Diplomacy & Crisis News

Very few countries have proven to be hospitable to Syrian refugees in recent years as the country’s long-running war has resulted in a de facto partition of the country. Lebanon offers no exception to this dynamic, as proven by the numerous attempts by the Lebanese government to return some of the 800,000 to 2 million registered and unregistered Syrian refugees within its borders forcibly and illegally to their home country.

The latest iteration of this dynamic arose last month, as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) arbitrarily detained hundreds of Syrians across Lebanon, turning them over to Syrian security services at the border. Yet while the army’s intervention in the refugee space is a new development, the political underpinnings behind the operation are not.

No Home for Syrians

Reports emerged in mid-April indicating Beirut’s renewed efforts to identify, detain, and return Syrian refugees after a brief lull in such efforts. In this context, an anonymous LAF official confirmed to local media that roughly fifty Syrians were deported in the first half of April, led by army intelligence. According to the official, the operation prioritized locating undocumented Syrians living in Lebanon. This is operationalized through a 2019 Higher Defense Council administrative procedure allowing immediate deportation of anyone entering the country “illegally” after April 24, 2019.

This number ultimately grew, with many reports indicating over 400 Syrian detainees across roughly sixty raids in April. Of this group, approximately 130 were forcibly returned to regime-held areas in Syria. Other reports highlight 1,100 arrests and 600 deportations across seventy-three raids as of May 4. The raids focused on individuals with invalid residency permits, supposedly under the orders of caretaker Social Affairs Minister Hector Hajjar. The Lebanese General Security Office (GSO) is not conducting deportations—an irregular move given they handle such cases.

Hajjar is a member of the Hezbollah-allied Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and has openly derided the presence of Syrian refugees, warning of a “big explosion” if tensions are not reduced between Lebanese and Syrians in his country. He has also claimed that Syrian refugees make up 40 percent of Lebanon’s population, arguing “no country in the world would accept” such conditions. The minister has plans to lead a ministerial delegation to Damascus to discuss the refugee issue in a similar fashion to previous Lebanese ministers.

However, Hajjar claims that GSO is leading deportation efforts—conflicting reporting focused on the LAF. In this regard, Acting General Security Director Elias Baissari—officially tasked with the refugee file—reportedly visited Damascus last week to meet with Syrian officials about refugees. Following up on these efforts, Prime Minister Najib Mikati on April 27 assigned Baissari with the task of developing a mechanism for returning Syrians.

In parallel, Lebanese interior minister Bassam Mawlawi ordered his ministry to survey and register Syrian populations on May 2, demanding municipalities ensure Syrians are documented before permitting them to buy or rent property. This coincides with a slew of curfews for Syrians in many municipalities, as well as checkpoints and roadblocks to identify undocumented migrants. Finally, Mawlawi, alongside other ministers, demanded the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) revoke the refugee status of any Syrians who go to Syria and return to Lebanon.

Government Failure and Scapegoating

These evolving dynamics surrounding the refugee file suggest a new level of engagement on the part of the Lebanese government. While the GSO has traditionally held authority over the refugee file, the inclusion of the LAF and multiple ministers suggests Beirut is shifting toward a whole-of-government approach as it prioritizes the issue even further in 2023—although such an approach could be decentralized along political alliances. For example, some have argued that the LAF’s involvement suggests Joseph Aoun is catering to the public and other politicians in support of a presidential run.

To be sure, this does not suggest the existence of any serious or effective strategy, nor that multiple governing entities were not previously working on the file. Rather, the intensity of anti-refugee efforts is increasing, albeit amidst a government that is incapable of doing much of anything well—which lies at the core of the situation.

Just as Beirut failed to implement its 2022 refugee return plans, stipulating the return of 15,000 Syrian refugees a month, recent efforts suggest the limits of and impediments facing the Lebanese government. Indeed, while any illegal returns in violation of basic non-refoulment clauses—the international legal statute outlawing forced returns to unsafe conditions like Syria—must be actively fought at all levels, recent efforts to return between 130-600 Syrians highlight Lebanon’s limited capacity to operationalize and scale such a program or any other serious government action today.

This suggests what many migration experts and human rights advocates have argued for years: that Lebanese political figures and elites continue to operationalize a Syrian refugee scapegoating strategy as opposed to any serious return program or domestic reform agenda. Given Lebanon’s historic economic collapse at the hands of a septuagenarian elite that is primarily interested in retaining a corrupt and sect-based political system, defenseless Syrian refugees present an easy target.

