help maintain the stability and security of other states or regions. Meanwhile, the GSI has reiterated some universal principles to which Indo-Pacific countries often subscribe, such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, adherence to UN principles, and the emphasis on dialogue. It also criticized the use of sanctions which the Western countries heavily rely on, so China is vocally criticizing the U.S.-led international security order. This could all raise the incentive of countries with relatively weaker ties with Washington to join the GSI. Accordingly, China would have a higher chance of securing more solid support during a naval blockade.

A Quest for a Greater Influence and Stability

Ultimately, the question of a naval blockade is a hypothetical future issue, but it is not entirely impossible. Beijing has been thirsty for greater power on the international stage. However, its pursuit of higher status has led to growing tensions with other states, especially the United States. Given this, China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait for energy transportation and trade could give rise to its concerns about the threats of blockade led by the United States or other countries in the region. Its lack of reliable support from partners could increase its vulnerability to serious economic and strategic repercussions arising from the Malacca Dilemma.

Nonetheless, the United States no longer has the hegemony it had during the Cold War. It relies on its regional partners to maintain effective regional security. If China is able to promote engagement with Indo-Pacific countries through the Global Security Initiative, it might be able to build closer cooperative ties with other states to weaken the influence of the United States’ coalition and prevent the Malacca Dilemma. This would embolden China’s ambition of expansion in the Indo-Pacific area and enhance its national security.

Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung is a geopolitical analyst at the Nicholas Spykman International Center for Geopolitical Analysis and a member of the International Team for the Study of Security Verona. Recently, he presented at the Oxford Hong Kong Forum 2022 and was interviewed by France 24, Al Jazeera, and Asharq News to provide geopolitical analyses of China’s political economy and global politics. He has written for Initium Media, UDN, The Journal of Conflict, Intelligence, and Warfare, The Webster Review of International History, Oxford Political Review, and other newspapers, peer-reviewed publications, and magazines.

Image: Shutterstock.

Our children are our future, but the demands of work mean that we can’t attend to them all the time. Because of this, an estimated 15.7 million children under the age of five experience some form of childcare outside their parent’s hands. Policy institutions, like the Center for American Progress and Child Care Aware, have reported on the impact this has on families and the economy as a whole, noting the need to attend to children has significantly contributed to labor shortages in many industries.

The semiconductor industry is no exemption from this, as the childcare imperative, along with the lingering effects of the coronavirus pandemic, has exacerbated the ongoing talent shortage. In an attempt to mitigate this problem and expand the labor force, the Biden administration is mandating childcare as part of the requirement to seek incentives from the $52.7 billion CHIPS Act fund. President Joe Biden, via the Commerce Department, is leveraging the CHIPS Act and requesting chip manufacturers seeking over $150 million in incentives to provide a plan for childcare services.

This idea appears very attractive to some American employers, including many manufacturers who regard the lack of childcare accessibility as the drive for talent shortages. But while childcare is indisputably a vital necessity, the CHIPS Act is not the means to achieving such.

First, including childcare in the CHIPS Act diverts resources and attention from the core objective of the law.

Almost 95 percent of the $52.7 billion CHIPS fund is allocated to semiconductor manufacturing incentives and research and development (R&D). Yet if manufacturers have to spend a significant portion of that on childcare, revitalizing the onshore chips industry ends up becoming secondary. Consider that, on average, childcare costs about $10,000 per year—accounting for over 10 percent of the income of a married couple. This burden would be placed upon manufacturers who already have limited funds.

Moreover, childcare is a social policy that many companies seeking incentives are unqualified to implement, including semiconductor firms. Mandating childcare would end up increasing the costs and complexity of implementing the CHIPS Act. This is intolerable in an industry that already faces challenges from budget constraints, political opposition, and geopolitical tensions. What’s more, the funding provided for CHIPS is nowhere near the amount that China has invested in its own domestic industry. To mandate childcare would effectively be asking companies to do more with less against well-funded competitors.

Second, mandating childcare in the CHIPS Act does not address the root causes of the childcare crisis in the United States: inadequate funding, quality, accessibility, and affordability of childcare services and programs.

