Diplomacy & Crisis News

When it comes to illegal mass migration, it is almost impossible to successfully protect a thin border line stretching for hundreds and thousands of miles. Thousands of people—concentrating their efforts on short border sections—can easily overrun the equipment and guards, as has happened from the Spanish exclave of Ceuta to the small city of Yuma, Arizona.

Neighboring states are reluctant to deter people from crossing because they do not want to serve as a “parking lot” for illegal migrants, as Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić has said. It is much simpler for transit countries to simply let people go—a win-win situation both for the migrants and the transit country.

Similar patterns are visible not only in Europe, but also in Mexico, which—after the end of pressure and threats from the Trump administration—has begun refusing to permit Customs and Border Protection to expel families with children under the age of seven, citing a new law relating to the treatment of migrant children since the Biden administration took office. 

Yet it is not only the “carrot and stick” policy—which does not save transit countries from becoming parking lots—that can bear fruit for both transit and destination countries. Providing support for transit countries’ own border protection to prevent aliens from entering can be more beneficial for all participants, likely in a cheaper manner than pure—and costly—blackmailing and bargaining.

During the current migration crisis in Europe, more and more countries recognized the need for closer cooperation with transit countries in a way that makes them also interested in combating illegal border crossings. One of the possible solutions is to help them with their own border security. In November 2022, Austria, Hungary, and Serbia signed a trilateral agreement in which the two EU member states offered to help Belgrade organize deportations by plane for people who arrived in the Balkan nation from safe countries and are not eligible for asylum. Furthermore, they pledged a police contingent equipped with vehicles, thermal vision goggles, and drones to strengthen border protection along the North Macedonian-Serbian border. So, what actually happened was that the three countries shifted the focus of border security to the south, from the Hungarian-Serbian border to the Serbian-North Macedonian one. It made Belgrade interested in participating in the collaboration and perhaps it is closer to a durable solution than the constant debates between Belgrade, Vienna, and Budapest. And this may be just the beginning. As President Vučić emphasized, “we are ready to move further south together with North Macedonia and thus protect both Europe and our own country.”

Due to the increasing number of illegal border crossings across the Western Balkan routes toward Italy, a similar plan emerged through the participation of Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy in late March. According to the preliminary negotiations, Slovenia and Italy will send joint police forces to their neighbor to combat illegal migration within Croatia, while local authorities can concentrate their efforts on the border area. The measure could make available hundreds of additional law enforcement personnel to strengthen border protection, while it can also reduce the flow of irregular migrants to Slovenia and Italy.

Similar solutions are not unknown on the other side of the Atlantic: certain U.S. administrations also realized that it was much cheaper and more efficient to provide assistance for Mexico to police its own southern border than focusing only on the American one. For instance, the Southern Border Plan aimed to construct a network of communications towers along Mexico’s southern border region in 2014–15 to help security and migration forces to communicate despite gaps in radio coverage. According to a report by WOLA, most towers had been built by 2019, even if final construction was delayed by Mexico’s lack of issuance of a deployment plan. 

But physical infrastructure is not the only thing. In the drug war, U.S. DEA agents are deployed to Mexico to facilitate the fight against cartels. The United States could follow similar patterns against illegal migration, sending Border Patrol agents to the southern border of Mexico. Even if they could operate—similarly to their European counterparts—only with the presence of local law enforcement agencies, it could increase the protection of the Mexico-Guatemala border and, from a humanitarian perspective, could make the procedure easier for people who are really escaping from persecution and war.

Furthermore, we should not forget that the length of the southwest border of the United States is 1,954 miles, while the Mexico-Guatemala one is just one-quarter of that, 541 miles, which makes more concentrated efforts possible.

Of course, this will not mean that the United States can neglect its own border security in the southwest. Even with enhanced support from Mexican border authorities, thousands will manage to reach the United States—not to mention people who fly directly to Mexico with valid tourist visas, and later move north. But preventing illegal migrants from crossing into Mexico from the south is also in the interest of Mexico City, which does not want to be “a parking lot.” Therefore, similarly to the European examples, it can lead to a mutually-beneficial collaboration and a win-win situation for both participants.

Viktor Marsai, Ph.D., is the Director of the Budapest-based Migration Research Institute, an associate professor at the University of Public Service, and an Andrássy Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, DC.

Image: Shutterstock.

French president Emmanuel Macron has again sparked controversy by suggesting that Europe should chart an independent course from the United States, this time over Taiwan. This is a recurring theme from the French leader, one that is both a challenge to his fellow Europeans and an opportunity for the United States.

On the one hand, the French have sought ways to distance themselves and Europe from U.S. leadership, while at the same time advancing their own authority. On the other hand, they have shown a reluctance to participate in the very organizations they seek to benefit from and to head. It is not easy to belong to a group whose leader does not seem to want to be a member.

The French have at least been consistent. Charles DeGaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966, intent on maintaining French autonomy, while at the same time retaining France's membership, and voting rights, in the organization.

In the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia, French officials promoted the Western European Union (WEU), a fully-European security organization and tacit substitute for NATO. The WEU—made up initially of French and German military units—was supposed to provide Europe with the modest level of security it needed in the post-Cold War era, cutting Washington out of the scene.

But the WEU did not work. Worse still was what might have happened if it did. France would not accept German leadership, nor were the Germans eager to cede authority to Paris. In the wake of European paralysis in response to dueling crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, the WEU was quietly euthanized and Europe returned to its security dependence on the United States.

However, the Gallic dream of a purely European security alliance—one with France at the helm—never entirely perished. Macron has enthusiastically sponsored a new security dialogue with his counterpart in Germany, Olaf Scholz, both before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Germans, for their part, appear amenable to continuing the conversation, though the question of which great power will hold greater sway in the relationship remains unaddressed.

Such posturing regarding jettisoning reliance on the United States routinely elicits anguish and anxiety from members of the Atlantic security establishment. Yet it is doubtful that European security run, and paid for, by Europeans constitutes a significant problem for the United States.

Indeed, there are a number of benefits. The first, and most obvious, is that it would be cheaper. There has long been bipartisan support in the United States for the idea of Europe ponying up more for its own defense. American presidents from Barack Obama and Bill Clinton to Donald Trump have called for Europeans to do so. The problem is that Europe did not have to. Free-riding is a thing. European autonomy would force Europeans, not Americans, to pay for Europe's security.

Europe was also skeptical of the need for security and reluctant to provide what U.S. officials thought prudent. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has kindly resolved doubts on this matter. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has made it clear that in military terms Russia is not the Soviet Union. What was once thought to be “the second best army in the world” is now more widely acknowledged as possibly the second-best army among the former Soviet republics.

While Russia and other security challenges remain, Europe is fully capable of addressing them. Gone are the days when Europe, humbled by two world wars, could not afford to protect itself. Europe has instead become addicted to American largesse (a phenomenon I refer to as "military welfare") while at the same time complaining about their North American partners.

One final concern is that the United States will lose the benefits it accrues from membership in NATO. What are these benefits? One of the most often referenced, and vague, is "influence." The notion that Europe will stray into darkness without U.S. supervision, as it did twice in the twentieth century, is a uniquely American conceit. Europe is a different place today, one that is stable, affluent, and moderate in its posture. It does not need Americans telling it what to do.

Nor is it the case that the United States needs to meddle in European affairs for its own policy purposes. By and large, Europeans will adopt policies and actions that are, for the most part, compatible with U.S. interests, with or without U.S. efforts to impose outcomes on Europe.

At the same time, America needs to focus on problems elsewhere. China is richer and likely more competent militarily and politically than Russia. While some European militaries have executed gestures in solidarity with U.S. efforts to contain Beijing, these efforts mostly just demonstrate the limited value of Europe's contributions in a region that is distant from Europe geographically and politically. A better outcome for the United States would be for Europeans to resolve their own security concerns, allowing the United States to actually pivot to Asia.

Macron has laid heavy hints that the United States has overstayed its welcome in Europe. Other leaders are more polite, but their sentiment is also clear. America can afford to be gracious in response. As tensions in Eastern Europe abate in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukraine war, there will be an opportunity for the United States to refocus and streamline its security commitments in Europe. Doing so will free up resources and reduce liabilities on both sides of the Atlantic.

Erik Gartzke is professor of political science and director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California at San Diego.

Image: Nicolas Economou / Shutterstock.com

Until recently, relations between Mexico and the United States had largely been centered around immigration, almost to the exclusion of other concerns, with the Biden administration seeking to control cross-border flows while moving away from former President Donald Trump’s harsh “build the wall” rhetoric. However, lately, another sensitive issue, narcotics trafficking, which had been relatively dormant in recent years, has become a high-profile source of friction, with harsh words over fentanyl emanating from both Washington and Mexico City, followed by some efforts to defuse tensions.