Human rights groups have rightly condemned this approach, with Amnesty International releasing a statement on April 24. The NGO cited previous research documenting human rights violations experienced by Syrian refugees upon return to regime-held areas in Syria—not limited to arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearance. Given that these constitute the norm under Assad’s government, Amnesty put it simply: “The Lebanese authorities must immediately stop forcibly deporting refugees back to Syria.”

Syrian Refugees and the Future

Unfortunately, Lebanese officials are not listening. Indicative of broader anti-Syrian hate speech prominent across Lebanon, FPM minister of parliament George Atallah stated that Amnesty should “mind its own business” and “not interfere in the sovereign decision of Lebanon.” This echoed responses to the human rights organization’s tweet on the issue, in which many identified Syrians as synonymous with violence, economic collapse, and land theft.

The heightened rhetoric draws a direct path to Lebanese political actors, producing increasingly violent hate speech and actions against Syrians in Lebanon. The unfortunate reality of this dynamic is circular in that elite rhetoric informs the population, which in turn expresses support for increasingly brutal anti-refugee policies. This scenario mirrors hate speech against Syrians in Turkey.

Thus, 2023 will likely continue to present a rapidly deteriorating situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The latest iteration of efforts to make conditions unbearable for refugees will not be the last this year, especially amidst rapidly evolving re-normalization efforts between Arab states and Damascus. 

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him at @langloisajl.

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Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is certainly on a path to enhance his country’s diplomatic profile by turning it into a “middle power,” a concept born during the Cold War to characterize states that “punch above their weight” in world politics. Considered to be neither big nor small powers, these countries can project a global significance that transcends a merely regional profile. Canada is the prototypical middle power. Australia is also frequently mentioned in this context.

Middle-powers are frequently associated with economic significance (for instance, due to their energy resources) combined with what scholars call their “norm entrepreneurship.” They typically do not exert influence through military force but rather through diplomatic means, often involving their role in conflict resolution.

Kazakhstan has all the classical characteristics of a middle power: strategic location, abundant natural resources, and commitment to international principles and cooperation. Kazakhstan has continuously emphasized multilateralism and conflict resolution in its international diplomacy.

One of the key factors contributing to Kazakhstan’s emergence as a middle power is its commitment to hosting and participating in international political conferences. In recent years, Kazakhstan has positioned itself as a neutral ground for dialogue and mediation. For instance, in January 2017, the country hosted high-level talks on the Syrian Civil War in Astana, bringing together the Syrian government, opposition forces, and regional stakeholders such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the Astana Process, which has since had a key role in promoting ceasefires and facilitating humanitarian aid.

In 2013, Kazakhstan also facilitated the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), which culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2017 to 2018, Kazakhstan emphasized such crucial issues as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict prevention, and counterterrorism. Likewise, it was instrumental in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan after the country’s political turmoil in 2021. 

Kazakhstan has coined its position on the Ukrainian crisis, a policy of non-recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. Such courageous consistency in pushing strategic neutrality in a region neighboring Russia and China has contributed to efforts to strengthen the UN principles in support of the world order, as well as the regional prospects for greater multilateralism.

It is remarkable that Kazakhstan is emerging as a middle power on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea at the same time as Azerbaijan is also doing so on its western shore. The promotion of their bilateral cooperation is driving deeper integration in the region, reinforcing its security structure. The recent agreement with Azerbaijan to leverage the full capacity of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR) is an example. The TCITR, also known as the Middle Corridor, runs from China to Europe through Central Asia and South Caucasus.

The latest bilateral meeting between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan follows the 2021 transformation of the Turkic Council into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Established in 2009, the Turkic Council was initially a platform for dialogue and collaboration between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. The creation of the OTS was a natural development from the Turkic Council’s evolution, over the years, into a more comprehensive organization encompassing economic, cultural, educational, and security affairs.

Kazakhstan’s diplomacy was a driving force behind both the foundation of the Turkic Council and, under Tokayev’s leadership, its more recent institutionalization as the OTS. This shift has enabled countries like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to develop stronger ties and to work together more effectively on regional challenges. The OTS’s November 2022 Samarkand Declaration, adopted on occasion of its ninth summit meeting, laid out a broad but grounded multilateral program for cooperation in the foreign policy and security fields as well as in the economy and people-to-people relations and the reinforcement of the institutionalization of Turkic-world activities.

