Diplomacy & Crisis News

A rather poorly-formed argument questioning Hungary’s loyalty to NATO has emerged in recent months over its opposition to Russian sanctions and calls for negotiations with Moscow. Some have even called for the country’s suspension from the alliance. But critics ignore Hungary’s real-world military-industrial buildup and humanitarian aid support provided to Ukraine which, unlike the fuel sanctions against Russia, has actually produced results and ultimately serve to strengthen NATO.

Were NATO’s leaders to heed calls for Hungary’s dismissal, they would be playing right into the hands of Vladimir Putin by creating fissures within the alliance and ignoring the steps the country has made that benefit the alliance’s defensive posture.

Since former President Donald Trump’s call for European NATO members to step up their game, Hungarians have undertaken an unprecedented effort to modernize their defense forces; an act that was ironically characterized as “democratic backsliding” in 2020 before becoming in vogue again with Putin’s aggression. Whereas Germany mostly failed to deliver on Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s grand speeches of plans to expand his nation’s military might, Budapest has actually begun to push a lot more capital into the defense sector; as much as $1.4 billion.

Defense industry firms have taken note. Europe-based military contractors such as Dynamit Nobel Defense, Colt CZ Group, and Rheinmetall have been attracted to Hungary for its existing industrial base and its need to upgrade its national military arsenal. While the current focus is to modernize Hungary’s own forces, the country’s central location on the European continent makes it a prime logistics node for transporting products all around Europe to other NATO partners.

The most prominent example has been Rheinmetall. The German manufacturer has begun initial production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle with full production scheduled to commence in July of this year. The Lynx is predicted to become a favorite of NATO’s forces, potentially replacing the Bradley fighting vehicle, a long-time workhorse for Western militaries. Hungary was the first customer. The Lynx also has the potential to operate remotely without putting a crew in danger, which explains Rheinmetall’s manufacturing plant being built as part of the Zalazone complex in Zalaegerszeg,  a testing track as well as a research and development center for self-driving cars. Clearly, the industry considers Hungary important for the future of European defense.

All of these developments seem to escape Hungary’s fierce critics, who continue to paint the country as a traitor to the West rather than a crucial pillar for its defense due to its divergence from the collective message-signaling opposition to Russia.

With regards to Western economic sanctions, they are not a prerogative of NATO but rather of the EU, and Hungary has in fact voted in favor of every single one of them despite Budapest’s serious concerns that sanctions will not achieve their intended goal of debilitating Russia enough to end the war.

Besides ignoring the facts on the ground, there is clearly a double standard when it comes to judging Hungary versus the rest of Europe. If any deviation from mainstream EU position on the war or act of dissent is treasonous, then what do we call France after Macron’s calls for negotiations with Russia? Or Germany’s initial refusal to provide tanks for Ukraine’s war? Should these countries also be suspended from NATO? Don’t hold your breath for an answer.

As an American currently in Hungary, I am rooting for a victory for the West in the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. Believe me: there is not a whole lot of sympathy for Putin on the streets of Budapest or in the countryside. Hungary has, in fact, shown greater support for Ukraine than anybody dares to give the country credit: over two million refugees fleeing the conflict have received safe passage and support from Hungary, with approximately 200,000 taking asylum here. That alone is equal to the population of Hungary’s second-largest city. Yet you don’t see refugee camps anywhere in Hungary. Why? Because Hungarians literally let their Ukrainian neighbors live with them in their spare rooms, vacation homes, or converted basements. Some have housed total strangers for over a year for free—a notable contribution for the citizenry of such a small nation. One is curious to know if other countries in the West have made such efforts.

Along with ignoring Hungary’s humanitarian efforts, the country’s loudest critics have no appreciation of the efforts of the country’s men and women in uniform to defend NATO’s eastern flank. Last year, a battalion of Hungarian troops deployed along the nation’s border with Ukraine, providing aid to Ukrainian refugees as well as standing ready to fight should Putin’s ambitions push farther westward. Last year, the Hungarian Air Force led aerial defense efforts patrolling the Baltic region, keeping watch for Russian incursions into NATO airspace.

At the heart of the conflict between Russia and the West lies the most important principle: freedom. Just as Ukraine has the right to self-determination, nations of the West cooperate in an alliance of consensus, not submission. One must not forget that Hungary has a long history of living under foreign oppression—including the Russians. The “obey or be punished” line brings back memories of imperialism and occupation the Hungarians suffered at the hands of the Soviets, not the democratic collaboration that America fosters.

The consequences have already become manifest. In the shadow of Budapest approving Finland’s application to the alliance is its continued deferment of approving Sweden’s admission. When Swedish prime minister Ulf Kristersson demanded an explanation, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s political director, Balázs Orbán (no relation), had an answer at the ready. During Kristersson’s previous position as head of Sweden’s Moderate Party, he had called for the EU to “break Hungary’s development” through financial pressure in response to “xenophobia,” and “renouncing support to Ukraine,” despite all Hungary’s actions showing directly the opposite. Asking for help from a nation that one previously tried to morally posture over does not make for good political optics. A recent Hungarian parliamentary delegation’s affirmative call for Sweden’s application to NATO lends hope that the storm will pass, but the affair demonstrates the folly of states sowing bad blood when bigger dangers loom.

Implementing a policy of conformity and “purification” within NATO will only widen fissures between member states. To avoid that, the West must prioritize unity along with tangible accomplishments like Hungary’s growing military industry and support to Ukraine’s exiles while setting aside the virtue-signaling that its detractors espouse. The former will strengthen Europe’s defense while the latter will strengthen the power that NATO is meant to keep at bay and out of Europe: Russia.

Logan C. West is an American visiting research fellow at the Danube Institute in Budapest, Hungary. His research focuses on geopolitics and cyber affairs of Eastern and Central Europe. Logan is also a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington DC.

The top UN Development Program official in Baghdad warned that an increase in global temperature will decrease the fresh water available to Iraqis by 20 percent. Basra, Iraq’s second most populous city, which sits at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, is already dying of thirst, its water contaminated and its population decreasing.

Israel, too, faces tremendous environmental stress on its water supply, yet has mastered the process of desalination. Its efforts are so successful, it has been pumping desalinated water into its natural reservoir, Lake Kinneret. So advanced is Israeli desalination that former Arizona governor Doug Ducey described the Jewish state  as “the world’s water superpower.” Accordingly, the arid southwestern state has awarded Israel contracts to deal with Arizona’s water shortage. Azerbaijan is also an Israeli customer.

Why not Iraq? Water can become the basis for formal peace between Israel and Iraq. The latter could reap the rewards of peace as soon as November when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosts the UN climate conference COP28.

At COP27, held in Egypt in November, the UAE brokered a water-for-energy deal between Israel and Jordan. Jordanian farms produce 600 megawatts of solar energy that it exports to Israel, which in turn uses the energy to desalinate sea water and pump it to Jordan, the second most arid country in the world. This water is just one of the benefits that flowed from Amman’s decision to make peace with Israel in 1994.

Iraq is the country fifth most vulnerable to climate change. Suffering through water shortages and sand storms prompted Baghdad to organize a conference last month in which Prime Minister Muhammad al-Sudani promised to plant five million palm trees to combat sand storms. The Iraqi Environment Ministry produced a documentary to spread awareness about global warming, while Iraq’s environmental NGOs—Humat Dijlah (Arabic for “defenders of the Tigris”) and Nature Iraq—have also launched several campaigns.

Yet Baghdad has no ideas on how to solve its water problem, other than having Turkey allow more flow on the Tigris.

Iraq desperately needs Israeli desalination technology, which in turn requires moving toward peace. Instead, Baghdad has been going in the opposite direction, passing an absurd law that punishes with death or life in prison anyone “who places a call to the Zionist entity.” Iraqis loyal to Iran and Qatar even criticized Sudani for participating in the U.S.-sponsored virtual Summit for Democracy because Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu also took part.

The Iraqi law says that its goal is to “preserve national, Islamic, and humanitarian principles and popular Iraqi wishes in defending Palestine, its people, and all the other Arab peoples whose lands are under [Israeli] occupation.”

Stoking popular resentment of Israel has a long history in Iraq, yet doing so now directly undermines the national interest in a secure supply of water.

Emirati plans include a Water Security Strategy 2036, which aims at reducing water consumption by 21 percent, increase water efficiency, improve water quality by reducing pollution, and achieving “universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water to all by increasing national water storage capacity.” Israeli universities and companies have been involved in jointly researching and achieving further efficiency in water production.

Gulf countries have already been trying to benefit from the Israeli desalination model.  Oman hosts MEDRC, a center established in 1996 as part of the Middle East peace process and tasked with finding “solutions to freshwater scarcity.” Members of MEDRC’s executive council include Israel, Oman, and Qatar, even though neither Gulf nation has relations with Israel. Water is indispensable.

Iraq—the second largest oil exporter in OPEC—should follow in the UAE’s footsteps, not only by switching to clean energy, but also by suing for peace with Israel and benefiting from Israeli innovation that can solve Iraq’s water problems.

So far, Iraq seems to be heavily invested in COP28. The Iraqi Embassy in Abu Dhabi has been recruiting young environmental activists to expand the Iraqi delegation at the summit. Just as Jordan benefited at the previous summit, COP28 offers Iraq a golden opportunity to enlist the help of the UAE and Israel in dealing with its thirst problems. The Iraqi government should convince parliament that desalination is a life-or-death priority, so now is the time to make peace.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Follow Hussain on Twitter: @hahussain.