Unquestionably, there is reason for concern regarding fentanyl, a highly addictive synthetic opiate, as it has increasingly become the product of choice among U.S. consumers of hard drugs. It is fifty times more potent than heroin. 70,000 deaths per year have been attributed to fentanyl overdoses, out of a total of 100,000 narcotics-related deaths.

Fentanyl’s precursor chemicals are produced in China, cross the Pacific by sea, and are smuggled into Mexican ports. The final product is then created in laboratories in Mexico and sent to the United States. The infrastructure for this, of course, already exists as Mexican drug trafficking organizations have long been major sources of heroin and cocaine entering the United States.

Calls in Washington for Unilateral Action Provoke a Sharp Response

With fentanyl deaths rising and receiving extensive coverage in the media, American politicians have become engaged. Republican Representatives Michael Waltz and Dan Crenshaw have submitted draft legislation authorizing the use of military force against the fentanyl trafficking cartels, while Republican Senators Lindsey Graham and John Kennedy have submitted a bill designating the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations.

The evident intention of these bills is to put the United States in a position to take unilateral kinetic action against the cartels whether or not Mexico agrees, as has been done against terrorist targets in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Although Crenshaw did tell Mexico that “we would love to have you as a partner,” the implication behind such a statement is that the United States should act in any event. And Trump publicly stated that if re-elected he will “order the Department of Defense to make appropriate use of special forces, cyber warfare and other overt and covert actions” against the cartels.

Mexican president Andres Manuel López Obrador reacted immediately to these initiatives. Never one to hold back on his own rhetoric, he asserted that fentanyl was America’s problem and the result of its “social decay,” rather than that of Mexico which, he said, does not produce or consume the product. This claim of Mexican non-involvement is true only if one somehow does not consider the processing laboratories in Mexican soil as production. And as for consumption, while it has not become a major issue in Mexico yet, there are documented examples of it taking place there.

Obrador has gone so far as threatening to urge Mexican-Americans to vote against Republicans if they do not cease their pressure campaign. This has resulted in some pushback from activists from that community, who have suggested that, instead, he should be concentrating on securing the safety of would-be immigrants—there was recently a fire at a Mexican detention center along the border in which forty detainees died.

Foreign Minister Marcel Ebrard also took up the cry against the American congressmen, going so far as to say he would call upon consular officials stationed in the United States to mount a public relations campaign “to defend Mexico.” And unsurprisingly, Mexican officials have also repeated their often-used response to American pressure on security issues, asserting (with considerable truth) that their country is flooded with weapons that are smuggled in from the north.

Answer: An Action Plan

After several weeks of sniping by American congressmen on one side and the López Obrador administration on the other, there has been some effort to turn down the heat. The Biden administration has avoided reacting to the Republicans’ offensive on the issue, doubtless viewing it as a complement to their ongoing effort to characterize its immigration policy as ineffective, despite the reality that fentanyl is smuggled into the United States through border crossings and not through illegal immigration.

For its part, despite its initial (and highly predictable) hostile reaction to U.S. congressional pressure, Mexico apparently has grudgingly accepted the need to be seen as “doing something” on fentanyl. A meeting between U.S. and Mexican officials took place on April 13, and Mexico has announced a fentanyl action plan which covers ground that will be familiar to those who have followed drug policy initiatives over the years.

The elements of this plan include creating a coordinating body within the Mexican government to address fentanyl, increasing the number of army personnel monitoring land customs stations and the number of navy and customs personnel at maritime ports, creating a special unit within the national prosecutor’s office dedicated to synthetic drugs and weapons, and establishing a protocol for consultations between the Mexican Finance Ministry and the U.S. Treasury Department on money laundering.

And after saying that fentanyl was entirely a U.S. problem, López Obrador has at least recognized that the precursor chemicals are entering Mexico. He has written to Chinese president Xi Jinping asking that action be taken to halt their flow. He is still awaiting a response.

At the same time, the U.S. Justice Department has recently announced charges of fentanyl trafficking against the sons of now-imprisoned drug lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzman, together with a $10 million reward for their capture. In addition to whatever legal merits this step may have, it has come at a moment when the Biden administration would certainly benefit from the appearance of aggressive action on this issue. However, López Obrador has criticized the United States for operating without consulting Mexican authorities, and said that his law enforcement priority is “public safety.” Further, while Mexican cooperation with the United States on fighting drugs will continue, López Obrador noted that it is at a “second level” of importance, seemingly undercutting any impact of the previously announced action plan.

The Drug Issue Always Comes Back

Thus it is not clear if the politics of fentanyl will remain conflictive or whether some sustained effort will be made to lower the decibel level. History shows that U.S. politicians and media become periodically seized on the issue of drugs coming from Mexico.

This includes during the Nixon administration when the border was nearly shut down for thirty days in “Operation Intercept”; during the Reagan administration, where at one point U.S. customs briefly repeated this action in an effort to put pressure on Mexico to address the abduction of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent; and during the Bush and Obama administrations, when, more productively, in response to the unprecedented rise of powerful drug cartels, the United States provided massive counter-narcotics assistance to Mexico under the so-called “Merida Initiative,” including aid to the police and military and also resources for judicial reform and human rights observance.

The narcotics issue, now manifesting itself as fentanyl, rises and falls as a public concern but never goes away. And the pattern of a spike in concern and the exchange of heated rhetoric by politicians, followed by an effort to return the issue to normal bureaucratic channels is likely to repeat itself. Ultimately, both countries have an interest in preventing the issue from disrupting the overall relationship. But in managing the issue, policymakers on both sides of the border will have to recognize certain unchanging realities.

The United States Needs to Get Real…

One reality that the United States must face is that unilateral action—subjecting the drug cartels to counterterrorist-style operations without Mexican consent—is a non-starter. Indeed, one may ask whether those promoting it are truly serious or are just looking to score political points. But if reiterated often enough an idea, no matter how dangerous, can go from the fringes to the center of debate, moving the famous “Overton window” of thinkable policy options.

First and foremost, unilateral action would not work. “Decapitation” strategies are unlikely to change the capabilities of the drug cartels if not accompanied by broader efforts to reclaim state presence in the large, lawless areas of rural Mexico in which they operate. Killing an individual drug lord or destroying an individual laboratory will have little effect without long-term follow-up by the Mexican government. General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose career includes service in Colombia, has stressed that counternarcotics operations are fruitless without local “support and approval.”

And few things would be more likely to make such cooperation impossible than unilateral military action within Mexico by the U.S. armed forces. The country’s historic memory includes the 1846–48 Mexican War in which much of its north was annexed and during which Mexico City was occupied. It also includes the U.S. interventions during the administration of Woodrow Wilson in which the port city of Veracruz was occupied and General John Pershing embarked on a “punitive expedition” against Pancho Villa in northern Mexico.

Given this history, no Mexican government could tolerate U.S. forces acting on its soil without its consent. It would likely mean that cooperation on immigration, the other top U.S. priority, would stop, and instead of Mexican security forces discouraging periodic caravans of would-be immigrants trudging towards the border from Central and South America, they would simply let them pass.

The “remain in Mexico” policy, which began under Trump and was maintained with some modifications by President Joe Biden, under which asylum claimants are not allowed to enter the United States for adjudication but must wait in Mexico until their hearing date, would no longer be tenable. And vital cooperation on trade, law enforcement, the environment, and public health could come to a grinding halt.

…And So Does Mexico

But there are also realities that Mexico needs to recognize, notably that legalization by the United States of hard drugs, a solution preferred throughout Latin America, is simply not on the political agenda. While marijuana has been largely legalized at the state level (and de facto at the federal level), there does not appear to be any movement toward doing the same for cocaine, heroin, or now fentanyl. Given the rise in deaths and the potency of this synthetic drug, Mexican leaders cannot expect that the United States will solve the problem for them.

And although change is unlikely to occur during his administration, another reality is that López Obrador’s policy regarding the drug cartels has been a failure. He termed his approach “abrazos no balazos” (hugs, not shooting), arguing that the answer to the drug problem was social welfare spending to improve the situation of poverty-stricken Mexicans who would otherwise turn to this illicit trade.