The country is well-placed to cooperate with Azerbaijan to play key middle-power geopolitical and geoeconomic roles in the Caspian Sea region. Each is the economic powerhouse of its area with vast energy resources and a stable political climate, making it an attractive partner for regional and global powers. Similarly, Azerbaijan is a crucial player in the South Caucasus, an important transit hub for oil and gas supplies, connecting Europe and Asia, including the westward transit of energy from Kazakhstan. Their recent bilateral agreement is in line with the 2022-2027 roadmap for the Middle Corridor’s development that Kazakhstan proposed trilaterally among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey in Aktau last November at the foreign-minister level.

It is worth mentioning that Kazakhstan was among the first to rally for greater regional and intra-regional cooperation to confront global challenges arising from increased polarization and fragmentation. It has reached out to the middle powers around the world, as well as business and academia with the call to convene in Astana at the Astana International Forum on June 8-9. The forum will provide a new means to amplify voices standing for nonviolence in international politics to ensure sustainable economic growth, peace, and security. There is a hope that the call will resonate among “middle powers” to find the path back to peace.

Kazakhstan has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy aimed at maintaining the balance between major powers while advancing its national interests. This pragmatic foreign-policy approach, pioneered by Tokayev as the country’s foreign minister and prime minister in the 1990s and 2000s, has allowed it to thread the needle between Russia and China while deepening its ties to the West as well as to other Asian powers and regional players. This is the policy of an archetypal Eurasian middle power.

Harun Karčić is a journalist and political analyst covering the Balkans and Turkey. Over the past decade, he has authored numerous articles on Islam and foreign influence in the region, including Saudi, Iranian, Turkish, and more recently Chinese and Russian. He also regularly reports on Muslim minorities in Europe and rising right-wing nationalism. He tweets @HarunKarcic.

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Patriot missiles have finally arrived in Ukraine, but the reality may not live up to the hype. Ukrainian air defense operators have been lauded in training, but the threat environment that Ukraine faces poses challenges that are daunting for the Patriot system.

Ukraine faces threats that run the span of Russia’s missile and drone arsenal. Russia’s unmanned aerial systems range from consumer-grade reconnaissance drones to more sophisticated Iranian-made kamikaze drones. Several classes of drones are interceptable by Patriot, but then it becomes both a tactical and economic issue: Drones can use their maneuverability and terrain-hugging flight patterns to remain undetected by Patriot radars. Moreover, it’s questionable to use $3 million interceptors to take out drones that cost orders of magnitude less. 

This is particularly the case when Ukraine’s supply of Soviet-era interceptors is slated to run out soon, and U.S. resupply of Stinger missiles remains similarly strained. This would leave Patriot as the sole defense Ukraine has against Russian air supremacy. The United States can’t just throw more Patriot interceptors at Ukraine, either. For one, they’re a precious commodity; Washington only bought 252 PAC-3 MSE interceptors this year for the entire U.S. Army, and many of these will be used to phase out more antiquated interceptors.

Patriot operating on its lonesome is a tenuous proposition at best; while a first-rate system technologically, the Patriot cannot be used to full effect if it is divorced from air defense doctrine. Patriot systems are limited to pinpoint defense of major assets and are designed to operate in tandem with air defenses engaging targets at higher and lower altitudes. Without these additions, Patriot will have too many threats to engage and the result will either be porous coverage that doesn’t protect its defended assets, or coverage that quickly subsides when Patriot runs out of interceptors.

Moreover, Patriot systems are themselves vulnerable. Operating a Patriot radar system gives away its location, making it an open target for Russian attacks. This means that Patriot is not a one-stop-shop for defending Ukraine’s military assets or its people.

The “do-somethingism” of handing over this advanced weapons system is also divorced from the strategic ends that the United States could reasonably achieve from doing so. Patriot coverage, or lack thereof, will not bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The air war in general is a means of shaping operations for maneuver forces, and on this front Ukrainian and Russian forces remain stalemated. Insulating Ukraine against air attack also discourages negotiation by providing a false impression that the air threat can be mitigated indefinitely. The longer the negotiation process is delayed, the more Ukrainians are killed and the more damage is done to Ukraine’s infrastructure in the long term. 

