Diplomacy & Crisis News

L'assassinat de Berta Cáceres le 3 mars dernier au Honduras a suscité une vague d'indignation. Ce meurtre s'ajoute à celui de nombreux militants amérindiens et écologistes opposés aux barrages hydroélectriques qui prolifèrent en Amérique centrale. / Amérique latine, Eau, Écologie, Énergie, Amérindiens, (...) / Amérique latine, Eau, Écologie, Énergie, Amérindiens, Mouvement de contestation, Violence, Amérique centrale, Honduras, Environnement - 2016/10

Le Congrès américain est composé de 435 représentants et 100 sénateurs. Si les premiers sont répartis suivant la population de chaque État — ce qui n'empêche pas certaines disparités —, les sénateurs sont toujours au nombre de deux par État. Ainsi, un sénateur californien porte la voix de 19 millions (...) / États-Unis, Démocratie, Élections, Femmes, Minorité nationale - Amérique du Nord

There is no planet B

When Congress makes a mistake in determining important economic policy like setting the tax rate or implementing a new trade policy, the results can be pretty awful. Unexpected inflation might take place, jobs might be lost, and personal savings might crumble. In the most severe cases, these disruptions might result in economic recession, or worse, a more sustained depression. It goes without saying, this can be devastating- on a personal, national, and even global level.

However, in the aftermath of even the most severe of these crises, individual people have proven resilient. We “Keep Calm and Carry On”, as the saying goes. Even when the most sensitive economic policy goes awry, the consequences are usually constrained to economic matters. A mistake in tax policy can certainly cause suffering, but it cannot result in the end of the world.

This principle applies for many of the most important matters in the American political landscape. Immigration, education, healthcare, and of course economic policy are critically important, but our collective resilience allows for politicians to gradually tweak policy to match the nation’s needs and mood. The American political system is designed to process these sorts of changes incrementally at the national level while giving local decision makers the ability to implement policy in a way that suits their constituencies. Put another way- for most things in American political life, policy makers have the opportunity to “muddle through” policy making decisions, honing and (hopefully) improving policy over time.

However, there are some policy matters where tinkering around the edges or “finding the middle ground” simply will not do. Climate change is perhaps the most obvious and most pressing of these. There is a strong scientific consensus, backed by the United Nations IPCC report, that in order to avoid reaching the point where climate change becomes self-reinforcing, the global community must become carbon neutral by the year 2050. This is only twenty-eight years away.

To the extent that the world’s governments and the individuals that they represent ignore these warnings, we are gambling with the fate of the whole of humanity. The idea that we can be protected from the worst consequences of climate change by making only incremental adjustments does not fit with intellectually honest political discourse.

Of course, there is still plenty of room for debate regarding the best course of action to address climate change. It is entirely reasonable to debate if the bulk of the responsibility for addressing climate change falls on nations that have emitted larger total sums of greenhouse gases over time but have already begun to reduce their harmful emissions, or if it lies with nations that are currently the world’s chief greenhouse gas emitters. In either case, it is appropriate to shame Russia and China for failing to attend the COP26 climate conference, and it is reasonable to question the follow-through of leaders like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he pledges that India will be carbon neutral by 2070 despite currently working to expanding coal mining operations.

More than that, it can be wise to weigh the virtues of a carbon tax against those of a cap and trade system in our own country. Local decision makers will know far better than distant bureaucrats if subsidies for solar panels or a heightened focus on local agriculture suits your local community’s needs better.

These questions, however, ask which actions and policies are best suited to address climate change- they are elevated beyond the basic question of whether or not drastic action is necessary in the first place.

This is what separates climate change from the other important issues in American life. A failure to address growing inflation is bad, while a failure to appropriately address climate represents a potentially existential threat. More than that, the action that appears necessary to avert the worst of the harm done by climate change remains fully outside of the Overton Window. Forget actually curbing emissions, the United States gives something to the effect of $14.5 billion in subsidies and tax breaks to oil and gas companies- those subsidies outnumber investments in the renewable sector by 7 to 1.