Implicit in this policy shift was an end to aggressive action to defeat or even contain the cartels—live and let live, essentially in the hope of seeing reduced violence. This entailed lowering the frequency and intensity of counter-narcotics operations, disbanding a U.S.-trained investigative unit while severely curtailing the DEA’s ability to work with local counterparts, and forcing the United States to replace the Merida Initiative assistance to a far less counternarcotics-oriented “Bicentennial Framework.”

The result has been continued narcotics-related violence, and ever-stronger cartel domination of many of Mexico’s states, with local governments and security services becoming in effect their junior partners. And while this has gone on, the cartels, with their Chinese associates, have moved into fentanyl production—and although the recent round of tough talk in each direction may have gotten the López Obrador government at least to admit that a problem exists, it strains credibility to think that placing a few hundred more soldiers and sailors at customs posts and holding inter-agency meetings, per its recently announced plan, will make much difference.

In It for the Long Haul?

What steps should the United States take? First, to quote Hippocrates, do no harm. The prospect of treating fentanyl traffickers like terrorists may have brought the issue to the forefront but further threats of unilateral action will be unlikely to produce results and actually undertaking it would be a disaster. And we must recognize that López Obrador, heading toward his last year in office, is not likely to make major changes in his narcotics policies behind the absolute minimum to keep the United States at bay.

For the United States, the only hope is to press for greater cooperation from López Obrador while understanding that the real challenge will be to begin a dialogue with his potential successors, be they from his party or from one of the opposition groupings. It will need to make clear that the prospect of legalization, and especially that of fentanyl, is a chimera, while recognizing that geographic reality and ongoing demand for narcotics in the United States means that complete elimination of Mexico-based trafficking is impossible.

Rather, both the United States and Mexico need to understand that aggressive Mexican law enforcement, backed by significant U.S. assistance, can have a positive, though admittedly not conclusive effect on containing and then shrinking the power of the cartels and their capacity to traffic in fentanyl.

Mexico, of course, is not likely to greet a restart of an aggressive counternarcotics effort with great enthusiasm. Action against the cartels will cost lives and treasure, and require patience. The initial goal must be simply to keep the cartels’ power and their capacity to produce fentanyl and other drugs from increasing. But Mexico may come to realize—hopefully before it is too late—that simply letting the cartels have their way and expand further will impose far higher costs, and indeed may let the country drift toward failed state status in large areas of its territory. On both sides of the Rio Grande, realism is in order.

Richard M. Sanders is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the U.S. Department of State, he served as Deputy Director of the Office of Mexican Affairs and as Director of the Office of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs and at embassies throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Image: Shutterstock.

Ukraine may need to use older missile defence systems with the dwindling stock of more advanced surface to air missiles.

A modern development of war that many were likely not aware of over the last decade was the ability for missiles to shoot down other offensive munitions like missiles and artillery shells. While it is still very difficult to shoot down targets that are small and fast moving, very high, or very low, if an acquisition radar can see a target, many advanced missiles have a high probability of shooting it down. The stealth solution can provide a level of protection, but at great cost and limited capability depending on the system being used. Even in the case of stealth, newer and more powerful radars are now able to see many stealth aircraft, but are unable to fire on the target for the time being. With modern missiles being such a great threat, it is often better to avoid using many air assets in a war zone, or use non-expensive and disposable equipment like cheaper drones en masse to overwhelm a small anti-air unit. In Ukraine, the conflict might change rapidly as it may be the case that Ukraine and its allies are running out of many of the advanced missile systems keeping the country protected from Russian missile and artillery threats.

In the video in the link here, the analyst discusses the probable lack of proper advanced air defence missiles possessed by Ukraine, and the limited numbers of international stock of other types of advanced missiles needed to keep up the current level of protection over Ukraine. The tactic of using low cost drones to terrorise Ukraine’s population by Russia, pressured Ukraine to use much of their modern missile stock against many low cost drones over the last few months. While the use of lower cost anti-air artillery like Gepards, Oerlikons and Shilkas might have been less effective, the upgrading of those systems should have been considered early on as an essential project to knock down drones as advanced missiles are limited in number, costly, and take time to produce in quantity. Another essential tactic to eliminate the threats of terror weapons on Ukrainians would have been to target the source of such equipment, especially if it is outside of Russia. Considering those weapons were designed to be used specifically against civilians, it would be considered an appropriate target under International Law.

With the recent decision to finally move allied MiG-29s into Ukraine from their neighbours, Ukraine will soon depend more on air-to-air assets for defence. This sudden change in policy is likely due to the low stock of Air Defence missiles possessed by Ukraine and its allies. Ukraine will soon be depending on fighter jets to manage the tracking and guidance of their own missiles on targets. Another reason for the increase in air assets to Ukraine is that with a diminished Air Defence shield, Russian Air Force planes are now less likely to be shot down by advanced anti-air systems from the ground. The mostly absent Russian air arm has been fairly passive in its approach since the beginning of the war, and it could be the case that the months of drone attacks to waste advanced Ukrainian missiles was planned so that the spring offensive could be supported in a more robust manner by Russian Air force artillery. Even with advanced tanks coming from NATO, air assets could cause a lot of problems for Western tanks on the field in Ukraine. Severe losses of NATO equipment may not change the position of the front lines in the war, but it would diminish the perception of power Western countries have over Russian forces in Ukraine. Whatever the outcome, the upcoming spring offensive will alter the narrative of the war when fighting intensifies on the fields of Ukraine.

The suffering of the Sudanese people becomes more dramatic by the hour: water and food supplies are shrinking while the injured are turned out of their hospital beds to make room for fresh victims of a pointless civil war, the third in as many decades. Hundreds have died and thousands have been gravely wounded in the crossfire as two generals fight for supremacy.

The shooting started the day following the Framework Agreement, which was supposed to enable the transition to a civilian government. Democracy in Sudan is always, tantalizingly, just out of reach.

Sudan’s politics live in a tragic loop. Since its independence from Great Britain in 1955, Sudan has been ruled by strongmen who are later replaced by coup leaders promising democracy, the rule of law, and, sometimes, the rule of Islam. Each time, from the coup leaders, a new strongman emerges.

After a bloodless 1989 coup, General Omar al-Bashir came to power along with his former classmates in what was then called Gordon College. Bashir, by 1996, had seized total power, pushing out the Islamists, former communists, and some northern tribal leaders. Bashir was himself was toppled in 2018 by protests, but the army quickly took control before democracy could break out. The doom loop cycled again.

Still, it would be wrong and dangerous to America’s security to assume a disintegrating Sudan poses no risks to the United States.

First, other global powers are already contending to control Sudan’s oil, gold, and strategic ports. If one Sudanese faction wins, then Russian demands for a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast would give Putin’s navy a global reach. If the other faction wins, Russia would also gain but Chinese influence in Sudan—already extensive, as measured by the Chinese-built skyscrapers in Khartoum and the bobbing oil derricks in the Nuba region—would surge.

During a visit to Khartoum in February, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov discussed the prospect of a Russian naval base with Sudanese leaders and the goal of completing it by the end of 2023, according to a document leaked online by a Massachusetts air national guardsman.

What’s important is that, left to its own devices, Sudan’s future will be controlled by America’s rivals. Those rivals, especially, include China.

China, already the world's largest consumer of energy, sees Africa as a “promised land’ of oil and gas. Sudanese crude alone satisfies more than 10 percent of Chinese oil needs. Beijing needs Sudan.

China’s Africa Policy Paper, released in 2015, calls for deep military engagement, technological cooperation, and a strengthening of African security forces. Although assistance initiatives to the African Union and its regional military pacts have multiplied considerably under this policy, Beijing channels most of its support bilaterally, from government to government. Often, this means arms sales. As a result, China is currently the largest arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa with 27 percent of the region's imports between 2013 and 2017—an increase of 55 percent over the period 2008–2012, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Sudan represents a significant part of that increase in weapon sales.

China also rules sub-Saharan Africa through debt. Growing debts of China’s military partner countries to Chinese state banks that fund China’s megaprojects now worry officials across Africa. They also ruefully note that China hires few locals for its African mega-projects—creating African debt without African wealth.

If Sudan comes apart like Libya, refugees will follow the Nile north and swamp Egypt’s rickety refugee centers. If Egypt decides to become more involved in Sudan, as it did in years past, it will use its influence to stem the tide of refugees and oppose the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on Ethiopia’s stretch of the Blue Nile. This will put Ethiopia into conflict with both Sudan and Egypt. East Africa could soon be aflame—risking U.S. counter-terror operations in the region.