Image: Luciano Santandreu/Shutterstock.

A major crisis in U.S.-China relations has just been averted. Speaking on April 14 at a news conference with the visiting German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang issued an assurance: “Regarding the export of military items, China adopts a prudent and responsible attitude. China will not provide weapons to relevant parties of the [Ukraine] conflict, and [will] manage and control the exports of dual-use items in accordance with laws and regulations.”

This episode is a textbook case of deterrence theory in action. It is a successful example of the United States practicing coercive diplomacy to deter China from providing military aid to Russia. The Biden administration directly warned China on several occasions not to provide Russia with military assistance. And after careful and repeated consideration over slightly more than a year, China has weighed the costs and benefits and complied with the threat.

A Year of Warnings

This U.S. diplomatic success came close to failing. The recent alleged leaking of intercepted U.S. intelligence records by Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, has provided us with some insight. According to a February 23 U.S. intelligence summary of Russian “signals intelligence,” China’s Central Military Commission had “approved the incremental provision” of weapons and wanted it kept secret. Yet at some point between that date and April 14, Beijing changed its mind.

To best understand then why China opted not to arm Russia, it is necessary to highlight the critical role of a series of direct U.S. warnings to China that taken place for more than year.

The first warning occurred during National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting with Yang Jiechi, the then-Director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission. According to Sullivan, “we are communicating directly, privately to Beijing that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them.”

The warning was repeated by Secretary of State Antony Blinken to then-Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi at the United Nations in September 2022. A State Department readout for that meeting stated that Blinken “reiterated the United States’ condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine and highlighted the implications if the PRC were to provide support to Moscow’s invasion of a sovereign state.”

A few months later, at the 2023 Munich Security Conference (taking place between February 17 and 19), Blinken repeated the message. A senior State Department official privy to the actual conversation briefed reporters that Blinken “was quite blunt in warning about the implications and consequences of China providing material support to Russia or assisting Russia with systematic sanctions evasion.”

In deterrence, threats need to be accompanied by credible assurances that, if the warning is adhered to, restraint will ensue. The readout for Sullivan’s March 2022 meeting “underscored the importance of maintaining open lines of communication between the United States and China.” Similarly, the readout of Blinken’s September 2022 meeting indicates that he conveyed to Wang that “the United States remains open to cooperating with the PRC where our interests intersect.” And at the February 18, 2023 meeting, the readout noted while “the United States will compete and will unapologetically stand up for our values and interests…we do not want conflict with the PRC and are not looking for a new Cold War. The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining diplomatic dialogue and open lines of communication at all times.”

Observations of Chinese Behavior

Washington’s consistent warnings to Beijing seem to have worked. But will China stick with this policy? Before that can be addressed, it is worth noting two preliminary observations.

First, no embargo is watertight. A variety of factors—ranging from profit seeking by individuals employed by the Chinese state, the historically porous borders of the twenty-first century, and the role of third parties—suggest that the transfer of a non-outcome determining level of dual-use Chinese technology on the battlefield would eventually occur no matter what. Indeed, declassified information released by the Biden administration in late February 2023 demonstrates that dual-use Chinese navigation, radar, drone, and electronic communication jamming equipment has reached the Russian military. There may even be other transferred equipment, such as high-level semiconductors, which simply hasn’t been detected.

Second, China has reason to provide military aid. In Beijing’s eyes, the notion that the United States—whose own State Department figures register $35.8 billion in security aid (as of April 4, 2023) to Ukraine’s war efforts against Russia—should issue warnings to China against aiding a belligerent in a conflict that is (in Beijing’s view) of Washington’s creation is the height of hypocrisy. That said, however sympathetic Beijing may be to Moscow, Qin Gang’s statement underlines the point that China has even more compelling reasons to exercise restraint. Accordingly, as long at the Putin regime’s survival is not at stake, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military assistance necessary to turn the tide of the war.

China Will Keep Its Guns

Overall, China’s policy is determined by a political logic. As such, China’s restraint will likely continue. There are three specific political reasons for this.

First, Beijing understands the dangers of both escalation of the war in Ukraine and the risk of Chinese entanglement. Chinese policymakers are hard-headed realists who recognize the importance of balancing the competing imperatives of aiding Russia while avoiding getting involved in a conflict that attract the ire of the West and damage the pursuit of China’s own national interests.

Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine has generated highly critical internal commentary in China’s strategic studies community. Specifically, the January 12, 2023 issue of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, China’s leading official military periodical, contains rare direct criticism. That such appeared in a reputable and authoritative paper provides a window into internal Chinese views. The conclusion is clear: Chinese strategists understand that the provision of a politically untenable level of military support would be needed to change the military outcome in Ukraine in Moscow’s favour. They are also keenly aware that Chinese military support seriously risks drawing Beijing into a quagmire created by the U.S.-led NATO alliance. Accordingly, Beijing draws a clear distinction between diplomatic and economic support for Moscow on one hand, and a policy of military support on the other.

Second, providing outcome-determining military aid to Russia would inevitably trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington, jeopardizing China’s economic growth prospects. The CCP’s domestic political legitimacy, especially in the post-coronavirus pandemic era, rests on its ability to deliver a sustained return to robust economic growth, which will itself rely on continued trade with the EU and the United States. The EU and the United States were China’s top two trade partners in 2021, representing 13.7 percent and 12.5 percent of China’s trade, respectively.

But much more than trade volume is at stake. European technology is increasingly critical to the quality of China’s economic development. Following the drastic reduction in U.S. technology transfer after Washington’s move in 2017 from a policy of “engagement” to what is being called “strategic competition” with China, Beijing is depending on Europe as a reliable alternative source of technology. Military support for Moscow would jeopardize that access.

This reality explains the accommodating comments that Wang Yi—promoted to the post of Director of the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission in January 2023—made to the substantial constituency of European attendees at the Munich Security Conference in February this year. According to Wang, “we need to think calmly, especially our friends in Europe, about what efforts should be made to stop the warfare; what framework should there be to bring lasting peace to Europe; what role Europe should play to manifest its strategic autonomy.”

Third and finally, China is intent on projecting a more positive image of itself in world politics, especially after the coronavirus pandemic. In February this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released two significant documents. The first was a systematic critique of U.S. hegemony, highlighting Washington’s alleged abuse of its power to maximize its political, military, economic, technological, and cultural interests. The second was more positive, outlining Beijing’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)—a Chinese alternative to the U.S. model of world politics. As things stand, a Chinese decision to provide military support to Russia would torpedo the GSI by causing many states to view Beijing as a facilitator of the very hegemonic behavior it critiques the United States of.

A Success for Washington

On the issue of China’s provision of military aid to Russia, a policy of U.S. deterrence has succeeded: Beijing will continue its diplomatic and economic support for Russia, but exercise restraint on military support. The reasons for this policy continuation reflects a combination of factors: the dangers of a Chinese military commitment to Russia; a concern that military aid to Russia will trigger economic sanctions from Brussels and Washington; and the imperative to improve China’s international image.

Short of an unlikely “fall of Putin” scenario, Beijing will not provide Moscow with the military capabilities it requires. Russia, it seems, must make do with what it has.

Nicholas Khoo is Associate Professor in the Politics program at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, and great power politics.

Image: Shutterstock.

One could be excused for assuming all states operate as true equals in the international system and under international law. A brief observation of Lebanon quickly dispels such a conception, however, as the recent exchange of fire between it and its southern neighbor Israel depicted last week. The series of incidents mark a continuation of the small Mediterranean country’s unfortunate reality—namely one of fractured subservience or submission to various regional and international actors that are worsening its numerous ongoing crises.

Lebanon-Israeli Tensions

The escalation between Beirut and Tel Aviv began on April 6, when missiles flew over Lebanon’s southern border and into northern Israel. While unclear at first, many suspect the Palestinian organization and armed group known as Hamas for launching the rockets from positions it controls in Lebanon. This was likely in response to the brutal attacks of Muslim worshippers inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem during the holy month of Ramadan on April 5 which constituted major human rights violations. The worshippers wished to stay in the mosque overnight to practice Itikaf—essentially overnight stays in mosques to pray, reflect, and recite the Quran.

The Israeli military reported that thirty-four rockets had been fired into its territory from southern Lebanon, noting that it intercepted at least twenty-five while four landed inside Israel. Three people were harmed in the attack, which also caused material damage and sent Israeli citizens fleeing for bomb shelters across northern Israel.

Tel Aviv responded on April 7 with airstrikes supposedly targeting the origin sites of the attacks in Lebanon, also opting to strike Hamas positions in the Gaza Strip—the origin of additional rocket attacks on Thursday. Fortunately, no deaths were reported as a result of the strikes. Importantly, the Israeli military made a point to explicitly note that it was only targeting sites linked to Palestinian militants—likely a signal to Lebanese Hezbollah that it did not desire further escalation along its northern border with the much more formidable armed group.

Naturally, the series of events produced a flurry of diplomatic efforts to prevent a rapid escalation akin to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which ravaged large parts of southern Lebanon. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the peacekeeping force operating as a buffer between Lebanese and Palestinian militants in Lebanon and Israel, was in close contact with both sides to prevent further violence.

But efforts by both parties to signal disinterest in any escalation ultimately won the day. Indeed, official Israeli statements did not blame Hezbollah for the attacks. This proved to be a crucial signal to Lebanon and Hezbollah, especially as many suspected the group green-lighted the strikes since Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah met in Beirut with senior Hamas officials and Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh just hours before the strikes. Lebanese officials reciprocated, with many—including Hezbollah-ally Gebran Bassil of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) political party—condemning “non-Lebanese” rockets fired from their country.