Democrats and Republicans alike need to make dramatic progress in their willingness to take on climate change if they are serious about the current administration’s stated goal of achieving carbon neutrality by the year 2030. Additionally, American political discourse needs to commit itself to curbing climate change regardless of other important policy making, and regardless of our confidence in the follow through of other nations that are sometimes untrustworthy. Without the United States on board, there is little hope for avoiding the worst consequences of climate change. This is true for the United States even as it is true for Russia, India, and China- however, a failure by any of those nations to fulfill their responsibility does not excuse failure by the United States.

The time is now for us to fully shift the conversation from “do we need to address climate change” or “under what conditions should we make a full commitment to addressing climate change” to “what is the most effective way to address climate change”. Despite this somewhat liberal sounding call to action, this sentiment finds roots on both sides of the aisle. Former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, “the [global warming] debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat, and we know the time for action is now.”

The time for action is now.

—

Peter Scaturro is the Director of Studies at the Foreign Policy Association

Le royaume chérifien est confronté à un climat social difficile. L'opposition peine à défendre les maigres concessions obtenues avec la Constitution de 2011. Dans un contexte de mise au pas des médias, questionner le pouvoir du roi Mohammed VI reste un tabou. / Maroc, Monde arabe, Citoyenneté, Droits (...) / Maroc, Monde arabe, Citoyenneté, Droits humains, Économie, Élections, Entreprise, État, Exclusion sociale, Justice, Mouvement de contestation, Parti politique, Pauvreté, Politique, Religion, Travail, Maghreb, Torture, Répression, Sexualité - 2016/10

Parce qu'ils relèvent du domaine public, l'éducation et la santé suscitent les plus grandes convoitises des entreprises privées. L'assaut d'une logique de profit se déploie avec une vigueur particulière dans l'université. Sous couvert de « marché des idées », la course aux disciplines qui « attirent (...) / États-Unis (affaires intérieures), Éducation, Entreprise, Finance, Recherche - 2001/03

Les investissements français en Chine sont six fois plus importants que les investissements chinois en France. Tandis qu'à Pékin personne ne s'inquiète d'une invasion hexagonale, les convoitises de l'empire du Milieu effarouchent nombre de commentateurs à Paris. Cet afflux de capitaux étrangers (...) / Chine, France, Économie, Entreprise, Finance, Industrie, Multinationales - 2016/10

On ne compte plus les biographies de M. Vladimir Poutine, mais le système politique russe reste mal connu. Sait-on par exemple que le parti du président a organisé des primaires avant les législatives, prévues le 18 septembre ? En imitant ses homologues occidentaux, Russie unie cherche à convaincre (...) / Russie, Démocratie, Élections, Parti politique, Politique, Autoritarisme - 2016/09

What might happen if Abiy Ahmed falls.

/ Asie, Frontières, Chine, Pakistan, Inde - Asie / Asie, Frontières, Chine, Pakistan, Inde - Asie

 

The Economist recently published an article on the overarching power of the European Council, a government body of the European Union that was designed to facilitate the discussion and application of policies throughout the EU. The problem that has always persisted in the European Union is how you can get consensus between so many differing ideas, cultures and interest groups that can be applied fairly and transparently throughout all 27 Member States. Part of the solution has been to reduce the number of voices in the process as not to make it so incredibly cumbersome, but many see this as a move towards systemically reducing democratic values in the process.

My experience studying the framework of the EU at a time when Accession was a major topic of the day was characterised by the expansion of the EU into Central Europe along with the addition of new cultures and former Warsaw Pact nations. These countries accepted entrance into the EU at the cost of what many see as an unfair burden on their agricultural sector and shared economic values. Many of those countries who over the last two generations overthrew the tyranny of fascism and the long slow decline of their societies under the Iron Curtain are naturally weary of outside pressures being put on their societies, and the top down structure of the European Council has the very real power of being able to tread on grassroots movements in Member States.