Other U.S. allies have strategic interests at stake, too. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are pressuring both sides to adopt a diplomatic solution. Sudan was part of the original Abraham Accord normalization agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. But after a military coup in Sudan in October 2021, the final steps of the process with Khartoum stalled. Israel is inviting Sudan’s warring parties to a peace summit in Jerusalem. For Egypt and Turkey, a civil war in Sudan would pose a significant threat to their naval presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

For the United States, the options for mitigating the crisis are limited.  After successfully evacuating U.S. diplomats and citizens, the focus should shift to alleviating human suffering by establishing safe corridors to allow trapped civilians to escape.

This is an opportunity for America to impose its leadership and to restore the Framework for democracy with negotiation, not war.

The United States has left a vacuum in Africa and now its rivals have rushed in. It is not too late for America to offer the African continent what it really wants: peace, prosperity, recognition, and democracy. It could start with Sudan.

Ahmed Charai is a Publisher. He is on the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, the International Crisis Group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Center for the National Interest.

Image: Shutterstock.

From 2016 until February 24, 2022, most U.S. foreign policymakers focused on America’s strategy in countering a rising China. Many policymakers placed Europe on the backburner, taking for granted the endurability of American primacy on the continent. The invasion of Ukraine changed this dynamic. Since the start of this war, America’s attention has shifted back towards Europe and NATO.

However, many policymakers seem to be regurgitating old solutions to new problems. These include an expansion of NATO and sending more American troops to Europe. Essentially, such solutions are a Cold War and 1990s answer to today’s new security environment. Whereas America’s position in the 1990s as the sole great power permitted it to expand the alliance, today’s NATO faces a revisionist Russia tired of the status quo of NATO expansion. Moreover, unlike the Cold War, today’s international environment consists of multiple great powers.

All of these concerns beg the question: what is the United States to do about Europe? The answer lies in strengthening Germany’s military.

Germany remains one of the richest countries in the continent, possessing a GDP of $4.479 trillion in 2022. It possesses much latent power, a form of power that John Mearsheimer defines in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as “the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.” The more money, population, and resources a country has, the more likely it can use those resources to make a strong military.

In the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany seems to be attempting to transition this latent power into hard military power. As German chancellor Olaf Scholz stated in a speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, Germany and Europe are at a Zeitenwende, or a turning point. As Scholz late elaborated in December 2022, this Zeitenwende involves Germany’s plan to build up its military capabilities to serve as “one of the main providers of security in Europe.” Despite critics pointing out Germany’s lack of ammunition stockpiles, and that Germany’s rearmament plans are lagging behind schedule, there remains hope and reason for the United States to encourage German rearmament. 

The main reason why the United States should desire a formidable German military is the dilemma of extended deterrence, usually defined as the capability and willingness of a country to deter and defend its allies against a potential attack. The dilemma with extended deterrence lies in its difficulty to credibly defend an ally at risk of military attack, since (in the words of RAND’s Michael J. Mazarr) “an aggressor can almost always be certain a state will fight to defend itself, but it may doubt that a defender will fulfill a pledge to defend a third party.”

It is understandable for critics of this German strategy to be hesitant in loosening the leash on Germany’s military. After all, Germany was the primary antagonist of two world wars in the twentieth century. Thankfully, the German government has taken measures to prevent this from occurring within its country again, having implemented laws on hate speech, and the German government employed its first rabbis to serve as a chaplain within the Bundeswehr. To be clear, there is a difference between militarism and maintaining a strong military. Militarists glorify war and the military, whereas prudent military strategists understand the necessity of a military to protect their country’s national interests. In other words, the difference between militarism and having a military is in the ends of having a military: militarists see war and the military as ends to themselves, whereas prudent strategists view these as means to achieve the ends of security.

Another way to make certain that Germany does not fall back into its militarist past is for it to create a people’s military. Such an ideal is not unfamiliar to German thinking. In fact, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a high-ranking Prussian military reformer, strongly advocated for such a military. As Trevor Dupuy details in his book, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Scharnhorst sought to extend military participation to common Prussians and grant them rights in a new constitution. Scharnhorst’s logic was to create a common identity with the military and Prussian citizens, thereby improving Prussian morale and military effectiveness.

The good news is that today’s Germany has made considerable progress in creating this people’s military. As James Angelos notes, Germany possesses “homeland protection” units within its military reserves, many of its personnel serving as part-time soldiers. To further progress this people’s military, Germany might consider reintroducing military conscription, creating an increase in citizen-soldiers within Germany.

The United States should encourage this development of German civil-military relations. Creating a people’s military within Germany would water two plants with one hose: improve its military effectiveness and solidify its democratic governance amid a strengthened military.  

An independent Europe would be the goal of all this remilitarization and engaged civil-military relations within Germany. Essentially, this would involve Europeans providing for Europe’s security. Germany would lead the way in this increased defense spending effort.

The world is anarchic, meaning there remains no international government to induce order. Creating order and stability is left to the most powerful countries to compromise over their interests. In this world, states can only count on themselves to guarantee their protection. Amid the need for the United States to deal with its domestic issues, such as increasing economic inequality and a mental health crisis, and a world of multiple great powers, it will be difficult for Washington to continue to be the security guarantor in Europe. Prudency and careful analysis are needed in foreign policy. Such statecraft is especially needed in our present world, where history is back with a vengeance in international politics. If we are not careful, we may be at risk of repeating history’s gravest mistakes.

Benjamin Giltner is a student at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M.

This essay won the John Quincy Adams Society’s 2023 Student Foreign Policy Essay Contest.

Image: Shutterstock.

Late last week, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Mark Warner described how over-classification of national security-related information is a key and neglected factor behind the latest, disturbing intelligence leak. “We need frankly a system that limits classification to really important documents and then have a process to declassify when appropriate.” His argument: fewer secrets shared with fewer officials are essential to keep our secrets secret.

He’s on to something. Just before the New York Times first revealed that top secret documents had been posted on social media, my nonprofit released a major study on over-classification. Those in the “know” understand that over-classification is bad but insist officials can’t help themselves: the penalties for letting a document leak far outweigh any professional rewards that might come from making secret information more available.

That’s the conventional wisdom. It’s also dead wrong. In fact, effective national security organizations have strong incentives not to over-classify. There are effective ways to avoid doing so, and one of the most important U.S. intelligence agencies—the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)—has done it.

This is the key conclusion of a classification project my nonprofit ran for two years. Last month, the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) asked that I privately brief them on the project’s final report. The study subsequently received national attention. It gave examples of how harmful over-classification has become:

• American troops in Afghanistan couldn’t get timely, properly classified imagery from our government. To fight effectively, they had to buy unclassified imagery from private firms, which they could share with their Afghan compatriots.

• The Pentagon recently used a new information restriction—controlled unclassified information (CUI)—to keep unclassified weapons test results from Congress.

• The head of the U.S. Space Force was prohibited from publicly uttering the name of our key spy satellite system (KH-11), even though the media has long and repeatedly referred to it.

• Official historians writing classified studies to help black program managers learn from past mistakes and successes have been unable to find key classified documents because routine archival classification reviews, which would otherwise assure proper document filing, are not being done.

• Wasteful, expensive, duplicative military space programs have been shielded from oversight by special access program classification barriers that effectively block cross-communication and information sharing.

• Draconian security rules discourage innovative firms here and abroad from sharing their best with the Pentagon. These same rules are blocking needed military collaboration with our closest allies.

• Previously unclassified U.S. civilian nuclear export and cooperation information is being kept from Congress even though such commerce might help countries develop nuclear weapons options.

What allows this? In a word, mismanagement.

Currently, our government has over 2,000 security classification guidebooks and roughly 1,400 original classification authorities. Nobody can consult them all, and they don’t. These numbers, and the impossibility of mastering their guidance, are why so many government officials over-classify—it’s safe, it’s easy, and it takes little or no thought.

Fortunately, our best government organizations disagree. A case in point is the NGA. Seven years ago, it recognized it could only succeed if it added value to its imagery and got it to its “customers” quicker than commercial, unclassified space imagery firms. If it continued to deliver its product too late, or made it difficult to share with critical allies and firms, the agency would effectively go out of business.

The NGA was floundering using sixty-five classification guidebooks to classify its imagery. So what did it do? It boiled these down to a single electronic guide, eliminating previously subjective, contradictory guidance. It also required classifiers to justify their proposals to an intra-agency group of users, de-classifiers, historians, and subject-matter experts, and made appeals easy and quick. Finally, it encouraged constant updating of its new consolidated guidebook.