Given these tactical and operational flaws, there is dubious strategic value for the United States in sending further systems to Ukraine. Patriot systems are not going to bring the war in Ukraine to an end or enable Kyiv to negotiate for or reclaim Crimea or the Donbas. What they do signal is a false American commitment that may prolong Ukraine’s carnage.

The ideological framing of the sanctity of territorial integrity needs to end, as it exacerbates Kyiv’s more maximalist—and unachievable—aims of retaking Crimea. The end state of the Russia-Ukraine War will likely not look like the status quo ante, and Washington should recognize this. Ukraine managed to make gains in the Donbas in 2022, but both sides’ long-anticipated spring offensives have yet to materialize, with a Stalingrad-esque deadlock in Bakhmut preventing any territorial gains.

The United States can follow a different model, namely one of mediation and deescalation. The United States cedes initiative and influence when it allows others to be the dealmakers, such as China’s recent brokering of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement or Turkey’s facilitation of Ukraine and Russia’s grain export deal during the war. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has begun undertaking the groundwork along with China for a negotiated end to the war. Germany likewise has not done much to decouple or rearm as its rhetoric suggested early in the war. The United States can take advantage of a stagnant front line to bring about a negotiated end, or at least a ceasefire. Waiting to do so limits what Washington can accomplish when Ukraine’s military means are exhausted.

Washington has misstepped by giving Ukraine Patriot systems that will likely produce few benefits. However, there is an opportunity for Washington to still play a needed role in concluding the war. Tactical means cannot achieve these strategic ends; weapons systems will not prove decisive, but diplomatic power might. Washington can still achieve much by doing less. The path to peace in Ukraine may not be paved with weapons but with diplomatic finesse.

Geoff LaMear is a Fellow at Defense Priorities.

Image: DVIDS.

Friday, April 28 marked the one-hundredth day of Dr. Najat Saliba and lawyer Melhem Khalaf’s parliamentary sit-in to demand accountability from Lebanese lawmakers and follow the constitution. In over ten sessions, Lebanese members of parliament have failed to elect a successor after President Michel Aoun’s mandate expired in October 2022. Rather than continue the process, everyone decided to return to their homes and wait until a “suitable” candidate appears. Najat and Melhem, however, chose an entirely different approach.

Why did they start the sit-in?

In a press conference held in January, both Najat Saliba and Melhem Khalaf announced their intentions to remain in parliament until every other MP assembles to have successive and open-ended sessions to elect a new president. At the conference, Khalaf highlighted that Article 75 of the Lebanese constitution obliges parliament to meet regularly until a person wins the necessary votes to become president.

The present situation and recent developments:

Saliba had to temporarily stop her side of the sit-in to travel abroad to Geneva and the United States. Her goal on the trip is to speak with high officials from the United Nations who share her conviction that the rule of law is being usurped in Lebanon. Once she returns to Beirut, Najat intends to return to parliament alongside her colleague and comrade. She is being accompanied by journalist and supporter Lebanese Australian film director Daizy Gedeon who produced the movie “ENOUGH! Lebanon’s Darkest Hour.” Although the sit-in received enormous praise for its tenacity and courage in defiance against a failed system at the beginning, there is now a sense of indifference and criticism.

Many are now seeing the sit-in as a waste of time and do not believe it can move the needle regarding the presidency. I have come across several people in Lebanon saying, “Why are they still sitting in there? They should be working.” My reply is always the same: “If they weren’t in Parliament, you would say they are no different from the rest.” The irony of such criticism is that Melhem and Najat are working. Everyone else is at home. Some have also taken shots at the sincerity of the sit-in. Najat and I spoke on this matter, and she explained her position.

“I think the sit-in with the values and principles should not be questioned anymore. Because this is the only way we can regain our democracy. People who are thinking the sit-in can do the miracle that the other MPs could not do, they are mistaken. So, I think instead of asking us about how much the sit-in has made a difference, I think they should be asking the other Parliamentarians who are really on vacation and doing nothing. They are not attending to people’s needs. This needs to be asked. I think we have stopped our lives for a beautiful and excellent cause that is to regain our anchor and point of reference, that is the Lebanese constitution.”