Not in My Backyard

While cooler heads prevailed amidst a context dominated by hawks, which should be welcomed, there is an inherent irony to statements from the likes of Bassil. Not only is it unlikely that Hezbollah was aloof to any Hamas efforts to strike Israel, but the concept of any rejection of “non-Lebanese rockets” is also hysterical and hypocritical.

Ultimately, the rockets fired by Hamas from Lebanon are sourced from the same country—Iran. Bassil and his Hezbollah-aligned FPM want to present a scenario in which Hamas rockets are “non-Lebanese” while pretending that Hezbollah rockets are somehow intrinsically different. In the real world, his party and the pro-Hezbollah bloc regularly point Iranian weaponry—namely “non-Lebanese” rockets—at their southern neighbor. Thus, Bassil presenting a “not-in-my-backyard” stance is as bad faith as it gets in Lebanese politics.

The Myth of Lebanese Sovereignty Today

Yet while Bassil’s newfound altruism regarding armed groups in Lebanon should be expected given his history of disingenuous and corrupt actions, such statements speak to the Lebanese reality today. Whether it be Iranian, Israeli, or other regional and international interests, it is clear that Lebanon has shed any remaining vestiges of sovereignty, opting instead to pawn this off to the highest bidder. Bassil’s statements are the epitome of this dynamic, as the “non-Lebanese” rockets commentary proves.

Indeed, regular Israeli military flights over Lebanese skies—22,000 as of mid-2022—mark one of the staunchest examples of the former’s violation of the latter’s sovereignty. This says nothing of unilateral military operations against Lebanon in recent decades that have resulted in tens of thousands of direct and indirect deaths.

To be sure, actors in Lebanon deserve some blame for these previous military operations. Iran regularly flouts Lebanese sovereignty through its Hezbollah and Hamas partners, the former of which essentially operates a state within a state as it erodes Lebanon’s institutions. In parallel, Hezbollah regularly smuggles essential energy supplies and other goods out of the impoverished country to Syria to prop up the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad—a country that occupied Lebanon for much of its existence in one form or another. Such actions are in support of Iran’s “resistance” efforts—not Lebanese interests. Still, they do not constitute many of the unilateral Israeli actions.

Regional states also have a long history of similar violations. Saudi Arabia is central to this reality as it has, until recently, long played a patron role in Lebanon, co-opting Sunni and Christian parties to counter Iranian influence in the country. This rarely meant support for basic human rights or anti-corruption efforts as regional states preferred Lebanon’s role as the Switzerland of the Middle East—namely for its incredibly opaque and corrupt banking system. A simple observation of the Lebanese political system shows that most politicians draw allegiances and legitimacy from ethnicity-based patronage systems that vertically span into both Lebanese communities and outside the country to various Middle Eastern states. Pro-Syria parties, such as Marada leader and presidential hopeful Suleiman Frangieh, offer perfect examples of this dynamic.

Ultimately, Lebanon’s sovereignty problem is a long-running net negative for the country, heavily contributing to the paralysis witnessed in its political and governing systems. While this does not explain the full story of despotic and nepotistic clientelism that has fueled corruption in the country for most of its existence, it is certainly a major impediment to reforms that could improve the reality of its people. 

If the region and world continue to view Lebanon as a playground for their geopolitical ambitions, the country will experience worsening economic and political degradation. As the recent Israeli strikes and political statements in Lebanon suggest, the situation is set to worsen so long as those in positions of power continue to reject the writing on the wall.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

Image: Andreas Zeitler / Shutterstock.com

A possible new trade route between Russia and India to take shape starting in 2023.

Diligent followers of international policy will likely see 2023 as the starting point for the official acknowledgment of a new power dynamic, one where the War in Ukraine will set the barrier between world powers old and new. Despite constantly changing predictions on the conflict in the East of Ukraine, there are no quick solutions, invincible tanks, massive advantages or much progress on the ground. The much discussed upcoming spring offensive may have already started due to mild weather and an influx of new equipment and conscripts, the result of which will likely determine the outcome of the war. A return to similar front lines as were static since 2014 may be the end result of both sides who have exhausted equipment supplies and have become increasingly entrenched. The dramatic loss of NATO sourced modern equipment, especially tanks, can change the narrative rapidly as the perception of weakness has rapidly shifted policy approaches since the fall of Afghanistan.

Sanctions against Russia have pressured countries dependent on Russian energy to take a policy stance on their future relations with not only Russian oil and gas, but all exports. Associated conflicts have or will erupt based on the response great powers see as beneficial to their future growth over the next generation. Smaller nations in regions south of Russia have been taking new positions, depending on where they see their future successes. The question of Russia’s relations with China, especially considering possible military support for Russia, is a major concern for those fighting in Ukraine. A new trade corridor through to China will be established, but with historical disagreements still on the minds of both sides, a cautious relationship is forming. Another possible trade route will link Russia’s economy closer to India, becoming a major influence over future politics in the region.

One nation that stands out as being in the centre of much of the new policy and trade shift is India. The future prospects of India’s economy is measured by its good relations with different countries abroad, high education, its ever growing population and military prowess. Despite being considered a close Western ally, India has benefitted from access to low cost Russian oil and gas along with good relations with both sides of the conflict in Ukraine. Little pressure has been put on India due to its position as a Western ally that acts as a bulwark against China and extremism in Asia, laying an international focus on keeping India strong and secure. India always stood out as an ally to those countries who seek trade, and their military being a mix of Western, French and Russian military designs is a reflection of their place in the security structure of their region. For this reason, trade with India may unlock a prosperous future, but conflict with India may end up being an economic disaster. One scenario sees ships being prevented from accessing ports in China if India supports an American blockade during a conflict against Taiwan. Regarding India, its always best to trade instead of compete.

The access Russia will seek with India travels through some conflicted territory in the Caspian Sea region and across Iran. India’s ever growing influence in the Caspian Sea region makes conflict between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia a possible choke point for Russian-Indian trade on this proposed route. Self inflicted flare ups between Iran’s government and minority groups inside Iran and on the border ties protests to Iran’s wider population. While human rights should be paramount for any country’s trade relations, the lack of attention seen in the West will do little to push Russia to avoid the region or motivate India to demand stability and freedom in the region itself. While a free Iran would benefit all powers and likely displace many security issues in the region, both sides need to consider the consequences of abandoning those asking for freedom. India can likely motivate their trade partners for a minimization of conflicts, peaceful government transitions, demand stability and basic human rights, and apply power in the new trade region with a voice that both sides will trust. Without this trade route, chaos west of India is assured, and Russia will be forced to expand its security structure even farther past its current borders. Even in this scenario, India will likely prosper due to its relations with strong allies in the West. It seems as if the choice is between internal conflict or peaceful trade with India. Each nation in the relationship will choose one or the other and it will establish the future for the next few generations.

The alliance between the United States and South Korea (Republic of Korea) is a cornerstone of the U.S. security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, in the world. Both the United States and South Korea must do all they can to strengthen this vital alliance.

As this year marks the seventieth anniversary of the alliance, with an upcoming state visit of President Yoon Suk-yeol to Washington later this month, it is important to appreciate the historical significance of the alliance.

For South Korea, the alliance has been the guarantor of its security and the bedrock of its economic development and prosperity since the Korean War. For centuries, Korea had been under the suzerainty of China and its fate had been tied to that of its Chinese overlords. As the Chinese empire declined in the late nineteenth century and collapsed in the early twentieth century, so did the old dynastic rule in Korea.

As Korea fell under Japanese colonial rule for thirty-six years, it was the United States that played the greatest role in liberating Korea from Tokyo’s grip at the end of World War II. And when communist forces overran South Korea in 1950 in the Korean War after Korea’s division, the United States spearheaded the United Nations forces dispatched to repel the invasion. Though the UN forces failed to reunify Korea, they preserved the territorial integrity of South Korea in large measure.

The U.S.-ROK alliance, cemented in 1953 at the end of the Korean War, marked a historic shift in Korea’s fate. For the first time in Korea’s history, a Western democratic great power came to be the principal ally and security guarantor of a Korean state. With its fate tied to the United States, South Korea came to experience miraculous economic development and an impressive transformation into a mature industrialized democracy.

For the United States, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been indispensable in preserving and defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific since the Korean War.

As the Indo-Pacific now contributes the largest share of the global population and the global economy, it is arguably the most important region of the world for U.S. national security and prosperity. However, the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific faces grave threats from Beijing’s expansionism and Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation.

Although defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific is crucial for U.S. national security and prosperity, there is no NATO-like collective security mechanism in the Indo-Pacific to stem forces of autocracy. In the absence of a collective security mechanism, what Washington has put together is an uneven patchwork of bilateral alliances and cooperative arrangements with individual countries. In this less-than-optimal security architecture, the linchpin is the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Other than the U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been the only enduring bilateral alliance for Washington in the Indo-Pacific. Other U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization did not endure, and the United States has only a few reliable allies in the Indo-Pacific, as numerous Indo-Pacific nations have been neutral or leaning toward Beijing in the standoff between Washington and Beijing.

The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Korean Peninsula cannot be overstated. Located within close proximity between Beijing, Tokyo, and Vladivostok and with substantial U.S. forces stationed in Japan and South Korea, it is the only place in the world where the national security and interests of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—four of the world’s greatest powers—directly intersect in a visceral way.