One Senator—Mike Rounds (R-SD)—noticed. He asked the Pentagon to report on how well the NGA’s example is being followed. He saw its model as the one our government should replicate. If it doesn’t, automating the review of the millions of classified documents it generates will be pointless: even the best document filtering system will fail if it follows contradictory and vague guidance that’s inevitable with thousands of different guidebooks and officials acting as classifying authorities.

So, what’s yet to be done? The Biden administration has pledged to tighten up the current system. But Congress must also act. At a minimum, it should fund and authorize dedicated staff to its own declassification policy review unit, the PIDB, which it has so far failed to do. Congress almost did this last year. It needs to get on with it.

Second, Congress should task the PIDB to oversee any government bidding on advanced technology contracts aimed to help automate the classification process. It also should track how many guidebooks, original classifications guidebooks, original classification authorities, classified documents, and declassification requests are being generated and recommend how best to reduce these numbers. 

More, of course, is needed. But skipping these first steps will only ensure we still will have too many classified documents to track to ever keep America’s top secrets from leaking again.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, served as deputy for nonproliferation in the Defense Department and is the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future.

Image: Shutterstock.

The White House released a twelve-page summary report on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan with little fanfare ahead of the Easter holiday. This low-key approach is unsurprising, given that America’s longest war ended in what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley described as a “strategic failure,” and that the national security apparatus has moved on to strategic competition with China and the war in Ukraine.

Yet while the report ostensibly provides context for a series of disastrous decisions that culminated in the deaths of thirteen U.S. service members at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in August 2021, it is also notable for what it doesn’t mention: what informed the decision to remove U.S. contractors as part of the operational retrograde. This is especially important considering the Biden administration’s plan relied on the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to secure the country during the U.S. withdrawal and beyond.

Where Was the Air Support?

The February 2023 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) report, titled “Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed,” notes that many Afghans thought the bilateral U.S.-Taliban peace agreement was “an act of bad faith and a signal that the U.S. was handing over Afghanistan to the enemy as it rushed to exit the country.” Despite intelligence estimates about when the Afghan government would fall ranging from two years, to somewhere between six to eighteen months, to a month after the U.S. withdrawal, Milley noted that “There are no reports that I am aware of that predicted a security force of 300,000 would evaporate in 11 days.” That is how quickly the Taliban insurgency rapidly took over villages, then provinces, and eventually Kabul itself, as the ANDSF unexpectedly collapsed and the troops melted away. If there was a window to stop or at least slow the Taliban’s advance, it was in those eleven days.

It is here that questions should begin, because, in addition to a sizeable advantage in troop strength over the 80,000 Taliban fighters, the White House report includes the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in its overall assessment of ANDSF capabilities. Unfortunately, the AAF deteriorated before the United States completed the withdrawal and its demise was a predictable (and predicted) outcome not reflected in these intelligence estimates.

Former Afghan Army commander and three-star general Sami Sadat authored a blistering New York Times opinion essay expressing his anger over the peace agreement that cut off contractor support for the fledgling AAF attack and support aircraft fleet when it was critically needed to halt the Taliban offensive. In addition to military forces, the agreement specified that the United States would withdraw “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel.” Accordingly, Sadat proclaimed that most of the 17,000 contractors were withdrawn by July 2021, “taking their proprietary software and weapons systems with them.” Consequently, the Afghan military lost its “superiority to the Taliban when our air support dried up and our ammunition ran out.”

The SIGAR report corroborates Sadat’s arguments and frustrations. Specifically, it states the AAF “was the greatest advantage the force had over the Taliban” but was not projected to be self-sufficient until at least 2030. The report also explains that the “decision to withdraw on-site contract maintenance from Afghanistan in May 2021 reduced the availability of operational aircraft and removed maintenance instruction at key regional airfields…As a result, ANDSF units complained that they lacked enough ammunition, food, water, and other military equipment to sustain military engagements against the Taliban.”

The SIGAR report concludes that the reduction of U.S. support “destroyed the morale of Afghan soldiers and police.” As demonstrated by Ukraine’s armed forces defending their homeland against a Russian aggressor more than a year after many analysts (wrongly) predicted the government would fall within days or weeks, morale and the will to fight can offset numeric superiority.

Questions to be Asked, Lessons to be Learned

If withdrawing contractors from the AAF was the seminal event described in the SIGAR report and by Sami Sadat, then these decisions warrant greater analysis and consideration going forward. The risk of prematurely cutting off contractor support should concern the Pentagon and policymakers. The demand for contractor support in efforts to advance U.S. national interests is unlikely to abate anytime soon. Moreover, some argue that such contractors have become a permanent element of the U.S. military force structure. If true, it behooves senior leaders in Washington to learn the right lessons from the Afghanistan experience and clarify policy going forward. The U.S. House’s various committees that provide oversight and perform investigations can positively contribute to these efforts by accessing classified reports and calling witnesses to provide a more robust analysis of the situation and the decisions made by military commanders and senior officials.

While one can criticize the United States for setting up the ANDSF for failure by providing an air force that is “too technologically advanced for its native country to sustain,” this risk was known to senior leaders before the withdrawal announcement. The White House summary report notes that President Joe Biden “took the advice of his military commanders on the tactical decisions regarding the operational retrograde of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, including the dates they closed facilities, and he regularly asked them if there was anything else they needed.” The House committees should summon these commanders to Capitol Hill and query them about these conversations and the impact of withdrawing AAF contractors. For example, there were legitimate concerns about force protection requirements for contractors in Afghanistan during the retrograde. What were the discussions regarding risk and was there a mitigation plan? Were there any deliberations about continuing AAF contractor work outside of the country?

In June 2021, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that “we should encourage the Afghan government to retain or engage contractor support for the Afghan Air Force and other key logistical and operational elements of the Afghan security forces – and we should pay for that support (including private security to protect those contractors).” Such an arrangement would allow American and other foreign contractors to remain in Afghanistan and maintain the AAF throughout the U.S. withdrawal and possibly beyond. House committees should inquire whether the Biden administration ever seriously considered such proposals.

Previously, I personally lauded the Biden administration for applying lessons learned from the botched Afghanistan withdrawal to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, I appreciated the extensive consultations and diplomatic efforts to rally NATO and lead a broader international coalition focused on countering Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ambitions and upholding the international order. That said, the “train, advise, assist” approach to build and sustain security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is not applicable to the Ukraine case because the United States does not have military troops conducting these activities in the country. Instead, training the Ukrainian Armed Forces is occurring in Europe and the United States. The contractor support issue will be interesting to watch as Ukraine receives and employs more Western equipment on the battlefield.

While I supported President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and am sympathetic to the constraints and deadlines inherited from his predecessor, he had agency for the withdrawal debacle that occurred on his watch. He should answer questions about whether his administration truly planned “for all contingencies – including a rapid deterioration of the security situation” as described in the summary report. Despite the political theater all too common in Washington these days, House committees should view the White House summary report as an opportunity for sober and bipartisan oversight to find out exactly what transpired, determine appropriate accountability, and codify lessons learned that can be applied in future operations.

Jim Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Shutterstock.

Recently, it was reported that during the presentation of the teams participating in the European Weightlifting Competition, a man ran onto the stage and set fire to the Azerbaijani flag, as the crowd booed the appearance of the Azerbaijani athletes on stage.  Later on, it was reported that the man who did this was a member of the organizing committee of the championship, Aram Nikolyan.

This occurred after the Armenian government had assured the European Weightlifting Federation that they would ensure the security of all of the athletes at the championship including the Azerbaijani athletes throughout their stay in Armenia and prepare for all kinds of security incidents.   As a result of this incident, the Azerbaijani athletes were forced to forfeit their participation in the European Weightlifting Competition.

“In conditions when such an atmosphere of hatred prevails in Armenia, security is not ensured, the normal participation of Azerbaijani athletes in competitions is impossible due to the psychological pressure,” the Azerbaijani athletes said in a statement. “Politicizing sport is absolutely unacceptable,” it added, urging the European Weightlifting Federation to impose sanctions on Armenia.

Following the incident, the European Weightlifting Federation “strongly condemned the incident, considering it extremely serious and a regrettable gesture and an attack on the integrity of sport values and on the universal principle of fair play.”   The Israeli Canadian Council also condemned the burning of the Azerbaijani flag at the European Weightlifting Competition in Yereven, noting that they also burned a Turkish and Israeli flag.   They expressed their solidarity with the Israeli, Azerbaijani and Turkish people.

They continued: “It is important to remember that sporting events should be a platform for promoting peace and unity, not for fomenting hatred and violence.   The ICC remains committed to working towards a world where diversity is celebrated, and all cultures are respected.   The ICC will continue to promote understanding and dialogue among different communities and stand up against any form of bigotry, discrimination and hate.”