It is clear from speaking to both Najat and Melhem they have no regrets for initiating the sit-in. Nevertheless, it does beg the question … Why haven’t other MPs from the so-called “Change” bloc followed their example? The arrival of more MPs could solidify and strengthen the sit-in and may push for more people on the ground to come out to support them. Ordinary Lebanese citizens have asked me questions such as, “Why are they not coming together?” Can they at least agree on a name? There is growing resentment on the streets towards some of the Change MPs.

There is truly no reason for all other independent and opposition MPs to be sitting at home. This notion of the “right timing” for a bargain to be struck by all the political bigshots is an insult and anyone who abides by it is breaking the law. MPs are supposed to be legislating and working on behalf of their constituency. Not ignoring them until a political breakthrough manifests out of thin air.

There is no perfect candidate. There is no international or regional solution for Lebanon. There is only the Constitution. If it is followed accordingly, Lebanon would have had a president by now. When will the rest of parliament understand this?

Adnan Nasser is an independent foreign policy analyst and journalist with a focus on Middle East affairs. Follow him on Twitter @Adnansoutlook29.

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On May 14, Turks will be going to the polls in one of the more consequential elections of this year. Turkey is a critical country, and the competing alliances and leaders promise distinct solutions and approaches to awaiting challenges.

This is the first in a series of articles analyzing the consequences of the different electoral outcomes. I start with a possible defeat of the incumbent president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). This starting choice reflects neither an expectation nor a preference. However, the fact is that tumultuous days await Turkey if Erdogan were to be defeated after a twenty-year reign. This is because the Turkish polity is deeply divided and polarized and needs a well-defined road map for a political transition. Moreover, the structural political changes pledged by the opposition coalition led by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and its head, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, represent a complete regime transformation.

The transition will be challenging as the new government will be confronting three immediate problems: the economy, the status of state institutions, and governing amidst disarray at all levels of society and politics. The most pressing one is the dire economic situation caused by mismanagement and exacerbated by the devastating February 6 earthquake. Therefore, the government must quickly introduce a financial package that tackles the high inflation rate, the dismal current account crisis, and the declining value of the lira and address the dramatic loss of confidence in the Turkish economy.

The earthquake’s cost is estimated to be between 8 and 12 percent of GDP—an immense amount. Considering how poorly the Erdogan government performed after the quake, expectations that a new government will quickly rehabilitate its victims and the affected provinces’ infrastructure are bound to be high. However, such expenditures will collide with the introduction of more orthodox economic policies, including interest rate hikes. In such a challenging environment, the new government must win domestic support by becoming as transparent and truthful as possible in explaining its policies to a public that has lost faith during the last decade of Erdogan’s rule.

The good news is that the Turkish manufacturing base is solid and capable; it needs to double its efforts at increasing and diversifying its exports, primarily geographically, and once again attracting direct foreign investment. Turkey’s advantageous location is conducive to landing some “friend-shoring” types of investments. Turkey will require sizeable foreign assistance to accomplish these and obtain restructuring funds; this support is likely to come mainly from the United States and Europe.

The second challenge is executing a transition unlike any other in modern Turkey’s history. This is because, during his rule, Erdogan, the consummate populist-authoritarian politician, brought just about every state and societal institution of any significance under his domination. From the judicial system to the central bank, the public universities, most of the press, parliament, the military, and the bureaucracy were all stripped of their autonomy.

Yet, nothing can move forward without first reestablishing the rule of law; one cannot attract investments in an environment where legal norms are constantly violated. So how does the new government deal with pent-up expectations for redress and justice in a country where thousands have been imprisoned arbitrarily or dismissed from their jobs and professions? While 800 government officiald—including governors, ambassadors, heads of intelligence and religious affairs, and various agencies—will automatically lose their jobs, the judiciary and other critical institutions will continue to be run by Erdogan loyalists. So, the victorious coalition must devise an action plan to rebuild confidence in institutions.

The third task is to create a coherent governing structure out of quite a disparate set of coalition allies and outside partners while tackling raw and divisive issues that separate them. Understandably, the focus will be on the promise to return to a parliamentary system and do away with the exiting hyper-presidential one. This gargantuan task will require careful planning and debate and a few years to accomplish.

The leader of the opposition, Kiliçdaroglu, is a well-meaning if unimaginative person who comes from a bureaucratic background. Nevertheless, he has outperformed all expectations by running an intelligent campaign and eschewing a calm and non-confrontational style. This is in stark contrast to Erdogan, who has gone out of his way to employ divisive rhetoric in which criticisms of the president were often deemed treasonous and meriting prosecution.