South Korea’s importance as a key ally of the United States has been demonstrated over the decades since 1953. In the Vietnam War, for example, Seoul sent massive numbers of troops to fight in Vietnam alongside U.S. troops.

Today, South Korea is increasingly a key U.S. partner in defending the rules-based international order. As a leading trading nation with an export-based economy that is heavily dependent on the import of energy and raw materials from abroad, South Korea’s security and prosperity depend on the integrity of the rules-based international order, including the freedom of navigation in the high seas where its exports and imports are in transit.

Seoul’s importance to Washington has increased even more in recent years, as South Korea has become one of the largest advanced industrialized democracies in the world with a global leadership in key strategic industries such as semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries. With a military rated as the sixth most powerful in the world, South Korea today has become a major arms exporter, with its military hardware supplying nations including Poland and Australia. Seoul now has troops stationed in nations including the United Arab Emirates and is a regular contributor to international peacekeeping activities.

All this has resulted in a major upgrade of the U.S.-ROK alliance, with the partnership now expanding from the military sphere into economics and technology. Last year, South Korean firms invested billions of dollars in the United States, seeking to build factories in states ranging from Georgia to Ohio to Texas.

Given all these developments, South Korea today is undoubtedly among the most pivotal key allies of the United States, and Seoul has arguably become as important to Washington as Tokyo. Considering this seminal importance, what can be done to protect and further enhance the alliance?

For its part, Washington must refrain from taking measures that damage the national image of the United States and turn South Korean public opinion against it. The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act recently is an example of such measures, as it contains provisions favoring electric vehicles made in the United States over those made overseas. Such discriminatory measures that are seen as promoting U.S. economic interests at the expense of the interests of U.S. allies including South Korea do much more harm than good to the U.S. national interest. Such measures must be avoided if the United States were to protect its crucial alliances with key partners such as South Korea.

Washington must bear in mind that China is keen to capitalize on tensions between the United States and its key allies such as South Korea. Washington must realize that damage to its alliance with Seoul can push the latter closer to Beijing. Washington must understand that Seoul moving into Beijing’s orbit would devastate U.S. credibility and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and indeed around the world.

For its part, Seoul must recognize that its future survival and prosperity hinge on the alliance with the United States and therefore strengthen its ties with Washington. While South Korea needs to maintain good relations with China, its biggest trading partner and a key stakeholder in addressing challenges posed by North Korea, Seoul must guard against Beijing’s attempts to drive a wedge between it and Washington. Seoul must realize that, if it allows its relationship with Washington to deteriorate excessively, it could fall back under Beijing’s suzerainty as it used to be for centuries.

Clearly, the seventy-year-old U.S.-ROK alliance is critical to the national interests of both nations and is among the cornerstones of the rules-based international order. Both Washington and Seoul would be wise to refrain from taking steps that damage this alliance, and they would be wise to guard against attempts by third parties such as Beijing to undermine this alliance. Under careful stewardship, this key alliance will help guarantee continued security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and around the world for many years to come.

Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is also Adjunct Fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum and Contributing Editor at The Diplomat. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004.

Image: Shutterstock.

Once hailed as a model for free thinking and expression, Lebanon is becoming increasingly authoritarian toward dissenting voices and the rights of journalists to be critical of government action and political parties. Media outlets and independent writers are gradually finding themselves in a tougher environment to do their job of informing the public of the truth.

An unfortunate example of the risks journalists faces while working in Lebanon is the loss of our fellow writer and activist, Lokman Slim. Lokman was a long-time critic of Hezbollah and other parties that belonged to the sectarian ruling class. But he directed his most fiery and brisk denunciation at the heart of where he believed Lebanon’s problems lie: Hezbollah. He was found dead in the south of Lebanon, a region Hezbollah has the strongest influence in the country. His death was gruesome. Four bullets to the head and one in the back. Why did he die? Because someone thought his beliefs “crossed the line.” Lokman himself came from a Shia Muslim background but refused to allow Hezbollah to have the monopoly on the Shia community from which it claims to draw its legitimacy. Such a grim reality cannot be ignored. Organizations and individuals have taken notice of the shift in how the media is being treated on the ground in Lebanon.

Freedom House, a non-partisan human rights organization that monitors the levels of democratic freedoms across the globe, reported signs of substantial self-censorship in Lebanon by journalists and bloggers. It found in 2019 that self-censorship has increased in the blogosphere and in top media circles out of fear of offending certain sectarian voices in the government.

The study also revealed how highly partisan the official media is in Lebanon because of its connections to the political class. Thankfully, because of internet access and the rise of digital media, it is challenging the system’s power in controlling the flow of information. However, government officials are using other means to block independent voices from delivering the news.  

Journalists who are friends and acquittances have spoken up about how difficult things have become when exercising their right of freedom of expression. Tarek Hmaidan, founder and CEO of Thawra TV, a channel dedicated to supporting the principles of Lebanon’s 2019 revolution, spoke to The National Interest about the frustrations independent media faces while trying to cover events in Lebanon.

“At the Parliament, they don’t let us work freely and now won’t let us go in. Ever since independent MPs Najat Saliba and Melhem Khalaf started their sit-in in Parliament in objection to the lack of a president, some independent media have lost access.” Tarek also talked about Lokman Slim and why he believed he was marked for death. “He was Shia criticizing Shia. This put him in a dangerous situation. If he was Christian, Druze, or any other religion, maybe they would not have killed him.” The point Hmaidan was making is: some members of the sectarian class do not tolerate criticism from those of their same confession. Instead, they are deemed traitors and must pay a penalty. Regardless of the motivation behind Lokman’s killing, the current environment makes people hesitate to speak and write with confidence that no harm will come to them.

Diana Moukallah, a journalist who works with Daraj Media, commented to TNI on today’s climate regarding free speech issues. “I believe it’s the mother of all battles here in Lebanon as the intimidation is increasing. If Lebanon loses the battle, then, the whole meaning of the country is lost for good. From the case of journalists being summoned to the case of imposing prior permission on lawyers to give interviews to the rising grip on mainstream media, I believe we are battling a vicious ruling class trying to impose restrictions on free speech.” 

If journalists in Lebanon start believing their voices could be silenced through blackmail or violence, the situation will worsen. Hmaidan expressed support for the idea that independent journalists should “unify and form a type of union to protect one another.” Without solidarity, true journalism will perish. It is time to put the criteria for free media protection back on the table if Lebanon is to have any serious chance of rebuilding what it once had as a democratic way of life.

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

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In March, the new foreign minister of China, Qin Gang, waxed eloquent about the state of Sino-Russian relations. “The more unstable the world becomes the more imperative it is for China and Russia to steadily advance their relations . . . The strategic partnership will surely grow from strength to strength.”

That struck some in the West as disingenuous. After all, Russia is getting a bloody nose in Ukraine, which is not only embarrassing from a power politics point of view (who wants to be seen as backing the losing horse?) but has also served to increase the unity and size of NATO. Furthermore, the Chinese were apparently told by the Russians to expect a more limited “special military operation”—not a full-scale invasion, complete with crimes against humanity. A crippled ally may turn out to be a burden and a hindrance; an ally that potentially crosses the nuclear threshold spells disaster.

And China’s got bigger fish to fry, after all. It dreams of supplanting the Western-led order with a China-led one, and it plans its own invasion of a territory it considers part of its national heritage. Some feel that China’s recently proposed twelve-point peace plan shows its desire to see its ally Russia back down from a long, grinding proxy war with the West while saving face. Negotiations over such a ceasefire would also save China the painful choice of whether or not to bring down Western economic sanctions on its head if it were to be forced to arm the Russians lest they be defeated.

After all, it was the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu who stated, “Victory comes from finding opportunities in problems.” While there are definitely some downsides to China in its current relationship with Russia, there’s also a very bright side.

A stumbling ally becomes even more dependent on you—as China has become indispensable to Russia’s survival, and that offers China significant leverage over its neighbor. Beijing has already negotiated big price cuts on the energy resources it buys from Moscow. Russia needs the rubles, and China is quite willing to play ball, for a price. In addition to those energy price cuts, China has negotiated favorable terms for Chinese investment in key Russian infrastructure, such as roads and ports, and even farmland. Though the terms of these agreements are not public, similar Chinese investments in other countries have been conditional on greater-than-average control over the resulting assets.

Much of the Chinese investment is concentrated in the Russian Far East, which has depopulated so rapidly in recent years that it is experiencing an astounding -33 percent population “growth” rate. It is interesting, then, that noted academic Yan Yuetong, writing in Foreign Affairs last year, commented, “Soon after the conflict began, some anti-Russia Chinese netizens began rehashing the unfairness of the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, which ceded roughly 230,000 square miles of Chinese territory to Russia.” The 1860 Treaty of Peking, which saw an even greater swath of northeastern China given to the Russians, has also been brought up. A de facto Chinese colonization of the Russian Far East might be one of the opportunities Beijing sees given the weakened state of its neighbor to the north, which could play into China’s new “Polar Silk Road” initiative.

There are a few other side perks from the hobbling of Russia, such as that nation’s dramatic decrease in its international arms sales. Not only can China take over some of these accounts, but it also means that countries China doesn’t want to see armed by Russia, such as Vietnam, find their supply line cut.