Zeynel Abidin Kiymaz, the head of the Union of Turkish Journalists, concurred: “I strongly condemn the burning of the Azerbaijani flag at the competition in Yerevan.   The burning of the state flag is unacceptable. I resolutely condemn the perpetrators of this incident at the weightlifting competition in Yerevan.”   The Dona Gracia Center for Diplomacy also issued an official statement, proclaiming that they would “like to condemn Armenia for burning the Azerbaijani flag at the European Weightlifting Competition,” emphasizing that a sporting event is no place to make political statements.

When Erion Veliaj, the reformist mayor of Albania’s capital, promotes his plans to modernize and transform Tirana into a high-tech hub offering jobs and promise to his country, he imagines the city as “the Tel Aviv of the Balkans,” alluding to Israel’s largest city—a vibrant metropolis that was celebrated by the New York Times as the “Capital of Mediterranean Cool” and the headquarters for the country’s high-tech industries.

With its large and innovative sector, Israel, which is celebrating seventy-five years of independence next week, has produced more start-up companies on a per capita basis than large, peaceful, and stable nations like Japan, China, India, Korea, Canada, and all of Europe, and has more businesses listed on the NASDAQ than those of any other foreign country. Hence the reference to Israel as “Start-Up Nation.”

But Israel’s technological miracle has to do with more than just the success stories of several Israeli companies. It reflects in many ways the ability of that nation, with its Western outlook and first-rate higher education system, to employ its scientific instructions, financial system, and talented workforce to emerge as a winner in the global economy at the beginning of this century.

To put it differently, the achievements of “Start-up Nation” and the market economy—which turned Israel into a hotbed of innovation in software, artificial intelligence, chips, medical equipment, biotech, electronics, and wireless communications—were built on foundations that reflect first and foremost the progressive values of a modern population that was adhering to liberal democratic principles, the rule of law, women rights, free press, and religious freedom.

Relatedly, this is why Tel Aviv Pride is among the biggest annual gay events in the world and certainly the biggest in Asian continent. The open and buzzing cultural scene of what many in Israel call “the State of Tel Aviv” goes hand in hand with the spirit of innovation of its technology industry and the strength of the Israeli currency, the shekel.

From that perspective, Israel’s recent political turmoil in Israel exposed the fragility of these foundations of Start-Up Nation; they are weakened by the hard-right-wing government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who tries to push through a package of legislation that would undermine the independence of the courts, ultimately weakening the shekel.

In a way, the crisis in Israel is pitting the residents of the State of Tel Aviv—Israeli professionals with academic degrees that constitute the cultural and commercial elites of Israel, including its high-tech entrepreneurs—against a coalition of ethno-nationalists and ultra-Orthodox Jews who in the name of the “people” are trying to take control of vast political power sans the checks and balances required for the functioning of a liberal democracy and a market economy, and who are turning it into an illiberal democracy a la Hungary.

It was not surprising that many of the protests against the Israeli government were directly coordinated by high-tech entrepreneurs and investors, warning that Israel’s “Startup Nation” reputation would be threatened if the rule of law became questioned at home and abroad. In one demonstration, the tech industry protesters put a mock locomotive in the middle of Tel Aviv, decorated with signs saying “High Tech is the locomotive of the Israeli economy and democracy is its fuel.” Some of these protesters are threatening to leave Israel for Silicon Valley if the government succeeds in passing the proposed legislation.

Their concern is that, even if some sort of a compromise between the government and the opposition is reached, the current uproar demonstrates the shape of things to come. The proponents of illiberal democracy in Israel want to turn the Jewish state into a theocracy, and will continue strengthening their political power in the coming years, particularly if, as expected, the percentage of ultra-orthodox in the country increases and the residents of the State of Tel Aviv become a minority.

Ultra-orthodox Jews, or Haredim, are the fastest-growing demographic group in Israel, already close to 14 percent of the total national population; with their current growth rate of 4 percent, they are expected to constitute 16 percent of the population by the end of the decade, or about a quarter of all Israeli Jews in 2040.

Young ultra-Orthodox men study religious texts in yeshiva seminaries, which are funded by the government but impart an exceedingly limited formal secular education. These individuals do not learn a core curriculum of math, science, and English. As a result, the majority of the members of the community, with the men (who unlike secular Jews don’t perform the mandatory military service) continuing to study the Torah are not part of the workforce and remain dependent on state funding.

A report published last year by the Programme for International Student Assessment, commonly known as PISA, last year suggested as the number of Jewish students learning in Yeshivas has been growing, Israel’s ranking for fifteen-year-olds has been steadily falling, with Israel ranking very low in math (32nd) and science (33rd), as the widening gap between Ultra-Orthodox and secular Jewish students continues to expand.

So while 10 percent of Israel’s workforce is now employed in the tech industry, the world’s highest proportion, many doubt that will last. Indeed, the dazzling high-tech industry is diverting attention from a changing reality in which a segment of Israeli society and economy has all the markings of a third-world culture.

As their numbers rise in the Israeli population, the political parties representing the ultra-Orthodox and other religious sects have gained more political power. For the first time in Israel’s history, with thirty-three seats in the Knesset (parliament), the religious parties constitute a majority in the governing Israeli coalition.

While in the past much of the demands by the religious parties centered on increasing government support for their religious institutions, the ultra-Orthodox and their religious allies are now trying to move beyond that limited agenda and transform the country’s political system through their proposed legislation.

That legislation weakens the current civil rights safeguards and allows the government to keep public transportation closed on the Sabbath and separate men and women in educational and public institutions. Not to mention that the religious parties are continuing to press for an ultra-nationalist agenda, including the building of new Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, which they want to annex to Israel.

Considering that close to 25 percent of the Israeli population is now Arab, adding the percentage of ultra-Orthodox Jews and other religious Jews to that number, suggests that Westernized liberal secular Jews, whose ancestors were the driving force in the Zionist project, are gradually a minority in their own country. This raises the following question: would their children and grandchildren want to continue living in a country where the responsibility for securing Israel and developing its economy lies exclusively on their shoulders while they defend and subsidize a sizable percentage of the country’s population?

Moreover, the growing influence of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox and ultra-nationalists could lead at some point to the annexation of the occupied Arab territories, with Arabs constituting at least 50 percent of the population in the area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. That raises the specter of Israel turning into a third-world Middle Eastern country, that, like Lebanon would be ravaged by ethnic and religious wars. The Start-Up Nation would turn into a distant memory.

Dr. Leon Hadar, a contributing editor at The National Interest, has taught international relations at American University and was a research fellow with the Cato Institute. A former UN correspondent for the Jerusalem Post, he currently covers Washington for the Business Times of Singapore and is a columnist/blogger with Israel’s Haaretz.

Image: David Cohen/Shutterstock.

On a recent state visit to Beijing, French president Emmanuel Macron declared that his country would not feel obligated to support the United States in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. “The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction,” Macron said.

These calculated remarks reveal a selfish and cynical perspective. Macron expects America to shoulder the lion’s share of the burden for the war in Ukraine, yet feels France has no obligation to support the United States in the event of war in the Pacific. So, to borrow Macron’s phrase from his remarks at the White House last December, we must be “brothers in arms” on Ukraine, but America must go it alone with China.

Macron’s statement should spark Washington to review the United States’ status as the lead donor to the Ukrainian cause. Congress should request that the Biden administration provide a full accounting of what France and other European partners have contributed to Ukraine over the last fourteen months, both individually and as members of the European Union. This request should also require a breakdown of the nature of that support. The House of Representatives should also make clear that it won’t consider any future requests for additional funding for Ukraine until it has received this accounting.

President Joe Biden has framed the war in Ukraine—most notably in his February speech in Warsaw—as an existential global struggle for democracy undertaken in conjunction with European allies. Macron’s comments expose this justification as disingenuous. The existence of Taiwan’s flourishing democracy, just 100 miles off China’s shores, disproves the PRC’s oft-repeated lie that the Chinese people do not want democracy as it is foreign to their cultural heritage. It is hard to imagine a more direct threat to freedom than a PRC invasion of a successful Chinese democracy. Yet, in the case of Taiwan, Macron finds no need to lend a hand in the struggle for democracy, nor any obligation to help those American brothers in arms who liberated his country in World War II.

Macron’s comments were so poorly received that even Chancellor Olaf Scholtz of Germany hurried to distance himself from them. Scholtz indicated that, in the event of a conflict, Berlin would not let either Taiwan or the United States down. He placed the burden on China not to escalate tensions around the island.