Kiliçdaroglu has projected himself as the ideal transitional leader; expansively viewed, the opposition has many rising charismatic stars all chomping at the bit to play a more significant role. While it may be problematic at the beginning of a new administration, their diversity in background, experience, and worldview will bring much-needed dynamism to Turkish politics. This needs to be improved on the government side; paradoxically, when he came to power in the early 2000s, Erdogan had amassed a wide-ranging group of seasoned political personalities and others from different walks of life. Unfortunately, over time they were all discarded in favor of “yes-men.”

One of the immediate challenges for the new government will be to manage the pent-up frustrations of supporters who feel they have been wronged during the very partisan governing style of the incumbent administration. For those who have been in Erdogan’s camp, even if they may have prepared themselves for a possible defeat, the fact remains that the rug will have been pulled from under them. Absent partisan institutions they can turn to for support, they will find themselves without protection and thus quite fearful of a coming reckoning for their future. These are businesspersons, especially builders who have been accused of corruption and favoritism; leaders of a slavishly pro-Erdogan press; judges and prosecutors who, under orders from the presidential palace, concocted fabulous conspiracy theories that “legitimized” the jailing of opponents; and unqualified university leaderships that ran amok firing professors deemed insufficiently loyal to the regime. The latter has already taken steps by surreptitiously creating positions for themselves in university systems.

The press, both state-owned and private, is a particularly thorny issue. The Erdogan government tried to starve the “non-loyal” outlets by forcing TV stations and websites to close down temporarily or preventing state entities, be they state-owned banks or ministries, from advertising in “opposition” newspapers. Meanwhile, it lavished attention and resources on members of the dominant pro-Erdogan press who actively collaborated in repressing regime opponents by heaping made-up accusations on them.

Will Erdogan, who has a large entourage to safeguard in addition to his family and his allies in the press, bureaucracy, and other sectors, pull a January 6 or try to delegitimize the elections? He tried it once when his party lost the Istanbul mayoralty in 2019 and fabricated an excuse to have the local elections repeated. It backfired on him as Istanbulites voted in much larger numbers for his opposition. Then the Supreme Electoral Council had no option but to follow Erdogan’s illegal wishes because he effectively yielded enormous power. This time, it may be different as members of the council are unlikely to risk their well-being if he proves unsuccessful in returning to power. Already, there are indications that some members of the Constitutional Court are willing to defy him.

Still, for the sake of a peaceful transition, the incoming government may want to consider coming up with an understanding with Erdogan and his family that offers them immunity and a promise that they will be left alone, provided he does not engage in election chicanery and interfere with the incoming government’s efforts to constitute an administration.

The new leadership will likely face unexpected challenges; different groups previously targeted by the Erdogan government can be expected to move quickly against their former tormentors once election results are announced. One can envisage, as an example, Bogazici University academics and students, who have maintained a vigil against Erdogan-appointed cadres that ransacked one of the country’s best educational institutions, attempting to take over the university forcibly. On the contrary, such events will likely be replicated nationwide.

Given the monumental domestic economic, political, and social issues awaiting the new government, it will likely focus on improving relations with the West, whose support Turkey desperately needs to fund the massive post-earthquake reconstruction efforts and stabilize the economy. Unfortunately, at this early stage, foreign policy disputes would divert attention and energy from the task at hand.

At the top of the agenda is Sweden’s application to NATO which the Erdogan government has blocked because Stockholm has refused to extradite so-called terrorists. Not only does the opposition have a different outlook on this issue, but traditionally Turkey’s center-left has had a favorable view of Sweden. U.S. President Joe Biden has indicated that he wants to sell Ankara F-16 aircraft, especially in light of Turkey’s ejection from the fifth-generation F-35 fighter program following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system. Congress, however, is unlikely to approve any arms sales, F-16s in particular, and offer substantial support to Turkey if the veto on Sweden is maintained. The much thornier S-400 problem, for which no immediate solution exists, will have to await an imaginative answer. Therefore, a new Turkish government will have to kick this can down the road. 

Not everything will change in foreign policy; Turkey’s center-left has its nationalistic attitudes. Kilicdaroglu, once in power, will continue to pay lip service to traditional issues that have been the hallmark of Turkish foreign policy, such as Cyprus and the Aegean, absent Erdogan’s combative style. It is worth noting that since the earthquake, the Turkish Air Force has stopped overflying Greek islands for fear of antagonizing Western donors.