At the same time though, China is also measuring how the entire situation helps or hurts its vision of retaking Taiwan in the near term. While surely the ineptness of the Russians must give China pause—its own soldiers and officers are as untested in battle as the Russians were—arming the Ukrainians is expensive and is rapidly depleting Western stocks of weapons systems and ammunition. For example, the UK government just released a report stating it will take the country ten full years to replace the weapons stocks gifted to Ukraine. There are rumblings from the DC Beltway that the United States is also running low on some systems and ammo because of what it has sent to Ukraine.

So while the Biden administration has been purposefully aiding the Taiwan government at a higher level and frequency than previous presidents have, how long can the United States figuratively burn the candle at both ends without impairing its own ability to fight? Having America entangled in the long, drawn-out slugfest that is the Ukrainian war is very much in China’s national interest.

Is Russia an albatross around China’s neck? Or, alternatively, is Russia’s weakness providing a wealth of opportunities for China to secure its own national interests? Great strategists see opportunity in problems, and the homeland of Sun Tzu is certainly no exception.

Valerie M. Hudson is professor and George H.W. Bush chair in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Image: Shutterstock.

There is a problem with deterrence; it’s not working. Not that we are about to descend into nuclear armageddon. But aside from nuclear wars, the United States’ deterrence paradigm does not seem to be deterring much recently. Our adversaries—principally Russia and China—do not seem cowed, either by the risk of failure to achieve their objectives or by the fear of retaliation. Both have been seizing the initiative with aggressive behavior ranging from information warfare, through the full range of gray zone tactics, all the way to the illegal military invasion and occupation of a sovereign neighboring state. Either the theory of deterrence is wrong, or the West is doing deterrence wrong.

The litany of Russian aggression in recent years includes the massive 2007 cyber-attack against NATO ally Estonia, the 2008 Russian seizure of the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (15 percent of Georgia’s territory), the 2014 occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea, and the 2015 intervention in Syria. Russia’s actions in Crimea sent shockwaves through the West, yet Russia’s main objectives, attained through well-planned cross-domain operations, were achieved at little real cost. In February 2022, confident in his impunity despite threats and warnings from Western powers, Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a full-fledged aggressive war against Ukraine. At the time of this writing, the war still rages in that beleaguered country as the death toll approaches half million.

Meanwhile, China—dubbed our so-called pacing threat—has been relentlessly and unapologetically stealing Western intellectual property for years at next to no cost in what was described by former National Security Agency director Keith Alexander as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” China has militarized the South China Sea, weaponized atolls in disputed waters, and bullied, threatened, and coerced neighbors and extra-regional countries that have dared to defy its strategic demands. The brutal repression of the Uyghurs and the brazen abrogation of the Hong Kong agreement and guarantees were met with loud protests from the West as well as limited economic sanctions, but nothing sufficient to deter China’s aggression.

Real deterrence depends on our will and our capability to inflict unacceptable costs on an adversary. If our adversaries believe that our intervention will prevent them from achieving their objectives, or that they will suffer unacceptable retaliation and consequences, they will be deterred. But deterrence requires credibility, and that is where the West in general, and the United States in particular, come up short. Who can forget President Barack Obama’s red line warning to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in August 2012 against the use of chemical weapons? Clearly, Russia and China haven’t. President Joe Biden took the military option for defending Ukraine off the table and has refused Ukraine permission to use U.S. weapons for retaliatory strikes on Russian territory. Our failure to demonstrate both the will and the capability to retaliate that undergird deterrence undermines deterrence.

Our fear of escalating the conflict in Ukraine has created an atmosphere of self-deterrence. We fear that any retaliatory action will exacerbate the situation and unleash an escalatory upward spiral, perhaps approaching or even crossing the nuclear threshold. While understandable, this mindset acts powerfully to restrain any credible demonstration of our capability and will. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue their persistent, multi-domain campaign against U.S. and Western security interests capitalizing, as they see it, on our paralysis. As the devastation of Ukraine drags on as China’s Xi Jinping, North Korea’s Kim Jung-un, and the Ayatollahs of Iran watch carefully and study. Indeed, Ukrainian cities are now routinely attacked by Iranian drones, sold to and deployed by the Russians. And soon, if not already, Ukrainian cities and troops will be bombarded by North Korean artillery shells traded to the Russians for food, by Kim. Neither of these odious regimes are deterred from actively, perhaps even enthusiastically, participating in the destruction of Ukraine and the murder of its people.

The lack of credibility has emboldened our adversaries who will inevitably push against and probe our environment of self-restraint, seeking to measure and understand where America’s will to act matches the need to defend its vital interests. For the moment, our adversaries believe our will to act is not aligned with our interests. As such, the persistent probing continues across a wide frontage and across multiple domains, especially in the cyber domain. Using an old metaphor, our enemies are pushing in the pin—globally—and carefully measuring when, where, and how they will strike an American nerve, and then how the United States will react. Understanding and anticipating the U.S. reaction will form the basis for their challenges against the U.S. and our allies. The lower the American threshold for either symmetrical or asymmetrical reaction to these now nearly constant probes, the greater the credibility of our deterrent. Conversely, the higher the threshold of American reaction, the more emboldened our adversaries become and the more risk we must absorb.

The Russian war in Ukraine exemplifies this situation clearly. Our fear of escalation has kept the West from taking the steps necessary to end the war. Putin has shown us he will not be deterred by economic sanctions. By now we should have learned that economic sanctions—regardless of how good they may make us feel, or even despite the harm they may cause to our adversaries—do not deter a determined foe. Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, as well as Russia and China, have been resistant to, and in some cases completely undeterred by, economic sanctions. If Putin is willing to sacrifice 200,000 soldiers, he is unlikely to be deterred by lower gas and oil revenues. By contrast, consider how effectively Putin has used the specter of nuclear escalation to deter an effective counter-offensive in Ukraine by nuclear saber-rattling. The debates about providing Ukraine with tanks; long-range, precision-guided missiles, F-16s, and other weapons, have been heavily influenced, and sadly, lengthened, by a strong sense of self-deterrence.

Western fixation on preventing escalation is compounded by an anachronistic interpretation of the laws of armed conflict which require any retaliatory operation to be proportional to the provocation, militarily necessary, and limited to military targets. These principles make sense in the context of conventional warfare, but contemporary conflict has metastasized far beyond the conventional sphere and now includes never-ending sub-threshold attacks, probes, and all the ambiguity of the so-called gray zone. These aggressions frequently defy rapid and unequivocal attribution and are often perpetrated by non-military agents.

It is noteworthy that the Western binary notion of war and peace is not shared by our principal adversaries. Both Russia and China perceive international relations as a constant and permanent struggle to create “positional” advantage to achieve strategic objectives that are in direct conflict with our values and interests. Given the persistent multidimensional threats we face, to which specific act of aggression would or should we respond? How can we determine if the act was perpetrated by a military or a non-military agent? Was it government-sanctioned, or just government-tolerated? This ambiguity converts the principles of military necessity, distinction, and proportionality into competitive handcuffs.

These observations beg the question: can there be any comprehensive theory of deterrence in the twenty-first century with so many incongruities and discontinuities? What does deterrence look like when dealing with a nuclear-armed opponent? What deters Al Qaeda, ISIS, or transnational criminal networks? What about cyber deterrence, and the real likelihood that we’ll soon encounter AI-powered, lethal autonomous systems? What deters attacks on our orbital constellation and our undersea fiber optic cabling by any entity capable of disrupting or disabling them? Witness the confusion over the damage to Nordstream II. Is there a single, master, comprehensive deterrent narrative that can simultaneously and concurrently work for us across all these domains and against all these state and non-state actors?

What is clear is that the base truism of deterrence theory remains the same: for deterrence to work in any domain our adversaries must believe we have both the will and the capability to prevent them from achieving their objectives or risking unacceptable pain. The re-building of Western defense forces over the past decade has been dramatic, but regrettably has also been frequently mitigated by strategic paralysis and equivocation. Declaring we have the will or declaring red lines will not suffice, and have already shown themselves to be inadequate. Words must be matched by deeds and actions. For Russia or China to believe in our deterrent we must break the cycle of reacting to their provocations and be prepared to be resolute in our intention to inflict some real pain in retaliation. This entails risk, but without taking some risk there will be no change in our adversaries’ behavior, and the persistent probes for our weak spots and the attacks on our vulnerabilities will be never-ending. Every strategic act entails some risk but so does no action. And no action, we know, is no deterrent at all.

General John R. Allen (USMC ret.) is a former President of the Brookings Institution, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and Commander of ISAF.

Michael Miklaucic is a Senior Fellow at National Defense University and the Editor-in-Chief of PRISM.

The views presented are those of the authors and are not statements of policy or official views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or National Defense University.

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Five years ago today in Nicaragua, citizens protested against Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo for their efforts to weaken protections for seniors. It quickly evolved into a broader call for greater freedoms and respect for human rights in the country. The Ortega-Murillo regime responded with utter brutality and violence, leading to a period of bloody turmoil. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at least 355 people were killed between April 2018 to July 2019.

Half a decade later—shamefully—the situation remains grim.

How did we get here? Let’s start with Ortega’s war against the Catholic Church. Even though Nicaragua is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reaffirms that religious freedom is a universal human right for all, Ortega sees religious freedom and communities of faith as threats to his authoritarian rule.

In the last year alone, Ortega has shuttered Catholic radio stations, expelled the nuns from Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity, expelled the Religious Sisters of the Cross, expelled the Vatican’s papal nuncio, severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican, detained Father Enrique Martínez Gamboa, sentenced Bishop Rolando Álvarez to twenty-six years in prison for being a traitor, requested Father Uriel Antonio Vallejos to be put on Interpol’s Red Notice list, arrested at least 11 priests, and banned public Easter processions.  