Countries like the United Kingdom always sat uncomfortably within the EU. This was always the case despite being at the top of its power structure and possessing parts of the UK that were happy to have the support of other regional Governments in the application of policies within the UK and EU. While The Economist article humourously compares the power of the European Council to that of a neo-Monarchic power structure, it was always the case that many English people saw themselves apart from Continental Europe, and were proud of their unique British cultural and democratic institutions and in some fashion had longed mourned their lost Empire. While the irony of the British Government having a Queen Monarch as Head of State would be lost on no one, the British Parliamentary system’s culturally based Constitution, assumed Customary Laws and invisible Constitutional etiquette would be hard to codify outside of British Society, and the grumbles against EU power within the UK was ever-present. One of the major factors that lead to Brexit that is often not spoken on is the feeling that democracy could not survive the whims of those not directly elected representing British citizens in a city with no connection to Britain’s culturally based democratic system. The Queen herself, while having the ability to technically apply Absolute power, culturally is at the sidelines and is well aware that interference in party politics may sour the public to the idea of having a Monarch altogether. This wise balance was not possible with UK representatives in Brussels, and it degraded the idea of Britain being in the EU for generations.

To see what the end result could be from those at the top ignoring grassroots politics and using their power to quell democratic traditions, you only need to look at how Canada’s Federated Government took to announcing policies that would greatly affect specific regions of its own country, in an international forum, and not within the region being affected or even Canada itself. The recent announcement of a cap on energy sales at a time where inflation hit record highs and cost of living is placing many in risk of losing their homes in winter is seen as needlessly aggressive policy. With a closed Parliament and no manner to answer to policy, the British Parliamentary system cannot function when Parliament is closed at a time of major policy development. In addition, ignoring the Customary laws of that traditional system means that people may feel their voices are muted, at a time when life is difficult and leadership is required. As the European Council slowly alienated British voters, no region of the world would tolerate a foreign power limiting their ability to produce an income, afford social programs and have an open voice in their own democracy. To keep a union of states or even a nation united, it should not be able to harm to itself as part of its own democratic system. As history has noted, then it is not really a full democracy.

Les traces que nous laissons sur Internet, les informations de nos smartphones et nos contributions aux réseaux sociaux ravissent les publicitaires et enrichissent les géants de la Silicon Valley. Pourtant, les données personnelles ne sont pas condamnées à ce destin. Leur usage à des fins d'utilité (...) / Capitalisme, Fiscalité, Idées, Information, Internet, Médias, Multinationales, Politique, Service public, Technologie - 2016/09

Pour se faire une place dans le supermarché mondial de l'enseignement supérieur, les établissements rendus « autonomes » par la réforme de 2007 fusionnent. Les exigences scientifiques et pédagogiques fondamentales se heurtent alors à l'expansion d'une bureaucratie libérale. / France, Éducation, (...) / France, Éducation, Mondialisation, Politique, Recherche, Région, Science, Travail, Université - 2016/09

Permettre à ceux qui ignorent une langue de profiter des chefs-d'œuvre qu'elle a produits : une mission à la fois essentielle et impossible. Comment restituer l'œuvre de Shakespeare en français, idiome si éloigné de l'anglais élisabéthain ? Un traducteur expose ici quelques-uns de ses partis pris. / (...) / Royaume-Uni, Culture, Histoire, Idées, Langue, Littérature, Théâtre - 2016/09

Depuis 1947, trois guerres ont opposé l'Inde et le Pakistan sur le Cachemire. La partie administrée par New Delhi vit sous un régime d'exception. Le 8 juillet, Buhrhan Muzaffar Wani, chef d'un groupe séparatiste, a été tué par des militaires indiens. Il était devenu un symbole de la résistance armée (...) / Inde, Pakistan, Art, Conflit, Culture, Géopolitique, Internet, Islam, Médias, Musique, Nationalisme, Politique, Presse, Violence, Conflit du Cachemire 1949-, Répression, Indépendance - 2016/09