Kilicdaroglu will push to restore relations with the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, especially if this would occasion some Syrian refugees' return. The recent “rapprochement” between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the apparent efforts at reintegrating Assad by Gulf countries may result in an attempt to end the Syrian stalemate. With Assad still firmly in power, Riyadh and Tehran could agree to enshrine the status quo, provided the regime makes some concessions. Given its support for the Syrian opposition and its military presence in northern Syria, Turkey’s participation would help ensure this agreement’s success.

Washington and Ankara are more likely to come to an agreement on the presence of U.S. forces stationed in northern Syria that partner with local Kurds in fighting the Islamic State, or ISIS. This had been a significant source of tension between the two countries.

Finally, Europe and the United States want to see Turkey reverse the path to authoritarianism under Erdogan. To this end, it is also in their interest to be as accommodating of a new government as possible.

Henri J Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Lehigh University and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.

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Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently announced a joint American-Turkish effort to sanction two individuals with ties to radical entities inside northern Syria. Specifically, the U.S. Treasury Department and its Turkish counterpart designated Omar Alsheak and Kubilay Sari as supporters of terrorism for their role as “financial facilitators for designated terrorist groups Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.” This collaborative move represents a seemingly renewed era of cooperation between Ankara and Washington, just ahead of Turkey’s impending national elections on May 14. While the effort will and should be welcomed by the Biden administration, it should be perceived as a token move—one that is intended to facilitate a reset in the beleaguered bilateral relationship between the two NATO allies.

Just days before this announcement, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, announced that the country’s intelligence service operatives had successfully neutralized the current leader of the Islamic State (ISIS), Abu Hussein al-Qurayshi. The new decision to sanction two individuals affiliated with radical entities in Syria builds upon a previous collaborative effort between U.S. and Turkish authorities that succeeded in disrupting ISIS’ financial networks at the beginning of January. On the surface, it appears as though Turkey has begun to substantively cooperate with its Western partners in the counter-terrorism efforts. However, that would be a hasty conclusion.

For one thing, the designation of a relatively few number of terrorist entities in 2023 misses the fact that radical entities and their operatives inside Syria are large in number. More importantly, for years, Turkey has provided support to entities that include, but are not limited to, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Erdogan’s quest to topple the Assad regime resulted in Turkey making a series of terrible choices. Ankara provided salaries, weapons, equipment, and logistical information to a plethora of jihadist organizations. Moreover, since 2015, Erdogan parted ways with the United States, as Washington was primarily focused on eliminating the ISIS threat, mainly by partnering with the Syrian Kurds under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey chose to label this organization a terrorist group due to its affiliation with its parent organization inside Turkey: the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. In doing so, Erdogan chose to ignore the real terrorist threat posed by ISIS and chose to back jihadi entities to fight against the Assad regime.

Erdogan’s jingoism in foreign policy can no longer continue, however, and Erdogan is aware of this. For one thing, he has had to abandon his fixation to topple Assad, as he is now likely to remain in power. Second, if Erdogan wins Turkey’s elections in the days to come, he will need to reset ties with Washington and the West in general. This is likely due to the serious amount of economic support that Turkey’s economy will require from Western creditor institutions. Turkey’s central bank spent over $14 billion to prop up its national currency in the past month. Following the elections, the ability to maintain the present level of exchange rate will be impossible. Bottom line: Erdogan (or whoever is in charge of Turkey) will need a Western lifeline, however, he has shown little that would convince lawmakers in Washington to sympathize with Turkey’s economic woes.

Erdogan has initiated a series of regional resets with Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. What has been lacking is positive overtures toward the West—Washington in particular. Ankara, under Erdogan’s continued tutelage, is attempting to buy American support, particularly if Turkey decides to knock on the IMF’s door. To be sure, sanctioning individuals affiliated with jihadist organizations and disrupting their financial networks will be welcomed. However, these initiatives represent only a fraction of the moves that Ankara could make if it was serious about counter-terrorism. To demonstrate that intent, it could definitely withdraw its support from radical groups in Syria and provide sustained information of more high-profile individuals to sanction. We have yet to see this happen.

Sinan Ciddi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he contributes to FDD’s Turkey Program and Center on Military and Political Power. Follow Sinan on Twitter @SinanCiddi.

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