In its 2022 report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom states that the Ortega regime has “gone after Catholic-affiliated organizations, shutting down charities and expelling their workers, stripping universities of funding and legal status, shutting down news media, and eliminating non-governmental organizations.”

In December 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken designated Nicaragua as a Country of Particular Concern under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

However, it’s not just the Catholic Church being targeted. All Nicaraguans are living under a tyrannical regime that is constantly violating their human rights and denying basic freedoms.

According to the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua at the UN Human Rights Council, crimes include “murder, imprisonment, torture, deportation, rape, and other forms of sexual violence of comparable gravity…intentionally orchestrated by the highest echelons of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, against part of the population of Nicaragua, for political reasons, constituting prima facie, the crime against humanity of persecution [emphasis added].”

Ortega recently deported 222 Nicaraguan political prisoners from the country. While their freedom is a positive development for them and their families—they endured beatings, torture, and other human rights violations—it comes at the detriment of Nicaragua and its people. The main opposition to the Ortega-Murillo regime has been expelled.

All of these abuses are causing Nicaraguans to flee in record numbers. U.S. border officials reported 163,876 encounters with Nicaraguans in fiscal year 2022, adding to the migration crisis facing the United States from our hemisphere.

On the national security front, Ortega has allowed Nicaragua to be a staging ground for Russian military activity. Just this week Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov will visit Nicaragua as well as Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba. Nicaragua has hosted a lot of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s military hardware, including T-72 tanks and even Russia’s Tu-160 Blackjack bombers. Russia has also installed a global positioning satellite system in Nicaragua, which many believe is a front to surveil the United States.

In 2020, former U.S. Southern Command admiral Craig Faller warned that “beyond Venezuela, the sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nicaragua provide Russia with footholds close to our homeland, giving Putin strategic options.”

Those strategic options are now growing. In June 2022, Ortega went a step further and had his National Congress—which he controls—pass legislation authorizing the presence of Russian troops, warships, planes, and other military equipment in the country, bringing it all close to the U.S. homeland.

The current SOUTHCOM commander, General Laura Richardson, testified before Congress last month stating that, “Russia continued its military engagements with both Venezuela and Nicaragua … Russia uses disinformation to further its malign influence, sow instability and undermine democracy in the region, activities that promote Russian geopolitical goals and undermine U.S. national security interests.”

The question now is how the United States and the rest of the international community should respond. 

First, because Ortega prevented the newly-Senate-confirmed U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua to enter the country, the United States should reciprocate and expel the Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States immediately.

Second, Congress has passed, in a bipartisan manner, legislation that stipulated that the United States must use its voice, vote, and influence to block loans to Nicaragua unless the loans promote democracy at each international financial institution. This must be fully enforced.

Recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) sent letters to Central American leaders urging that they exercise their influence at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration to stop funding the Ortega regime. This is a good step forward, but the United States should go further. If the bank does not stop loaning money to this murderous regime, they are indirectly aiding and abetting a human rights abuser, and the United States should sanction the bank’s leadership.

While admonishing the Central American Bank is welcomed, the United States must also hold other international financial institutions accountable where it has leverage. According to former Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chairman Congressman Albio Sires (D-NJ), the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank have loaned at least $1.2 billion to the Ortega regime since 2018. This is appalling.

Third, the United States must prohibit imports from Nicaragua to the United States, exports from the United States to Nicaragua, and prohibit new U.S. investments into the Nicaraguan economy in accordance with authorities that the Biden administration extended by modifying Executive Order 13851 in October 2022. These authorities should be executed and utilized immediately against sectors that Ortega, his family, or his private sector collaborators control.

Whether it’s responding to Russian activity close to our homeland or attacks against the Nicaraguan people, including the church, Nicaragua must be prioritized within U.S. foreign policy. Nicaraguans today live under an illegitimate tyrannical regime that uses violence, fear, intimidation, unjust incarcerations, and state-sponsored killings to maintain its iron grip on the country.

Five years ago, many Nicaraguans sacrificed their lives for freedom. We must reaffirm our commitment to democracy for those who were massacred, and for all Nicaraguans still living under this brutal dictatorship.

Eddy Acevedo was recently deemed a “traitor” to Nicaragua by Daniel Ortega and was previously sanctioned by the Russian Federation. He is the chief of staff and senior adviser to Ambassador Mark Green, the president and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He was formerly the National Security Adviser at the U.S. Agency for International Development and senior foreign policy advisor for former Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL.). This opinion is solely that of the author and does not represent the views of the Wilson Center.

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On April 5th, U.S. Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, welcomed Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California. Ms. Tsai’s visit with Mr. McCarthy, who is second in line to the presidency, is the highest-ever profile meeting between Taiwanese and U.S. lawmakers on American soil. Accompanied by a bipartisan congressional delegation, Mr. McCarthy reaffirmed American support for Taiwanese sovereignty while demonstrating Congress would not be deterred by Beijing’s threats. In the weeks leading up to the event, Chinese officials repeatedly warned the Speaker, even emailing the attending U.S. lawmakers the morning of April 5th, labeling it a “blatant provocation.” Immediately after the meeting, several spokespersons for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) vocalized their disapproval, calling it a violation of China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and “the basic norms of international relations.” Ms. Tsai’s recent rendezvous echoes Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last year, which elicited a ferocious Chinese response in the form of 11-day military exercises, missile launches, and a simulated island blockade. However, China’s reaction exhibited more restraint this time, with military displays lasting only three days and no blockade. Why is this?

Of course, the PRC considers Taiwan part of its territory and vows to reincorporate the island under President Xi Jinping’s National Rejuvenation scheme. The One China Policy, adopted by the U.N. and the U.S., recognizes Beijing as the sole authority over all Chinese territory, including Taiwan. Acknowledging Taiwanese sovereignty and violating the One China Principle is the foremost redline governing any country’s relations with the PRC. In the last week, China operated an aircraft carrier off Taiwan’s east coast, imposed several symbolic sanctions, violated Taiwanese airspace, and deployed several other intimidation tactics. However, experts note how the PRC departed from the overwhelming shows of force utilized after Pelosi’s visit, notably the absence of missile launches.

With Ms. Tsai due to step down in 2024, Xi knows an overreaction could hurt the opposition’s chances in the subsequent elections. Ms. Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the bulwark against reunification, championing independence and a Taiwanese identity distinct from mainland China. Xi’s bellicosity after Pelosi’s visit and his brutal crackdown on Hong Kong’s protestors only heightened support for the DPP. Currently, the PRC plans to reunite with Taiwan peacefully, and Xi views the Kuomintang Party (KMT) as his best chance. As the main opposition to the DPP, the KMT favors closer ties with China, and some members support reunification altogether. While the next election will be pivotal to Taiwan’s future, greater geopolitical forces are at play.

At the dawn of a new era of great power competition, Xi wants to portray himself as a responsible international statesman who will mediate disputes and broker peace accords with no underlying motivations. On the one-year anniversary of the Russian invasion, Xi released his 12-point peace plan as a roadmap to a potential ceasefire. For good reasons, the U.S. and its allies dismissed the proposal, which fails to condemn Putin’s invasion and reiterates Russian narratives of NATO provocations and Western aggression. Indeed, a thorough analysis of the ambiguous 12 points shows that the plan is little more than political theater. Nonetheless, the quick dismissal by the West encourages the false narrative that it has no interest in peace while depicting Xi as a neutral arbiter in global conflicts.

China demonstrated its growing presence in early March when Saudi Arabia and Iran announced they would reestablish diplomatic relations after talks facilitated in Beijing. In 2016, Saudi Arabia severed ties with Iran after protestors stormed its Tehran embassy in response to the execution of a prominent Shia cleric. The PRC state media released photos depicting Iranian and Saudi officials shaking hands with China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in the background. The news reverberated in Washington, which views Saudi Arabia as a strategic partner and counterweight to Iranian regional influence. However, American relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated recently after President Biden pledged to make the kingdom a pariah over the crown prince’s connection to the gruesome murder of a Washington Post columnist. While the accord could be a win for regional stability, the significance of Chinese mediation with America’s faltering presence is indisputable. Though the U.S. still wields regional influence, China appears keen on filling the diplomatic void and acting where the U.S. cannot.

As Beijing’s diplomatic clout and global profile steadily increase, so have tensions with the U.S. in what looks to be the start of a new Cold War. It’s no secret the Biden administration seeks to build an international coalition countering Chinese influence, choking off access to certain technologies and pushing businesses to relocate supply chains elsewhere. While Biden’s assessments are strategically correct, Xi attempts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies. Last week French President Emmanuel Macron concluded a three-day visit to China where the two leaders lauded a “global strategic partnership.” The message was this: France has no plans to decouple its economy from China, and Macron sees Xi as instrumental to ending the war in Ukraine. The phrase “multipolar world” frequented discussions, alluding to a new international order where America no longer stands alone at the top. Most concerningly, Macron warned Europe against entering disputes that are not their own, referencing Taiwan.