But all our European allies should be on notice that the days of the United States bearing a disproportionate burden for Ukraine while also being expected to go alone against China over Taiwan are running out, and that more will be required of them than “moral support.” While many partners in what Donald Rumsfeld once called “New Europe” are stepping up to the plate and contributing more than their fair share, this audit would provide clarity as to what France and Germany—the European Union’s two largest economies—are and are not contributing to the defense of democracy on their own continent.

Recent intelligence leaks disclosed, among other state secrets, that the Defense Department assesses that Ukraine is running short of a range of supplies. This suggests that Biden’s oft-repeated strategy for Ukraine—“as much as it takes for as long as it takes”—is failing. In addition, these documents have revealed a contingent of Special Forces Operators stationed at the U.S. embassy in Kiev, despite frequent administration assurances that there will be no U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. As well as an accounting of the contributions our European partners are making, Congress must demand clarification of what Biden’s strategy on Ukraine actually is, that the administration provide a realistic assessment of what it will take to make it successful, and how that investment might impact our ability to counter China.

The bottom line on Ukraine is that, given the multi-valiant threats the United States faces around the globe, America cannot care more about European security than the Europeans do, especially if continental leaders such as Emmanuel Macron openly declare their intent to abandon America when the United States might need them the most.

America needs allies who understand the unique pressures the United States faces and can see the larger picture beyond what is happening in their own backyards. And if that is too much to ask, those same allies can start taking the lead in a war that is, after all, a far more direct threat to them than it is to America.

James Jay Carafano is a Heritage Foundation vice president, responsible for the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign relations.

Victoria Coates is a senior research fellow at Heritage’s Thatcher Center for Freedom.

Image: Shutterstock.

Asked at a recent event, when asked what possible plans his country had or would support for its relationship with Russia once the conflict between it and Ukraine ends, a senior member of a NATO-country parliament and political party official replied, “None at all. At least while Putin is still in charge.” That would be a serious mistake, not only because of Russia’s inherent, domestic attributes but also because of its relations with other countries, especially (but not only) with China. NATO allies, and Ukraine itself, need to find an acceptable blueprint for engaging with Russia after the war.

The palpable fury at the Kremlin by Ukraine and the NATO allies is driving their policies toward Russia. We have not seen such an intentional, deliberate, indiscriminate, barbaric assault turning entire regions and towns, hospitals, schools, nurseries, homes, and power plants into rubble and concrete graveyards since the Wehrmacht attack against Poland and the Soviet Union.

President Volodymyr Zelensky has established the unambiguous Ukrainian objective: "We will only stop when we bring our country back to the borders of 1991. We will return the Ukrainian flag to every corner of Ukraine." That understandable ambition is almost certainly beyond the grasp of the Ukrainian forces. Yet Russia is also unlikely to achieve Vladimir Putin’s goal of terminating Ukraine’s independence, decapitating its government, re-occupying all or almost all of the country, and absorbing it within a Greater Russia. It seems unlikely to even recapture all of the Donbas at this time. Short of resort to its tactical nuclear arsenal, it does not have the military resources—troops, hardware, munitions, leadership, strategy or elan—to do so. Still, neither side is (yet) willing to settle for a ceasefire in which, like World War I, the two forces are dug indefinitely into trenches running down half of the Donbas.

Zelensky has rightfully noted that 2023 is key to Ukraine’s goal. Ukrainian forces must be able within the year to turn the tide and make significant advances expelling Russian forces in the east and the south. If they cannot, the tide of the war will most probably turn against them and in favor of Russia or of a stalemate. The Ukrainian people cannot indefinitely withstand the desolation visited upon them. Their remarkable valor, endurance, and granite resistance cannot last indefinitely, nor will their own assets or the economic, political, and military support of allied countries. None of that portends a Russian victory—it means only that at least parts of the Donbas and probably most, if not all, of Crimea would remain in Russian hands, meaning that de jure borders would sooner or later adjust to the de facto realities. Ukraine’s allies will need to work with Kyiv to develop and support a realistic strategy through 2023 and, preferably, to some kind of victory acceptable to and achievable by Ukrainians.

Still, notwithstanding NATO outrage at Russian aggression and atrocities, international ostracism does not provide a judicious prescription for relations particularly for a country as large and important as Russia once the wanton carnage has ended or abated. True statecraft requires a sagacious perspective on long-term as well as immediate-term policies. Russia will not disappear, although Putin might.

If anger and hostility are to be the hallmarks of NATO-country policies toward Russia, the result would be a line of enmity from the Barents Sea, down the eastern frontiers of Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine to the Black Sea and, depending on the disposition of Turkey, possibly to the Mediterranean—in effect, a recreation of the Cold War 450 miles to the east. It would mean a border of animosity between whole civilizations, each with huge armies and economies, and with nuclear armaments capable of turning one another into a pulverized (and now also radioactive) wreckage. The celebration of the end of the last Cold War three decades ago and its replacement by a peace, however stoney and contingent, would be reversed. Surely that cannot be the only or let alone the best option.

Justifiable anger toward toward Russia cannot blind policymakers to what it really is: an expansive county with extensive human and natural resources; a federation of republics, the largest country in the world spanning eleven time zones; really, a kind of empire in its own right. Moreover, it has a long history and a commensurate sense of itself as great power in Eurasia and an imperial chronicle three centuries old. It commands very substantial armed forces, however much now depleted, and it has nuclear weapons and systems of delivery that could obliterate an adversary even if Russia itself were also devastated in the process. In addition, even if Russia could be ostracized from the West, it cannot be sequestered from the rest of the world, and although it would pay an enormous price were it to be isolated by the West, so too would the countries attempting the isolation. Finally, it cannot be in the U.S. interest to see Russia pushed into the arms of China and thus find itself confronting two colossi rolled into one challenger. Russia is not some barely inhabited Pacific atoll, and it would be both foolhardy and arrogant, even self-defeating, to try treating it as one.

By far the better strategy is, if possible, to induce Putin (or his successor) with his enervated forces and economy to negotiate a tolerable resolution, and to provide clear benefits for doing so. Among those benefits would be a return to global commerce, an end to sanctions, and—unlike the end of the Cold War—treatment as the global power that it is rather than the humiliation it felt in the 1990s. Instead of “no relationship at all,” Russia—with or without Putin—should be integrated as far as practicable into the European family not as a supplicant seeking the forbearance of its superiors. None of that requires restraint in supporting Ukraine now or restraint in responding to Russia’s barbaric aggression. It requires only that carrots, not just sticks, be available in the process and that the NATO allies keep in mind that the objective is a better status quo not a worse one.

Gerald F. (“Jerry”) Hyman has been a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies since 2007. He held several positions at USAID from 1990–2007, including director of its Office of Democracy and Governance from 2002–2007. He has published widely.

Image: Shutterstock.

While this week’s White House meeting between Colombian president Gustavo Petro and U.S. president Joe Biden saw no major announcements, the meeting itself was historic—and shows that both countries understand the importance of maintaining a close relationship in spite of policy differences.

The irony of his Washington visit was probably not lost on Petro. The Colombian leader has often commented on the way that his transition from Marxist guerrilla to mainstream politician—and his country’s first progressive president—has shaped his view of the United States. After shaking hands and exchanging gifts with CIA director William Burns in Bogota in October, Petro remarked: “A few decades ago we might have been enemies, today I’m giving him a hammock and a bag of sugar.”

This relationship has not been easy. Petro has been deeply critical of Colombia’s traditional counternarcotics approach, which has been a pillar of the U.S.-Colombia relationship over the last three decades. While coca cultivation and cocaine production numbers have reached record highs, Petro is emphasizing the need to provide economic opportunities in rural areas over conventional military-led crop eradication.

The Colombian president’s trademark domestic policy is a plan for “total peace” that includes dialogue not only with that country’s last remaining rebel army, the National Liberation Army (ELN), but also with other organized crime groups that control much of the countryside. His administration is attempting to address inequality by proposing major pension, healthcare, and labor market reforms, and has promised to better address the needs of underrepresented indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

The ambitious agenda isn’t surprising. Petro took office in August promising to lead an agenda of change to reshape Colombia’s political and economic landscape. That’s precisely what he is working for.

While there will inevitably be points of disagreement between Washington and Bogota, the historic and strategic nature of this partnership needs to be preserved. One year ago, Biden called Colombia the “linchpin” to the hemisphere. The United States needs to preserve and strengthen its linchpins. In a rapidly changing global order, and with geopolitical rivals trying to shore up their own relations in our hemisphere, it is more important than ever for the United States to deepen alliances with longstanding hemispheric allies.