En septembre 1990, lors de son discours à Joué-lès-Tours, le premier ministre Michel Rocard vantait les mérites d'une « démocratie d'opinion » dont les sondages seraient la clé de voûte. Il allait ainsi contribuer à ce qu'ils deviennent progressivement l'un des principaux modes de désignation des (...) / Démocratie, Élections, Médias, Politique, Sondage d'opinion - 2008/11

Zone de contact avec la péninsule Arabique, la Corne de l'Afrique est une région stratégique : ports, puits de pétrole, trafics de marchandises, d'armes et de populations. Occidentaux, Asiatiques, multinationales, pétromonarchies et puissances locales — Éthiopie et Érythrée en tête — s'y livrent une (...) / Égypte, Érythrée, Éthiopie, Somalie, Armée, Conflit, Géopolitique, Mer, Politique, Stratégie, Violence, Yémen, Djibouti, Dictature, Diplomatie, Stratégie militaire, Afrique de l'Est, Frontières, Somaliland - 2016/09

Entre 2007 et 2016, le nombre de généralistes en France a diminué de 8,7%. Plus de trois millions de personnes peinent désormais à trouver un médecin traitant. D'abord apparu dans les zones rurales, ce problème touche désormais de petites villes comme Lamballe, une commune bretonne gagnée par le désert (...) / France, Démographie, Inégalités, Protection sociale, Région, Santé, Travail, Ville, Géographie, Médecine - 2016/09

D'AT&T aux États-Unis à SFR en France, un mot d'ordre circule comme une traînée de poudre : la convergence entre télécoms et médias. Suivant cette stratégie, les propriétaires de réseaux numériques et téléphoniques rachètent des journaux ou des télévisions en difficulté pour remplir leurs tuyaux. / (...) / États-Unis, France, Audiovisuel, Communication, Économie, Entreprise, Information, Internet, Médias, Presse, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Télécommunications - 2016/09

Longtemps vilipendés, les graffs, tags et dessins au pochoir ont conquis leurs lettres de noblesse. La reconnaissance a parfois conduit les artistes de rue à abandonner toute velléité de contestation, même si la plupart continuent à rejeter la récupération marchande. / France, Art, Culture, Histoire, (...) / France, Art, Culture, Histoire, Industrie culturelle, Société, Ville, Répression, Peinture - 2016/09

Kyle Mizokami

North Korea, Asia

The PLA might lack the institutional skill of the battle-tested U.S. Army, but it is certainly better than the Korean People’s Army.

Here's What You Need to Know: While North Korea has traditionally been a Chinese client state, ties between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years.

Amid the near-constant threat of a crisis breaking out on the Korean Peninsula, one major power is often left out of the discussion: China. The People’s Republic of China shares an 880 mile long border with its notoriously unpredictable neighbor, has a large army and values stable borders at any cost. In the event it deems military action necessary, what are Beijing’s options for dealing with North Korea and what kind of force could it bring to bear?

North Korea is both a blessing and a curse for China. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an independent state that is openly hostile to the United States and other regional powers. Pyongyang’s military is a deterrent to attack without posing a direct threat to China. As a result, nearly a thousand miles of China’s borders are occupied by a regime that finances its own defense and will never fall willingly within the U.S. sphere of influence.

The situation is far from perfect. While North Korea has traditionally been a Chinese client state, ties between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years. Pyongyang’s fiery anti-American rhetoric and nuclear weapons program have provoked the United States, making North Korea a major point of contention between Washington and Beijing. The country’s flagrant violation of international norms have tested Beijing’s patience.

There are persistent rumors that Beijing has long prepared to intervene in North Korea, whether in the aftermath of a government collapse or should the country’s leadership make credible threats against China. No one outside of Beijing knows what those preparations might be, but we can outline some scenarios. One thing seems reasonably certain, however: if China goes into North Korea, the presiding regime, whether of Kim Jong-un or someone else, will not survive.