With Sino-American relations at rock bottom, all eyes look to Taiwan as a future flashpoint, but conflict is not unavoidable. What is inevitable is the diplomatic competition already afoot. The PRC appears to be winning, but do not count America out just yet. While Washington’s military prowess is unrivaled, the U.S. must do better diplomatically. For one, Biden should stop alienating half the globe by framing each dispute as a struggle between democracy and autocracy. Standing with Taiwan and Ukraine is a moral imperative not because they are democracies but because sovereignty is the foundation of international stability and a nation’s existence. A country need not be a democracy to support sovereignty, and the democracy-autocracy rhetoric fails to resonate with much of the developing world.

On the contrary, it’s often interpreted as Western liberal arrogance and condescension. A well-functioning Democracy is indisputably the most just and desired form of governance, but the previous decades show the U.S. cannot force the regime on other nations. America lost recent opportunities by shunning nondemocratic partners like Saudi Arabia. As time progresses, the world will see the PRC for what it is: a state intent on reshaping the world order in its image. But for now, America must convince countries everywhere, democracies and dictatorships alike, that the world order it crafted after WWII has no better alternatives.

Peter Baker, White House correspondent for the New York Times, published an analytic piece the other day that should be disturbing food for thought, especially for professional diplomats but also for everyone else. While marking, along with President Joe Biden, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland, Baker observed that “such diplomatic breakthroughs have become a thing of the past.” In recent years, nations—and especially the United States—have appeared more likely to break treaties and international agreements than to sign new ones. Baker concludes that although it would go too far to talk about the death of diplomacy, “certainly there is a dearth of diplomacy for now.”

Baker uses formal agreements as a measure of diplomatic accomplishment, a gauge that may overstate the problem. The output of productive diplomacy goes well beyond such agreements to include communication and informal understandings that help to stabilize volatile situations, as well as the persuasion of foreign governments to act more in line with the interests of the country the diplomat represents. Nonetheless, Baker is on to something, and it is appropriate to consider what most accounts for the dearth.

The same three levels of analysis that political scientist Kenneth Waltz once used in a classic work about the causes of war can also be used to address a decline of diplomacy. One of those levels, the international system, figures prominently in Baker’s article, with references to “the revival of great power competition on the scale of the Cold War,” and what currently appears to be little appetite in Moscow or Beijing for compromise with the West. But recalling how the original Cold War featured highly significant international agreements, especially on arms control, most explanations at this level for a decline in diplomacy are not persuasive. There is at least as much need for peacefully negotiated agreements with one’s competitors and enemies as there is for agreements with one’s friends and allies.

As for any reluctance in Moscow or Beijing to compromise, if one could strip away the internal forces affecting policies in those two capitals and look solely at the geopolitical circumstances facing Russia and China today, there is little or no reason for those two regimes to turn away from diplomacy. The relevant needs to be served by diplomacy include, for Russia, a rescuing of its great power status in the face of economic and military decline, and for China, a full exploitation of its rising strength to secure a major role in the international system.

A second level of analysis—national political systems—provides more cogent explanations for the current dearth of diplomacy. The rise of anti-globalist populism provides much of the story here, and Baker correctly mentions the ascendance of that brand of populism during the administration of President Donald Trump as a big factor as far as the United States is concerned. In the current hyper-partisan U.S. political environment, Republicans attuned to their populist party base adhere to an anti-globalism that often takes the form of opposition to any agreement with an adversary that involves compromises, as all such agreements do. For Democratic presidents, the certain prospect of being assailed by the other party for making such compromises means the path of least political risk is to forgo major new international agreements.

Many significant international agreements, including the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland as well as the arms control treaties from the Cold War, are the product of months and often years of work. Such timelines include not only the negotiations that lead to the final agreement but also much earlier diplomacy that conveys shared interests, explores the boundaries of the bargaining space, and otherwise prepares the ground for signing on to a new agreement. U.S. politics that revolve around a four-year election cycle impede the sustained effort necessary for diplomatic success.

The peculiar American practice of tearing apart the upper echelons of the federal government with each change of administration has always been a problem in this regard—with domestic as well as foreign policy—but the effects have become more severe amid the intensified partisanship of the last three decades. Not only have cross-party senior appointments become much rarer than they once were, but also there is often reflexive rejection by one party of any initiative coming from leaders of the other party.

The third level of analysis—the individual leader—offers additional explanation for the absence of diplomatic agreements in situations where such agreement seems badly needed. The tragedy of the war in Ukraine, with no ceasefire agreement in sight, has much to do with the personal ambitions and now the personal political predicament of Russian president Vladimir Putin, who has staked his regime on achieving not compromise but rather victory in Ukraine. In China, the consolidation of power in one man’s hands to a greater degree than at any time since the death of Mao Zedong has meant that Chinese foreign policy, including bully-like “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, is primarily the policy of that one man, Xi Jinping.

Trump’s proclivities are a major part of why in recent years the United States has torn up or reneged on more major international agreements than it has negotiated or signed. The line between this level of analysis and the previous one is somewhat blurry insofar as much of the Republican Party remains in thrall to Trump. But Trump put a more personalized stamp on U.S. foreign relations by posing as an ace negotiator without—as demonstrated perhaps most clearly by his handling of relations with North Korea—getting substantive results commensurate with the pose.

Powers other than the United States have the potential for rising out of the diplomatic dearth and are already demonstrating their ability to do so. This is true of China with its recent brokering of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, of Russia with its facilitation of restored relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria, and both Russia and China regarding the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and potential expansion of the BRICS group. By comparison, U.S. diplomacy in recent years has not appeared as productive, apart from Finland joining NATO and other Western actions in response to the Russian war in Ukraine.

The dead hand of Trump continues to weigh heavily on U.S. diplomacy. In several important areas where U.S. leadership in the more distant past had led to fruitful international agreements, the Biden administration, apparently out of an abundance of domestic political caution, has not undone the Trump administration’s damaging retreat from diplomacy. It has not reversed most of Trump’s moves that made an Israeli-Palestinian peace an ever more remote possibility, such as the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. It missed an early opportunity to reverse through executive order Trump’s reneging on the multilateral agreement that had closed all possible paths to an Iranian nuclear weapon (a subject on which the Trump administration intentionally tied the political hands of its successor with the way it constructed a “sanctions wall” against Iran). And it has not undone Trump’s move away from the promotion of trade through international agreements.

Whether the United States can follow other major powers in ending the dearth of diplomacy will depend heavily on the direction of domestic U.S. politics. And it will depend on getting the American electorate to understand how the compromises that are inevitable in international agreements represent not just concessions to foreign states but also sometimes an essential part of advancing U.S. interests.

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was a National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.

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The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s exercise surrounding Taiwan this past week, conducted in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, is only the latest development in an extended competition over Taiwan. The formation of the Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, and the CHIPS Act have brought to the fore a bipartisan appetite for supporting Taiwan and being tough on the PRC. Last year, the Taiwan Policy Act, reviewed by the Senate, would have provided unprecedented recognition by naming the island a “major non-NATO ally.” It is increasingly important to evaluate and discuss whether, after over forty years of intentionally ambiguous policy, an overt defense commitment—“strategic clarity”—would really make Taiwan safer.

Arguably, strategic clarity opens the door to unnecessary conflict because of two faulty assumptions. First is that, in the current status quo, Taiwan is at a high risk of being invaded. Second, that a explicit defense commitment to Taiwan will deter the PRC. The omitted possibility for fait-accompli missions targeting defenses beyond the main island of Taiwan demonstrates why strategic clarity has a high risk of destabilizing the fragile cross-strait status quo, and setting a dangerous trajectory for Sino-American relations into the future.

“Strategic Clarity” Will Not Be Clarifying

Central to understanding how strategic clarity would be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests is understanding the particular circumstances of Matsu and Kinmen islands, which lie just off the coast of the Chinese mainland but are governed by Taiwan. Their geographical location makes them a preliminary target in a PRC campaign to occupy Taiwan, and a critical factor in creating a cross-straits defense policy.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States found itself in a position similar to the present, with chances to clarify its security guarantees to Taiwan. The resulting 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty bound the United States to defend the main island and the Penghu (Pescadores) islands but did not clarify a position on Taiwan’s other smaller islands. When the PRC responded by attacking these, Taiwanese leadership asked for public guarantees on Kinmen and Matsu. Recognizing the calculus and context for defending these islands could easily change in the future, the United States denied these requests. Instead, private assurance was given that the United States would support the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. Three years later, the PRC’s campaign progressed with an amphibious invasion of Kinmen and Matsu, which America responded to by presenting a conventional façade, heavily reliant on the threat of nuclear escalation.

In short, while the main island stayed safe, China was undeterred by the treaty from attacking other Taiwanese holdings and bringing the world close to nuclear war, illustrating issues with clarifying the Taiwan issue. The PRC’s machinations for these islands remain and their capabilities have since substantially grown.

Since agreeing to the three joint communiqués with the PRC and the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has not taken a “clear” official position on the sovereignty of Taiwan, nor explicitly defined a policy to defend Taiwan. Switching to strategic clarity now, like in the 1950s, requires making an impossible choice over whether to include the Kinmen and Matsu islands or not. If defense commitments are clarified, but Kinmen and Matsu are not explicitly mentioned, then clarity is not achieved—this would bolster the PRC’s perception that the islands are fair game, yet an attack on the islands would still appear as a U.S. commitment failure if it did not intervene. On the other hand, including the islands in a defense commitment is even more dangerous. The Kinmen and Matsu islands remained under Taiwan in the 1950s only by the lack of PRC military capabilities—nuclear threats and deployment of the 7th fleet to the Taiwan Strait functioned as a checkmate which the PRC had no means of contesting. The balance of military power has since shifted dramatically.