It's a relationship that is far deeper than policy and economic interests. Even at the level of people-to-people diplomacy, Colombia and the United States have a special relationship. Colombians have among the most favorable views of the United States in the region.

Productive engagement with the Petro administration—both on the issues where there are disagreements and those where there is common cause (including a resolution to the Venezuela crisis and addressing climate change)—should be a top priority during and after the White House visit. Rhetoric aside, U.S. policymakers should operate under the reality that Petro understands the value of a productive relationship with Washington. He knows U.S. cooperation is essential to enact his domestic agenda.

Progress won't be easy, but it is possible for both the U.S. and Colombian administrations to chart a way forward based on shared priorities of peace, prosperity, security, and regional diplomacy. This approach—one of patient engagement that prioritizes interests over ideology—is gaining traction in Washington. On Capitol Hill this week, Senators Ben Cardin and Bill Hagerty presided as Honorary Co-Chairs over the launch of the US-Colombia Advisory Group, a high-level group of experts, policymakers, and private sector and civil society representatives.

The group aims to encourage productive bilateral engagement for this new chapter in U.S.-Colombia relations. As Colombia tries to move beyond its armed conflict and address the needs of areas hardest hit by violence, there is a clear role for the United States in supporting efforts to build state presence and rule of law across its territory. Doing so may require taking a hard look at best practices in security and drug policy cooperation.

Building a more prosperous Colombia should also present new opportunities for investment. But many investors remain concerned by the rapid pace of changes to the country’s longstanding economic model – from major overhauls to tax policy to reforms of the health and pension systems. As a free-trade partner, Colombia has an opportunity to capture new domestic and foreign investment as momentum toward nearshoring advances in our hemisphere. Moving forward, with Petro’s robust social agenda, reassurances of a healthy investment climate will be essential.

Navigating tensions will require an approach that builds on consensus. While the two administrations may differ on their views toward Venezuela, the White House has applauded Petro’s plans to hold an international conference in the coming days in support of ongoing negotiations between the opposition and Maduro government to restore the country’s democratic institutions. This kind of coordination, based on a relationship of mutual respect, could provide a foundation for future cooperation on other complex diplomatic issues.

The fact that Biden and Petro reaffirmed shared interests at the White House is a good sign. But it is essential for this affirmation of common cause to be echoed more broadly. The leadership of the U.S. Senate, including Senators Cardin and Hagerty, to advance our shared agenda goes back to the core of what has made the U.S.-Colombia partnership successful: long-term, bipartisan Congressional prioritization of our bilateral ties alongside a willing Colombian government. Coming out of Petro’s visit, the greatest accomplishment will be agreement on a route forward to ensure that our partnership can adapt to the new reality of the relationship while ensuring that core U.S. strategic interests remain at the top of that agenda.

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak) is Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center/

Geoff Ramsey (@gramsey_latam) is the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Senior Fellow for Colombia and Venezuela.

The Center launched its new US-Colombia Advisory Group on April 18.

Image: Dmitrij Plehanov/Shutterstock.

The long-term energy crisis provoked by the war in Ukraine has been economically destructive to the entire world—Europe faces the prospect of deindustrialization, coal factories have been turned back on, countries in the Global South have been priced out of liquified natural gas markets, and so on. Yet demand for energy is expected to keep growing. Higher energy prices reverberate throughout the entire economy, and arguably where oil prices go, there go prices for everything since over 6,000 daily products emanate from petroleum derivatives.

Given this situation, one thing is very clear: only nuclear power is carbon-free and able to meet growing U.S. calls for electrification and global needs for basic economic growth. Nuclear power works to alleviate the dependence on oil and gas, since it is abundant, energy dense, and can be a tool against Middle East geopolitical mechanisms used against whatever U.S. president is in office.

America is Investing in Nuclear

Washington is cognizant of this necessity. In April 2022, two senators introduced the International Nuclear Energy Act of 2022 to enable a “whole-of-government” strategy for U.S. global leadership in civil nuclear technologies, including advanced nuclear technology (ANT). Nuclear power is now at the forefront of safe, reliable, emission-free ways to produce electricity and thermal heat. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, approximately 70 small modular reactors (SMRs) concepts are currently under research and development.

Globally, there are roughly nine different types of SMR designs. These are fluid projections since new Generation IV (Gen IV) technologies are rapidly changing. For the United States, companies such as NuScale Power’s VOYGR SMR design to Kairos Power’s Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactor; and Westinghouse’s eVinci Heat pipe-cooled microreactor are leading the way for ANT.

Gen IV reactors and SMRs offer financial benefits and improvements from Generation III-III+ reactors with their ability to produce electricity at a lower operational cost over the life of the power plant. Moreover, SMRs offer lower initial capital investment, greater scalability, and sitting flexibility for locations unable or unwilling to accommodate larger light water reactor power plants. The potential for enhanced safety and security compared to previous designs makes advanced reactors desirable moving forward. This drives economic growth and high-paying professions in the nuclear industry.

Alternatives to Nuclear Aren’t Enough

Unfortunately, nuclear power has been demonized, and many believe it should be fought against at all costs. Nothing could be further from the truth. Approximately 200 people have died of radiation from nuclear accidents in over sixty years. These numbers are inclusive of accidents at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima. Counting cancer diagnoses among people exposed to radiation from these accidents, the harm from a nuclear power plant compared to the effects of coal pollution or methane emissions from natural-gas-fired power plants is definitive proof why nuclear power is the best choice for energy and electricity when all factors are considered.

Speaking of coal, the recent dramatic increase in coal use numbers more than echo the call for greater nuclear power. Despite global promises, 2022 witnessed “the coal fleet grow by 19.5 gigawatts, enough to light up around 15 million homes.” New coal plants were predominantly added in China and India, then Indonesia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. If nuclear power were deployed instead of coal, global emissions would have declined instead of growth in the United States and abroad.

But what about the counter-argument of using renewables? The wind and the sun are always free, and no matter what OPEC, the international oil cartel, conjures up the change in energy prices can be countered with natural resources.

If only that were true. Renewables use enormous amounts of materials compared to nuclear and fossil fuels. It is a misnomer to say renewables are carbon-free compared to nuclear power. Whereas nuclear power accounts for all materials through the decommissioning phase—and surprisingly, 90 percent of all materials from a nuclear power plant can be recycled—compared to old wind and solar platforms, which generate millions of tons of waste. The International Renewable Energy Agency calculates that old solar panel disposal to meet 2050 Paris Accords “will more than double the tonnage of all of today’s global plastic waste.”

Of course, nuclear power plants themselves require enormous amounts of steel, rebar, concrete, wiring, plastics, and other materials. But a nuclear power plant reliably performs and isn’t intermittent, unreliable, or variable. As an example, a typical wind turbine demands “900 tons of steel, 2,500 tons of concrete and 45 tons of nonrecyclable plastic” to function. Solar power requires even more metals, cement, steel, and glass. Renewables have their uses in non-grid applications, some microgrids, and remote applications, but to build enough wind turbines and solar panels to supply at least half the electricity needed for global consumption “would require two billions tons of coal to produce the concrete and steel, along with two billion barrels of oil to make the composite blades. [And] more than 90% of the world’s solar panels are built in Asia on coal-heavy electrical grids.”

Nuclear power plants do not run into heavy fossil fuel conditions nor do they need to be replaced within a mere ten to twenty years the way industrial solar and wind farms need replacement under current technology. A nuclear power plant does not warrant nearly the amount of land renewables confiscate, and this is where the greatest advantage lies. True, coal-fired and natural-gas-fired power plants also do not require significant amounts of land. But it is the land-use issue that is crucial for why nuclear power can solve global and environmental energy woes. Nuclear will play a leading role in mitigating the effects of high land-usage renewables on the grid, and growing populations in India, Africa, and Asia gaining carbon-free electricity according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Nuclear’s Time Has Come

The United States’ nuclear industry has had a tough stretch, but the biggest obstacle to advanced reactor progress, lower emissions, and geopolitical stability is the modern environmental movement. What once was meant for good has taken on the stench of Malthusianism. Nuclear can also solve that woe.

Todd Royal is the Senior Project Analyst for E4 Carolinas, a non-profit energy advocacy firm located in Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is working on a three-year grant for the U.S. Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration focusing on a value chain study for the advanced nuclear technology sector (Generation IV reactors, SMRs, and advanced reactors). Todd lives outside of Dallas, Texas.