One possible scenario is a military incursion into North Korea in response to regime collapse. An imploding economy, military coup, or Syria-like rebellion could all cause the regime to fold, and it will likely fold quickly. When it does, the national food distribution system will likely fail, causing refugees to flee the country. Given that the border with South Korea is notoriously fortified and the Russian border is relatively far and remote, the least difficult border to cross is into China.

Beijing, obsessed with internal stability, would almost certainly not tolerate millions of refugees crossing into northern China. From a Chinese perspective, it would be far better for those refugees to stay in North Korea. In the event of regime collapse, we could see the three People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armies in the country’s Northern Theater Command move south. One option is to create a buffer zone in North Korea, but that would not solve the problem of political and economic instability. If the PLA does move South, it would likely go all the way to Pyongyang in order to establish a puppet government and reestablish some level of stability.

The most likely scenario is that China launches an all-out invasion to topple the existing regime. Of the sixteen armored, mechanized, infantry and artillery corps that make up the Korea People’s Army (KPA), only two are deployed along the Sino-Korean border. Three more corps are stationed in and around Pyongyang. Nearly 70 percent of the KPA is south of the Pyongyang/Wonsan line, sited to support a cross-border attack against South Korea.

China’s Northern Theater Command ground forces consist of the 78th, 79th and 80th Armies. These armies are what would be considered corps in the U.S. Army, collectively controlling eighteen combined arms brigades supported by three special operations, three aviation, three artillery and three engineering brigades. This gives the PLA a powerful force equivalent, at least on paper, to roughly five or six U.S. combat divisions. Supported by the two air attack divisions of the Chinese Air Force assigned to the Northern Command, the three PLA armies could quickly cross the border and march south into the KPA’s strategic rear.

To what extent would the KPA resist an invasion? It depends. If the regime in Pyongyang is still in place, it China could face considerable resistance. A lack of fuel reserves, dictated by China, would likely strand many of the remaining fourteen army corps in place, rendering them unable to resist a Chinese invasion. If the government collapses the KPA could become part of the hungry, leaderless masses—masses with weapons. Ideally, Beijing would cultivate ties with the KPA leadership before a move South and persuade it to not resist and maintain order.

It’s difficult to foretell how well the PLA would do in wartime. The last time the Chinese Army engaged in such large scale combat was the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Using inferior, outdated tactics, China’s ground forces suffered heavy casualties against their battle-hardened Vietnamese opponents, and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping vowed never to repeat such a costly war. It is unlikely that Beijing would order the attack if it did not have full confidence in the PLA to carry it out without embarrassing failure.

The PLA of today however is a completely different beast. While the PLA lacks the institutional skill of the battle-tested U.S. Army, it is certainly better than the Korean People’s Army. The army has modernized both its equipment and military doctrine—Xi Jinping’s repeated calls to be “combat ready”, often interpreted as outwardly aggressive, are more likely to be exhortations toward general readiness and against corruption in the ranks. A recent and pervasive emphasis on high speed, mechanized warfare will pay the PLA dividends in a drive on Pyongyang.

The most dangerous aspect of a Chinese invasion of North Korea is if it is launched concurrent with a U.S. and South Korean assault northward from the demilitarized zone. While the U.S. and South Korea would operate with the same objectives in mind, they would likely be very different from China’s. The possibility of fighting breaking out between those armies marching north and those marching south would be very real.

Barring a total collapse of the Pyongyang regime, China is unlikely to invade North Korea any time soon. The economic, political, and military costs outweigh the benefits—at least for now. That having been said, if the calculus changes China maintains the forces, just over the border, to decisively intervene in its smaller neighbor. Whether China, South Korea, or anyone is ready for the outcome is a very good question.

Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. You can follow him on Twitter: @KyleMizokami.

This article first appeared several years ago.

Image: REUTERS/Tyrone Siu