The idea of leveraging funding from industrially-focused legislation to cover social policy has been tried before. During World War II, the Lanham Act funded childcare centers all over America as a means of addressing labor shortages in critical industries. However, after the war, these 3,000 or so childcare centers were closed, demonstrating that tying the provision of childcare to supporting the temporary funding of a strategic imperative only lasts so long as there is a need for the latter. Additionally, the childcare centers funded by companies who pursued this agenda implemented a one-size-fits-all childcare policy that did not account for families’ diverse needs and preferences nationwide.

We cannot expect that introducing a childcare policy into the CHIPS Act would fare better; at most, it would offer temporary relief to the chips industry. It would not have any major impact on solving the issue of inadequate funding, quality, accessibility, and affordability of childcare services and programs.

Finally, using the CHIPS Act to implement childcare creates a potential conflict of interest between the federal government and the private sector. In terms of regulating and providing childcare services, this can create unintended consequences and trade-offs for workers and families.

Though both the government and private sector are facing the same issue of labor shortage, the two have different interests when it comes to childcare. If employers are required to provide childcare services by constructing on-site childcare facilities or contracting existing providers to help, it’s hard to say whether the quality of childcare provided would be sufficient without proper government oversight. An employer could reduce workers’ choices, flexibility, and autonomy in balancing work and childcare responsibilities—imagine if you were only allowed to spend thirty minutes with your child because your employer said so. This creates a disincentive for parents to work in the semiconductor industry or other high-tech sectors that require long hours and specialized skills. The government standard for quality and diverse childcare welfare may not align with private actors, whose primary motivation is to maximize production and profit. Scott Lincicome, a senior fellow at Cato Institute stated that the government would not have mandated child care “if they weren’t in conflict”.

Leveraging the CHIPS Act to implement affordable childcare may present useful outcomes on paper, but these would not be without a cost. Using the CHIPS Act as a means to remedy the childcare crisis sidelines the main agenda of the legislation, diverges from the root cause of the childcare crisis, and breeds a conflict of interests between the government and private actors. Moreover, adding this social policy to already complex legislation would increase the program’s cost and reduces its effectiveness in addressing the semiconductor shortage and broader U.S-China tech competition.

Childcare is a public good with no place in a purely economic and political agenda. By using the CHIPS Act to revitalize the domestic chip industry and address childcare, Biden is attempting to put the old adage “killing two birds with one stone” into action. But will a “stone” like the CHIPS Act be enough to kill two birds if they both happen to be eagles?

Benedicta Kwarteng is a 2023 Marcellus Policy Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society. She is a graduate student and Public Service Fellow at John Hopkins SAIS. Her research interests include U.S. foreign policy, the informal economy, and the U.S.-China Tech War.

Image: Shutterstock.

Séisme, tsunami, puis fusion de trois réacteurs nucléaires : le Japon reste meurtri par l'enchaînement de catastrophes de mars 2011. Si, sur le moment, l'essentiel des victimes et des dégâts matériels ont été dus à la vague d'eau, les conséquences humaines et économiques de la faillite de la sécurité à la (...) / Japon, Capitalisme, Énergie, Nucléaire civil, Santé, Société, Travail, Environnement, Pollution - 2018/04

Peu de pays ont été aussi sévèrement touchés par la crise de 2008 que la République d'Irlande. L'éclatement de la bulle immobilière avait précipité le déficit budgétaire au-delà de la barre des 30 % en 2010 — du jamais-vu. Quelques années plus tard, une nouvelle flambée des prix de la pierre enthousiasme les (...) / République d'Irlande, Capitalisme, Économie, État, Jeunes, Logement, Protection sociale - 2018/04

Au nom de la lutte contre l'usurpation d'identité (quelques centaines chaque année), le gouvernement français a autorisé en 2016 la création d'un mégafichier regroupant les données, notamment biométriques, de tous les titulaires d'une carte d'identité ou d'un passeport. Passée inaperçue dans le contexte (...) / France, Biotechnologie, Citoyenneté, État, Histoire, Information, Informatique, Sécurité, Police, Technologies de l'information, Technologie - 2018/04

How Washington and New Delhi can contain a rising China