Nuclear threats will not have the same effect against the PRC as then, especially with the latter having secured second-strike capabilities. The PRC has also ramped up production of both commercial dual-use means of transport and amphibious assault ships. Taiwan, meanwhile, has substantially reduced its forces on the islands. In a twenty-first-century crisis, conventional defense of the islands is impractical and increasingly unpopular. Kinmen and Matsu are now deep within the PRC’s anti-access/area denial (A2AD) umbrella. In fact, the islands are so close that numerous drones, heavy artillery, and other short-range systems not usually evaluated as A2AD capabilities can cover the islands. In order to succeed, military operations under this umbrella require stealth, division of forces, missile defense, significant suppression of opposing fires and intelligence, and raw numbers. A lack of any of these elevates the need for others. An operation to defend Kinmen or Matsu would possess none.

Overall then, while an invasion of Taiwan would certainly be a costly endeavor for the PRC, there is no doubt even an opposed occupation of the Kinmen and Matsu islands could be achieved in short order.

Strategic Clarity Takes Peaceful Reunification off the Table

Despite the PRC’s recent sound and fury, peaceful reunification still plays a large and explicit role in PRC strategy according to President Xi Jinping. Strategically, the PRC’s current pursuit of peaceful reunification is sound. If there is a way diplomacy, propaganda, and/or coercion could still allow the PRC to peacefully unify with Taiwan, Xi would prefer to exhaust all other options in that direction before taking actions that irreversibly escalate the dispute which may lead to conflict with the United States.

To achieve peaceful unification, Kinmen and Matsu play a uniquely important role. The islands’ ties to the PRC, both economically and culturally, make them unusually close to the mainland. The PRC would rather these particularly pro-unification parts of Taiwan be leveraged as advocates for peaceful reunification, rather than crushing them by force. Invading the islands would not only deracinate the PRC connection into the Taiwanese political context, but it would also irreparably alienate the remaining Taiwanese by proving fears of CCP malintent correct. The CCP would be locked out of a peaceful strategy. Unification would remain an albatross around Xi’s neck, with the only solution being a risky full-scale invasion.

The prospects of peaceful reunification are thus predicated on the possibility that U.S. interest in Taiwan may falter, and that the PRC will be able to successfully convince Taiwan through isolation and dependency that unification is in its best interest. Partially because of this, U.S. deterrence policy has historically been tailored to deter a Taiwanese declaration of independence as much as a PRC invasion. Formal guarantees cement U.S. support, devastating the case for peaceful reunification and emboldening separatist factions in Taiwan. This would provide the PRC with its crisis justifying an invasion as per its Anti-Secession Law. The PRC’s pursuit of peaceful reunification would cease, precluding the continuation of the status quo détente.

The PRC is currently deterred from invading Kinmen and Matsu for good reason: aggression would undermine the effort and wealth the PRC has sunk toward curating an air of responsible leadership. This runs counter to a growing realization the PRC needs friends, even apologizing for interference abroad. Without a substantial shock to the system, the PRC does not have a good reason to face the serious and long-term costs of invading Kinmen or Matsu now: it would lose the possibility of peacefully reunifying, and face global condemnation even if it succeeded.

The PRC May Respond to Strategic Clarity by Invading Kinmen or Matsu

In this light, strategic clarity is dangerous because it necessitates an escalatory PRC response. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership closely follows any U.S. government move perceived as supporting Taiwanese independence and responds appropriately, with the magnitude and hostility of the response calibrated by how threatened the PRC leadership feels. One might believe it is likely PRC responses will remain in the form of signals short of war. However, the PRC has issued continual warnings that the status of Taiwan is a red line. Beyond a certain point, provocative actions taken by the United States would trigger a military response.

Worth noting is that the PRC uses crises to permanently alter the regional status quo in its favor; from expanding control in the South China Sea, to continuous patrolling of vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These actions seek to wear down and delegitimize the original threatening presence. Since the visit of a congressional delegation last August led by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi—seen by the PRC as threatening the One China policy—the PRC has taken action to intentionally weaken Taiwan’s sovereignty, commencing unprecedented military exercises around the island and continually crossing the Taiwan Strait median line with aircraft. A true change in U.S. commitment to Taiwanese sovereignty would force the PRC to take action to delegitimize that commitment. An assault on Kinmen or Matsu would be an extreme response to an extreme threat, but nonetheless consistent with PRC strategy and historical responses.

Bombastic foreign policy rhetoric obfuscates that the CCP’s greatest worries have always been internal threats. Among these, reunification is characterized as an internal issue and remains extremely salient in the mainland. In the face of slipping economic growth and unpopular zero-covid measures, the CCP was willing to emphasize Taiwan as a priority at the 20th Party Congress, positioning the issue as a goal on which leaders will be judged. A policy challenging CCP leadership would further polarize the issue, empowering hawkish voices within the Party.

There Will Be No Unprovoked Invasion of Taiwan Any Time Soon

Proponents of strategic clarity present a narrative where any day Xi Jinping may surprise the world with a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, or engage in such as a domestic diversion. It is because of this potentiality, they argue, that strategic clarity is necessary.

This position is untenable. While there are building internal frustrations, and Xi may wish he could easily invade Taiwan, the current diplomatic environment and strategy of the CCP undercuts any justification that Xi is gambling the continued existence of his government on an unprovoked and costly invasion.

Invading Taiwan would perhaps be the most difficult military operation ever. Sea conditions in the Taiwan Strait limit the window of large-scale invasion to only two small windows in April and October, and preparations for such would be transparent in the months leading up. Routes would be predictable and could be mined or ambushed by aircraft and submarines. The island itself is also highly defensible. Suitable landing areas are few and narrow, denying a massive amphibious landing necessary to leverage the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) overwhelming numbers. Beaches are prone to becoming jammed with ships entering, exiting, and sinking. PLA’s massive arsenal of missiles would be severely limited by targets to attack. Moreover, Taiwan has significantly increased purchases of difficult-to-detect anti-armor, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles since 2017. The island’s mountainous and foliage-covered geography ensures that many positions would remain undetected and intact to repel incoming forces. This is to say nothing of the capabilities of the United States, Japan, and Australia, which have all indicated involvement in the event the PRC attempts an invasion, bringing the possibility of success far lower. And even if a limited or full invasion were successful, the PRC would face disastrous economic and diplomatic costs.

In short, Taiwan faces a low risk of being invaded. Only 10 percent of experts in a recent survey believed that an amphibious assault with the goal of taking Taipei was likely in the next ten years. This starkly contrasts with 64 percent of those polled believed that the PRC would respond “negatively and significantly, provoking a crisis” if the United States ended strategic ambiguity. Over 70 percent agreed that the PRC believes the United States is willing to bear at least substantial costs in a conflict over Taiwan. Current U.S. policy is already explicit: the Taiwan Relations Act contains language almost as strong as in U.S. defense treaties, and in the Three Communiques—from which the One China Policy is based—the United States exclusively ties Taiwan and peaceful settlement. In a separate poll, a majority of experts expressed that they do not approve of strategic clarity on Taiwan.

America’s position is already clear enough toward the audience that matters the most: the PRC. Why kill a policy which continues to work?

The United States Should Support Taiwan… Just Not through Strategic Clarity

Strategic clarity is a rhetorical rather than a substantive change in U.S. policy—one which ultimately does not make Taiwan safer and may be dangerous enough to trigger a crisis by pushing the PRC to invade either Kinmen, Matsu, or both. The inability of the United States to respond to a Kinmen or Matsu fait accompli—the very public idea of Taiwanese territory being captured by the PRC—would severely weaken not just Taiwan’s position, but also the perception that America can support its alliance commitments across the world.

Instead of high-profile diplomatic gestures, the United States can make Taiwan safer under current strategic ambiguity without risking conflict from highly provocative actions.

First, the United States should focus on providing Taiwan with defensive assets at a rate that keeps the PLA uncertain about its capability to invade Taiwan. These assets should be capable of reaching operational capacity in the next few years, not be easily targeted by PLA missiles, and should not be tied to airstrips or ports which will be PLA priority targets. This requires clearing existing backlogs, as well as signing deals on new smart naval mine-laying craft, smart artillery, and redundant, robust intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities across the whole range of battlespaces. Dispersing assets that mitigate missile effectiveness and Chinese intelligence gathering such as more anti-air defenses as well as shore-based anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare tools are also key parts of making Taiwan’s defense equation add up. The United States can build up credibility that it will come to Taiwan’s defense by posturing more forces capable of responding quickly and affecting conflict from outside the missile range of the Chinese mainland.

Second, there is no military solution that denies an invasion of Kinmen or Matsu. However, this has been the case for years. The islands remain Taiwanese because of astute diplomacy in maintaining the cross-strait status quo. The United States should pursue a diplomatic goal of motivating allies—particularly non-regional allies who may not otherwise willingly damage relations with the PRC—on board with sanctions against non-peaceful attempts to change the status quo. Sanctions can change the calculus of a potential invasion in a way the U.S. military power cannot.

The Taiwan Strait will remain a geopolitical flashpoint, and the United States will play a deciding factor in its direction. Sober diplomacy, smart military investment, and leadership of allies can maximize the security of Taiwan.

Ike Barrash is an independent consultant working with think tanks on Indo-Pacific security and technology. He has an MA in political science from Iowa State University and has been an intern at the Department of State, CSIS’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, and the Stimson Center’s Defense Strategy & Planning project.

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